ASAA Women in Asia Series

FACE-VEILED WOMEN IN CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA

Eva F. Nisa

ROUTLEDGE

THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Face-veiled Women in Contemporary Indonesia

Face veiling is relatively new in Indonesia. It is often stereotyped as a sign of extremism and the growing Arabisation of Indonesian Muslims. It is also perceived as a symbol that demonstrates a lack of female agency. However, increasing numbers of women are choosing to wear the *cadar* (the full face veil). This book provides an ethnographic study of these women: why they choose to wear the *cadar*, embody strict religious disciplinary practices and the consequences of that choice. The women in this book belong to two Islamic revivalist movements: various Salafi groups and the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. Indonesia has constantly witnessed transformations in the meanings and practices of Islam, and this book demonstrates that women are key actors in this process. Nisa demonstrates that contrary to stereotypes, the women in this study have an agency which is expressed through their chosen docility and obedience.

Eva F. Nisa is a Senior Lecturer in Anthropology in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. She currently holds an Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Researcher Award.

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Face-veiled Women in Contemporary Indonesia

Eva F. Nisa

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For Fedwa,

my mother Ustādha Hj Uun Maimunah and late father H Amrullah, with love and gratitude

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Series Editor's Foreword

The contributions of women to the social, political and economic transformations occurring in the Asian region are legion. Women have served as leaders of nations, communities, workplaces, activist groups and families. Asian women have joined with others to participate in fomenting change at micro- and macro-levels. They have been both agents and targets of national and international interventions in social policy. In the performance of these myriad roles, women have forged new and modern gendered identities that are recognisably global and local. Their experiences are rich, diverse and instructive. The books in this series testify to the central role women play in creating the new Asia and re-creating Asian womanhood. Moreover, these books reveal the resilience and inventiveness of women around the Asian region in the face of entrenched and evolving patriarchal social norms.

Scholars publishing in this series demonstrate a commitment to promoting the productive conversation between Gender Studies and Asian Studies. The need to understand the diversity of experiences of femininity and womanhood around the world increases inexorably as globalisation proceeds apace. Lessons from the experiences of Asian women present us with fresh opportunities for building new possibilities for women's progress the world over.

The Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) sponsors this publication series as part of its ongoing commitment to promoting knowledge about women in Asia. In particular, the ASAA Women's Forum provides the intellectual vigour and enthusiasm that maintains the Women in Asia Series (WIAS). The aim of the series, since its inception in 1990, is to promote knowledge about women in Asia to both academic and general audiences. To this end, WIAS books draw on a wide range of disciplines including anthropology, sociology, political science, cultural studies, media studies, literature and history. The series prides itself on being an outlet for cutting-edge research conducted by recent PhD graduates and postdoctoral fellows from throughout the region.

The Series could not function without the generous professional advice provided by many anonymous readers. Moreover, the wise counsel provided by Peter Sowden at Routledge is invaluable. WIAS, its authors and the ASAA are very grateful to these people for their expert work.

Louise Edwards (UNSW Australia)
Series Editor

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Glossary

***ʿabāya,* or *abaya* (Ind.)** head-to-toe wrap completely covering a woman's body.
***akhwāt* (sing. *ukht*), or *akhwat* (Ind.)** lit. sisters.
al-akhlāq al-karīma noble behaviour.
al-ḥayā' shyness, shame or modesty
al-Jāmiʿa al-Islāmiyya bī-l-Madīna al-Munawwara Islamic University in Medina.
al-Lajna al-Dā'ima lī al-Buhūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa al-Iftā' The Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Nonbinding Religious Ruling.
al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ pious ancestors or predecessors. There is no consensus among Sunni Muslims on the coverage of who the pious predecessors are. However, most scholars include the first generation of the Prophet Muḥammad, and others would stretch to include the three generations after the Prophet: the first, the Prophet and his *ṣahāba* (companions); the second, the *tābiʿīn* (the followers of the companions); and third, the *tābiʿu al-tābiʿīn* (the followers of the followers of the companions).
al-walā' wa-l-barā' loyalty or fidelity to Islam and Muslims, dissociation from all things non-Islamic and renunciation of unbelievers.
***asātidh* (sing. *ustādh*)** male religious teachers.
ʿawra part of the body that must be covered with the connotation of vulnerable.
baju koko one of the most common styles of Muslim dress for men in Indonesia.
baju kurung a long-sleeved loose tunic usually worn over a *sarung* (*sarong*).
berguk* or *bergoek a loan word from *burqa.* The use of this term to refer to face veil can be traced from its presence in the official dictionary of the Indonesian language, *Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia* (KBBI, The great dictionary of the Indonesian language).
bidʿa innovation, usually used to refer to that is forbidden in religion.
burqa face veil. It has been deeply rooted in Afghan culture and predates the rise of the Taliban.
burquʿ face veil.
busana Muslim/Muslimah varied types of dress worn by Muslims which the wearers themselves believe is part of their religious teaching.
cadar face veil. In KBBI, *cadar* also refers to a cloth that covers a table and bed. The origin of this word can be traced to the Persian *chādar* referring to

a tent, pavilion, a mantle, scarf or a veil. *Cadar* should not be confused with the term *chadar/chaddar/chādar* in Hindi and Urdu which usually refers to an enormous shawl or wrap that is also used to cover parts of women's faces and their bodies except their eyes.

cadari face-veiled women. *Cadari* or *perempuan bercadar* refers to a woman who wears two pieces of cloth; the big headscarf and detachable *cadar*. It can also be a one piece of cloth if the big headscarf is stitched together with the *cadar.* The headscarf that accompanies the *cadar* can be regarded as a quick cover-up because it does not need any pins to wear it. The two pieces that cover the entire upper body of *cadari* pair with a *gamis* or *jubah* (robe) that covers the whole body.

celebgram celebrities on Instagram.

chador a large rectangular cloth that is worn on top of women's clothes. The Iranian *cadhor* (lit. tent) is a large cloth worn since the fifth century CE on top of women's clothes and covers the entire wearer's body.

dāʿi male preacher or male religious scholar.

***dāʿiya* (pl. *dāʿiyāt*)** female preacher or female religious scholar.

daʿwa proselytisation.

***dawrah, dawra* (Ar.)** (religious) training.

dhikr lit. means remembrance of God, consisting of a litany formula.

faḍā'il Islamic virtues.

Faḍā'il al-Aʿmāl virtues of everyday actions.

farḍ al-ʿayn obligatory for each individual Muslim which cannot be replaced by a certain number of Muslims performing it.

Fatayat or Fatayat NU the young women's wing of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).

***fatwa, fatwā* (Ar.) (pl. *fatāwā*)** nonbinding religious ruling or opinion from religious scholar/s on questions related to Islam and Muslims.

***fikih,* or *fiqh* (Ar.)** Islamic jurisprudence.

fitna infatuation, riot, trial, scandal and disgrace. In the context of the link between the outward appearance of women and *fitna,* it means that improper female dressing can provoke sexual temptation which threatens order and stability.

gamis a long, full-body covering.

garis taqwa a specific term used by the Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Indonesia. According to them, *garis taqwa* refers to Islamic teachings written in religious texts (al-Qurʾān and *ḥadīth*) that must be obeyed strictly as they are, without any further interpretations.

***ḥadīth* (pl. *aḥādīth*)** the narration of words, deeds or approvals of the Prophet Muḥammad.

ḥaḍramī a person whose ancestry can be traced to Ḥaḍramawt in Yemen.

***ḥabīb* (pl. *ḥabā'ib*)** lit. 'beloved.' It refers to a descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad.

***ḥajj, haji* (Ind.)** pilgrimage.

***halal, ḥalāl* (Ar.)** permissible.

halaqah study circle or religious meeting.

***haram, ḥarām* (Ar.)** impermissible.

***hidāya, hidayah* (Ind.)** guidance from God.

***hijab, ḥijāb* (Ar.)** lit. means 'curtain,' 'partition' or screen.' It is also used to refer to a woman's headscarf.

***hijrah, hijra* (Ar.)** lit. means emigration. It refers to religious transformation to be better Muslims.

***ʿibāda* (pl. *ʿibādāt*), *ibadah* (Ind.)** act of devotion, religious observance, religious rituals and duties.

ʿiffa purity, chastity, virtue.

ikhtilāṭ the mixing of the sexes.

***īmān, iman* (Ind.)** faith.

instant jilbab sometimes known as instant *kerudung* (*kerudung instan*). It is an already shaped headpiece with elastic that can be directly put on without the need for pins.

***isbal, isbāl* (Ar.)** wearing trousers below the ankles. Non-*isbal* trousers are also known as *celana cingkrang* or *celana ngatung.*

Islamism a political or social movement emphasising that Islam covers guidance to all areas of life including private or individual and public or social (politics).

istiqāma committed or being consistent.

jāhiliyya the times or condition of ignorance. It is often used to designate the pre-Islamic period.

***jama'ah/jamaah/jemaah, jamāʿat* (Ar.)** congregation.

***jihad, jihād* (Ar.)** struggle or religious war. Therefore, the struggle is both against weaknesses in oneself (*jihad al-nafs*/self-improvement) or in the larger society (lesser *jihad*/religious war).

jilbab tight veil.

jodoh a marriage partner.

jubah/jubbah an ankle-length garment. This term in Indonesia is used to denote both men and women's outfits. Women's *jubah,* however, usually refers to a head-to-toe wrap.

kafā'a the criteria for equality between spouses.

***kaffah, kaffa* (Ar.)** total.

kain unstitched length of fabric wrapped around the lower half of the wearer's body.

kajian Islamic study lesson.

kampung village.

kebaya bodice cut to follow the contours of the body.

keluarga sakinah harmonious family.

kerudung loose veil.

kesadaran awareness, *menyadari* means becoming aware.

ketaatan obedience.

khalwat being alone with a male stranger or illicit close proximity between genders.

khimār veil that covers the head and extends over the torso.

khitba the proposal of marriage.

***khurūj, khuruj* (Ind.)** for Tablīghī, *khurūj* refers to going out of one's own neighbourhood to proselytise. Among some Salafi groups, *khurūj* can refer to rebellion against a legitimate ruler.

kitab kuning yellow books refer to the classical Arabic texts.

kyai head of the *pesantren* or classically educated Muslim scholar.

ladang pahala field of reward.

liḥya (long) beards.

***ma'had, maʿhad* (Ar.)** boarding school. In Indonesia, some *pesantren* prefer to use the term *ma'had* rather than *pesantren* or *pondok.*

maʿṣiya disobedience to God, including an immoral act.

***madhhab* (pl. *madhāhib*)** school of Islamic law.

maḥram non-marriageable male kin. It refers to members of one's close relatives with whom marriage would be considered *haram* (impermissible) or a state of consanguinity precluding marriage.

majelis taklim a council or a meeting place for learning Islam of Islamic study group. It is also spelled *majelis ta'lim, majlis taklim* and *majlis ta'lim.*

makrūh reprehensible or not recommended.

malu shy, shame or embarrassment.

manhaj lit. a methodology that refers to the way of life of the early Muslims. It also refers to guidance and path in religious life.

***marhalah, marḥala* (Ar.)** levels of apprenticeship.

al-maṣlaḥa al-ʿāmma common good.

***mastura, mastūra* (Ar.)** lit. means something being covered. Among Tablīghīs, *mastura* is generally a term referring to a woman. Some Tablīghī use it to refer only to a woman who has performed *khurūj.*

mastura taʿlīm religious study group for women within Tablīghī Jamāʿat.

mathnahan co-wife.

mudarris male religious teacher.

***mudarrisa* (pl. *mudarrisāt*)** female religious teacher.

mufti *fatwā* givers.

***muhadarah, muḥāḍara* (Ar.)** religious lectures.

muḥaddith al-ʿaṣr the traditionalist of the era.

Muhammadiyah an Indonesian modernist Islamic organisation.

***mujāhid, mujahid* (Ind.)** a man who performs *jihad.*

***muslimah, muslima* (Ar.) (pl. *muslimāt*)** a Muslim woman.

mustaḥab also known as *faḍīla,* favoured.

murabbiyah mentor.

mutarabbiyah disciple.

muṭīʿa a woman who is *ṭāʿa* (obedient).

***nadwah, nadwa* (Ar.)** seminar.

naẓar a meeting between a prospective bride and bridegroom to see each other's faces.

ngaji to learn about Islam, including learn how to read the Qurʾān.

***niqab, niqāb* (Ar.)** face veil.

niṣāb Tablīghī use it to refer to a time limit or a permanent demand for men (and women) to perform *khurūj.*

nuṣra local help or visiting a group of women who perform *khurūj.*

pengajian religious study circle or group.

pesantren Islamic boarding school, also known as *pondok* or *ma'had.*

purdah/purda/parda a veil, curtain, tapestry. In Indonesia, it is used to refer to a face veil that not only covers the face but also the eyes of the wearer with a transparent, thin cloth. It also has its roots in the Persian term, *parda.*

qadarullāh God has decided.

qasidah a type of Indonesian music which originates from an ancient Arabic word *qaṣīda* referring to religious poetry accompanied by chanting and percussion.

rukhṣa dispensation for leaving Islamic practices or an exception given by Sharīʿa to Muslims in specific circumstances to remove hardship.

***sabar, ṣabr* (Ar.)** patience.

***saleh, ṣāliḥ* (Ar.)** pious or a pious man. *Kesalehan* means piety.

***salihah, ṣāliḥa* (Ar.)** a pious woman. *Anak salihah* means a pious daughter.

ṣalāwāt sending blessings to the Prophet.

santriwati female students in *pesantren.*

santun politeness.

***sarung* (Ind.)** sarong. A stitched tubular garment which is often wrapped around the waist.

sharaf honour.

sharīʿa lit. the way of referring to the totality of God's will. It is often used to refer to Islamic law and the rituals Muslims practise every day.

***sharīfāt* (sing. *sharīfa*)** female descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad.

***shuyūkh* (sing. *shaykh*)** distinguished Muslim experts.

sorban turban or headwear worn by men.

subḥānallāh lit. God is pure from all faults/all glory be to God.

sufi one who practises Islamic mysticism. Sufism refers to Islamic mysticism.

sunna the exemplary ways of life of the Prophet Muḥammad deducted from *aḥādīth.*

sunna (in Islamic jurisprudence) favoured, recommended or virtuous action.

***taat,* or *ṭāʿa* (pl. *ṭāʿāt*) (Ar.)** obedient.

***ta'aruf, taʿāruf* (Ar.)** getting to know each other before marriage without having pre-marital relations or a passionate courtship.

taʿlīm religious study circle.

tabarruj illicit display or displaying one's beauty.

tābiʿīn followers of the Prophet's companions.

tablīgh synonymous with *daʿwa* which refers to spreading the call to Islam.

tajwīd rules and the art of Qurʾānic recitation.

taqlīd imitation of past interpretations of religious texts, particularly used in the discussion of choosing *madhhab.*

***taqwa* or *takwa, taqwā* (Ar.)** God-fearing.

***tarbiyah, tarbiya* (Ar.)** religious training.

tarekat lit. road or way. In mysticism it refers to a Sufi order.

taşfiyya purification.

***tawḥīd, tawhid* (Ind.)** doctrine that does not allow any associates of God; monotheism.

***ʿulamāʾ* (sing. *ʿālim*), *ulama* (Ind.)** religious scholars or learned men and women in religious knowledge.

***ʿumra, umrah* (Ind.)** minor pilgrimage.

***ustādh* (pl. *asātidh*), *ustaz* (Ind.)** male religious teacher.

***ustādha* (pl. *ustādhāt*), *ustazah* (Ind.)** female religious teacher.

wājib compulsory.

***zina, zināʾ* (Ar.)** adultery or fornication.

Abbreviations

DDII	Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation)
DI	Darul Islam (Abode of Islam)
FKKA	Forum Kegiatan Kemuslimahan Al-Atsari (The Forum of Al-Atsari Muslim Women's Activities)
FLP	Forum Lingkar Pena (The Pen Circle Forum)
HTI	Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (Indonesian Liberation Party)
ICBB	Islamic Centre Bin Baz
IMM	Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (League of Muhammadiyah Students)
JI	Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community)
KPPSI	Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syari'at Islam (Committee for the Preparation of Formalisation of Sharīʿa)
LBIA	Lembaga Bimbingan Islam Al-Atsary (the Institution of Al-Atsary Islamic Guidance)
LM	Lembaga Muslimah (Women's Institution)
LIPIA	Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic)
MUI	Majelis Ulama Indonesia (The Council of Indonesian ʿUlamāʾ)
NGO	Non-government organisation
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (The Revival of ʿUlamāʾ)
PK	Partai Keadilan (Justice Party)
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)
PM	Pemuda Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Youth Activists)
PP	Pondok Pesantren (Islamic Boarding School)
SMAIT	Sekolah Menengah Atas Islam Terpadu (Integrated Islamic Senior High School)
UGM	Universitas Gadjah Mada (Gadjah Mada University)
UIN	Universitas Islam Negeri (State Islamic University)
UNY	Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta State University)
WI	Wahdah Islamiyah (The Unity of Islam)
YPIA	Yayasan Pendidikan Islam Al-Atsari (The foundation of Al-Atsari Islamic Education)

Transcription notes

I use the *Macquarie Dictionary* as the spelling reference, unless it is part of a quote. I translate Indonesian and Arabic text except in a few cases where the words appear frequently, such as *cadar* and *daʿwa.* For the words and phrases that appear in Arabic, I have followed Brill transliteration style. All foreign languages (Arabic, Indonesian, Persian and Hindi) are italicised, unless they are proper names, therefore *pesantren* but Pesantren Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah.

The Indonesian spelling of Arabic words is used, especially where it is known and used by research subjects in this study, such as *Muslimah* (sing. and pl. Muslim women) instead of *Muslima* (sing.) or *Muslimāt* (pl.). However, when there are options of spellings for Arabic terms—Indonesian and Arabic spellings (with Arabic transliteration)—I use the spellings that refer to the way the principal subjects of this study pronounced the words, such as *ʿabāya* (Ar.) instead of *abaya* (Ind.) and *hijab* (Ind.), instead of *ḥijāb* (Ar.).

All the names of the informants have been changed to preserve confidentiality, except where they wish to be mentioned and for well-known figures. The titles that accompany the people's names are not italicised, such as Ukht, Umm, Ummu, Shaykh, Ustādh, Ustādha, Bunda, Abuya and Kyai. Indonesian names are repeated using the most known name. Therefore, Ustādh Abdul Najib Al-Ayyuby will be repeated as Ustādh Najib instead of Al-Ayyuby.

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Introduction

Islam in Indonesia is often labelled as having a 'smiling face' with moderate characteristics, yet has repeatedly demonstrated an unfriendly face to the presence of face-veiled women (*cadari*). Battling against radicalism and conservatism, the country has not been friendly towards the *cadar* (an Indonesian term for the face veil) and *cadari,* who hold strict literalist understandings of Islam and are stereotyped as subjugated and powerless.

This book was driven by the quest to understand how *cadari* experience the practice of covering their bodies, especially their faces, in the light of the dominant view in popular discourse that deems them to be subservient to and oppressed by their male relatives and Muslim community leaders. A similar view circulates in mainstream media, alternative online posts and scholarly literature. The dominant view is that full-face veiling indicates a lack of women's agency while it signals their subordination and oppression under the patriarchal reign of Islam (Ali 2011; Cromer 1908). Veiled Muslim women are often seen as cyphers, indexing stark opposition to their Western counterparts. Evelyn Baring (later the Earl of Cromer), former British Controller-General and Consul-General in Egypt, for example, highlights the binary oppositions between a veiled Muslim woman living 'a life of seclusion' and the visibility of the face of the European woman in public (1908, 155). Such binary oppositions rely on an essentialism that is familiar to us from the orientalist discourse identified by Edward Said (1995) and as such is not unique to Baring; indeed, it continues to be echoed in contemporary times.

Some popular discourses have retained negative stereotypes of Muslim women wearing diverse forms of covering—ranging from head coverings and certain types of modest dress deemed to be Sharīʿa-compliant[1] to full coverings of the body and face, as in this study—including the notion that they are backward, oppressed and disempowered (Ahmed 1992, 152). Although in some Western contexts today, the veil or headscarf issue has become part of the wider debate about multiculturalism and Western ideals, such as secularism, democracy and liberalism (Scott 2007), there has been a reduction of prejudice against Muslim women covering their heads in some Muslim minority and Western countries. This can be seen from the growing presence and acceptance of Muslim women wearing headscarves. The stereotypes against face-covered women, however,

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remain the centre of attention not only in Western countries but also within Muslim majority countries.

Similar stereotypes circulate in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world. This is primarily due to aspects attached to the *cadar* which do not sit comfortably with Indonesian moderate Islam and the often-mentioned characteristic of friendly Islam or Islam with a smiling face. Negative stereotypes of *cadari* have worsened since the late Suharto years and the fall of the authoritarian New Order regime in 1998, when the country battled to fight against radicalism. Unfortunately, in the public mind, prejudice about *cadari* is often linked to various radical movements associated with terrorism. The reproduction of visual images of face-veiled women by national and international media outlets when reporting the trials of terrorist suspects has been prominent.

The stereotype was further cemented by the involvement of a *cadari* called Putri Munawaroh who was active in protecting wanted terrorists in 2009. Besides Munawaroh, the presence of several wives at the trials of terrorists or suspected terrorists who wear the *cadar* has also justified the government's surveillance of *cadari.* In 2016, the prejudice against *cadari* and their perceived relationship with terrorist cells was intensified, particularly due to the emergence of *cadari* in terrorist acts in Indonesia. The latest controversy surrounding the *cadar* occurred in 2019 and was related to a statement by the then newly appointed Minister of Religious Affairs, General Fachrul Razi, who was a retired army general. In an attempt to fight growing radicalism, President Jokowi, re-elected for a second term, appointed Fachrul Razi. In relation to this, Fachrul Razi issued a controversial statement regarding the discourse and recommendation of banning civil servants from wearing the *cadar* and *celana cingkrang* or non-*isbal* (Ar. *isbāl*) trousers (above ankle-length trousers worn mostly by conservative men) within government compounds.

Facing growing radicalism in the country and the rise of radical political Islam, domestic pressures led the government to expel any signs of extremism. The government, through police officers, stigmatised face-veil wearers and determined that there were links between terrorism and wearing a *cadar* for women or wearing Muslim dress for men—including non-*isbal* trousers and having long beards. Following this development, a number of incidents occurred where both the police and wider society mistakenly accused Muslim men and women who were wearing clothing which 'resembled' terrorist dress (*Kompas* 23 August 2009). These stereotypes have led face-veil wearers to be categorised by many Indonesians as agents who pose a threat to social and national security.

What my research has found is that most of the face-veiled women experience the practice of face veiling, not as a type of subordination or as part of terrorist group affiliation, but as part of what they perceive to be an Islamic lifestyle and within their understanding of what it means to be a true Muslim woman. Contrary to popular opinion in Indonesia and elsewhere, many women who adopt the *cadar* do so of their own volition and take pleasure in disciplining themselves. This book deals with the disjunction between the sensibilities of the women who are my research subjects and the views of people outside their social milieu.

The main objectives of the study are to understand the life experience of face-veiled women. As a relational concept, face veiling plays an important role in the construction of subjectivity. It is, therefore, a doing and a becoming activity. An individual becomes a subject through his or her experience of the world. Therefore, subjectivity is continually being constructed through everyday experiences. This can be seen from the way anthropologists have long discussed the lived subjectivity of their research subjects by emphasising the fluidity, inconsistency and temporality of subjecthood, and the intersections between personal subjectivities and social and cultural formations (Ewing 1990, 251; Moore 2007, 44; Ortner 2005, 31). By listening to the voices and perspectives of my research subjects, this book analyses how these women articulate their religious observance and their everyday life. Following Pnina Werbner, the everyday here refers to 'a constantly changing way of being in the world' (2018, 80). It is also a lens through which we can better understand how the face-veiled women in this study feel about the Indonesian majority that does not necessarily share their views. My aim is to expand understandings of how the practice and embodiment of Islam in Indonesia continue to shift over time, and how women are key actors in this process. Finally, this book seeks to reveal how the wearers of the *cadar* are important figures in the continuous process of remaking Indonesian Islam.

This book tries to make sense of the significance of being true *Muslimah* (Ar. pl. *Muslimāt* or Muslim women) and being part of a religious group in the life of face-veiled women.[2] This is done by not only focusing on their religious activities but also on their daily life experiences, passions and emotions. The research focuses on Muslim women with a very particular conception of what being a true *Muslimah* entails in terms of embodied comportment and commitment. This study does not limit me to solely focus on the ritual spheres of these women, I also explore the social fields within their lives. It covers their everyday lives outside their ritual spheres.

While I try to uncover what lies behind the face veil, as it were, I am also cautious not to romanticise the Muslim women involved in this study, many of whom face multiple challenges in their lives. Rather, the book seeks to present the everyday lives of these women, with all their complexities. As such their passions, needs and fears are entwined with their ability to negotiate with their 'heavenly' aspirations, to be true *Muslimah* blessed by God (*yang Allah ridai*). Unsurprisingly perhaps, throughout the book, we witness the anxiety experienced by some women in their struggles to express themselves in less religious tones. This can be seen when some try to reconcile their interests in mundane aspects of life, like fashion design and their religious sensibilities. Carla Jones captures this dilemma in her writing on veiling in Indonesia. She observes, 'Fashionably pious women in Indonesia have become figures of concern, suspected of being more invested in the material and hence superficial world than their virtuous appearances suggest' (2010, 617). Jones's argument also reflects the opinion of some face-veiled women who are opposed to the temptation to become fashionable. They view 'fashionable' women as overly invested in their appearance, which, for them, contradicts the 'true' essence of wearing the face veil.

This book focuses particularly on face-veiled women who belong to two Islamic revivalist movements, Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafism, that try to revive the role of religion in one's life and society and reaffirm Islamic heritage and ethos. The women's degrees of attachment to the two movements are varied, as can be seen throughout the discussions in this book. While women who belong to these conservative movements are relatively far from mainstream Islam in Indonesia, they do offer key insights into debates around what constitutes Islam and piety. Throughout this book, the expressions of Muslimness from face-veiled women belonging to Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafism emphasise that there is no single way of being a good Muslim woman. This aligns with the notion that Islam is not monolithic. At the level of *ʿaqīda* (essentials of the faith), Muslims have the same beliefs.

Contextualising Islamic revivalist movements in Indonesia

As the world's largest Muslim majority country, Islam in Indonesia, which is adhered to by more than 86 per cent of more than 276 million inhabitants, is often regarded as a 'friendly' form of Islam: Islam with a smiling face (van Bruinessen 2011). The 'smiling face' can be seen in its characteristics: moderate, tolerant, accommodative and able to maintain harmonious relations with non-Muslim minorities; and its rejection of an Islamic state (Azra 2006; van Bruinessen 2011). This feature of Islam is significantly different to that of Islam in the Middle East, which is considered to be more rigid. This 'benign' or friendly form of Islam is adhered to by Indonesian mainstream Muslims who are mostly affiliated with the two biggest mass organisations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. NU is commonly categorised as 'traditionalist'—that is, it emphasises the importance of following venerated *ʿulamāʾ* (religious scholars) in practising Islam. NU has long been known as more tolerant of cultural expressions of Islam. By contrast, Muhammadiyah is seen as 'modernist' or 'reformist'; that is, it calls for purifying Islam and thus tends to be more scripturalist than NU. However, throughout their development, both organisations accommodate a range of views within their camps.

Since the end of the New Order (1966–98), some scholars have questioned the 'smiling face' view of Islam (van Bruinessen 2011; 2013). This is in large part due to the upsurge in inter-religious conflicts, such as those between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas in 1999; the violence against ethnic minorities and other violent activities, as in the case of the attacks against Ahmadiyyah that have occurred since the 2000s. In addition, there has been an evident increasing religio-political polarisation between the pluralist camp and certain Islamist groups, especially since 2014, including the 2014 and 2019 presidential election campaigns (Mietzner 2020, 235). The conservative interpretations of Islam from some mainstream Islamic quarters have also reached new heights.[3] This is evidenced in the controversial *fatwa* (Ar. *fatwā* or non-binding religious ruling or opinion from religious scholar/s) released by Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, The Council of Indonesian ʿUlamāʾ) in 2005 opposing

religious pluralism, liberalism and secularism. The anti-Ahok Islamist mobilisations in 2016 and 2017 are also a manifestation of growing Islamist activism in the country (Warburton and Aspinall 2019, 259). Together these phenomena signal a conservative turn that is at odds with what many view as the friendly face of Indonesian Islam.

It comes as no surprise that the country has continuously witnessed a gradual increase in devoutness among everyday Muslims. Although the number of Indonesian Muslims who join revivalist and conservative movements is small, there is a climate of growing pietism in Indonesia which cannot simply be understood as leading to a growing radicalisation in the country. This is illustrated from the increasing trend of *hijrah* (religious transformation to be better Muslims), especially among young people trying to return to their religion (Nisa 2019, 445; 2021, 234). We see an increasing number of Muslim women wearing the veil and adopting the latest trends in Muslim fashion; or young Muslims who perform *ʿumra* (a lesser or minor pilgrimage), *ḥajj* (pilgrimage) and attend Islamic study groups. These phenomena should be understood as an increase in the varieties of expressions of Muslimness or Indonesian 'Muslim publics,' to borrow Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman's term (2004, xi), rather than a growing radicalisation.

Martin van Bruinessen lists the various terms used to denote the currents of Islam in Indonesia, such as 'liberal,' 'progressive' or 'emancipatory Islam,' 'conservative,' 'fundamentalist' and 'Islamist' (2011, 6–7). There is contestation and tension between followers of these various factions. During my research with university students, severe tension can be seen among followers of groups from diverse currents, especially the Jama'ah Tarbiyah,[4] Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI, the Indonesian Party of Liberation)[5] and Salafi groups.

Two movements, Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafism, are the main niches for *cadari* and form small but visible segments of the Islamic revivalist movement (see Figure I.1). Some new understandings of Islamic teachings, which are significantly different to the model of Islam rooted in Indonesian history, have been promoted by these two movements. Although the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi movements are very different, they share some quintessential characteristics. They can both be regarded as purist or revivalist movements,[6] since they strive to 'purify' Islam through an emphasis on returning to its pristine form as practised by the Prophet and his companions. Both movements endeavour to emulate *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* (the pious predecessors). It is noteworthy that the effort to purify Islam is not new in the Indonesian context. This, for instance, can be seen from the nineteenth-century Padri movement in West Sumatra. Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi movements emphasise the same fundamental elements of belief, namely *tawḥīd* (the doctrine of the unification or indivisible oneness of God). One of the main essential differences of Salafism compared to Tablīghī Jamāʿat is that of intolerance (Esposito 2010, 77). Tablīghī Jamāʿat emphasises tolerance and rejects the use of violence. The tension between these movements is evidenced in some publications made by diverse Salafi *ʿulamāʾ* (Abdat 2007; ʿAbdullāh 1997).

Figure I.1 *Cadari* in their black *cadar* at a Tablīghī *pesantren* in Tangerang. Source. Courtesy of © Mala Hayati, 23 June 2008. Used with permission. (Note: Mala Hayati is a professional photographer who had a special exhibition about veil culture in Indonesia featuring images of face-veiled students from my field site. I helped Mala with this veil project and, with the permission of my research subjects, invited her to the field site.)

Who are the *cadari?*

In contemporary Indonesia the practice of wearing the *cadar* is confined to women (see Figure I.2), although there are occasions when men also cover their faces. For example, in public demonstrations or in particular workplaces, a few men may cover their faces with a turban or *sorban* (Ind. headwear worn by men) (see Rasmussen's study on Tuareg men 2003). Apart from being used occasionally by men, the *cadar* is not used by women of other religions in Indonesia. In contrast, in some parts of India, Hindu women also wear a face veil (Papanek 1973, 302).

The main subjects of this book are face-veiled women who are university students and graduates, including *cadari* mostly in their forties and fifties, or students at *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools). The first group (university students and graduates) were ardent wearers and staunch cadres within their movements. The women who began to wear the *cadar* at university generally were committed to having the *cadar* form part of their self-transformation. Throughout this book, I use the term 'passionate *cadari*' for women who wear the *cadar* of their own volition. This term distinguishes them from my other principal research subjects, school-aged girls in *pesantren* where the *cadar* is the norm. The total number of participants in this study was 179 *cadari* and non-*cadari,* including men within and outside the *cadari* communities. While wearing of the *cadar* is a growing phenomenon in Indonesia, it is not possible to estimate its frequency of use. The Salafi and Tablīghī Jamāʿat movements do not keep official records of their followers.

Figure I.2 Romaini at a special photoshoot with a friend. Source. Photographed by Romaini's friend, Jakarta, 2 April 2008. Used with permission.

Ways of being face-veiled Muslim women in Indonesia

Diverse theoretical concepts are brought together in this study to analyse ways of being Muslim in Indonesia. The book focuses on the practice and embodiment of Islam by face-veiled women, many of whom have been positioned by media and people outside their religious circles as 'Other.' Yet, as I show, the 'Othering' of these women is hardly unified in either its form or content. In fact, this is illustrated by the way 'outsiders,' including media outlets, view face-veiled women by emphasising the aspects of difference in their lives. For example, those wearing strange clothing (the face veil) are said to belong to certain conservative and radical religious communities, featuring different lifestyles from mainstream Muslims in Indonesia. This includes strict gender segregation between men and women. When applying the lens of Said's *Orientalism* (1995), it becomes clear that the concept of 'Other' in the lives of these face-veiled women arises from the reduction (by outsiders), of their life experiences, needs and wants, to a flat representation devoid of substance. The use of an orientalist framework seems particularly apt in the case of face-veiled women, whose media representations cast them as 'fanatical' or subject to a curious, even exotic gaze. Malek Alloula, in his critique of French postcards featuring the image of Algerian face-veiled women, argues that these postcards allow Western audiences to have access to the exotic 'Other'—the victims of religious fanaticism—which serve as a justification of colonial presence (1986, 10–11). In this book, we can see how this concept of 'Other' is particularly related to the way the image of the people being defined is constructed by outsiders.

In this study, some theoretical concepts used as important analytical tools include agency and piety, and the techniques of the body and *taat* (Ar. *ṭāʿa* or obedience).

Agency and piety

In the field of study on women and religion, especially women in revivalist and fundamentalist movements, scholars have long focused on the *why* question (Bracke 2003; Deeb 2006). Why do women get involved in religious movements which sit uncomfortably with the secular liberal framework? Some scholars have approached this complexity by studying the interplay between religion, piety and women's agency (Abu-Lughod 2002; Deeb 2006; Mahmood 2005). In following this trajectory, I can unpack the complexity of understandings that have evolved from the experiences of face-veiled women, their piety and their engagement in diverse transnational revivalist movements in Indonesia. The debates about pious female subjects in a range of religious traditions, including pious Muslim women wearing diverse forms of coverings, veils or face veils, often suggest that they are gripped by a 'false consciousness' of sorts (Bracke 2014, 36). Such lines of arguments, rob women of their agency, as they imply that they are led by ideology or controlled by other sources. In her study of the Western framing of saving Muslim women, which particularly gained momentum in the post-9/11 era, Lila Abu-Lughod observes,

> Veiling must not be focused with, or made to stand for, lack of agency … As I described in *Veiled Sentiments,* my first ethnography of a Bedouin community in Egypt in the late 1970s and 1980s, for women I knew there, pulling the black head cloth over the face in front of older, respected men was considered a voluntary act.
>
> (2013, 39)

The United States (US) government and media often represent Afghan women wearing the *burqa* (face veil) as gendered slaves who need to be 'saved' by the West. Alternatively, Kevin Ayotte and Mary Husain (2005) argue that the oppression of women cannot be measured exclusively by isolated signifiers such as the *burqa.* Indeed, Afghan feminists also used the *burqa* as part of their political strategy for women's empowerment.

Likewise, Saba Mahmood, in her ground-breaking work *Politics of Piety* (2005), associates agency with observance. Her study is about the urban women's mosque movement in Cairo, Egypt, and is concerned with the cultivation of ideal virtuous selves. Mahmood (2003; 2005) argues that the women's mosque movement is part of a larger progression within the Islamic revival tendency that emerged approximately twenty-five years ago in Egypt, with the intention of producing a devout Egyptian society. In her critique of Western liberal feminists, Mahmood (2005) proposes that agency can be assessed outside the binary model of resistance and subordination, emancipation and oppression.[7] She points out

that agency can be understood: '(a) in terms of the capacities and skills required to undertake particular kinds of moral actions; and (b) as ineluctably bound up with the historically and culturally specific disciplines through which a subject is formed' (29).

Mahmood questions the poststructuralist feminist assumption that positions agency within the concept of resistance to social norms.[8] She argues that agency should be understood, 'not as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that historically specific relations of subordination enable and create' (2001, 203). According to Mahmood, rather than casting agency solely in the idiom of resistance, women's acts can be understood in 'the multiple ways in which one *inhabits* norms [emphasis in original]' (2005, 15). Such consideration resonates with my study of face-veiled women in Indonesia.

Building on Mahmood's *Politics of Piety,* Pnina Werbner introduces a missing element in Mahmood's discussion of personal piety. Through her reanalysis and deconstruction of Mahmood's thesis, Werbner contends that 'women in the *da'wa* movement are also successfully challenging ("resisting") the status quo of (male) Islamic scholarship and authority' (2018, 87). Werbner's argument is imperative in analysing the everyday life of face-veiled women in this study. Some face-veiled women can be regarded as engaging in resistance, but not to the conservative religious structures which are often seen by feminist movements as the source of women's oppression or to 'hegemonic male authoritative Islamic knowledge and practice,' as Werbner mentioned (2018, 84). Rather, they can be regarded as engaging in resistance due to the persistent stereotypes and prejudices against them, while at the same time they *inhabit* the religious norms seen by feminists as dominating and controlling their lives. Thus, their resistance cannot be classified as Kelsy Burke's *resistance agency* signifying women's efforts to challenge male-dominated institutions (2012, 124).[9]

Orit Avishai's work (2008) on the agency of Israeli Orthodox Jewish women is interesting. Having been inspired by Mahmood's argument that agency is also present through docility, Avishai emphasises that agency for religious women refers to their religious conduct or 'doing' of religion (2008). The agency of face-veiled women can be regarded as the same type of agency demonstrated by women in Avishai's (2008) work, which is a compliant agency, following Burke's term (2012, 127–28). The compliant agency's approach focuses on diverse ways women choose to conform to religious teachings.

One important work on piety and agency in Indonesia is offered by cultural sociologist Rachel Rinaldo. Extending from Mahmood's work, Rinaldo argues that 'pious agency' can take various forms. In her study of Muslim women activists in Indonesia, she mentioned two forms of pious agency: pious critical agency referring to 'the capacity to engage critically and publicly with interpretations of religious texts,' and pious activating agency which is 'the capacity to use interpretations of religious texts to mobilize in the public sphere' (2013, 19). The agentive capacity of face-veiled women in this study mirrors the second type of agency in Rinaldo's analysis because most of the *cadari* do not engage in the reinterpretation of religious texts.

The agency of pious face-veiled women in this study, that I call *taat* (obedient) agency, refers to the capacity of these women to take action and take pleasure in becoming pious docile subjects. Face-veiled women in this study understand that their submission to God and God's path requires them to engage in certain techniques of self, including docility. The embodiment of certain techniques of self is necessary for these women to experience the world through the corridor of the established religious teachings they uphold.

Besides *taat* agency, the notion of piety is also at the centre of this book. This concept is capacious enough to accommodate multiple meanings. The common understanding of piety refers to a virtue which usually relates to religiosity, religious devotion and spirituality. The most basic reference to piety for the majority of Sunni Muslims in Indonesia is the observance of the five pillars of Islam (*arkān al-Islām*), namely the profession of faith that there is no God but Allah and Muḥammad is the messenger of God, prayer, almsgiving, the Ramadhan fast and the pilgrimage to Mecca (*ḥajj*). Joy Tong and Bryan Turner define religion as acts of piety (2008). In Indonesia, the Islamic reawakening since 1970 has boosted diverse expressions of everyday pious conduct (Fealy and White 2008). Therefore, what piety means in Indonesia can be diverse.

The notion of piety in this study is related to the focus of the everyday life of these face-veiled women, namely the 'Islam' that they perceive as true Islam (on their everyday activities, see Figure I.3).[10] The focus on piety in this context refers to the way in which Islam matters in the lives of face-veiled women who come from different religious groups. It is also related to their understanding of what it means to live as true Muslims who are committed to the teachings of their religion. Piety in this regard refers to life guided by belief. Therefore, their piety refers to both private and public piety. The commitment of the face-veiled women in this study is analysed through the concept

Figure I.3 A *cadari* cooking in her house—as part of her everyday activities. Source. Photo credit, the author, 24 January 2010. Used with permission of the subject.

of 'public piety' developed by Lara Deeb, which signifies the importance of activities contributing to the 'common good' (2009a, 249; on 'active piety' see Bayat 2007). In her discussion of women's public participation, Deeb also warns against the danger of 'over-privileging individualized practices of piety and divorcing them from their social, economic and political contexts' (2009b, 113–14). The activities of some face-veiled women in this study exhibit public piety, in the sense that they demonstrate endless efforts to be true *Muslimah.* This involves visible virtuous practices which can contribute to the common good (*al-maṣlaḥa al-ʿāmma*), so that the women internalise 'a total obedience' (*ketaatan yang kaffah*) towards God.

It is noteworthy, however, that although outsiders might assess that the concept of piety is at the heart of their lives, the majority of face-veiled women in this study do not use the term piety, which is often translated in Indonesian as *kesalehan* to designate their activities. Instead, they often refer to their activities as part of their commitment to their religion. The concept that they often mention is *taat.* Therefore, throughout the book, the concept of *taat* often appears in relation to the manifestation of piety. Although these face-veiled women interpret their life experiences through the language of obedience, it does not mean that their religious journeys have been smooth or linear. Samuli Schielke (2009, 7) argues, 'Piety does not proceed along a unilinear path. It is an ambivalent practice that is often related to specific periods in life, especially those marked by crises.' There are some consequences of their attempts to be true *Muslimah.* The process of negotiating the transformation (*hijrah*) occurs in many places in their lives and can be seen throughout this book. Transformation is related to the life crises with which each woman is faced.

The techniques of the body and *taat*

The concept of the techniques of the body put forward by Marcel Mauss (1979) is one of the important keys to understanding the life of the face-veiled women in this study. Mauss's concept is used to analyse and describe the ways in which humans use and train their bodies to embody the values and norms they uphold. The practices of women wearing proper Muslim dress can be considered to be an example of 'body techniques.' Mauss's definition of habitus emphasises the important element of intelligence and learning processes, and for him it should not be associated with simple behaviour. Mauss notes, 'These "habits" do not vary just with individuals and their imitations; they vary especially between societies, educations, proprieties and fashions, prestige. In them we should see the techniques at work of collective and individual practical reason rather than, in the ordinary way, merely the soul and its repetitive faculties' (1979, 101). His definition also signifies the important position of Aristotle's influence. Pierre Bourdieu further developed Mauss's concept of habitus. While Mauss focuses on the pedagogical aspects of habitus, Bourdieu argues that habitus is 'embodied history, internalized as a second nature and so forgotten as history.' It is a 'spontaneity without consciousness or will' (1990, 56).

Mahmood (2005) also follows the Aristotelian formulation of habitus which resonates with Mauss's understanding rather than that of Bourdieu. The formulation of Aristotelian habitus involves the active capacity of transforming oneself through bodily practice. It is a 'conscious training in the habituation of virtues' (Mahmood 2005, 139). This understanding aligns with Mauss's definition of habitus that signifies the training of the body. Aristotle earlier also argued that inward dispositions and moral cultivation are produced through deliberate human practice and discipline (2000, 14).

For Bourdieu, the notion of habitus is 'necessity internalized and converted into a disposition that generates meaningful practices and meaning-given perceptions' (1984, 170). A habitus is embodied in nature, whereby varied practices, or forms of 'embodied competence' (Bourdieu 1977, 81), are at play, as in certain modes of behaviour, manners, sets of acquired tastes, appearance and style—all of which constitute social capital and render life meaningful. Bourdieu's concept of habitus is also embedded in social history, to the extent that the habitus of some face-veiled women—much like those wearing traditional face veils in Indonesia—is inherited history articulated through the interplay of wider structures and the individual.

The varied pious habitus in the country can be seen in adoptions of women's covering. This aligns with the way Muslims in Indonesia perceive what they consider to be proper Muslim dress which is a dynamic arena of choice and fashion. The meaning attached to diverse types of women's head coverings has been a contested and evolving issue. Initially, women wore the *kerudung* (loose veil), which has been popular since the 1920s (White 2006, 327–29). In the 1970s and 1980s, a stricter version of head covering known as the *jilbab* (tight veil) started to be worn by students at universities and became the most salient symbol of their struggle to support an Islamic revival in Indonesia (Brenner 1996, 673; see also Amrullah 2008, 22; Robinson 2009, 172). The terms *jilbab* and *kerudung* are often used interchangeably, but *kerudung* usually refers to a long transparent shawl which loosely covers a woman's hair and *jilbab* is a larger cloth pinned around the face and which may cover a woman's upper body except for her face and hands.

The techniques of the body and habitus are useful for unpacking the importance of the notion of *taat. Taat* or *ketaatan* is an Islamic concept that refers to an act of obedience to God and the Prophet Muḥammad. The Qurʾān often uses the verb *aṭāʿa,* which means 'to obey,' to refer to the characteristic of pious believers. The Qurʾān (Q.S.) āl ʿImrān [3]:132, for example, says, 'And pay heed unto God and the Apostle, so that you might be graced with mercy.'[11] *Taat* is the key concept in the life of passionate, face-veiled women, particularly in their distinctive subcultures. They believe that wearing a face veil is part of the core tenet of *taat* because it is mentioned in the Qurʾān. In the work of Mahmood (2005), the mosques' participants in Egypt used the term *taqwā* (Ind. *taqwa*) (fearful for God), not *taat,* which she translated as piety referring to 'inward orientation or disposition and a manner of particular conduct' (4 n. 7). Although in Indonesia the

term *taqwa* is also commonly used, in the context of obedience, devoutness and faithful observance among face-veiled women in this study, the term *taat* is more prevalent. *Taat* appears as the result of strong faith (*īmān*) in the true path of Islam and of strong intention (*niyya*) to surrender to the rules of God in order to abandon sin. It stems from the believer's *ḥubb* (love) and *khashya* (fear with awe) towards God, especially God's retribution. *Īmān* (lit. faith or belief) is the main aspect that distinguishes between a believer and a non-believer. The connection between *īmān* and *taat* can be seen clearly in the Qurʾānic verses, including Q.S. An-Nisāʾ [4]:59. This verse signifies that all believers (*muʾminūn*) must be obedient to God and the Prophet Muḥammad. Therefore, the word *taat* encompasses dispositions related to *taqwa* (devoutness, God-fearing) that for face-veiled women can lead believers to embrace the true Islam.

One of the key insights in my study that can distinguish it from Mahmood's work is that Mahmood focuses on the way Egyptian women are pursuing pious lives while face-veiled women in this study are pursuing obedient lives that are embedded in the concept of *taat.* This concept suggests something slightly different to that of Mahmood's concept of piety. Piety, as in the work of Mahmood (2005) and Charles Hirschkind (2001), is still a highly individuated, self-focused concept. In contrast, obedience, in the life of the face-veiled women, refers to a focus on seeing oneself through the gaze of an authority. Such gaze itself can be varied (as in the women in this study), such as *ustādh* (pl. *asātidh,* male teachers) and *ustādha* (pl. *ustādhāt,* female teachers), senior students, seniors and other cadres, or perhaps more accurately for them, Allah (God). Therefore, the focus of these women is less on piety per se than on correctness and obeying the rules of Islam as they understand them. This is much more social, interactive and sometimes can be a less self-focused pursuit.

Engaging the field

It was early morning when I visited a *cadari* community around the Jamilurrahman complex. This was one of the places that I chose to conduct fieldwork because of the attachment of many *cadari* in Yogyakarta to Jamilurrahman's institutions and networks. As with other researchers embarking on the journey, I was quite nervous. It was pouring with rain. All I could see were hectares of rice fields with no signs of housing. Adding to my nervousness, the taxi driver repeatedly asked me whether I had the correct address. After travelling down a long and bumpy road, we finally reached the housing complex. When I exited the taxi and waded through shallow mud, I could faintly see people in a mosque—some men and face-veiled toddlers. A young man wearing a *jubah* (an ankle-length garment) approached me and kindly helped me meet a *cadari.*

I began my first day there by visiting Ummu Hanifah (pseudonym). When I was in front of her house, I could see her husband had a guest. I said '*As-salāmu ʿalaykum*' [Islamic greeting, literally means 'peace be upon you'] and her husband called her. She came out from the back of her house and asked me to enter from the rear. Her house was a typical village house, very simple with an earth

floor in the kitchen. Ummu Hanifah was very warm. Since I had never met her before she asked my permission to take off her *cadar.* She said, 'But please do not be surprised, okay Ukht [Sister]. If you see a very pretty face [while giggling].' As she removed her *cadar,* her oval-shaped face and wide smile made me feel welcome and comfortable, despite it being the first time that we had met. We both talked and laughed. In the afternoon, I asked permission to talk to her husband. She agreed, but she asked me if I was okay speaking to him from behind the curtain. I then spoke to him with Ummu Hanifah sitting next to me. We talked for nearly two hours and stopped when we heard the call for prayer from the mosque.

My first day at the field site in Yogyakarta gave me a glimpse of the pious or *taat* habitus of the *cadari* and their community. This was quite different to various other Islamic habitus in Indonesia, which place emphasis on accepting diverse expressions of moderate, mostly lenient Islam borne from the spirit of acknowledging diverse interpretations of Islamic texts.

This book is based on long-term fieldwork from 2008 to 2010, with additional stints conducted from 2011 to 2019. This enabled me to maintain strong relationships with the field site and its people as well as enhance my understanding of social and cultural values, including any changes in the political climate. I focused my research on three urban areas: Jakarta, Makassar (South Sulawesi) and Yogyakarta. However, during my fieldwork I found that it was difficult to focus solely on these three sites, because the women have affiliations with institutions which are scattered all over Indonesia, such as Banten, Magetan (East Java), Bekasi and Tasikmalaya (West Java), and Solo (Central Java). Regarding urban fieldwork, Deeb points out that 'one of the challenges is that the research population is often defined in non-geographical and rather imprecise ways' (2006, 7). Such was the case for my fieldwork, where it was hard to set firm boundaries around my field sites. This is partly because the majority of my participants had attachments to groups of like-minded faithful adherents which were more important than being bound to a locality. Adapting the insight of Benedict Anderson (1983), the imagined community shared by these women rested principally on their attachment to a shared religious ideology.

The main reason to choose my study groups in large cities is that the majority of the *cadar* constituency, especially the most ardent supporters of this form of dress, are university students who live there. Furthermore, the activities of *cadari* who attach themselves to the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi movements can be accessed easily in these cities. Jakarta, in particular, was selected because it is the location of the headquarters of Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic, LIPIA (the Saudi Arabian-funded university) where some *cadari* continue their higher degrees.[12] In addition, the headquarters of the Niqab Squad is also in Jakarta. The decision to choose Yogyakarta was due to its reputation as the city of students (*kota pelajar*) where, with the support of students, diverse Islamic groups have a strong foothold. Similarly, Makassar was chosen due to the presence of the largest Makassar-based Salafi mass organisation, Wahdah Islamiyah; the face veil is widely adopted among its followers.

Building rapport within an exclusively face-veiled milieu

Conducting the research was quite demanding, especially because the *cadari* and the movements to which they are attached are suspicious of outsiders. I was prepared for this barrier as my previous research was conducted amongst face-veiled women in the Netherlands. I found that face-veiled women were willing to talk only to researchers whom they trusted. Conducting the research in Indonesia was equally problematic, since I was attached to an overseas university, and could not be trusted. Their first set of questions to me was: 'What is this research for? Are you working for a foreign government or the Indonesian government? Do you have any attachments to NGOs (non-government organisations) or social movements?' Of course, such suspicion amongst marginalised people is familiar to many researchers (see Abu-Lughod in her work with Bedouins, 1986). In my case, the fact that media coverage in Indonesia often represented *cadari* as being part of terrorist networks, while journalists are said to pressure some women to obtain information on terrorist attacks in Indonesia, has also played a significant role in creating hostile feelings towards outsiders.

While my interlocutors were initially suspicious, regarding my attachment to an Australian university, such fears were soon eased. The fact that I am a veiled Muslim who graduated from the world's leading Sunni Islamic university, Al-Azhar University, in Egypt gave me a degree of social capital. This was the best antidote to overcome their suspicions. There were times that the women coaxed me to 'convert' from wearing a veil to wearing a face veil. Those who tried hard to 'convert' me were novices who had great enthusiasm in demonstrating their 'active piety' (Bayat 2007), rather than the cadres who had known me and my background over many years. Throughout my fieldwork, I found myself employing certain strategies to try and generate a comfortable environment and explain my 'native' status as best I could (Narayan 1993). So, I often found myself explaining that although I was Muslim, I had to hear and learn more from them as the way I practised Islam was quite different from them. I tried to focus on building good rapport by emphasising our shared concerns but was equally happy discussing my own different background.

The above-mentioned situation was often encountered during my engagement with Salafi women. In contrast, working with the Tablīghī Jamāʿat proved easier because they are more tolerant towards Muslims from outside of their movement. Some of them asked probing questions about my research, but as I explained the reasons for my interests their suspicions were allayed, and they soon considered me to be part of their wider family. For example, one day, a female Tablīghī, daughter of the Chairman of the Indonesian Presidential Advisory Council, who owned a luxurious house at which their weekly *taʿlīm* (religious study circles) was hosted and who had just returned from conducting *ʿumra,* distributed gifts to those she considered close contacts (on Salafi *taʿlīm* see Figure I.4). Unexpectedly, I received a gift from her. She even asked me to choose a gift that I preferred. In anthropological inquiry, such expressions of generosity and gift-giving are often afforded to close kin, to demonstrate strong ties that connect and bind

Figure I.4 Some Salafi *cadari* waiting for their *kajian* or *taʿlīm* (Islamic study gathering) to begin. Source. Photo credit, author, 29 October 2017. Used with permission of the subjects.

people together. Gift-giving is, thus, an important vehicle of social exchange that strengthens social bonds (Malinowski 1984; Mauss 2016; Sahlins 1972). After successfully building good rapport during my long-term research, I was fortunate that some Salafi key research subjects also often gave gifts to me or my daughter who sometimes accompanied me during my research.

Throughout my research, I employed qualitative methods of data gathering. Participant observation—which has long been considered the method that distinguishes anthropological research from the research of other academic disciplines, or those that simply rely on interviews and group discussions—was especially important. The choice of this methodology is designed to enable women to speak for themselves. I also understand that discussions during fieldwork are mediated by researchers' points of view, their presence and what they choose to highlight.

As the study was progressing, I had to employ a combination of offline and online research techniques. One of the salient characteristics of Salafi women that distinguishes them from the Tablīghī Jamāʿat is their prominent activity in cyberspace. During offline interviews, they often asked me to visit their websites to learn more about their groups and their communities. I then added computer-mediated communication methods to my existing repertoire to provide a wider qualitative research approach. Since 2011, after the continued development of

diverse social media platforms like Facebook and Instagram, and the birth of the Niqab Squad (2017), many *cadari* have actively used these platforms for various cyberactivist causes.

Outline

Chapters 1, 2 and 3 focus on the *cadar* as an item of dress with its own values for wearers and non-wearers, revealing how the wearers, followers of relevant conservative movements, and more generally people in Indonesia and the media, understand the practice of wearing the *cadar.* The following chapters focus on the life experiences of *cadari* in different settings: boarding schools, universities and families, and *daʿwa* (Ind. *dakwah*) (proselytisation) activities.

In Chapter 1, I elucidate some practices of face veiling in the Indonesian Archipelago from an historical perspective. The discussion shows how the practice of face veiling is rooted in certain parts of Indonesia through the existence of local versions of face veiling since the period of the Islamic sultanates. The chapter also examines the impact of growing transnational relations with countries where face veiling has a much longer history, especially Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt. I also examine the Indonesian Muslims' encounter with diverse revivalist movements in neighbouring countries, especially Darul Arqam from Malaysia and the Tablīghī Jamāʿat movement from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. This chapter, in turn, expands our understanding of how the practice and embodiment of Islam in Indonesia continues to shift over time, and how women's bodies are always the main site of contestation in such discussions.

In Chapter 2, I discuss the arguments that women put forward in support of wearing the *cadar.* In doing this, I shed light on the connection between their link with the movement and their *cadar* adoption. Specifically, this chapter analyses the arguments for wearing the *cadar* which originate in Islamic traditions—the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth* (the narration of words, deeds or approvals of the Prophet Muḥammad)—and which direct believers to embody their religion by disciplining their bodies and by wearing the *cadar.* It discusses the notion of habitus in their lives and considers the significance of notions of women's religious purity and the relevance of religious compatibility for *cadari* when choosing spouses to support their becoming true *Muslimah.*

Chapter 3 looks at how the media represent and use the *cadari* and how the *cadari* use the media. It concentrates on the representation of the *cadar* and *cadari* in the media and the way Indonesian popular culture depicts *cadari*, especially within literature and film. The chapter demonstrates the responses of *cadari* to popular novels and a movie *Ayat Ayat Cinta* (Verses of love) featuring face-veiled women. Their responses provide an important discussion of how they relate to the politics of their own representation. This chapter also discusses how *cadari* use the media, in particular the internet and social media platforms, in strategic ways to complement their strict Islamic lifestyle, and to assist their *daʿwa* activities. The chapter challenges assumptions about women's passivity and their confinement to the private sphere by investigating how they use the media in

their everyday lives to pursue their religious goals, build networks, socialise, earn money and have careers. This is a chapter that is successful in disrupting popular notions of face-veiled women as 'living in the dark ages' or as somehow disconnected from modernity.

Chapter 4 focuses on face veiling within Islamic educational institutions. It provides an overview of the everyday life of *cadari* in *pesantren.* Their story is different from the majority of *cadari* (passionate *cadari*) with whom I worked, because the *cadar* is mostly imposed on students in these *pesantren.* The chapter portrays disciplinary techniques operating in the *pesantren* aimed at producing good Muslim women. It engages with the concepts of techniques of the body, subjectivity and total institutions. The condition of these students might be glossed over easily as a sign of their docility and their lack of agency. However, a different reading might also be possible: students who are exposed to disciplinary techniques can be regarded as self-determining agents. Therefore, this chapter is an important addition to the book because it highlights how face veiling is experienced when 'choice' is nominal or restricted, which is an important counterpoint to the 'choices' of passionate *cadari* discussed in the following chapter.

Following the chapter in which wearing the *cadar* is highly supported in certain institutions, Chapter 5 analyses the struggle of the main subjects of this research (passionate *cadari*), face-veiled university students and graduates, to defend their practice and to achieve their goal to be true *Muslimah.* It situates the exploration of women who wear the *cadar* in the context of tertiary environments. It explores women's quest for belonging, and the discovery of authoritative religious knowledge and ways of being. The chapter assesses their motivations not only in wearing the *cadar* and bearing the larger obligations of adopting the practice but also in being part of the movements that support the wearing of *cadar.* Their choice is continually negotiated in daily life. Focusing on their adoption of the *cadar* and their religious transformation, this chapter demonstrates the capacity of *cadari* in exercising a specific type of religious or *taat* agency.

In Chapter 6, I focus on the *da'wa* activities of *cadari* as part of the embodiment of being true *Muslimah.* It shows that the experiences of *cadari* who belong to revivalist movements do not conform to the stereotype that they are merely objects of male oppression who do not have agency. This chapter inverts popular assumptions that women are passive followers of religion; indeed, it clearly demonstrates how they are dedicated religious actors. Therefore, theoretically the chapter extends and advances the claim on religious agency for *cadari,* discussing public piety, subjectivity and extending the notion of religious habitus into the public sphere. I conclude that the cultivation of the virtuous self and the aspiration to be true *Muslimah* have led *cadari* to constantly engage in questioning their commitment to their religion. Their active involvement underscores the important, but often neglected, part that women play in supporting conservative groups. I discuss 'Othering' and the positions *cadari* occupy in this process. This chapter shows the growing visibility of the religious movements of these *cadari* and their critical roles in this growth. The actions they perform within their movements are

forms of agency that allow them not only to make their own choices but also to act in ways that directly affect the lives of others.

In Chapter 7, I present final discussions on the life of *cadari* in Indonesia, including implications of the increasing presence of *cadari* in the landscape of Indonesian Islam. The chapter also addresses the need to improve understandings of the lives of women whose existence is often bound by prejudice.

Notes

1 The term 'Sharīʿa-compliant' is widely used today to refer to what is permissible under Islamic law.
2 In Indonesia, the term *Muslimah* is used for both singular and plural forms. The term true *Muslimah* in Indonesian refers to various terms, including *Muslimah sejati, Muslimah hakiki, Muslimah kaffah* or *Muslimah yang sebenarnya.*
3 I follow van Bruinessen's definition of 'conservative' as referring to, 'the various currents that reject modernist, liberal or progressive re-interpretations of Islamic teachings and adhere to established doctrines and social order. Conservatives notably object to the idea of gender equality and challenges to established authority, as well as to modern hermeneutical approaches to scripture' (2013, 16).
4 Jama'ah Tarbiyah or Jemaah Tarbiyah (the Tarbiyah movement) is the main religious community base of the Islamist political party, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera), and it emerged in the 1970s (Fox 2004, 9). Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn (the Muslim Brotherhood), founded by Ḥasan al-Bannāʾ (1906–49) in Egypt in 1928, is the main inspiration for the Tarbiyah movement in Indonesia.
5 Hizbut Tahrir or Hizb ut-Tahrir is a transnational organisation that aims to restore a caliphate for the whole Muslim world. It was founded by Palestinian judge Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn al-Nabhānī (1909–77) in Jerusalem in the early 1950s. HTI is the Indonesian chapter of Hizbut Tahrir which was banned in Indonesia in July 2017.
6 Farish Noor (2009, 197) argues that the establishment of Tablīghī Jamāʿat was inspired by the Wahhabi (Salafi) movement in Saudi Arabia. However, apart from this inspiration, Tablīghī Jamāʿat is often seen to have a special connection with Sufism (Metcalf 2002) which the Salafi movement considers to be one of their 'enemies.'
7 It is noteworthy that this is not a new kind of critique from scholars including feminist anthropologists relating to the condition of women living outside the Western context (Bangstad 2011; Mohanty 1986; Moore 1988).
8 See critiques of Mahmood's explanation on her research subject, Abir—a 30-year-old married woman with three children—and her concept of resistance (Werbner 2018, 83).
9 Four types of agencies are classified by Burke (2012): resistance, empowerment, instrumental and compliant.
10 The true Islam is known in Indonesia by various terms, including Islam *hakiki,* Islam *sejati,* Islam *yang sebenarnya* and Islam *yang murni.* For many *cadari,* it was important to identify that the Islam to which they adhere is the true Islam. Therefore, it is noteworthy that throughout the book, when I use the term true Islam and true *Muslimah,* I am referring to the way the *cadari* identified themselves and their belonging. However, I am not suggesting that the version of Islam that the *cadari* follow is the true Islam, or that the various versions of Islam perceived by Muslims are not the true Islam.
11 All the Qurʾānic translations in this book are taken from Muhammad Asad (1980).
12 It is noteworthy that not all female students in this university wear the face veil.

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1 The practice of face veiling in the archipelago

The practice of veiling, especially *kerudung* (loose veil) or *jilbab* (tight veil) in Indonesia, has been studied by many scholars (Baulch and Pramiyanti 2018; Brenner 1996; Jones 2007; Smith-Hefner 2007). In 2012, the Directorate General of Small Business Industry stated that the number of veiled (not face-veiled) Muslim women in the country was approximately twenty million (Directorate General of Small Business Industry 2012). In 2015, the Alvara Research Center conducted a study on Muslim women's dress and discovered that 79.4 per cent preferred to wear the regular veil or *hijab*[1] (Ar. *ḥijāb*), 13.5 per cent chose to wear a longer and looser iteration called the Sharīʿa-style *hijab* and merely 2 per cent preferred to wear the face veil (Hawley 2017). Little, however, has been written on the histories of these types of head covering, let alone the practice of face veiling across time in the archipelago. The earliest that *kerudung* began to be mentioned in historical texts was in 1899 in a *fatwa* (or nonbinding religious ruling or opinion from religious scholar/s on questions related to Islam and Muslims) issued by Sayyid ʿUthmān (1822–1914)—an important Islamic scholar in the Netherlands East Indies—which said that women had to wear *kerudung* when they left their houses (Kaptein 2009, 191). In contrast, the history of wearing Arab dress, especially *jubah* (an ankle-length garment for men), by male Muslims in the archipelago is easier to trace because, during the colonial period, there were numerous reports on the practice (van Dijk 1997). Wearing a turban or *sorban* (Ind.) (headwear worn by men) and *jubah* by Muslim men of the archipelago can be seen in the seventeenth century when the Dutch allowed natives who had performed the pilgrimage to wear this type of dress, while at the same time the colonial administration ruled that colonial populations had to wear their ethnic attire, which included Arabs and Chinese wearing their own distinctive dress styles.[2]

In the nineteenth century, the Dutch perceived aspects of the natives' religion, especially the increasing number of natives performing *ḥajj* (pilgrimage)—in particular after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869—as part of what they believed to be 'Meccan- or Arab-inspired' threats, to borrow Michael Laffan's term (2002, 79, 82). Certain rules were issued by the Dutch government in fear of the Arabs and their influence on the natives. In 1881, for example, an Honorary Adviser on Native Affairs, Karel Frederik Holle, made a recommendation on dress 'that male and female *hadjis* [pilgrims] be prevented from wearing "particular types of Arab or Turkish clothing"' (cited in Laffan 2002, 97).

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Despite the *fatwa* issued by Sayyid ʿUthmān on *kerudung,* mentioned above, the adoption of female Arab-style dress in the Netherlands East Indies became a topic of debate in the 1930s (Kaptein 2009, 176). This indicates that the adoption of foreign dress by women in the archipelago was rather slow. Some anthropologists who have focused their studies on the adoption of various clothing styles, such as Karen Hansen, also emphasise that 'men's dress is changing more rapidly than women's' (2004, 374). In the early 1950s in Indonesia when European dress became popular among young Javanese elites, it was recorded that women were still committed to ethnic costumes, wearing *kain* (an unstitched length of fabric wrapped around the lower half of the wearer's body) and *kebaya* (a bodice cut to follow the contours of the body) (van Dijk 2001, 64–65).[3] Ali Tantowi argues that in the early twentieth century in Java, the number of veil wearers was insignificant and mainly consisted of women affiliated with two organisations: Muhammadiyah and Persis (2010, 63–64).

This chapter provides an understanding of the practices of face veiling in Indonesia across time despite resistance from many mainstream Muslims. It also aims to trace the impact of contemporary transnational relations with Islamic and Islamist movements in which wearing the *cadar* (face veil) has become the accepted norm for women. This chapter does not intend to provide genealogical and detailed historical trajectories of face veiling in the archipelago, because it is not the focus of the book. Therefore, this chapter does not demonstrate the general development of the practice of face veiling nor the historical links between past and current practices. As a guide to the broader discussion of the practice of face veiling in Indonesia, the first part of the chapter analyses the extent of the role of Arabs. This is because the common assumption in Indonesia is that the practice resulted from the adoption of Arab dress styles. The following section discusses the existence of a local practice of face veiling. It then explores the practice of face veiling by followers of diverse revivalist movements in Indonesia. The chapter ends by observing one of the current practices of face veiling by women who are graft suspects and/or have been found guilty of graft scandals. Marcel Mauss's techniques of the body and Pierre Bourdieu's habitus are important in unpacking the phenomenon. Understanding the relationship between body techniques and collective knowledge is particularly helpful when analysing how the *cadar* is worn in the archipelago across time and place by different generations of Muslims.

From the perspective of the wearers, as we will see, the face veil is not merely a dress. For some, it is part of their embodiment of social normativity: the embodiment of social knowledge and understanding. Some *cadari* (face-veiled women) understand and embrace the social normativity around them through the way they act and conform to the norms. Covering as part of the embodied practices for women differ from one society to another, which mirrors Mauss's (1979) point on different types of embodied practices in different societies, such as eating with a knife and fork. Mauss's (1979) emphasis on the social aspects of body techniques is also important in the study of the practice of face veiling. Although the face veil is worn by different women from different generations and affiliations, a

common factor that unites them is that they wear the face veil because it is part of the embodiment of their knowledge and the norms prevalent in their social sphere.

Bourdieu's account on habitus can also help us understand the development of the practice of face veiling in the archipelago, especially in his emphasis on the aspect of its historicity. In explicating the dynamic nature of habitus, Bourdieu argues that the concept consists of 'systems of durable, transposable *dispositions,* structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations [emphasis in original]' (1977, 72). The formulation of habitus, as explained by Bourdieu, necessitates human beings adjusting to the external world through unconscious or less than conscious ways (Farnell 2000, 403; King 2000, 423; Lock 1993, 137). Bourdieu pointed out, in relation to this unconscious embodiment, that:

> Each agent, wittingly or unwittingly, willy nilly, is a producer and reproducer of objective meaning. Because his actions and works are the product of a *modus operandi* of which he is not the producer and has no conscious mastery, they contain an 'objective intention,' as the Scholastics put it, which always outruns his conscious intentions.
>
> (1977, 79)

It is 'a self which embodies history; it is socially produced, but also generative as it interacts with the social world' (Rinaldo 2008, 29; 2013). Habitus is, thus, 'malleable but persistent' (Hurst 2013, 48). Bourdieu argues, 'We learn bodily. The social order inscribes itself in bodies through this permanent confrontation, which may be more or less dramatic but is always largely marked by affectivity and, more precisely, by affective transactions with the environment' (2000, 141). Habitus is subject to change although it might take a long time. This can be seen from how gradually the traditional face veils, like *rimpu mpida* in the archipelago have been abandoned by women.

The agency of women who wear the face veil as part of the embodiment of collective norms aligns with Orit Avishai's argument on the importance of normative expectations in understanding agency (2008, 413). In analysing the wearing of the face veil by different women of different generations, times and places, this chapter is also indebted to Avishai's approach in 'recognizing that religious conduct does not occur in a discursive vacuum.' She emphasises the important role of 'the structural and institutional contexts that shape conduct' (2008, 413). Here in this chapter, we can see there is a strong relationship between private and public aspects of life when discussing subjectivity.

Early encounters with Arab people from Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Egypt

This section critically assesses whether Arab influence is significant in the introduction of the *cadar* to the archipelago, as this is a view commonly found in popular media and scholarship. Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Egypt are often mentioned

as breeding places for the adoption of certain types of *busana Muslim/Muslimah* (Muslim dress) in Indonesia, since *busana Muslim/Muslimah* is routinely worn, especially by religious people, in these countries.

Nowadays, the most common assumption in popular discourse related to the adoption of female Arab-style dress, especially a face veil, is that it reflects the influence of Arab culture (Karim 1992, 175; Nagata 1984, 105; Goshal 2010, 73; Syamwil 1996, 238). In addition, as stated in the previous chapter, a face veil is often mentioned as the 'uniform' of fanatics, extremists or terrorists (Nagata 1984, 105; Woodward et al. 2011). Because of these assumptions, many Indonesians have been reluctant to accept the *cadar.* The debates on *cadar* have been present since the early nineteenth century at the time of the Padri War (1821–37). The Padris who fought against unIslamic practices also focused on Muslim dress, including the introduction of what they believed to be certain proper presentations for Muslims, such as men wearing a turban and women wearing a face veil (Tantowi 2010, 63; International Crisis Group (ICG) 2004, 5).

Ruth Barnes and Joanne Eicher argue that dress as a cultural phenomenon can be regarded as a 'property of inclusion and exclusion' (1997, 1). This is in line with the responses towards *cadari* in Indonesia; those who oppose the *cadar* exclude dress as an aspect of Islamic teachings. Instead, many associate it with the Wahhabi movement in Saudi Arabia. 'Wahhabi' is a term with pejorative connotations used in the archipelago to refer to extreme teachings of the reform movement founded by Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (1703–1792) in Saudi Arabia in the eighteenth century.[4] Since the *cadar* is linked to Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia, for opponents of Wahhabi influence it is regarded as part of an Arab tradition that may be suitable for Arabs but not for Muslims in the archipelago. Also, opponents of the *cadar* argue that women in Indonesia have long been accustomed to wearing more 'moderate' Muslim dress, such as *kerudung* and *baju kurung* (a long-sleeved loose tunic worn over a *sarong* or *sarung* [Ind.] or long skirt, also known as *baju melayu* or Malay dress). The assumption of the link between the *cadar* and Wahhabism strengthens the assumption that dress can carry public messages where the outsiders may perceive it differently from the wearers' perceptions, and it can be seen as a visual boundary marker (Sweetinburgh 2004, 111).

It is a conundrum whether the presence of Arab people in present-day Indonesia has played an important role in the introduction of Muslim dress, especially women's style of dress. Azyumardi Azra points out that the 'contacts and relations between Malay-Indonesian Muslims and the Middle East began to gain momentum with the flowering of Muslim kingdoms in the archipelago in the late sixteenth century' (2004, 9). Azra recorded that there were several important places where the Islam of Indonesia originated, such as Arabia (Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Hadhramaut or Ḥaḍramawt [Ar.] in Yemen) and India (Gujarat, Bengal, Malabar, Coromandel) (2006, 10–19). However, according to Azra, the theory that Islam in Indonesia came directly from Arabia, not India or China, since the first century of Hijri or since the seventh and eighth centuries, is the most reliable (2006, 19). After that, Arab culture was introduced, and this accelerated after marriages between Arabs and Indonesian women. However, to assume that the then Arab

women's style of dress, such as full-body covering (*abaya* or *ʿabāya*) and face veil (*niqab* or *niqāb*), was popular among Muslim women in the archipelago is most likely misleading.

Among Arab countries that have had great influence in the archipelago, Yemen was important in the history of the advent of Islam, particularly through the flow of migration, which may have existed as early as the seventh century CE (Jacobsen 2009, 15; Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 21). From the latter half of the eighteenth century, the first substantial flow of migration brought Yemeni, especially those from Ḥaḍramawt, a province of the Republic of Yemen, to Southeast Asia including present-day Indonesia (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 21). The immigrants from Yemen also married natives of the Dutch East Indies (Ho 2006, xxii; Jacobsen 2007, 474; Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 23). This was related to their cultural taboo for women undertaking long-distance travel (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 22).

When Yemen immigrants brought their wives (Patji 1991, 139), the tradition of face veiling was most likely not prevalent. One of my Ḥaḍramī (a person whose ancestry can be traced to Ḥaḍramawt in Yemen) research subjects, Geisz Chalifah, said 'Almost all our grandmothers did not wear the *cadar,* not even *jilbab.* They only wore typical Indonesian *kerudung.* This is because most of our *enjid* (grandfathers) indeed wanted to assimilate into Indonesian culture.'[5] Tantowi records, however, that in the 1940s there was a campaign in Solo initiated by Idrus al-Masyhur and Ali bin Yahya of the Arab community requesting ʿAlawiyyin, referring to the descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad in the region, and particularly women, to wear a face veil. This was borne from their concern about the moral decadence among women of the ʿAlawiyyin background and 'to differentiate between Arab women and Javanese women' (2010, 76, 87), There was a special gathering to discuss face veiling among ʿAlawiyyin women in 1940 which was attended by sixty people (Tantowi 2010, 75). The meeting produced an agreement stating:

> The meeting which has been held in February 1940 in Salim bin Basrie's house concluded that *berguk* [face veil] is a religious obligation for women. Another meeting held in the same house on March 3, 1940 decided that 'every Alawiyyin man must oblige his wife and women under his control to wear *berguk;* he who disobey this decision would be reminded three times and if he still ignores, he will be excommunicated.'
>
> (Cited in Tantowi 2010, 76)

This campaign was heavily rejected by the women and some Arab men and even led to cases of divorce (Tantowi 2010, 76).

Nowadays some young generations of Yemeni descendants have increasingly started to adopt the *cadar* or *purdah* (see Figure 1.1). The practice of face veiling is especially common with female graduates from Dār al-Zahrā'—a female wing of Dār al-Muṣṭafā, an educational institute for the study of traditional Islamic Sciences founded in 1993 in Tarim (Ar. Tarīm), Ḥaḍramawt, Yemen—who then become female preachers in Indonesia. This includes female religious authorities such as Ustādha (Ind. Ustazah) Sharīfa Halimah Alaydrus and Ustādha Sharīfa Amirah Jindan (see

Figure 1.1 A *cadari* with her black *purdah* and gloves. Source. Photo credit, author, 30 January 2010. (Note: Some people differentiate between *cadar* and *purdah* in which *purdah* refers to a *cadar* with a screen that covers the eyes of the wearer.)

Nisa 2012). Today, although some young *sharīfāt* (female descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad) have started to wear the *cadar* in Indonesia, they are not as evident in everyday life as women of non-Yemeni descent as in this study. Al-Ḥabīb ʿUmar b. Ḥafīẓ (the leader of the best-known Dār al-Musṭafā) noted during one of his visits to Indonesia in January 2008: 'Why do not the *sharīfāt* wear the *cadar,* while other Muslim women [in Indonesia] do? We should be ashamed not covering our *ʿawra* [part of the body that must be covered] properly compared to other lay women.' This comment was reported by one of my research subjects who decided to wear the *cadar* after listening to his advice.

Besides Yemen, Saudi Arabia is very important with regard to the spread of Islam in the archipelago, especially due to the existence of the two important holy cities in the life of Muslims, Mecca and Medina (Ḥaramayn). Saudi Arabia is not only the destination of pilgrimage (*ḥajj*) but also 'the intellectual hub of the Muslim world' (Azra 2004, 8). The sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries were a period of growth for the international networks of *ʿulamāʾ* (religious scholars) in the Ḥaramayn, which included some students from the Indonesia–Malay Archipelago (Azra 2004, 3, 9). The moment of pilgrimage provides an impetus for many Muslims to wear *busana Muslim/Muslimah* (Brenner 1996, 674). However,

it is difficult to identify the exact date of the first Indonesian visitors to Mecca for pilgrimage. What is obvious is that there was a large number of visitors from the archipelago in the sixteenth century (Azra 2004). The moment of pilgrimage transforms the appearance of *ḥajja* (a woman who has performed the pilgrimage) with her adoption of more modest Muslim dress. This phenomenon can be encountered in diverse parts of the Muslim world, for example, in Egypt (El Guindi 1999, 114). As mentioned above, until the nineteenth century, Muslim men who returned from the pilgrimage adopted Arab dress. However, many *ḥajja* at the time, especially older *ḥajja,* adopted distinctly loose *kerudung* or other local styles to indicate their status (Jones 2007, 217; Laffan 2002). For example, *ḥajja* in South Sulawesi wear *cipo'-cipo'* (a *ḥajja* head covering) upon returning from their pilgrimage. This signifies 'the product of the acculturation of Islamic values with local culture' (Robinson 2012). This phenomenon is resonant with the common phenomenon that women are often objectified as 'the bearers of traditional culture and heritage' (Huisman and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2005, 47). Therefore, changes in women's dress are relatively slower than changes in men's dress. It has been noted in other contexts that men who migrate to other countries often adopt the style of the host country's dress sooner than women (Huisman and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2005).

Following Saudi Arabia, particularly Mecca, Egypt (Cairo) became a new destination for Muslims from the Dutch East Indies to deepen their religious knowledge. A strong presence of students from the Indies in Cairo could be seen, especially during the 1920s and the 1930s (Eliraz 2004, 48). William Roff pointed out that 'it was apparently not until 1922 that they became sufficiently numerous, or sufficiently conscious of themselves as a group, to organise an association' (1970, 73). Many Indonesians also claim, in relation to the adoption of Muslim dress, that graduates from Cairo, especially al-Azhar University, had a significant influence on the export of Muslim dress to Indonesia. Wearing the face veil in Egypt can be seen as early as the dynastic rule of the Mamluk period (1250–1517 CE) (Winter 1992). At this time, town women wore diverse types of face veils: *miqnaʿa* (a veil of black shroud covering the entire face), *qinaʿ* (covering a woman's face and leaving two holes for her eyes) and *niqāb* (a face veil [*burquʿ*] that covers the wearer's face up to her eyes) (Mayer 1952, 73). However, it is important to note that up until the 1960s most female Indonesian students in Egypt did not cover their hair completely. They wore only a typical Indonesian *kerudung* (Abaza 1994, 137).

It cannot be denied that Arabs had a significant role in the spread of Islamic teachings in the archipelago (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 23). Muslim scholars of Ḥaḍramī origin have always been important in the dissemination of religious teachings in Indonesia. Initially, Arab cultures might have been considered more Islamic than local traditions (Mobini-Kesheh 1999, 24). However, the role of natives in realising their Islamic understanding in practice should also be appreciated. Martin van Bruinessen has argued, 'The process of Islamization of the archipelago over the past six centuries, and of Islamic reform over the past three, has been powered less by foreign preachers and missionaries arriving from abroad than by local people travelling to Arabia in search of knowledge and prestige' (2011, 7). Therefore, the scholarship of Indonesians studying in Mecca, Medina,

Cairo and Ḥaḍramawt who understand the nature of Islam in the archipelago cannot be neglected. In addition to this, the role of local rulers who converted to Islam should be acknowledged in the discussion of the adoption of Muslim dress. The local variation of Muslim dress in the archipelago demonstrates that discussions of politics and power cannot be separated from the whole discussion of dress. Wearing diverse and distinctly local variations of face veiling which adapt products of local culture, for example, the *sarung,* indicates local efforts to understand and implement Islamic teachings as well as to introduce the characteristics of their regions. Throughout the history of present-day Indonesia, Islam has had an influence on clothing, but this is not uniform and depends on the mode of transmission and the relevant historical period. Below I discuss what was happening at the time of the Islamisation of Bima, where the practice of wearing the face veil became syncretised with local custom, and Makassarese influence.

Rimpu mpida: A local type of face veiling

During my fieldwork, I did not expect to find local forms of face veiling. When I analysed some Indonesian popular culture products, in particular in literary works representing *cadari,* I found a distinctly Indonesian face veil worn by a female character in one of the novels, *Sebab Cinta tak Harus Berkata* (Because love doesn't have to say) (2008) written by Akhi Dirman al-Amin. After reading the novel, I contacted the writer and this communication led me to discover that in Indonesia wearing the *cadar* has its own cultural roots.

The local style of face veil had been practised by women in diverse areas of the archipelago as part of the implementation of religious teaching and the embodiment of local wisdom. The characteristic of a distinctly local face veil can be seen from the use of *kain* (fabric), namely *sarung.* The shapes and designs of this local face veil are significantly different from those of the current *cadar.* For example, in Bima (West Nusa Tenggara) some women wear a face veil called *rimpu mpida. Rimpu mpida* is also known as a *cadar* version of Bima (*cadar a la Bima*) (Aulia 2012, 90). Similarly, in Donggala (Central Sulawesi), there is a recognised face veiling garment known as a *nutingka,* worn especially by single women as their daily dress. In Donggala, *nutingka* is considered to be a product of Islamic influence (Kartiwa 1983, 18–19). Elsewhere in Jambi, a face veil known as *kuluk duo kain* is worn by women along the Batanghari River. Women who wear *kuluk duo kain* cover their faces at night but can show their faces during the daytime.

It is generally the case that the advent of Islam led to changes in dress. Bare-chested women and men began to wear a tunic above their *sarung* (Reid 1988, 89) and, in Makassar in the mid-seventeenth century, it is recorded that women covered their entire bodies including their faces (de Rhodes 1966, 207; Reid 1988, 89). On 26 December 1925, the local newspaper *Bintang-Hindia* published a picture of the 'real' Malay woman (*perempuan Melajoe toelen*) wearing a face veil that covered half of her face with a *sarung.*

In this section, I focus especially on the practice of wearing *rimpu mpida* in Bima (Dana Mbojo/Tanah Bima), a municipality in West Nusa Tenggara.[6]

The kingdom of Bima was Islamised by Gowa in 1618–19 (Chambert-Loir and Salahuddin 1999, xiv; Noorduyn 1987). After the formerly Hindu–Buddhist kingdom embraced Islam in 1633 CE, the first Islamic sultan, Abdul Kahir (the twenty-fifth king of Bima, who ruled from 1630 to 1635), issued a command to all sultanate staff and Bima society in general to obey Islamic law and practise Islamic teachings (Salahuddin 1997, 6). The second sultan, Abil Khair Sirajuddin, who ruled from 1640 to 1682, made the Malay language written in Arabic script the formal script within the kingdom (Chambert-Loir 2004, 20; Salahuddin 1997, 7). Michael Hitchcock (1996, 2) points out that Muslim culture in Bima was brought by others, especially Malays and Makassars. The presence of face veiling in Makassar in the mid-seventeenth century influenced Bima. Influence from South Sulawesi can be seen in other traditional costumes, such as the *baju bodo* (traditional short blouse) which is also worn by women in Bima.

Further, more people of Bima adjusted their local wisdom to be in line with religious teachings. This can be seen from the practice of wearing the face veil, *rimpu mpida.* It is important to note that although the *rimpu* is mentioned as expressing the identity of Muslim women in Bima (Sundari 2010), it is seldom mentioned in reports on Bima culture. For example, on Bima tradition in 1977/1978, Ahmad Amin and his research group, mentioned *rimpu* only briefly (1997, 23, 105). Hitchcock also mentioned the *rimpu*[7] only in passing, in reference to rural women's dress that was worn to market (1996, 52–53). According to local history, the *rimpu* has been worn since the implementation of Sharīʿa law by the second Bima sultan (Chambert-Loir and Shalahuddin 1999, 607). It was mandatory for a girl who had commenced menstruation to wear it (for Saudi Arabia, see Altorki 1986, 36; for Oman, see Chatty 1997, 128). Therefore, wearing the *rimpu* can be regarded as part of the product of the acculturation of Islamic values with local culture as in the above-mentioned phenomenon of *cipo'-cipo'.*

Although the shape of the *rimpu,* especially *rimpu mpida,* is not exactly the same as the face veil worn in Arab countries, its function to cover women's faces and bodies is the same. The Arabs in Bima are mostly of Ḥaḍramī background (Hitchcock 1995, 241), whose ancestry can be traced to present-day Yemen. The role of Arabs in maintaining the use of the *rimpu* cannot be neglected. This holds true because, as well as trading, the Arabs also played a religious role (Aulia 2012, 83; Chambert-Loir 1993, 82). This does not mean that the practice of *rimpu mpida* in Bima was popularised by Arab women, because, as mentioned above, at the time men of Arab descent often married local women (Hitchcock 1995, 253; Jacobsen 2009, 23). In addition, the local rulers of Bima were eager to encourage the wearing of *rimpu,* including *rimpu mpida,* as the proper dress for Muslim women in the region. Therefore, it is not surprising if, for example, Hitchcock mentions that *rimpu* indicates 'a Muslim and Bimanese identity' (1995, 244).

In *Kamus Bima-Indonesia, rimpu* is explained as a verb meaning to cover a woman's head and face with a *sarung* so that only the eyes can be seen (the traditional Bimanese women's dress); and as a noun which refers to a veil that is shaped from a *sarung*. *Douma rimpu* refers to the person who veils herself with a *sarung* (Ismail et al. 1985, 128). *Rimpu* is especially worn by women when they

go out of their houses, especially for certain formal occasions (Aulia 2012). They differentiate between two types of *rimpu: rimpu mpida* and *rimpu colo.* '*Mpida*' literally means soft and very small (Ismail et al. 1985, 92). *Rimpu mpida* is worn by young, single, adult females. This is the *rimpu* that covers the entire woman's body except her eyes. The cloth that is used for *rimpu* (headcloth) is called *tembe* or *tembe paleka* (Hamzah 2004, 255), which is a *sarung* (Ismail et al. 1985, 154). They wear two *sarung* to totally cover all parts of their bodies, upper and lower.

In my interview with a prominent Bima scholar, Hamid Syukrie, he pointed out that the *rimpu* initially reflected the pride of the wearers, because they weave the *sarung* for their own *rimpu,* and it functioned as a supportive element to finding a marriage partner (*jodoh*)*,* because a man usually identified the girl that he liked from the *sarung* that she wore. The second type of *rimpu, rimpu colo,* is worn by married women. *Rimpu colo* is different from *rimpu mpida* in that it covers the head and body but not the woman's face.[8]

This distinction strengthens the aspect of local wisdom that unmarried women should be able to conceal their bodies more thoroughly than married women to avoid the male gaze. This extra emphasis on unmarried women completely covering their bodies by wearing the face veil can also be found in other countries, like Saudi Arabia. The reason for such emphasis is the same: unmarried women are expected to guard the purity of the family which is linked to the pride of their male protectors (Altorki 1986, 39; Papanek 1973, 317). Here we see how wearing the *rimpu* is part of the historical variability of body techniques to cover one's body properly based on the social norms prevalent in Bima. During the same time, when *rimpu* remained popular in Bima, Muslim women from other parts of the archipelago covered their bodies differently. This technique of the body emerged within the collective life of Muslims in Bima. The phenomenon is resonant with Mauss's case study in which he analysed different kinds of marching and digging techniques by French and English soldiers (1979; Crossley 2007, 85). They are different because the techniques that they used emerged from different collective understandings.

Rimpu for Bima society serves as a social boundary that marks their commitment to Islam from other religions. Mary Douglas's (1966) account on the link between social boundaries and purity is relevant in understanding the use of *rimpu* during the sultanate period in Bima. Douglas argued that boundary maintenance and purity are especially important for a type of society that has strong group orientation (1970). We can see the adoption of *rimpu,* at the time of the promulgation of Islamic law, as a collective commitment of the sultan's subjects to Islam. For them, *rimpu* was a sign that the wearer was a decent pious Muslim woman. Women who wore the *rimpu* were expected to maintain their purity by avoiding anything that could violate their image as honourable Bima women. This is resonant with Santi Rozario's study of gender divisions in Bangladesh in which she elaborates on the importance of controlling female sexuality in maintaining group boundaries and social hierarchy (1991, 15). The failure to control one's purity can impact on family and community honour. In Bima, the assimilation of understanding between Islamic law (*hukum Islam*) and customary law (*hukum adat*) has been well recorded in a pledge, which says: *Mori ro made na dou Mboje*

ede kai hukum Islam-ku (both life and death in Bima society must be in line with Islamic Sharīʿa). Indeed, the practice of covering women's faces was in line with a strong tradition of *malu* (shame or embarrassment) among women in Bima. Rozario argues that 'to have shame' means 'to be sensitive to public opinion' (1991, 16). Bima women were also expected to embody this sensitivity, to guard their *malu* and to feel *malu* if they could not meet the norm of their communities (Sundari 2010). The general philosophy of the Bima people is related to *malu.* This philosophy, which had been known since the period of the Bima kingdom, is *maja labo dahu* meaning *malu dan takut* (shamefulness and fear) (Syukrie 2009). *Maja labo dahu* is a cultural concept and the main element of Bima culture which was used as a warning for Bima people to stay away from behaviour that could induce shame in themselves and their families.

In Bima, as elsewhere (see Rozario on Bangladesh 1991), the tradition of *malu* was strictly preserved for single women. In the marriage proposal process, a bride was usually reticent to meet the groom who had proposed to her. The groom usually knew about the physical appearance of the girl only from his family. The preservation of this concept of shame and modesty was inculcated at an early age. Therefore, throughout the history of the wearing of *rimpu mpida,* many Bima parents were reluctant to enrol their daughters in Dutch schools because female students in these schools did not wear the *rimpu. Malu* is not independent of Islam, but it is a core element of the faith. However, the standard coverage of *malu* and modesty (*kesopanan*) are different across time and place. It depends on how the society involved understands the terms. Those who did not wear the *rimpu,* especially during the sultanate period, were not punished. However, it was considered that they were breaking moral, social and modesty norms (Aulia 2012, 87–88). This clearly and sensitively captures just how much subjectivity is a social phenomenon and how much the agency of *rimpu* wearers is related to their efforts to embody the collective norms in their society.

When the sultanate period ended with the discontinuation of the royal lines, after the death of the last sultan, Muḥammad Salahuddin (1915–51), the practice of wearing the *rimpu mpida* for Muslim girls decreased.[9] One of the main reasons was that when they attended school, they had to wear a uniform that required them to uncover their faces. This phenomenon demonstrates shifting dress conventions in different periods. Kimberly Huisman and Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo point out that 'dress conventions are not static … Changes in dress do not occur in a vacuum; rather, changes are negotiated within specific temporal and structural-historical contexts' (2005, 46, 51). Nowadays the intention to wear *rimpu* is more related to a desire to preserve local traditions than to an intention to maintain religious belief (Sundari 2010). Lately, there have been efforts to revive local wisdom, evident from cultural parades featuring *rimpu* wearers at certain festival occasions, including the celebration of the anniversary of Bima.[10] The local government is especially eager to preserve this local heritage by organising the *rimpu* parade during celebrations. In 2018, the national *rimpu* festival was held for the first time in the National Monument of Indonesia or Monas (Jakarta). In 2019, the Museum Rekor Dunia Indonesia (MURI, the Indonesian World Records

Museum) rewarded the Bima Government with an award for setting a world record by gathering 20,165 *rimpu* wearers during the *rimpu* festival.[11] Such successful events, however, have not translated into the everyday wearing of *rimpu.* Some Bima women nowadays feel that the *rimpu* is out of date or old-fashioned (Yulius 2001, 78). Younger generations of Bima, to borrow Bourdieu's term (1990, 52), no longer 'feel for the game' if they have to wear *rimpu.* It does not feel natural for them. Some of the younger generation of women feel that wearing the *rimpu* prevents them from embracing their youth culture. Syamsiyah, a 21-year-old *jilbab* wearer originating from Bima, gives her opinion on *rimpu:* 'Although I respect those who still wear it, I myself do not wear it because for me it is so out of date, especially its design. Besides the design, wearing *rimpu* is what old ladies do.'

The growth of the Muslim fashion industry has impacted the practice of wearing *rimpu.* For some people, wearing *jilbab* nowadays is more than a religious statement but it is also a fashion statement (Jones 2007; Hamdani 2007) (Figures 1.2 and 1.3). This has been boosted by the growing presence of young fashion designers, such as Dian Pelangi, Jenahara, Ria Miranda and Ghaida Tsuraya with their new, young fashion styles, which gave birth to the Hijabers Community (HC) in

Figure 1.2 A Muslim model wearing a Muslim dress on the runway in Jakarta. Source. Photo credit, © Jeny Tjahyawati, 24 December 2005. Used with permission. (Note: Jeny Tjahwayati is a well-known Indonesian Muslim fashion designer. I have been friends with her since 2005 when I conducted research on Muslim fashion designers in Indonesia.)

Figure 1.3 Jeny Tjahyawati (centre) with her Muslim models at a fashion show in Jakarta. Source. This photograph was provided by © Jeny Tjahyawati, 27 May 2006. Used with permission.

2010 (Baulch and Pramiyanti 2018, 2; Beta 2014). The Muslim fashion industry in Indonesia has offered more practical and simple ways of covering parts of the body that must be concealed (*ʿawra*), such as through the invention of the 'instant' *jilbab* (*jilbab instan*),[12] because, for many young Bima women, wearing the *rimpu* is very complicated (Figure 1.4).

Many of them also consider that what is offered by Muslim fashion industries is sufficient to cover women's *ʿawra.* Therefore, most young women in Bima today do not wear *rimpu mpida,* but they have replaced it with *jilbab* and not *cadar.* Nowadays, those who wear *cadar* (not *rimpu mpida*) in Bima are mostly young well-educated Muslim women who associate themselves with purist movements that indeed oppose any Islamic practices that have been mixed with local cultural practices.

The present-day *cadar:* Encounters with Islamic revivalist movements

This section focuses on analysing the practice of the present-day *cadar* and the role played by revivalist or purist movements in the introduction of the type of *cadar* and *purdah* currently being worn. These *cadar* and *purdah* are clearly different from the local forms noted previously. The shapes and styles

Figure 1.4 Women inspecting instant *jilbab* at the biggest textile market in Southeast Asia, Tanah Abang. Source. Photo credit, author, 9 February 2008

of present-day *cadar* and *purdah* are almost the same as the ones that can be found in other countries, especially in the Arab Gulf. However, the 'Indonesian touch' can be found in designs of the *cadar,* especially those worn by the followers of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Niqab Squad (Figure 1.5). The *cadar* style is usually worn by female followers of revivalist movements that seek to purify Islam by offering what they perceive as purer, more authentic versions of Islam as practised by pious predecessors (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*).[13] It is noteworthy that the close connection between wearing the present-day *cadar* and the existence of conservative and revivalist movements in Indonesia, including transnational ones, demonstrates that wearing the *cadar* is emblematic of the body techniques prevalent in such groups.

Using Mauss's embodied practice, in which he argues that it is specific to certain societies (1979), this section shows how the diverse religious revivalist movements which exist in Indonesia set their specific embodied practices to differ significantly from those of other Islamic and Islamist groups, especially mainstream Islamic groups in the country. Mauss also emphasises the importance of collective knowledge in his explication of habitus (1979, 101). Nick Crossley explains Mauss's account of the knowledge involved in body techniques arguing that 'the mindful aspect of body techniques consists in the fact that they are not mere movements; that they embody knowledge and understanding' (2007, 86). It

Figure 1.5 A Tablīghī *cadari* with her embroidered *cadar* in front of her room in the *pesantren.* Source. Photo credit, author, 8 January 2008.

is in this context we see the close link between the presence of *cadari* and their direct and indirect affiliation with the Tablīghī and varied Salafi factions, as well as other Islamist movements.

This phenomenon also indicates that the subjectivity of the wearers is part of the product of social phenomenon. Since women who wear *cadar* continue to see themselves through the eyes of authoritative figures in their groups or at least through the interpretation of Islam produced by these figures, it also indicates that besides self-focused pursuit, this practice of obedience is a social and interactive activity.

Besides the concept of body techniques, the concept of subculture is also relevant in the study of the distinctive lifestyle of *cadari* who associate themselves with diverse revivalist movements. Subculture may be identified by the 'norms that set a group apart from, not those that integrate a group with, the total society' (Yinger 1960, 628). My approach takes its inspiration from the insights of cultural sociologist Sarah Thornton (1997). She points out that 'the defining attribute of "subculture," then, lies with the way the accent is put on the distinction between a particular cultural/social group and the larger culture/society' (5). In this case, the concept of subculture relates to norms, values and beliefs that differ from those of the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. Nowadays, *cadari* also strive to

distinguish their presence from other mainstream Muslim groups in Indonesia by establishing what they believe to be a more authentic Islam. Qualities of the lifestyle of *cadari,* such as their opposition towards the behaviour of mainstream Muslim women in Indonesia, including the outward appearance of these women, mark their conscious subcultural orientation. The majority of *cadari* with whom I worked mentioned that one driver compelling them to be part of a certain revivalist movement is their opposition to the Islam practised by their parents and by the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. For them, this Islam is inauthentic, corrupted. By being part of this subculture, they strive to detach themselves from their past and from their parents' lack of understanding of what they perceived to be true Islam. This association then becomes the main aspect that produces resistance from many Indonesians.

The practice of wearing the *cadar* by women attaching themselves to revivalist groups can also be regarded as 'doing religion,' to borrow Avishai's concept (2008). Doing religion refers to 'a mode of conduct and being, a performance of identity' and when it is viewed as a strategic action, for her, 'doing religion' means 'religion may be done in the pursuit of religious goals' (413). For women in these groups, wearing the *cadar* is part of their aspiration to become true *Muslimah* (Muslim women).

Saba Mahmood's (2005) intellectual contribution to the study of virtuous subjects in Egypt is especially important to this study. There are some differences between Mahmood's research and the focus of this book. For example, regarding the main research subjects, Mahmood conflates diverse religious or *daʿwa* movements in Egypt into one single 'mosque movement' (2005, 180–185; Bangstad 2011, 30; Gauvain 2013, 13, 274 n. 57). In this book, I carefully analyse the affiliations of face-veiled women. In every chapter, the affiliation of the *cadari* is explored to better understand their world view. I think this is important because ideological tendency is one of the key points for understanding the ways in which *cadari* struggle to be true *Muslimah* and how they experience their religious journey. In addition, Mahmood's focus on the lives of members of the women's mosque movement mainly concentrates on their experiences within the domain of the mosque. Therefore, there are many aspects of the lives of her women subjects that are unknown to the reader, in particular their life beyond the mosque. Peter van der Veer points out that Mahmood's 'focus on the micro-practices inside the mosque seems to prevent her from looking at the micro-practices outside the mosque' (2008, 812; see also Soares and Osella 2009). This book presents the voices of face-veiled women as research subjects in diverse spheres of their lives. Furthermore, it engages with and comments on their everyday life experiences.

Darul Arqam

Darul Arqam, Jama'ah Rufaqa', or Global Ikhwan[14] is a Malaysian Islamic movement with its 'Sufi-millenarian ideals' and aspirations to build a *halal* (Ar. *ḥalāl* or what is permissible according to Islamic law) lifestyle. The term Darul

Arqam (The House of Arqam) refers to the name of one of the Prophet's companions called Arqam b. Abī Al-Arqam or ʿAbdul Manāf b. Asad b. Makhzūm. His name was very popular at the advent of Islam in Mecca, mainly because his house was used as the propagation centre by the Prophet Muḥammad. Darul Arqam was founded in 1968 in Kampung Keramat by Shaykhul Arqam Ustādh Ashaari Muḥammad at-Tamimi (1938–2010), known by his followers as Abuya, who then became leader until the movement was banned by the Malaysian Government in August 1994 for being deviant (Meuleman 1996, 48; Nagata 2004, 111). The ban was issued as a decree of the Islamic Division of the Prime Minister's Department (Bahagian Hal Ehwal Islam, Jabatan Perdana Menteri) on 14 March 1992, stating that some of Al-Arqam's teachings could be regarded as major deviations in Islam. In Darul Arqam's 'sacred book,' *Awrad Muhammadiyah,*[15] it is written that its compiler Shaykh Suhaimi (d. 1925) is Imām Mahdī, who will rise at the end of time, and Ashaari, the leader, is the *khalīfa* or vice regent of Imām Mahdī.

There were diverse responses to the early presence of Darul Arqam in Indonesia. Although there were some groups that opposed Darul Arqam, such as the modernist organisation, Muhammadiyah; the other large Muslim mass organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), responded positively.[16] In contrast to Malaysia, the Indonesian Government did not take any serious action against the growth of Darul Arqam (Azra 2005, 17). It was banned only in some districts. The first region to ban the activities of Darul Arqam was North Sumatra (19 August 1994), followed by West Sumatra, Aceh, Riau, West Java, DKI, Central Java, East Java and West Nusa Tenggara (Dasuki 1994, 288).

The presence of Darul Arqam can be regarded as the most important moment in the history of *cadar* in Indonesia. Wearing it is part of the body techniques introduced by Darul Arqam which also means it is one of the most important elements of their subculture. The term often used in Malaysia to identify the *cadar* is *purdah.* Based on my fieldwork most *cadari* and non-*cadari* mentioned that it was Darul Arqam women who had pioneered the practice of wearing the present form of the *cadar* in Indonesia in the 1960s. It is noteworthy that many of the *cadar* constituencies are not aware of the presence of distinctly local face veils, like *rimpu mpida.* While a small number of them do know about this distinctly Indonesian face veil, they argue that the current *cadar* is different from the Indonesian face veil. Umm Yusuf, 42 years old, who originally came from Bima and currently lives in Yogyakarta, says: 'I know that in Bima there is also an Indonesian face veil, *rimpu mpida.* It is, however, different from the *cadar* that I am wearing now. The *cadar* is more Islamic than *rimpu mpida.* As you know Ukht [Sister] … *rimpu mpida* is very colourful, therefore, it does not fulfil the characteristic of proper dress for Muslim women.'

Tablīghī Jamāʿat women who have worn the *cadar* since the 1980s also admitted that when they started to wear the *cadar,* Darul Arqam women had already set the trend. One of the first Tablīghī Jamāʿat women to wear the *cadar,* Umm Zaynab, 61 years old, said: 'When the number of women joining Tablīghī was still very few and the number of women wearing the *cadar* and *purdah* among us

also still very few, I remembered *cadar* and *purdah* were already popular among Darul Arqam women, not Salafi women like nowadays.'

In my conversation with Ibu Sakinah Rahmanudin, the third wife of Ustādh Niezamuddin, one of Darul Arqam founder's sons, she said that since the 1960s Abuya has never issued a religious legal decree (*fatwa*) stating that wearing the *cadar* or the *purdah* is obligatory. Nevertheless, he emphasised that Muslim women have to love their God, and if the person loves her or his God then everything that comes from God should be obeyed, including wearing proper Muslim dress. In this regard, covering women's bodies properly should be observed without question. It is recorded in one of Darul Arqam's early publications, *An Nasihah,* that from the early 1990s there were some Darul Arqam women in Indonesia who not only wore the *cadar* but were also actively propagating Darul Arqam's teachings.[17] Ibu Sakinah herself, who is from Indonesia, had worn the *cadar* since 1989, before she finally gave it up.

Darul Arqam women can be regarded as the first *cadari* to face obstacles from fellow Indonesians who opposed their 'strange' dress and the norms within their subculture. In 1991, for example, the *cadari* of Darul Arqam were threatened in Indonesia by young people armed with sticks. They accused them of being harmful women. This incident was part of the impact of a late 1980s rumour that women with this kind of dress spread poison on fruit and vegetables in some Indonesian traditional markets (Abd Rahma 1991, 9). In Malaysia, the resistance towards *purdah* was also strong. In 1984, three students at University Sains Malaysia who were wearing the *purdah* were labelled 'freakish' (*aneh/sudah menyeleweng*) by non-wearers. Following a government ruling on banning the movement, the university then banned wearing the *purdah* in February 1985 (Karim 1992, 215 n. 9). The resistance towards the *purdah* illustrates other characteristics of subcultures: that it could possibly 'bring a little disorder to the security of neighbourhood' (Thornton 1997, 2).

After the Malaysian Government decreed Darul Arqam to be deviant, it strove to prevent the rebirth of the movement. It is recorded that in April 1996, eighteen members of Darul Arqam or Al-Arqam were detained under the Internal Security Act (ISA). For the Malaysian Government, the followers of Darul Arqam's way of life who rejected any attachment outside their group and who preferred to live in seclusion were viewed as a potential security risk (Horstmann 2006, 74). The government then took further action to remove and forbid any images and any Darul Arqam signifiers such as *purdah* for women and *jubah* as well as *sorban* for male followers. After the condemnation of Darul Arqam as a deviant Islamic group, Abuya asked his female followers to give up their *purdah.* In Ibu Sakinah's words:

> What we wanted and certainly what Abuya wanted was that every Muslim woman dress in the most proper and perfect way. However, if the situation was not conducive and if wearing the *cadar* or the *purdah* even had invited some *fitna* [provocation leading to disorder or chaos], negative impacts, then there is a *rukhṣa* [dispensation of leaving the teaching] in this situation.

The first woman who took off the *cadar* was Abuya's first wife. She then appeared in public to help Darul Arqam women understand the reason for giving up their *purdah,* especially in relation to the political situation in Malaysia. She explained the reason for giving up their *purdah* was because it was God's decision, as they had previously adopted it. This phenomenon of giving up the *cadar* by followers of Darul Arqam demonstrates that the lifeworld of these women cannot be separated from diverse aspects of cultural and political circumstances. Their lifeworld is always bound up with the public sphere and public discourse. In the process of adopting certain proper Muslim dress, both public and private aspects of their lifeworld are intermingled.

The 'uniform' of Darul Arqam women in Indonesia and Malaysia, in general, had changed several times; from an all-in-black (*purdah*) to a colourful, or white *purdah,* in the early 1990s. They then adopted *tudung labuh/jilbab besar* (a headscarf that covers the entire upper part of women's bodies except their face) until the 2000s.[18] The current 'uniform' is a colourful loose-fitting Muslim dress with *tudung* (a smaller headscarf which is more relaxed than *tudung labuh*) known in Indonesia as *jilbab.* During my fieldwork, some of the female followers of Jama'ah Rufaqa' or Global Ikhwan wore diverse types of veils, such as *jilbab* and instant *jilbab.*

The importance of Darul Arqam in popularising the practice of *cadar* wearing among Muslims, especially in Southeast Asia, was also felt in other countries like Egypt. This is mainly due to the presence of the *cadari* of Darul Arqam in some countries where they enthusiastically performed their missionary activities. In the late 1980s and early 1990s female students of Darul Arqam, who were sent to Egypt for Arabic and Islamic studies, wore the *cadar* (Shafie 1990, 24).

Tablīghī Jamāʿat

Tablīghī Jamāʿat or Jama'ah Tabligh or JT (Je-Te), as often used in Indonesia, is a transnational Islamic reform movement founded in the 1920s in India. The followers prefer the term 'Muslims' for people active in this group. For their activities, they use terms that refer directly to the activities. Thus, the terms often used are *kerja dakwah* or *usaha dakwah* (the work of *daʿwa* or proselytisation), *rombongan dakwah* (*daʿwa* group), *jama'ah dakwah* (*daʿwa* congregation) or *rombongan silaturahmi* (bonding and close ties group). The focus of Tablīghī Jamāʿat teachings is to reform and purify the lives of its followers. The initial struggle of the founder, Mawlānā Muḥammad Ilyās (1885–1944), was to establish a movement that could purify the practice of Islam in the South Asian subcontinent—and an Islam which had been mixed with Hindu mores.

Tablīghī Jamāʿat, as one of the two main movements in this study besides Salafism, has had a vital position in disseminating the practice of wearing the *cadar* in Indonesia, especially after Darul Arqam women started to relinquish it in 1994. It was under the second *amīr* (leader) of Tablīghī Jamāʿat, Mawlānā Muḥammad Yūsuf Kandhalawi (1917–65), the only son of Mawlānā Muḥammad Ilyās, that Tablīghī Jamāʿat expanded its influence outside South Asia, including

into Southeast Asia (Masud 2000). Upon strengthening their influence in other Southeast Asian countries, Tablīghī Jamāʿat arrived in Indonesia in 1952 (Razak 2008).[19] The first group from India was led by Miaji Isa (Razak 2008). In 1972, foreign Tablīghī Jamāʿat groups started strengthening their influence on Indonesian Muslims by way of a group from Pakistan. Tablīghī Jamāʿat began to become more popular in Indonesia from 1974 (Aziz 2004). That year is often mentioned as an important moment for Tablīghī Jamāʿat in Indonesia. Tablīghī Jamāʿat started to attract some ardent followers, including the head of the Kebon Jeruk mosque in Jakarta, H. Zulfakar, who was appointed as the first leader of the Indonesian congregation, and Kebon Jeruk mosque was officially chosen as the Indonesian headquarters of Tablīghī Jamāʿat.

Mawlānā Muḥammad Ilyās set certain embodied practices, including the building of a *halal* lifestyle within his subculture and that all Tablīghī people must follow the examples set by the Prophet, his family and his male and female pious companions in every area of their lives, from dressing, eating and sleeping, to the way of seeing the world. For Tablīghī women, the lifestyle of the Prophet's wives and his pious female companions became role models.

Purdah, not *cadar,* among Tablīghī women can be regarded as their 'uniform' to perform their *daʿwa* (Ind. *dakwah*) (proselytisation). Tablīghī communities are very strict in differentiating between *purdah* and *cadar.* This is because one of the main rules for female followers (*mastura*)[20] when they perform *khurūj* (go out for *daʿwa*) is that they must wear *purdah*—a face veil that covers the woman's entire body including her eyes, not just the *cadar,* which covers women's faces but not their eyes. Therefore, for them wearing the face veil is not merely a body technique. It is a body technique that is intertwined with the notion of perfection in performing religious duty.

The first group of female Tablīghī came to Indonesia in 1985 from Pakistan. Their initial destinations were important centres of Tablīghī Jamāʿat, namely Jakarta, East Java (Temboro, Magetan) and South Sulawesi (Makassar). After their visit to Indonesia, nine couples (husbands and wives) of Indonesian Tablīghī went to Pakistan. These nine couples, particularly the women, were expected to learn how to correctly perform *khurūj* or *mastura khurūj,* because they were required to transfer their knowledge to other prospective Tablīghī women in Indonesia. Indeed, the focus of this *khurūj* was on women's participation because this was the first time Indonesian Tablīghī women had performed *khurūj.* The following year (1986), for the first time, women could attend the Tablīghī Jamāʿat's national gathering (*zur*) in Ancol, Jakarta. After the establishment of the first group of female Indonesian Tablīghī, the number of women performing *khurūj* with their non-marriageable male kin (*maḥram*) started to grow, which means that the number of women wearing the *cadar* or *purdah* among Tablīghī followers has also been increasing. Ibu Umamah (pseudonym), one of the women who performed the first *mastura khurūj,* said that she had worn the *cadar* consistently since 1987. She has focused on disseminating the practice of wearing the *cadar* since she opened her first shop in 1991. Located near the main headquarters of Tablīghī in Indonesia, her

shop sells diverse female needs ranging from Tablīghī women's dress such as *ʿabāya, cadar* and *purdah* to eyeliner (*kuhl/kohl*).

The Salafi movement

Salafi movement was founded in the eighteenth century on the Arabian Peninsula. It is a movement that calls for a return to the foundational texts of Islam. Salafi, then, refers to those who have a strong commitment to purify their religion (*taṣfiyya*) and to return to the basics of Islam as they believe it was practised by the Prophet Muḥammad and his companions (the *salaf* as opposed to those of the *khalaf* or the later generations). According to Salafi, the Islamic principles upheld by *salaf* are the only correct understanding of Islam.

The Salafi movement in this study differs from the nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernist reform movement led by Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849–1905) and the Muslim Brotherhood of Ḥasan al-Bannāʾ (1906–49), who also often use the term Salafi. The term Salafi/Salafism, as used in this study, describes a group or set of practices known by many lay Indonesians as Wahhabi. Wahhabism is a sub-variant or part of a larger Salafism; however, the common use of the term Salafism did not occur until the late-nineteenth century (Niblock 2006, 23). In the period of the Prophet Muḥammad, this term was never used. Therefore, the use of the term itself is a subject of contestation, including in Indonesia. The global Salafi movement is large and there are many factions. Scholars have introduced typologies and varied terms to signify the diversity. R. Hrair Dekmejian's work (1985) was one of the early attempts at classifying factions within varied Islamist groups, including 'gradualist-pragmatic,' 'revolutionary' and 'messianic puritanical.' Quintan Wiktorowicz introduced three major factions: purist, politico and jihadi (2006). Some scholars try to modify these typologies or criticise them (Hegghammer 2009, 257). The tension among the Salafi groups mostly originates from the way they contextualise their interpretations of Islam. In general, these groups have similar and even overlapping agendas. Despite their claims of difference, one common feature is their attention to the outward appearance of their followers. Men and women should present themselves as guardians of morality. Therefore, male followers ideally wear *liḥya* (long beards), *jubah* and avoid *isbal* (Ar. *isbāl*) (below ankle-length trousers). Female followers should wear Muslim dress, of which the *cadar* forms a crucial element.

The presence of the Salafi movement with its diverse factions in Indonesia can be further regarded as the most prominent element in the increasing popularity of the current practice of wearing the *cadar* and the *purdah.* Wearing the *cadar,* in the life of Salafi women, has long been part of their body techniques which are also part of the collective understanding of religious scholars within diverse Salafi circles that true *Muslimah* should embody this kind of practice. This practice is intertwined with the wearers' quest to be true *Muslimah* following what they believe are the teachings of true Islam. Therefore, the practice of face veiling is not merely about women's covering, it is also a reflection of the embodied knowledge and understanding of the wearers.

The significant influence of the Salafi movement in Indonesia can be seen through the establishment of the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia/Indonesian Council for Islamic Propagation (DDII) by the former leader of Masyumi, Muhammad Natsir (1908–93), in 1967. DDII developed a good relationship with a Saudi Arabian organisation established in 1962 which was responsible for spreading Salafi Islam, the Rābiṭa al-ʿĀlam al-Islāmiy (Islamic World League). In 1973, DDII was appointed as the representative of the Rābiṭa in Indonesia (Hasan 2002, 151–52). In 1980, the establishment of a Saudi-funded university in Indonesia, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic, LIPIA), has further strengthened the influence of Saudi-Salafi Islam in Indonesia. Diverse Salafi groups in Indonesia have developed significantly since the 1990s on some campuses (van Bruinessen 2002, 134). This development was particularly due to Indonesian students returning from studies in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt and other centres of Islamic learning in the Middle East.

Nowadays, Salafism in Arab countries—such as Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Kuwait—can be regarded as the main references for the diverse Salafi factions in Indonesia. There have also been some changes in the styles of Muslim women's dress in these countries. For example, in Saudi Arabia, prior to the unification of the kingdom in 1932, Hejazi women still wore a pale coloured veil. Following unification, the black veil became the norm (Yamani 1997, 59). During the 1980s, the same time as people in Indonesia witnessed the expansion of the Salafi movement, Hejazi women became stricter in the practice of veiling. In Yemen, since its unification in 1990, most women have worn a head covering in accordance with the growing religious conservatism (Adra 2006, 47–48).

Women in Salafi groups are not only very strict in practising the *cadar* but are also very active in disseminating the norms within their subcultures. Among many diverse Salafi factions, *cadar* is regarded as the ideal Muslim dress (except for the jihadi Salafi faction). One of the Salafi jihadi teachers (*asātidh*), Abu Jibril, mentioned that it was an Australian Salafi woman called Rabiah Hutchinson who popularised the wearing of a certain modest Muslim dress, particularly the *ʿabāya,* to her Indonesian Muslim sisters (Neighbour 2009, 114). This is most likely true within Salafi jihadi circles, because Rabiah had started to wear the *ʿabāya* in the early 1980s. However, to assume that it was Rabiah who introduced *ʿabāya* is misleading because earlier Darul Arqam women had worn not only *ʿabāya* but also *cadar.* Rabiah, had worn a triangular *jilbab* in the 1980s and began to wear the *cadar* in the early 1990s when she was in Afghanistan (Neighbour 2009, 175). The mainstream *cadar* constituencies these days come from non-violent factions. However, media attention has focused on those associating themselves with terrorist cells in Indonesia.

Cadar as a 'shelter'

Since 2011, Indonesia has begun to witness the phenomenon of the *cadar* as a 'shelter' for women who have had to face the Lady of Justice. This book, however,

does not focus on this type of wearer because their numbers are still relatively small, and the women involved mostly wear it only temporarily. However, I need to mention the practice here briefly because their initial appearance of these women has shocked many Indonesians. This started when four women received extensive media coverage on their sudden use of the *cadar:* Dharnawati, a businesswoman who was found guilty of bribing two officials at the Manpower and Transmigration Ministry, and who started to wear the *cadar* in public in September 2011; the two witnesses of the bribery case of the athletes' village construction project for the Southeast Asian Games, Yulianis and Oktarina Furi, who appeared in court wearing *cadar* in January 2012; and finally, Neneng Sri Wahyuni, a businesswoman who was sentenced to six years gaol and was convicted of corruption relating to a solar power project.[21] Wahyuni first appeared in public wearing a *cadar* in June 2012.

Some journalists and scholars consider this phenomenon to be a new trend of female defendants turning to religious symbols. It is not only the *cadar* which has been worn by these 'delinquent' women, but also different types of veils, especially *kerudung* and *jilbab.* The presence of veiled women when on trial is not a striking phenomenon, because it has been common to see men wearing religious outfits when facing legal matters. Nevertheless, the presence of the *cadar* in court was initially common in the trials of the wives of terrorists. The Indonesian public was surprised to see women who had previously not worn the veil in their daily lives, suddenly adopting the strictest type of woman's covering, the *cadar.* News on this issue was splashed across the headlines of Indonesian media. *Republika,* a well-known Indonesian daily newspaper, had this issue as their headline for two days in a row.[22]

The motives of delinquent women for wearing the *cadar* are different to those of the main research subjects of this book. They wore it not for religious ends, but for the purpose of 'shelter' in the hope it could save them from bad luck during their law cases. For example, Yulianis admitted this by saying that '*cadar hanya kami* [Oktarina Furi and I] *pakai di persidangan*' (we only wear the *cadar* during the trial) (*detikNews* 28 January 2012). Other than Yulianis and Oktarina Furi, Dharnawati also stated that her motive for wearing the *cadar* was mainly for safety reasons. The women understood that their lives might be in danger because of the legal cases. Therefore, their reasons for wearing the *cadar* were far from gaining advantage in their religious lives.

Many outsiders, however, see it differently, namely that the *cadar* was worn by the women not only because of fear of exposure but also to draw the sympathy of the judge and the public (Djani 2012). Therefore, some might assume that they wore it at the suggestion of their lawyers as part of an 'innocent' image-building strategy. This kind of assumption led many people, including religious scholars of the two main movements in this study, to see the women's adoption of the *cadar* as an insult towards Islam.

Henk Schulte Nordholt's (1997) argument on the importance of clothes in the social context is especially helpful in helping us to analyse this current trend. Nordholt beautifully explains the role of dress in the social context (1997). He points out the importance of clothes and the connection to one's identity: 'Clothes are, in

other words, our social and cultural skin' (1997, 1). Since clothes are our social and cultural skin, they convey meaning to outsiders. Therefore, the plurality of meaning related to clothes cannot be neglected. This is illustrated in the perceptions held by outsiders to *cadar*-wearing women in the courts and the wearers themselves which might be different. Nordholt says, 'It is, moreover, very likely that there is a difference between intention and perception, between the motivation for wearing certain clothes and the various ways this is interpreted by others' (1997, 2).

Those who oppose the use of the *cadar* by female defendants might see them as 'manipulating' the concept of piety or *taat* (obedience) attached to the *cadar,* especially because they wore it only during their appearances in court. However, the effort of these women to adopt the *cadar* also demonstrates the ways in which they have internalised the social expectations of the image of the good woman. Their choice of wearing the *cadar* indicates their knowledge of certain body techniques that stem from collective understandings.

Referring to the motives of these women defendants, their agency cannot be classified as a compliant form of agency or a 'doing religion' type of agency, to borrow Avishai's term (2008). Rather, it is more suitably analysed as part of the instrumental agency that focuses on non-religious outcomes. Those who exercise this kind of agency are mainly concerned with the non-religious outcomes of their religious practice (Burke 2012, 124). Kelsy Burke argues that this instrumental agency 'emphasises external advantages (either material or relational) that may result from religious participation' (2012, 127). The female defendants do not have certain religious affiliations. However, they use religion by adopting certain religious symbols and the external advantage they gain is more relational. They believe that the *cadar* can save them from bad luck, impressions and intentions. It allows them to feel comfortable, safe and secure facing a turbulent time in their lives.

The practice of face veiling across time demonstrates that for many women, social scripts (including religious ones) and expectations are important for the wearer's sense of being a '"who" and a "what"' (George 2010, 13). Therefore, the women's subjectivity is also part of the production of the way they negotiate their private existence and public expectations. This can be clearly seen, for example, from the motives behind the decision of women to wear the face veil, such as the Bimanese women with their *rimpu,* women of diverse religious movements and the female graft defendants with their *cadar.* This phenomenon also accords well with Avishai's argument that agency does not occur in a discursive vacuum. One element that has united the practice of face veiling from time to time, including the adoption of *rimpu mpida,* is that this practice can be analysed as a body technique derived from collective knowledge—except in the case of the face-veiled graft suspects. Wearing the *cadar,* therefore, is regarded as the embodiment of what the wearers believe to be the true knowledge prevalent in certain localities.

This chapter has argued that the local practice of face veiling in the archipelago is not exclusively of modern provenance, but rather has a historical tradition in various local cultures and that the face veil was worn well before the modern Islamic revival in Indonesia. The case of Bima has been treated in

more depth, without the intention of making generalisations about other local practices of face veiling in the archipelago, but on the basis of the existence of the practice by very few Bimanese women to date. *Rimpu mpida* reflects the religious and ethnic identity of the people of Bima. This hybrid combination of what is perceived as Muslim dress with the spirit of local wisdom can be seen from the ruling that accompanies the adoption of different styles of veiling in the archipelago.

The dominant view of the practice of face veiling is that it is part of the Arabisation agenda of Islam in the archipelago. However, this chapter has demonstrated that despite the important role of Arabs in the advent of Islam and in the transmission of religious knowledge, the contribution of present-day Indonesian *ʿulamāʾ* during the Islamisation process of the archipelago is significant, including those who have successfully built transnational scholarly networks with *ʿulamāʾ* in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. In addition to this, the perception that the present-day practice of wearing the *cadar* in Indonesia is a mere by-product of Arab culture ignores other influences, especially revivalist movements originating from other countries, in particular Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Indeed, interactions with neighbouring countries—especially Malaysia through Darul Arqam and India, Pakistan and Bangladesh through Tablīghī Jamāʿat—brought the current practice of face veiling to contemporary Muslims in Indonesia. Although Darul Arqam women contributed to the growing popularity of the *cadar* and *purdah* in Indonesia, they no longer preserve the *cadar* and *purdah* after the 'tiring' journey of confrontation with the Malaysian Government, except for small numbers of the older generation who have become used to the *cadar*. Similarly, *rimpu* is now mostly worn by the older generation. Currently, staunch supporters of the *cadar* and the *purdah* are Tablīghī and Salafi women. Therefore, throughout this book, I focus on *cadari* who have an attachment—directly and indirectly—to these movements. Salafi women are indeed the most active and strict wearers. The adoption of the *cadar* and the *purdah* among the younger generations has a strong connection with the subculture to which they belong.

The present-day practice of face veiling demonstrates the agency of these religious women. The agency that the *cadari* exercise is mainly related to religious goals. The latter part of the chapter has demonstrated a different kind of trend in which the agency of face-veiled women who have to face legal cases can be regarded as an instrumental agency, as they wear the *cadar* for non-religious ends. These women wear the *cadar* for their own benefit, which has nothing to do with religion. This is not the type of mainstream agency that can be seen in the lives of face-veiled women, especially the research subjects of this book.

Notes

1 Nowadays, the term *hijab* has become increasingly popular to refer to a veil besides *kerudung* and *jilbab*. The Arabic term *ḥijāb* has a broader coverage, including diverse forms of covering. Many people in Indonesia often use these three terms interchangeably.

2 This regulation was issued in some parts of present-day Indonesia, such as in the capital Batavia (van Dijk 1997, 45). The rationale behind the rule was the preservation of public order. Perpetrators could be easily identified through their outward appearance (Kaptein 2009, 177). In other parts of the archipelago some Muslims started to adopt Arab dress as a symbol of their religiosity and as a 'battledress' against non-Muslims and half-hearted Muslims (van Dijk 1997, 55). For example, Muslims who participated in the anti-Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) propaganda in Banten in the 1670s and joined Prince Dipanagara (Diponegoro) during the Java War (1825–30) reportedly preferred wearing Arab dress instead of Javanese costume. The regulations lasted up to the end of the nineteenth century (van Dijk 2001, 54–55). By the early twentieth century, the authorities could not maintain the regulation due to the increasing adoption of 'western' dress (van Dijk 2001, 58).

3 The concern about covering bodies in the archipelago was the result of Islamic and European influences (Nordholt 1997, 11).

4 It is noteworthy that the followers of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb refused to be called 'Wahhabi,' a designation created by outsiders. They prefer to be labelled '*al-muwaḥḥidūn*' (Unitarians), '*salafi*' (followers of pious predecessors) or '*ahl al-tawḥīd*' (the people of Divine unity). For a sympathetic study of Wahhabism, see Natana DeLong-Bas (2004), and for a more critical study of Wahhabism, see David Commins (2006).

5 In Yemen when it was two separate countries (North Yemen and South Yemen), women wore diverse types of dress; some covered their faces with *lithma*—a face veil which consists of 'a long piece of black cloth tightly wrapped around both the upper and lower part of the face' (Moors 2007, 335)—such as women in Sanaa (North Yemen). Some women in South Yemen wore a scarf tied under their chin without covering their faces and some even rejected the practice of covering the hair (Makhlouf 1979, 30–34; see also Moors 2007).

6 It is important to note that Bima is chosen not because the practice of face veiling in this region can lay a historical context for later discussion in this study of *cadari* in Indonesia. It is chosen because the local practice of face veiling exists to date, even though the number of wearers has decreased significantly. This phenomenon is missing in the main field sites of this study, Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Makassar.

7 It is noteworthy that Hitchcock does not actually mention the word *rimpu* but instead he uses *rimpi* to refer to women's headcover.

8 Therefore, the two different types of *rimpu* also provide a marker of a woman's marital status. According to its history, a woman could be identified either as single or married through their adoption of *rimpu mpida* or *rimpu colo.* This kind of rule regarding the clothes that symbolise the marital status of the wearers was common in other parts of the archipelago, such as in South Sulawesi where unmarried women wore red (blood red and clear red) and married women wore deeper red (Robinson 1998, 284).

9 Today, women who wear *rimpu* can be found especially in rural areas including some parts of Bima, such as in the sub-districts Wawo, Sape, Lambitu, Sanggar, Tambora, Palibelo, Belo, Woha and Monta (Sundari 2010).

10 It is also worn as a costume during the *pawai* (parade) on Indonesian Independence Day, 17 August.

11 See *Kota Bima Pecahkan Rekor MURI Pakaian Adat Rimpu Terbanyak,* n.d., available 18 March 2021 at: https://kominfo.bimakota.go.id/upload/ppid/b2c6dfaa06b8587e08b44d8bf0c0e546_Kota%20Bima%20Pecahkan%20Rekor%20MURI%20Pakaian%20Adat%20Rimpu%20Terbanyak.pdf.

12 *Instant jilbab,* sometimes known as instant *kerudung* (*kerudung instan*), emerged in Indonesia as early as the 1980s. It is an already shaped headpiece with elastic that can be directly put on without the need for pins. In my interview with a prominent Indonesian

designer specialising in Muslim dress, Ida Royani pointed out that since the 1980s the shape of this instant *kerudung* has evolved and its use has gained momentum. Instant *kerudung,* which are mostly made of Lycra fabrics, is a response to the difficulties faced by Muslim women who want to wear the veil. By wearing instant *kerudung,* Muslim women do not have to allocate much time or provide many accessories to wear head coverings; no pins and no bandana are needed (Amrullah 2008, 23). With the emergence of instant *kerudung,* many Muslim women feel that their daily lives have become easier.

13 In addition, some women followers of other Islamic groups and organisations in Indonesia, such as those of Jama'ah An Nazir and a few Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) women also wear the *cadar.*

14 Global Ikhwan can be regarded as the new face of Al-Arqam (Neo-Arqam Movement) or Darul Arqam, as it is better known in Indonesia. It is the last known name of Darul Arqam in Indonesia. Before Global Ikhwan (since 2008), it was also known as Jama'ah Rufaqa' (1997–2008). In its country of origin, Malaysia, Rufaqa' was registered as a business corporation known as Syarikat Rufaqa' Corporation Sdn Bhd founded by the same leader of Darul Arqam Ashaari in April 1997, Rawang, Selangor. In 2006, Rufaqa' was accused several times of trying to revive the Darul Arqam movement and violating the *fatwa* on its banning.

15 *Awrad Muhammadiyah* is a *dhikr* (litany formula) compilation by Shaykh Suhaimi and is read regularly by followers after each prayer time.

16 This can be understood because, to a certain extent, some of the NU traditions are quite close to those of Darul Arqam. In terms of religious activities, for example, Darul Arqam reads *Mawlid al-Barzanjī* and *Mawlid al-Dība'ī* to commemorate the birth of the Prophet (Dasuki 1994, 287).

17 In 1990, for example, some Darul Arqam women were already active in performing their *da'wa* in Samosir Island, North Sumatra (Jah 1990, 5).

18 Malaysian terms are often used by Darul Arqam in Indonesia, such as the use of *tudung* and *tudung labuh.*

19 Some studies, such as Nasrullah (2005), mentioned that it was in the period of Mawlānā In'amul Ḥasan (1918–95), the successor of Mawlānā Yūsuf or the third *amīr* of Tablīghī Jamā'at, that Tablīghī Jamā'at came to Indonesia.

20 *Mastura* (Ar. *mastūra*) in Arabic literally means 'something being covered.' Among Tablīghī, *mastura* is generally a term referring to a woman, or a woman who has performed *khurūj* (to go out of one's own neighbourhood to proselytise). Matters relating to women always use the term *mastura,* so the term is used to define women's *khurūj* is *mastura khurūj* or in Indonesia it is sometimes called *masturahan,* and women's *ta'līm* (religious study group) is *mastura ta'līm.*

21 She is also the wife of Muhammad Nazaruddin, the former treasurer of Indonesian's Democratic Party, who was convicted of corruption in connection with tenders for the Southeast Asian games.

22 The first headline titled 'Mendadak Beratribut Agama' (Suddenly adopting religious symbol) (20 June 2012) and the second headline was 'Sandiwara Penampilan' (Hypocritical performance) (21 June 2012).

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2 The production of Islamic knowledge and the introduction of *taat* habitus

The voices of women who enjoy living strict lifestyles are often neglected in scholarly works on the lives of Muslim women, including Indonesian Muslim women. This chapter investigates one of the motives behind the decisions of *cadari* (face-veiled women) to wear the *cadar* (face veil) and embody their *taat* (Ar. *ṭāʿa* or obedient) habitus, namely to follow particular authoritative voices. In addition, it strives to unpack the doctrines they uphold related to conventional ideas associated with femininity and marital life. Femininity in this context is expressed in the ways *cadari* structure their lifestyles and desires to adjust to the proper appearance of a true Muslim woman (*Muslimah*). Their *taat* habitus has introduced them to the importance of religious homogamy in marriage to ensure that they achieve their aspiration to be true *Muslimah* by marrying husbands who have the same understanding of Islamic doctrines.

Adapting the insights of Saba Mahmood (2005), I wish to employ the Aristotelian concept of habitus to the life of *cadari,* including their marital life. This emphasises the role of ethical pedagogy or 'conscious training in the habituation of virtues' (Mahmood 2005, 139). My aim is to understand *cadari*'s choices in terms of self-consciously constructing a virtuous or *taat* habitus. How *cadari* live their lives and how they constantly discipline their bodies are consistent with those who speak for Islam and its doctrines within their communities. As mentioned in the introduction, this point highlights the difference between the focus of Mahmood's study and that of this book. Piety for the women in Mahmood's study is highly individuated. The *cadari* in this study and their concern with performing *taat* or *ketaatan* (obedience) signify a slightly different goal than that of the women observed by Mahmood, in that they judge their performance of *ketaatan* through the eyes and voices of authority figures.

Following Michel Foucault, who was influenced by Aristotle and is central to Mahmood's conceptualisation of agency, this chapter begins by unpacking the 'moral code' that surrounds *cadari* lives. Foucault defines 'moral code' as 'A set of values and rules of action that are recommended to individuals through the intermediary of various prescriptive agencies such as the family (in one of its roles), educational institutions, churches and so forth' (1990, 25). This chapter brings us to understand the moral code introduced through the voices of authority figures in the lives of *cadari*. Following from this, the subsequent chapters focus

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more on Foucault's other dimension of morality, namely 'ethical conduct' which refers to 'the manner in which one ought to form oneself as an ethical subject acting in reference to the prescriptive elements that make up the code' (1990, 26). It should be noted that in the context of modes of subjectivation, Foucault emphasises that there are many different ways to form a relationship with a moral code or 'to "conduct oneself" morally' (1990, 26–28). By unpacking the moral code, this book is able to focus on the ethical conduct of *cadari* illustrated from the disciplinary exercises they employ to achieve happiness by being true *Muslimah.*

The agency of women who strive to understand their religion accords well with Orit Avishai's concept of 'doing religion' (2008). Their quest for an authentic Islam and their religious practices resonates with the logic of what they perceive to be the true Islam. Their agency mirrors religious conduct or the 'doing of their religion.' The main research subjects in this study do not use religion for non-religious ends. Their agency is not an instrumental agency in the sense used by Kelsy Burke (2012), but it is a compliant form of agency that they utilise as they are 'doing religion' (Avishai 2008).

A key focus of this chapter involves understanding the authoritative sources in the life of *cadari*—sources that influence their choices and introduce them to a purification agenda, especially those virtuous practices related to the construction of a *taat* habitus. As *cadari* in Indonesia are mostly affiliated with the Salafi and Tablīghī Jamāʿat movements, this chapter focuses principally on doctrines introduced by their *ʿulamā'* (religious scholars) concerning women within both movements. This aligns with Peter Mandaville's argument on the globalisation of religious knowledge (2007b). Globalisation (in the sense of the transmission of religious ideas and religious awakening across national borders) and its apparatus have enabled these *cadari* to not only find new forms of Islam but new versions of their lives that lead them to achieve their aspiration to be true *Muslimah.* This chapter highlights the competing voices pertaining to what a *taat* habitus and a true Muslim woman's life entail.

This chapter also aligns closely with scholars working on the anthropology of religion highlighting the importance of taking God seriously (Moll 2018, 258). Scholars of the anthropology of Islam or those conducting ethnography among Muslims have long discussed the position of (Islamic) texts, including the very word of God, in their work (Varisco 2005; Schielke 2019). Ronald Lukens-Bull asks, 'The anthropological study of Islam is one that has been plagued by problems of definition. What exactly are we studying? Local practices, universal texts and standards of practice, or something else entirely' (1999). This question is not easy to answer. The *cadari* in this study who always feel thirsty for religious knowledge and instructions have led me to take God seriously. Talal Asad's discursive tradition emphasises that Islam 'consists essentially of discourses that seek to instruct practitioners regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice that, precisely because it is established, has a history' (1986, 14). This chapter demonstrates the varied aspects used to instruct *cadari* on how to act in particular ways to be true *Muslimah.* Yasmin Moll argues, 'One way to take God seriously anthropologically … is to pay attention to how religious subjects

Figure 2.1 Niqab Squad *cadari* attending a regular *kajian* (gathering for Islamic study) in Jakarta at which Ustādh Oemar Mita was teaching. Source. Photo credit, the author, 29 October 2017.

themselves do so, to trace ethnographically the social life of theology as a space of critical contestation' (2018, 258). Through this chapter, we can see how *cadari* understand God's desires through the voices of the influential religious authority figures in their lives (Figure 2.1). Although this chapter takes seriously talk about God, I am not involved in theological debates beyond what I have learnt from the voices of my research subjects.

Globalisation that brings sound authoritative religious knowledge

The globalisation of religious knowledge is important in understanding how Tablīghī and Salafism exist as prevalent doctrines in the life of *cadari* in Indonesia. The pluralisation of Islamic knowledge and authority becomes more salient nowadays, particularly due to the impact of globalisation. Mandaville (2007b, 102) has pointed out that

> globalization does not in and of itself instantiate a pluralisation of Islamic authority insofar as there has never existed a situated, singular source of authentic Muslim knowledge. Rather, globalisation can be seen to represent

a further shift in the extent and intensity of debate about the meaning and nature of the authoritative in Islam.

Global transnational religious knowledge networks can be seen in the life of *cadari* evident from global networks built by *ʿulamā'* within their movements. For example, Tablīghī elites have obtained religious education in South Asia. Salafi *asātidh* (male religious scholars) from diverse groups in Indonesia have made strong links to distinguished Muslim experts (pl. *shuyūkh,* sing. *shaykh*) in many Arab countries. Elites in diverse Salafi factions often sit in the same study circles and have the same teacher (Wiktorowicz 2006, 213). For example, Shaykh Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī, a well-known Salafi *ḥadīth* (the narration of words, deeds or approvals of the Prophet Muḥammad) scholar, who is also known as the traditionalist of the era (*muḥaddith al-ʿaṣr*) and one of the most important influences on modern Salafism, had students and followers ranging from non-violent Salafi to radicals (Meijer 2009, 9; Wiktorowicz 2006, 213). In Indonesia, the opinion of al-Albānī on matters relating to women is upheld by different groups—groups which often have friction on a daily basis on other matters.

What is important for Tablīghī and Salafi women is religious knowledge produced beyond the confines of nation states. Therefore, *fatwa* (Ar. *fatāwā,* sing. *fatwā* referring to nonbinding religious rulings or opinions from religious scholars on questions related to Islam and Muslims) issued by *fatwa* givers (*mufti*) from other Muslim countries belonging to the same Islamic tradition can become authoritative. Diverse Salafi groups in Indonesia follow different religious authorities, though many follow *fatwa* given by *mufti* from the Permanent Committee for Scientific Research and Nonbinding Religious Ruling (al-Lajna al-Dā'ima lil-Buhūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa-l-Iftā') in Saudi Arabia. Mostly, they share identical characteristics of Salafi *manhaj* (lit. a methodology that refers to the way of life of the early Muslims). They reject the blind following of certain religious scholars (*taqlīd*)[1] and support the use of individual interpretations of basic sources of Islam, the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth.* At the same time, they reject the use of human reason and logic to understand these sources.

Tension among Salafi groups usually originates from the way the interpretation of Islam is contextualised and how they apply their understanding of Islam to contemporary issues. The tension can also be seen in the opinions of Salafi *ʿulamā'* on matters related to women, including the *cadar* which will be discussed in this chapter.

All the contemporary Salafi currents (purist, political and jihadi or other classifications) follow the basic doctrines of the purification of classical references, such as their rejection of *bidʿa* (innovation which is forbidden in religion) and their condemnation of the veneration of the tombs of saints. The classical references or important figures in the formation of Salafi doctrines in Indonesia are Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal (780–855), the founder of Ḥanbalism or one of Sunni law schools; Taqiy al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Taymiyya (1263–1328), the follower of Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal and the main inspiration for Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in his effort to purify

Islam; Muḥammad b. Qayyīm al-Jawziyya (1292–1350), the main disciple of Ibn Taymiyya; and Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (1703–1792), the founder of a reformist movement in Saudi Arabia in the eighteenth century.

Further in its development, although varied Salafi factions have their own main figures who have authoritative voices with regard to their opinions on contemporary affairs, in terms of their common religious creed (such as their understanding of *tawhīd* or a doctrine that does not allow any associates of God, practising the Sharīʿa and avoiding *bidʿa*), they mostly follow purist scholars. Senior purist scholars are well known for their great and deep religious knowledge in comparison to those of the *haraki* (activist) or *politico*[2] and jihadi[3] factions whose authority lies in their political analysis (Wiktorowicz 2006, 224–25; see also Pall 2012). Among well-known senior purist scholars are ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz (1912–99), Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (1914–99), Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-Uthaymīn (1928–2001) and Ṣāliḥ b. Fawzān al-Fawzān (b. 1933). They are those whose religious opinions are most often cited among diverse Salafi factions even though different opinions on Islamic teachings can be found among these senior purist scholars.

The tension within Salafi factions mirrors 'a generational struggle over sacred authority—the right to interpret Islam on behalf of the Muslim community' (Wiktorowicz 2006, 221). In Indonesia, diverse Salafi factions can be seen as a result of constant disputes linked to the ways these groups contextualise their Salafi ideology; some groups are perceived as too accommodative and others as too rigid (ICG 2004a, 12). The same terms, purists, *haraki,*[4] and jihadi, are often used (Wahid 2014, 372). For example, Abu Nida's circle and Wahdah Islamiyah are often labelled as being part of *haraki* Salafi (Iqbal 2017, 73; Wahid 2012, 252). Other terms are also used in Indonesia, such as Yemeni Salafi, which refers to a purist faction affiliated with a leading purist Salafi figure in Yemen, Shaykh Muqbil b. Hādī al-Wādiʿī (the founder of Salafism in Yemen). The competition for Arabian funding (from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other Gulf countries) that has flowed into Indonesia to support the expression of preferred forms of Islamic practice is also a major source of friction (ICG 2004, 12).

Media and transnational religious networks

The proliferation of Islamic presses and diverse forms of media in Indonesia has played a significant role in the transmission of Islamic doctrines of moral purification from other parts of the Muslim world. Most of the *cadari* with whom I worked argued that Islamic knowledge brought by diverse forms of media, including the internet and various social media platforms, has enabled them to cultivate virtuous conduct. Ummu Mu'az, a 33-year-old cadre from one of the Salafi groups in Yogyakarta, says:

> I always asked other sisters to be active to generate Islamic knowledge not only from attending the *taʿlīm* [religious study circle] but also from listening

> to our radio, buying good books from well-known Middle Eastern *shaykh,* and accessing Salafi websites. All these elements should be used not only as references but also as a reminder for them to cultivate good habits, especially *ketaatan* to God and the Prophet. I also said to them, if we want to be good and true *Muslimah* then we have to be proactive.

Like Ummu Mu'az, many *cadari* whom I interviewed mentioned that all the entailments of being a true *Muslimah* and the introduction to virtuous practices as well as how to discipline their lifestyle can be found in booklets of *fatwa* translated from Middle Eastern *mufti* or from their community bulletins, websites, social media accounts, magazines and journals sold at booksellers' stalls, usually set up outside or in the corner of every female *taʿlīm.*

In addition to the circulation of printed materials, two media have played an increasingly important role in facilitating global networks of religious knowledge and authority. The first involves the growth of community radio (radio *komunitas*) in Indonesia. One of the best managed is Radio Rodja, which was aired on the FM band in 2005 and expanded its coverage by opening an AM band (756AM) in May 2007 to cover Jabodetabek (Jakarta, Bogor, Depok, Tangerang and Bekasi). Radio Rodja has a special program of lectures from well-known and distinguished Middle Eastern Muslim experts with direct translation from Indonesian students studying in Saudi Arabia. For example, the station broadcasts lectures given by Shaykh ʿAbd al-Razzāq b. ʿAbd al-Muhsin al-Badr, a professor in the Department of Theology at the Islamic University in Medina.

The second important modern technology tool is the internet. *Cadari* deepen their religious knowledge by accessing lawful or *halal* (Ar. *ḥalāl*) websites, where they can see videos or hear recordings of distinguished Muslim experts delivering sermons on religious affairs. They can also read articles from religious scholars approved by the authorities of their communities. *Cadari* who are staunch supporters of Salafi groups usually have been informed by religious teachers in their communities about the relevant *halal* websites. The most reliable among the large number of websites on Islam are identified by reference to the name of their *shaykh* and *ustādh* (religious scholar). These community websites usually list some worldwide Muslim websites which have the same understanding of Islam as their groups. In addition, there have been efforts to overcome the possibility of Islamic religious seekers going astray. A group of Salafi followers have established their own version of Google search, called Yufid, that generates 'safe' articles from qualified Islamic scholars which have the same understandings of Islam as their group. Lately, the growth of tech-savvy Salafi preachers from varied groups has been significant. Many of these preachers, such as Khalid Basalamah, Syafiq Riza Basalamah and Adi Hidayat, have successfully generated income from the popularity of their YouTube accounts.

For my research subjects, the technological dimension of globalisation is important to facilitating their efforts towards self-disciplining, which they view as an essential quality defining the true *Muslimah.* Ummu Mu'az says:

> You know Mbak [Sister], the essence to be true *Muslimah* is to teach us to embody pure Islam, not Islam that we know from our parents. We will not know this from them, of course, but from our own effort to generate this new knowledge. We can use high technology [like the internet] for our purpose, for accessing knowledge from *shaykh* living far away from us.

Ummu Mu'az's statement demonstrates that the notion of self-purification is a key expression of the learnt habitus that they have constructed through their associations with their various movements.

The position of *cadari* in the production of religious knowledge

It is noticeable that *cadari* follow religious knowledge produced by global and local *ʿulamā'* within their own groups. So, what is their position in relation to the production of religious knowledge? Are they mere followers? It should be noted that in contrast to women from other Muslim organisations in Indonesia, especially the two largest Muslim organisations (Nahdlatul Ulama or NU and Muhammadiyah), the women in this study are less concerned with engaging in intellectual discourse and in challenging the patriarchal interpretation of Islamic teachings than those who support a progressive understanding of Islam (Nisa 2019; Rinaldo 2008). However, they are certainly active agents in searching for religious knowledge and, in particular, their version of the true Islam. Although they oppose the blind following of certain religious scholars (*taqlīd*), most of these women still believe that they are not worthy to make individual interpretations of the basic sources of Islam; this is still the prerogative of qualified religious experts.

This does not mean that none of the *cadari* is able to showcase their Islamic view. Some of them are active in writing online articles for Salafi Muslim women's websites and bulletins, as will be explained in Chapter 6. Their writing, however, can be regarded as an 'amplifier' of *ʿulamā'*—local and global—in their movements. One example of this is an article titled 'Al Wala' Wal Baro': Kunci Sempurnanya Tauhid' (Fidelity to Islam and Muslims and dissociation from all things non-Islamic: The key to perfect monotheism) by Ummu ʿAbdirrahman on a Salafi *Muslimah* website (*Muslimah.or.id* n.d.). She explained the importance of the doctrine of *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* and its connection to *ketaatan.* Her *marāji*ʿ (references) here are to the voices of local and global *ʿulamā',* Syakh Ṣāliḥ b. Fawzān al-Fawzān and Ustādh (Ind. Ustaz) Afifi Abdul Wadud. By referring to the voices of these *ʿulamā,* Ummu ʿAbdirrahman explained that *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* requires all Muslims, including women, to prove their love for 'God by loving what God loves and hating what God hates' (n.d.). She explained some points pertaining to *al-barā'* (dissociation from all things non-Islamic and the renunciation of unbelievers) including 'Do not imitate them [unbelievers] in things that are their characteristics and habits both related to worldly [conduct] (such as how to dress, how to eat) or religion (such as celebrating their religious festivals).'

The women I interviewed mostly felt they were still improving their capacity to be able to understand the true teaching of Islam and enhance their ability to

speak and understand the Arabic language. Acquiring Arabic in the process of knowledge production is important since most of the references that they need to become familiar with are in Arabic. One popular institution often mentioned as useful by my Salafi research subjects for Arabic and Islamic studies is the Medina International University or MEDIU.[5] It was established in Medina in 2004 as a distance learning higher education institution with a branch in Malaysia founded in June 2006. In Indonesia, it began operating in 2008 in Makassar and Yogyakarta. Their aim is to provide training for male and female students to become religious scholars who can be the agents of change in their community. MEDIU provides a way to satisfy the female constituent's eagerness to learn Islam directly from distinguished Muslim experts living in other Muslim countries, in particular Saudi Arabia, because women are trapped in their own strict interpretations of Islam which do not allow them to leave their countries without their non-marriageable male kin (*maḥram*). The Saudi Arabian Board of Religious Decrees, al-Lajna al-Dā'ima lī al-Buhūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa al-Iftā', for example, argues that it is forbidden for a woman to go out without their *maḥram* (al-Juraysī 2008). In support of this, the *ʿulamā'* quote a *ḥadīth* narrated by Ibn ʿUmar that the Messenger of Allah (the Prophet Muḥammad) said: A woman must not travel for three days except with a *maḥram* (al-Juraysī 2008, 1927).

One of the primary motivations for *cadari* to deepen their religious knowledge is because of their commitment and full responsibility towards *daʿwa* (Ind. *dakwah*) (proselytisation) and their object of *daʿwa.* When cadres from various Salafi factions become aware of their commitment, they begin to strive to develop their ability in the learning of religious knowledge. Being knowledgeable, for these *cadari,* is part of the process of becoming *taat*.

Embodying *taat* habitus

Becoming obedient or *taat* by following the religious teachings introduced by religious authorities within their religious movements is part of these *cadari*'s habitus. The lives of *cadari* in self-disciplining themselves to be true *Muslimah* can be explained through the Aristotelian formulation of habitus. Aristotle illustrates: 'Men [*sic*] will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher.… This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust' (2000, Book 2, 15). He emphasises that people are rational beings who can make decisions and choices to take particular actions to attain happiness. Rational beings must constantly refine themselves to attain happiness (Book 2, 14). The passionate *cadari,* who decide to wear the *cadar* and explore what is best for them by becoming *taat* to all religious rulings, are also rational creatures. They understand their bodily acts including face veiling as means of becoming a better true *Muslimah*. This aligns with Aristotle's (2000) emphasis on habitus as ethical pedagogy and that an ethical subject is an active practitioner. Becoming *taat* is their effort to refine themselves by combining action with virtue. They hope to achieve happiness through this effort.

This consciously cultivated form of habitus can be seen clearly in their everyday lives. The *taat* habitus that they have actively learnt and embodied has led them to adjust their whole lifestyle to correspond to what they perceive to be good moral characters. I use the term *taat* habitus to distinguish it from the habitus they experienced before their self-transformation in their journey to find true Islam.

Islamic teachings on women: The *cadar* and *masalah wanita* (women's issues)

Masalah wanita (women's issues) is the term often used by both movements to refer to the discussion of teaching on women in Islam. *Masalah wanita* indicates that women can cause alarm if they behave improperly. *ʿUlamā'* within both movements emphasise that women's religious observance is the key to the establishment of true Islamic societies and to prevent social discord. This is especially linked to their belief in the capacity of every woman to provoke disorder or chaos (*fitna*) in society. *Fitna* literally means infatuation, riot, trial, scandal and disgrace (Elias 1960, 492). Margot Badran records, 'Women were held to possess a more powerful sexual drive than men, posing a threat to society because of the chaos or *fitna* they could unleash' (1995, 5). When women are regarded as the greatest *fitna,* they are perceived to be dressed improperly or provocatively which can arouse sexual temptation (in men) which threatens social order and stability (Frembgen 2004, 56). Indeed, this understanding can be found in other religious traditions, especially in the discussion of modesty in dress, in which the focus is mostly on women's dress. Ronit Irshai, in her study on Jewish law (Halakhah), states:

> As opposed to men, to whom some restrictions apply but who are primarily required to cover themselves only in the presence of God, women must cover themselves in the presence of men and also accept a degree of responsibility for the prospect that they may make men sin by provoking sexual arousal. The major stipulations of the laws of modesty require that married women cover their heads; forbid women to sing in the presence of men; and mandate the wearing of non-revealing clothing.
>
> (2014, 6)

Fitna in the discussion of Muslim women's bodies is considered to be the gateway to the doors of adultery and fornication (*zina*). Fatima Mernissi pointed out that *fitna* refers to a beautiful woman (1975, 4). Zaynab al-Ghazali (1917–2005), a prominent female figure of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn), emphasised that a very beautiful woman should cover her face to avoid *fitna* (cited in Zuhur 1992, 90–91).

To prevent this *fitna,* women have to maintain their purity (*ʿiffa*), which refers to their commitment to follow the true or pure Islam as understood by religious elites within their communities. Wearing proper Muslim dress is often emphasised by *ʿulamā'* as the most important disciplinary practice that prevents women from becoming the source of *fitna,* and the key practice that can lead them to

becoming respected Muslim women. The most proper Muslim dress for women, according to the majority of elites within both movements, is the *cadar,* as the gaze of both men and women is one of the most dangerous sources of *fitna.* These elites often refer to Q.S. An-Nūr [24]:30–31 to support their position:

> Tell the believing men to lower their gaze and to be mindful of their chastity: this will be most conducive to their purity – [and,] verily, God is aware of all that they do (30). And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and to be mindful of their chastity, and not to display their charms [in public] beyond what may [decently] be apparent thereof; hence, let them draw their head-coverings over their bosoms. And let them not display [more of] their charms to any but their husbands, or their fathers, or their husbands' fathers, or their sons … and let them not swing their legs [in walking] so as to draw attention to their hidden charms … (31).

Lowering one's gaze is important to guard one's purity and modesty. It is noteworthy that the Qurʾān also enjoins men to lower their gaze and many Islamic feminists focus their discussions on men's gaze. Qāsim Amīn (1863–1908), who is famous for his symbolic reform of the abolition of the veil in Egypt and popular among Indonesian progressive *ʿulamā',* has questioned the relationship between *fitna* and the requirement to wear the *cadar.* He argues: 'The *burquʿ* [face veil] and the *niqāb* [gauze face-cover] actually increase the risk of temptation. The thin, white *niqāb* reveals the good features and hides the blemishes … These two coverings are in reality part of the ornaments worn by women that incite an onlooker's desires' (2012, 43). Amīn's assessment on the attractiveness of the image of face-veiled women is validated by the current practice of many publishers that use the image of *cadari* on the covers of novels, as will be discussed in Chapter 3.

Amīn also questioned men's ability to fight temptation in his discussion of seclusion (2012). Amīn, whose books are considered to be 'the founding feminist texts in Egypt' (Badran 1995, 19)—*Taḥrīr al-Mar'a* (The liberation of women) and *al-Mar'a al-Jadīda* (The new woman)—also emphasised that the practice of face covering should cease (see also Ahmed 1992). In his *Taḥrīr al-Mar'a,* Amīn criticises the traditional exegetes who link the concept of *fitna* to women:

> This fear of *fitna* [temptation] which we see emerging in almost every line written on the topic, it is a matter connected with the hearts of fearful men … whoever fears of *fitna,* whether man or woman, should avert his or her glance. The commands in the noble verse direct both groups to avert their gaze equally. In this we have clear evidence that it is no more appropriate for a woman to cover her face than for a man!
>
> (2012, 43)

What is interesting in this regard is how much the wearers assume that wearing the *cadar* can prevent *fitna.* However, outsiders might have different assumptions.

The common assumption from some outsiders towards *cadari* can be seen from the comments of Raudha, a 22-year-old university student, who says: 'For them, wearing the *cadar* might function as the way they cover themselves from others. And the way they prevent *fitna.* But for others, I think it is the opposite. It might generate *fitna,* because people want to know more about this person.' Raudha's statement resonates powerfully with the statement of one of my research subjects, Ummu Falah, a *cadari* with one child, who says: 'It is true that indeed many people become more curious of us when we started to wear the *cadar.* When I wore the veil no one stared at me, but now they are eager to know about my life. After I started to wear the *cadar,* my life has always been a magnet for many people.'

In one of the focus groups, we discussed a *ḥadīth* stating '*An-nisā'u nāqiṣātu ʿaqlin wa dīnin*' (women are deficient in intelligence and religion). Many people understand this *ḥadīth* as a hegemonic concept that frames men as rational and women as passionate. Many *cadari,* however, understood this slightly differently: for them this *ḥadīth* is not generalisable and does not indicate that they should be inferior to men in everything. Ukht Fadhilah, a 36-year-old religious teacher, says:

> What I know Mbak from the explanation of Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, as cited in *Majalah Asy-Syariah* [one of the Indonesian Salafi magazines] if I am not mistaken, is that this is partial deficiency. We have to understand this rule also as God's leniency and easiness for us because we do not have to pray and fast during the menstruation and post-partum bleeding. We are not inferior to men in everything. There is no difference between men and women in the eyes of God. Look at now, Mbak, how many of us can even practice our religion better than men. I think there are many women who are more capable of controlling their deeds, such as wearing this *cadar* which actually can be regarded as 'saving' men from imagining sexual things on women.

She mentions the word 'saving' in reference to the *cadar* that can protect not only women from men but also men from imagining women's sexuality.

Raudha, who sat next to Ukht Fadhilah during the focus group discussion, added:

> I think we cannot deny Mbak that women are always vulnerable to male gaze and male lust. Actually, our presence in Indonesia is good to balance the presence of women who wear sexy dress. It is so funny, because many times when we have to sit next to these sexy women, they are the ones who feel uncomfortable. They try to pull down their miniskirts every few second so that people cannot see their thighs.

Ukht Fadhilah and Raudha's comments on feminine sexual vulnerability help us to understand layers of meaning that *cadari* generate from their religious conduct.

They also articulate their motivation to wear the *cadar* as part of their active piety, doing religion or their responsibility as Muslim women.

Authoritative voices: Is *cadar* obligatory?

Wearing the *cadar* for *cadari* is part of their responsibility as believers. They oppose the opinion that wearing the *cadar* is part of an imported Arab tradition despite the fact that this type of covering is often referred to popularly as a sign of the Arabisation of Indonesia. *Cadari* emphasise the Islamic aspect of the *cadar,* not its Arab links.

Many progressive Muslim scholars, such as Muḥammad Saʿīd al-Ashmāwī (2002), an Egyptian scholar, and Muḥammad Shahrūr (2000), a Syrian Muslim thinker, do not consider wearing certain coverings to be part of Islamic teachings. Besides, a number of scholars such as Amīn (2012), Nikki Keddie (2007) and Fadwa El Guindi (1999) have pointed out that veiling was present in the pre-Islamic Middle East. That said, proponents of wearing the *cadar* argued that it is part of pure Islam. Here, they refer to the fact that rules concerning the *cadar* are stated in the Qurʾān, Q.S. al-Aḥzāb [33]:53, 59 and Q.S. An-Nūr [24]:31, and that the rules also appear in some prophetic traditions. According to religious teachers from both Salafi and Tablīghī movements whom I interviewed, the easiest way to understand that the *cadar* is proper Muslim dress is by the fact that the wives of the Prophet and his companions reportedly wore the veil.

Salafi scholars

Saudi-Salafi scholars from different groups have a variety of opinions concerning the legal basis for the practice of wearing the face veil. Some of them, like Shaykh Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-Uthaymīn and Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz, argue that it is obligatory (*wājib*);[6] for each individual Muslim and it cannot be fulfilled only by certain numbers of Muslims performing it (*farḍ al-ʿayn*). Al-Uthaymīn argued that women's faces are part of their bodies that are likely to cause the above-mentioned *fitna* (2001, 9; see also al-Tuwayjirī 1974). He also linked covering the face to the expression of one's *malu* (shyness), which is one of the main ingredients of faith (*īmān*) (Al-Uthaymīn 2001, 9). Shaykh b. Bāz emphasised that covering the face is part of an act of devotion (*ʿibāda*) and uncovering the face is part of an illicit display (*tabarruj*) (1989, 225). Other Salafi scholars, in particular Shaykh Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī (2002a; 2002b),[7] argue that wearing the *cadar* is recommended (*mustaḥab*).

Those who support and those who oppose the wearing of the *cadar* use the same sources, the Qurʾān and *ḥadīth.* The discussion runs especially around Q.S. An-Nūr [24]:31; Q.S. al-Aḥzāb [33]:53,[8] 59;[9] and some often-heard *ḥadīth.* In the discussion of Q.S. An-Nūr [24]:31 that orders women not to show their adornment and fineries except only that which is apparent (*illā mā ẓahara minhā*), and to draw their veils all over *juyūb* (their bosom), Shaykh Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-Uthaymīn (1928–2001), one of the most well-known senior purist scholars,

says that if a woman is commanded to cover her breasts, she is also automatically obliged to cover her face (2001, 13–14; see also al-Tuwayjirī 1974, 57–59). Many *cadari* and elites in their movements also often quote al-Uthaymīn's explanation. The face, adds al-Uthaymīn, is the centre of beauty or the best part of the human body, as well as being the source of *fitna* (2001, 13–14). Al-Uthaymīn, has issued the *fatwa,* that after the revelation of veil (*ḥijāb*) verse, which is in the sixth of Hijra, all the wives of the Prophet started to wear the face veil with the exception of one eye, and that the face veil is an obligation for all Muslim women (see al-Juraysī 2008). A Salafi *ustādh* (religious teacher), in a religious lesson that I attended for *cadari* at the State Islamic University (UIN) Alauddin Makassar, said that Islam *memuliakan perempuan* (Islam honours women) through the *cadar* and he then quoted this *ḥadīth* 'woman is an *ʿawra* [part of the body that must be covered] that must be covered.' Those who oppose the obligation to wear the *cadar* and have different interpretations of the sources mentioned include progressive Muslims and Muslim feminists[10] as well as some Salafi purist *ʿulamā',* such as Muḥammad Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Albānī. Regarding the content of Q.S. An-Nūr [24]:31, al-Albānī interprets the phrase in this verse, which is also the main source of controversies, '*illā mā ẓahara minhā*' (except that which is apparent) as face and palms (2002a, 118), meaning that both of them can be displayed in public. Therefore, he argues that wearing the *cadar* is only favoured, not obligatory. Ummu Najah, a 45-year-old follower of a Salafi faction in Yogyakarta, says, 'I wear this *cadar* because according to *ʿulamā'* like Syakh al-Albānī although it is not obligatory, it is *lebih mulia* [nobler].' Similar to Ummu Najah, many of my research subjects follow Al-Albānī's view.

There is also no homogeneity in the opinions of Indonesian Salafi *ʿulamā'* about the *cadar*; some of them argue that it is compulsory and some think that it is favoured. There is a general view among them that wearing the *cadar* for a Muslim woman is best (al-Jibrin 2007). Some Indonesian Salafi scholars also emphasise the importance of wearing the *cadar* within the Indonesian context where they see the emergence of what they perceive as moral decadence. They connect the loss of morality, especially among Muslim women in Indonesia, with the loss of shame which is linked to the loss of faith and the neglect of religious teachings.

Some *ʿulamā'* from both Tablīghī and Salafi movements who support the *cadar* point out its connection to the embodiment of *malu.* According to them, when a woman knows the concept of *ketaatan* and strives to discipline herself to obey the standards of good deeds in Islam, then she will be *malu* if she fails to discipline her lifestyle. A Salafi *ustādh* who preached in front of his female congregants in a mosque in Jakarta said, 'When a woman has *al-ḥayā'* [shyness], she will definitely choose to wear the *cadar.*' Mahmood also pointed out that *al-ḥayā'* is the most feminine of all Islamic virtues (2005, 155). *Malu,* in the Indonesian vernacular, is linked to the expectations of the social milieu where one lives (Geertz 1973; Lindquist 2004). One who fails to live up to the standards of society should feel *malu.* The essence of *malu,* as in the vernacular, is similar to what has been argued by authoritative voices in the life of *cadari*—that women

should be concerned with *malu* and should respect the norms within their own communities. The main difference between *malu* in the vernacular and the religious concept is that cultivated *malu* as a religious concept is related to other sets of Islamic doctrines that have to be expressed in practice to achieve the goal of being better Muslim men and women.

It is noteworthy that some Indonesian elites of the jihadi Salafi groups do not support those who argue that the *cadar* is obligatory and recommended.[11] This opinion can be found in their publications. For example, in *Risalah Mujahidin,* which was the bulletin of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Holy Warrior Assembly), one of the jihadi Salafi organisations banned in the country, it is said that the *cadar* is permissible (*mubāḥ*) for those who want to wear it (2008, 97–99). But some argue that it is a redundant practice (*ghuluw*) (*Risalah Mujahidin* 2008, 97). This more relaxed position is evident in the style of the *cadar* worn by women belonging to some of these groups which is more colourful and shorter than the style worn by those of non-jihadi Salafi groups (Figure 2.2).

Tablīghī scholars

Many Tablīghī Jamāʿat elites know that there are diverse opinions on the basic rule of the *cadar,* however, they adhere to the views of religious scholars in the movement who are well known as the followers of Deobandi *ʿulamā'*.[12] The founder of the movement, Mawlānā Muḥammad Ilyās (1885–1944) studied in a Deobandi school in India (Sikand 1999, 42). Religious teachings taught in Deobandi educational institutions resemble those of Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (1703–1792) (Mandaville 2007a, 228). In contrast to Salafi women, Indonesian Tablīghī women rarely mentioned any religious scholars from their

Figure 2.2 A bright *cadar* in a jihadi Salafi book stall at an Islamic Book Fair in Jakarta. Source. Photo credit, the author, 9 March 2008.

circle. Indeed, Barbara Metcalf emphasised that in comparison to other Islamist movements in South Asia, Tablīghī are not known for producing literature related to women (1998, 117).

The teachings of Tablīghī Jamāʿat about women, in general, focus on maintaining strict sexual segregation (*pardah/purdah/parda*). Writing about Muslim women in Bangladesh, Santi Rozario pointed out, 'The ideology of *parda* implies that women should remain within the private sphere as far as possible' (2006, 370). Wearing the face veil is an important part of observing *parda* (Jeffery 1979, 3). Since *parda* is a social system on this continent, the justification for wearing the face veil not only lies in its ideological basis but in social rationales, such as women should observe *parda* because their chastity is part of family honour (White 1975, 25).

For many Tablīghī elites, wearing the face veil is obligatory for Muslim women in relation to their presence in an age of disorder (Metcalf 1998, 113; Sikand 1999, 51). Some elite Tablīghī in Indonesia, however, argue that it is not obligatory but highly recommended. Therefore, there are still a few Tablīghī women who do not wear the *cadar* daily. Nevertheless, regarding their 'uniform' for venturing out to proselytise (*mastura khurūj*), all Tablīghī scholars agree that it is obligatory for them to wear *purdah* (a face veil that not only covers the face but also the eyes of the wearer with a transparent, thin cloth) and not the *cadar*. According to the basic norm of Tablīghī Jamāʿat, there is no excuse for disregarding any norms set when one performs the duty of proselytisation.[13] During this special activity, the wearing of socks and gloves is mandatory.

When Muslim women's activists and feminist activists talk

Muslim women's activists and feminist activists have long highlighted face veiling as a barrier to women's liberation and as an important gender issue, along with other issues such as gender segregation and domestic seclusion. In Egypt, for example, Badran argued, 'Early Egyptian feminists were well aware that face veiling was a powerful symbolic affirmation of fundamental sexual difference' (1995, 67). This section will especially focus on the influence of women's activists, feminists and progressive Muslim scholars in Egypt.[14] Within Muslim women feminist circles, Muslim women's organisations, progressive Muslim thinkers in Indonesia, Egyptian feminist activists and Muslim reformists have become their important points of reference (Nisa 2021).

During the early battle to remove the face veil, two well-known early Egyptian feminist activists, Malak Ḥifnī Nāṣif (1886–1918) and Hudā Shaʿrāwī (1879–1947), did not remove their face coverings because they believed that 'society was not ready for it' (Badran 1995, 23). Until she died, Nāṣif never unveiled herself, while Shaʿrāwī began unveiling in 1923, after her husband's death (Badran 1995, 23). Shaʿrāwī removed her veil with another Egyptian feminist and nationalist, Saiza or Ceza Nabrawi (1897–1985), after attending a conference in Europe. It was another feminist, Nabawiyya Mūsā (1886–1951), known also as the pioneer of women's education, who first began to uncover her face in 1909, while

emphasising that it is not an Islamic prescription (Badran 1995, 23). ʿĀʾisha ʿAbd al-Raḥmān (1913–1998), known for her penname, Bint al-Shāṭiʾ (Daughter of the Shore), mentioned that she was part of a generation that 'entered into three different but interconnected battles: to discard the veil, to be educated, and to go to work' (cited in Calderbank 1999, 194).

Scholars recorded face veiling as a practice followed by elite, rich and/or city women, who did not need to be economically active to support their families and less secluded lower-class women (Badran 1995, 22; Fay 2012, 35).[15] Indeed, from the historical point of view in Middle Assyrian Law within Assyrian society, long before the advent of Islam, Gerda Lerner recorded:

> The law … specifies that a slave girl must not veil herself … Domestic women, sexually serving one man and under his protection, are … designated as 'respectable' by being veiled; women not under one man's protection and sexual control are designated as public women, hence unveiled.
>
> (1986, 134)

Mary Fay records that peasant women and lower-class urban women did not cover their faces 'because their labour in the fields and in shops and workshops are necessary to the family's survival' (2012, 35).

It is important to mention Naẓīra Zayn al-Dīn (1908–1976), a female progressive scholar of Beirut and the first Arab woman to publish an in-depth discussion of veiling, argues that the source of face-covering practices and other unjust understandings and practices for women's inequality are not from the Qurʾān but from the interpretation of *ʿulamāʾ* (Zayn al-Dīn 1928, 227; see also Cooke 2010). Zayn al-Dīn is one of the women who took part in the issue of female emancipation following the steps of other Muslim reformists (Abū Zayd 2006, 90). In 1928, Zayn al-Dīn wrote *Al-Sufūr wa al-Ḥijāb: Muḥāḍarāt wa Naẓārāt* (Unveiling and veiling: Lectures and points of view) in which she focuses on face veiling. She argued that Muslim women have the right to shed their face veils yet remain within the faith. Zayn al-Dīn wrote on how 'the *niqāb* [face veil] is an insult to men and women' (1928, 139). In her explanation in which she also quoted Amīn, she mentions, 'It does not work for men and women, if men should only support women physically and financially' while at the same time they always mistrust their 'mothers, daughters, wives, and sisters' by suspiciously accusing them of bad morals and locking them up in their *niqāb* (Zayn al-Dīn 1928, 139). At the end of her book, she argued: 'How is it that we are not allowed to unveil the face when God forbids us to cover it or cover some of it during *iḥrām* [a sacred state] in *ḥajj* [pilgrimage] and *ʿumra* [the minor pilgrimage] when women are surrounded by tens of thousands of men?' (Zayn al-Dīn 1928, 438).

Following the agenda of early Muslim women activists and feminist activists, feminist and women activists of the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first centuries have focused on women's bodies where face veiling has been opposed. Nawāl al-Saʿdāwī or El Saadawi who, in 1982, founded the Arab Women's Solidarity

Association, is known for the term 'veiling the brain' referring to her belief that face coverings not only veil women's bodies but also lead to the veiling of the brain; the veiling of intellectual capacity (1988). In dealing with sources of Islamic teachings, El Saadawi emphasised the absence of reference in the Qurʾān to the imposition of the veil.

In the discussion of the *cadar,* Indonesian women activists and Islamic feminists do not only refer to these Middle Eastern thinkers—especially Egyptian progressive Muslims, women activists and Islamic feminists—but also to the country's context. One of the most prominent progressive Muslim scholars in Indonesia, Siti Musdah Mulia, highlights her rejection of the *cadar* through her own reading of the Indonesian context. She has been a vocal critic of the *cadar.* In an interview, Musdah stated that she was uncomfortable seeing her students with the *cadar* because she could not see their facial expressions; thus, she rejects the right of a *cadari* student to attend her class (*Media Indonesia* 6 March 2018; *Pulham Media* 27 February 2020). Musdah's position in this context is rather ambiguous, especially because she has been widely known as a women's rights activist and part of Muslim women's activist groups which have an agenda to prove that Islam is not a religion of discrimination. This implies that people should respect any expressions of religious practice, especially in the world's largest Muslim-majority country, Indonesia.

The *cadar* has also attracted young contemporary Indonesian women activists and Islamic feminists. In 2018, responding to the growing presence of *cadari* in the Indonesian public sphere and the popularity of the Niqab Squad, progressive Muslims, Muslim feminists, women activists and their organisations, including the Wahid Foundation, specifically discussed the *cadar* in their Bahtsul Masa'il meeting. Bahtsul Masa'il is a *fatwa* forum founded as a platform whereby NU *ʿulamā'* (men and women) can issue a *fatwa* to respond to contemporary issues. In the forum, 'Halaqah Perempuan untuk Perdamaian' (Women's Religious Meeting for Peace), the *cadar* was discussed under its specific division called the Halaqah Komisi Cadar (Religious Meeting for *Cadar* Commission). I was delighted to attend this meeting. It was interesting to see how progressive Muslims with their strong Islamic studies and NU-*pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) backgrounds demonstrated their careful assessment of the phenomenon. NU Bahtsul Masail had issued a *fatwa* on the *cadar* in 1933 emphasising that *ʿulamā'* of the four major Sunni *madhhab*—Ḥanafī, Shāfiʿī, Mālikī and Ḥanbalī—had varied opinions. Thus, NU tried to accommodate them and highlighted that Muslims can follow the opinions of *ʿulamā'* who say it is both obligatory and non-obligatory.[16] Decades later, the 2018 Bahtsul Masa'il forum initiated by progressive Muslims issued their religious position and view on the *cadar.* Like the position of the 1933 NU *fatwa* that acknowledged the varied opinions pertaining to the *cadar,* this 2018 Bahtsul Masa'il emphasised the Indonesian context. It states:

> This Bahtsul Masa'il forum has the view that the use of Muslim clothing should be harmonized with the Indonesian context and traditions. The use

> of clothes which might be considered as creating social segregation and reduced social interaction should be avoided. This is in line with the view of the Mālikī *madhhab* which states that the law of using the veil is *makrūh* [disliked] because it is considered excessive (*ghuluw*) for people where the veil is not part of their culture.

Trying to accommodate those who have different opinions, the forum also called for respect for those who believe that the *cadar* is obligatory and disrespect for those who stigmatise the *cadar* as synonymous with violence and extremism. However, the forum admitted that the biggest challenge is posed by Muslims including *cadari* who believe that their Islamic understandings are correct and that others are incorrect—and thus they try to persuade other Muslims to wear the *cadar.* The forum consisting mostly of female *ʿulamā'* demonstrated their pious critical agency that highlighted their capacity to read not only religious texts but also the Indonesian context.

Everyday life of *cadari*: More than layers of protection

The discussion of the importance of the *cadar* in the life of its wearers might guide us to question how much the articulation of a broad desire to become true *Muslimah* and obey a true Islam comes down to one issue: contact and visibility between the sexes and especially the management of this through clothing. Why does covering one's face and policing one's appearance for the opposite sex become important in achieving aspirations and submitting to God's will? These questions come up when one tries to understand the everyday life of *cadari.*

Policing one's contact with the opposite sex, for my *cadari* research subjects, is one of the most important aspects that can help them achieve God's will. The management of contact and visibility between the sexes through clothing, especially women's clothing, can be seen from another comment of Ukht Fadhilah:

> Mbak Eva, a woman is a beauty. So, we have to make sure that our beauty is not a cheap beauty, but a precious beauty. To make this beauty precious we have to work extra carefully. Thus, we do not wear something because we want to wear it, but we want to wear it because we know that it can help us in our becoming true Muslim women. Therefore, when Muslim women want to have a contact with their God, they have to wear a *mukena* [praying costume]. We wear it not only because we have to, but we need it to help us reach *khushūʿ* [concentration and humility] in our prayer. Just imagine Mbak, if we prayed in a mini skirt!

Ukht Fadhilah's statement generates some points. First, when she mentions 'a woman is a beauty,' not as a seductive being, it accords well with her earlier statement that women are indeed stronger than men in terms of their ability to save men and make the world more Islamic by presenting themselves in a manner that hinders men from committing sin. This point has been neglected by

many discussions of sexuality and impurity in Islam. Second, her argument on the importance of wearing a certain dress, *mukena,* that covers her *ʿawra* during prayer, demonstrates that which cannot be denied in Islamic teaching. To 'communicate' properly with God, Muslim men and women have to present themselves in a decent way. For *cadari,* whose worldview is embedded in aspirations to be true *Muslimah* so that they can achieve closeness with God, it can be understood that wearing proper Muslim dress is important as they prepare themselves to achieve this goal. It is not only related to their self-focused eagerness to pursue pious lives but also, as mentioned above, it is part of their responsibility as Muslims who have been appointed as God's vicegerents with the duty to fulfil the will of God. Many *cadari* argue that as human beings they are God's vicegerents, and their duty is to make earth a patch on which to collect God's rewards and blessings. Ukht Fadhilah, says:

> We are God's vicegerents Mbak. Therefore, our duty is to make the world as a place for us and others to perform *ʿibāda* [acts of devotion]. We do not interpret *ʿibāda* in a narrow sense Mbak, as only prayer. All our activities in this world should be labelled as *ʿibāda.* Therefore, we have to always make sure that whatever we do, be that in our office, house, neighbourhood, mosque, etc., should be always for the sake of performing our duty as God's vicegerents.

For Ukht Fadhilah, wearing the *cadar* should not be understood only as a self-focused pursuit but as a social pursuit. Her understanding of human beings as vicegerents on earth is shared by other *cadari* I met. They often reference this kind of view to Q.S. al-Baqarah [2]:30:

> And Lo! Thy Sustainer said unto the angels: 'Behold, I am about to establish upon earth one who shall inherit it.' They said: 'Wilt Thou place on it such as will spread corruption thereon and shed blood – whereas it is we who extol Thy limitless glory, and praise Thee, and hallow Thy name?' [God] answered: 'Verily, I know that which you do not know.'

Wearing the *cadar* is certainly not the only way to be a true *Muslimah* and to be *taat* to God. However, in the life of *cadari,* the adoption of the *cadar* has had a great impact on them embracing the importance of being responsible Muslim women. Being responsible in this regard refers to their ability to live their lives within a true Islamic path—a *halal* lifestyle. No one wants to be committed to wearing a *cadar* for non-religious ends. The few who have such intentions mostly do not wear it properly; they wear it only at certain times when they think that the *cadar* can help them to fulfil non-religious ends like in the case of those wearing it as a 'shelter' when appearing in court. Those who become passionate *cadari,* who adopt the *cadar* of their own volition and take pleasure in disciplining themselves, know the consequences of wearing the *cadar.* They know that all 'eyes will be on them.' They also understand that wearing the *cadar* is not the only way to achieve

God's will, but it is the most important aspect in helping them to perform other religious acts.

Their active listening to the authoritative voices in their religious community on proper *ketaatan* to God and the Prophet Muḥammad and to be true and ideal Muslim women aligns with Mahmood's emphasis on the possibility of associating agency with observance and docility. The agency of *cadari* is resonant with Rachel Rinaldo's view that 'women may be agentive in ways that do not align with feminist expectations—such as choosing not to resist unequal social arrangements; embracing the family, nation, or other social structure that feminists see as a location of oppression; or even contributing to the subjugation of others' (2014, 826). While Mahmood focuses on the agency of the women's mosque movement and the centrality of their religiosity, many scholars have expanded her focus to cover the varied expression of women's everyday lives beyond the 'mosque,' religiosity or piety. These scholars focus on 'ordinariness, daily pleasure, and everyday life' (Sehlikoglu 2018, 83; see also Schielke 2010; Schielke and Debevec 2012; Soares and Osella 2009). Samuli Schielke argues, 'There is a certain tendency to project Islam as a perfectionist ethical project of self-discipline, at the cost of the majority of Muslims who—like most of humankind—are sometimes but not always pious and who follow various moral aims and at times immoral ones' (2010, 2). This book also unpacks the everyday life of *cadari.* The everyday life of passionate *cadari,* however, revolves around their standard of *ketaatan*. When they have decided to perform *hijrah* (to transform into better Muslim women), they strive to centralise *ketaatan* and *piety* in their everyday lives. This can even be seen in their decision to choose certain sports—swimming, archery and horse riding—over others, mainly because these are the sports mentioned in a *ḥadīth.* A comment of Ummu Azkiya, a 35-year-old religious mentor of young *cadari,* is interesting in this regard. She says:

> When we wear the *cadar,* we know that we do it because we want to be close to God. We want to focus our lives just on being *taat* [obedient] towards God's command. It is only, *maaf* [I am sorry], a stupid woman who wants to play with their *cadar,* because everybody knows how hard it is to wear something like this.

Wearing the *cadar* is not only about women's sexuality and their ability to control it. It is more than that. For them, it is the dress that can make them closer to God. Ummu Azkiya explains it:

> When I wear the *cadar,* I feel close to God. Wearing the *cadar* does not mean we want to hide ourselves from men who are incapable of controlling themselves. It is about pleasing God. It is about *ketaatan,* doing what God and His messenger loves. When we wear the *cadar* we try to adjust what we do and what we think only to please God. However, Eva, it is not a guarantee that all *cadari* are very careful in fulfilling God's command. We are not angels anyway. We made mistakes.

Ummu Azkiya's comments on the ability to control oneself resonates with Suzanne Brenner's (1998) argument that 'while both men and women are subject to the sometimes overwhelming influence of their own desires, it is *women,* not men, who are believed to have more ability to control themselves [emphasis in original]' (149). Ummu Azkiya's last comment is also important. Many *cadari* often share their concerns about the mistakes that they have made. This resonates with what Schielke (2010) argued above, that the majority of Muslims, even the *cadari* in this study, are human beings who are not always pious.

Only *cadar?*

Wearing the *cadar* is not the only important element in the construction of their new *taat* habitus. *Cadari* have to diligently perform the Muslim duties stated in the five pillars of Islam,[17] such as praying five times a day and fasting during the month of Ramadan. Performing basic Islamic duties is unquestioned. The majority feel great pleasure when they can fulfil not only their obligations as Muslims but also all the Islamic virtues (*faḍā'il*) which are not obligatory: these usually refer to virtuous practices in which the Prophet, his family and his companions become perfect role models. Wearing the *cadar* is important because *cadari* believe that it can be regarded as the major discipline that can assist them in the formation of moral virtues. Ummu Sofyan, a 31-year-old Tablīghī woman, said:

> Wearing the *cadar* trains us to be always close to God. When we wear the *cadar* we feel that all we have to do in this world is just to be *taat* [obedient] towards God's rules. Wearing *cadar* also can make us more *taqwa* [God-fearing] and more *sabar* [patient]. We become *taat, taqwa,* and *sabar* because if we are unable to cultivate all these moral virtues it means that we fail to understand the essence of wearing the *cadar.* When we wear *cadar* we also cultivate *malu* [shame] in ourselves when we are unable to conform to other rules of God.

A virtuous practice that can assist *cadari* to embody purity in relation to their outward appearance is to avoid *tabarruj. Tabarruj* refers to the display of the female body and its charms, including any efforts by women to attract male counterparts, such as wearing heavy make-up. *Tabarruj* is illustrated as one of the characteristics of pre-Islamic society, namely exhibitionist behaviour. It is mentioned in the Qurʾān, Q.S. al-Aḥzāb [33]:33: 'And abide quietly in your homes, and do not flaunt your charms as they used to flaunt them in the old days of pagan ignorance.' Based on their understanding of this verse, most of the *cadari* argued that those who are able to embody their *taat* habitus and purify their belief means that they have successfully distanced themselves from the lifestyle of people living in the times of ignorance (*jāhiliyya*).[18]

Maintaining strict segregation between men and women is the other most important element of the *cadari* lifestyle. They adopt strict habits which can prevent them from creating any *fitna.* For example, they avoid the mixing of the

sexes (*ikhtilāṭ*) in all spaces (public and private); they are reluctant to go out without the company of their non-marriageable male kin (*maḥram*); they avoid being alone with a male stranger (*khalwat*) (Smith-Hefner 2019, 37); and they do not shake hands with the opposite sex. Maulana Ashiq Elahi Bulandshahri, a leading Indian Tablīghī scholar, argued that women should be hidden 'even more carefully than silver, gold and precious stones.' He argued that women going out can lead to *fitna* (cited in Sikand 1999, 46–47). Both the Tablīghī and the Salafi movements believe that these rules and practices are based on the model set by *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* (pious predecessors).

Besides the stigma outsiders associate with *cadari,* another common assumption by outsiders is that those who wear the *cadar* have religious qualities above the average standard of other Muslims. Many *cadari* have also felt this assumption. Umm Faiha, a 24-year-old university student, for example, says: 'When a man sees a woman wear the *cadar* then our *cadar* is like an alarm sign for them that they should treat us like a respected woman. They will not shake our hands.' The majority of *cadari* have experienced the impact of wearing the *cadar* so they self-discipline their lifestyle to be in line with the purity and *ketaatan* spirit of the *cadar.* For example, the most committed *cadari* will not wear make-up or perfume and they will not wear a colourful and fully adorned dress that may attract men's attention. They do not want others to think they are committing *tabarruj*.

Returning to the idea of everyday life, the following section focuses on how some *cadari* demonstrate everyday pleasure through fashioning their *cadar.* Sertaç Sehlikoglu argues, 'One of the most well-known attempts to move away from centralising the religiosity of Muslim women is the body of work that shifts the scholarly gaze to fashion as an attempt to bring out joys and pleasures of Muslim women' (2018, 82). The *cadari,* as we will see, also experience joy in fashioning their attire. However, they insist that this is also part of *ketaatan*.

Fashioning *cadar*

It is noteworthy that although *cadari* strive to return to *pure* Islam and try to purify Islam from any syncretism and to distance themselves from 'Indonesianised forms of Islam' (Fealy and White 2008, 1), they are still Indonesian women who love to pay significant attention to their presentation of self, including the way they fashion their *cadar.* Here, we can see that there is variation among these women in terms of the way they negotiate this aspect of their everyday lives.

During my fieldwork, I tried to respect *cadari* and one of their community's norms by wearing what they perceive to be proper Muslim dress. Every time I wore my *ʿabāya* (Ind. *abaya* or head-to-toe wrap completely covering a woman's body), they always asked me where I bought it; how much the price was; could they borrow mine to copy the design. Before they asked this type of question, I did not really pay great attention to their fashion style and taste. It is also noteworthy that fashion should not be reduced to simply trends dictated by external factors, like magazines and other media outlets. Rather fashion should be considered in a more expansive sense that covers one's dress choices. Drawing on my fieldwork

data, many outsiders think that *cadari* do not care about what they wear as long as the cloth used is thick and black or other plain colours then their mission to present themselves as true *Muslimah* has been accomplished. Meyna, a 23-year-old university student, said: 'I do not think that these women care about what they wear. It is so boring. I think what they have in their wardrobes are just very plain dark colour of *ʿabāya* without any ornaments.' Meyna's assumption can be understood since that is the most visible impression given by *cadari* that she meets on the streets. Looking closely at their lives, however, it is not uncommon to see *cadari* wearing diverse styles of *cadar* and *ʿabāya.* They are creative in making a distinctive Indonesian *cadari* look. This especially can be seen with Tablīghī *cadari* who are more relaxed in adopting diverse styles of *cadar,* while Salafi *cadari* are mostly stricter in choosing the kind of *cadar* and *ʿabāya* they should wear. Nowadays with the birth of the Niqab Squad and *cadari* celebgram (celebrity on Instagram), the country has witnessed the growth of trendy *cadar,* including *cadar* sport outfits (Figure 2.3).

According to some women from diverse Salafi groups, the outlook of the Tablīghī women cannot be regarded as fulfilling Islamic teachings on how to dress. Alternatively, Tablīghī women feel that the style of their *ʿabāya* and *cadar*

Figure 2.3 *Cadar* active wear with loose-fitting (Athira) pants and flowing outer top/*cadar* with arm holes. Source. Courtesy of © Nusseyba, 11 July 2021. Used with permission.

is indeed based on Islamic teachings. A Tablīghī follower, Tahnia, a 19-year-old university student, says:

> We know that many Salafi women are opposed to the way we dress, because we have embroidery and beadwork on our *ʿabāya* and *cadar.* We believe that Allah loves something beautiful and our *ʿabāya* and *cadar* are beautiful, so [there is] nothing wrong with it. People from other countries, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh even often praised our *ʿabāya* and *cadar.* When they visited our *pesantren*, they told us that they loved Indonesian embroidery.

This demonstrates that besides their passion to be part of the global Tablīghī movement, they are also eager and proud to adopt stylish dress which incorporates Indonesian materials.

Decorating one's dress on the basis that God appreciates beauty has been widely discussed in the broader Islamic fashion world in Indonesia (Jones 2010), where this phenomenon has happened with the *jilbab* (tight veil). Its commodification has produced anxieties about hypocrisy and insincerity. This is evident by the criticism that has been levelled at the *jilbab gaul* (trendy veil) and the Hijabers Community that was founded by four young Indonesian Muslim fashion designers (Baulch and Pramiyanti 2018, 2).

In Indonesia, as well as in other countries, the fashionably veiled women, such as *hijabista* (*hijab* and *fashionista*) and *hijabster* (*hijab* and *hipster*), have been widely criticised (Kavakci and Kraeplin 2017; see also the edited collection by Tarlo and Moors 2013). Banu Gökariksel and Anna Secor, for example, contend that in Turkey 'the idea of "veiling-fashion" continues to be controversial, drawing criticism from secular and devout Muslim segments of society alike' (2009, 6). The *cadar* phenomenon is poised to repeat the early path of the *jilbab,* including its commodified fashionability especially after the birth of the Niqab Squad in 2017.

Salafi *cadari* usually focus their attention on fashionable dress that they wear within their houses. For married *cadari*, this effort is aimed to please their husbands. Ummu Khalidah, a 28-year-old woman with one child, says: 'I am a wife. I always want to look attractive only in front of my husband. Therefore, at home I am wearing make-up, perfume, trendy dress sometimes even sexy dress [she recounted this while laughing].' The efforts of Ummu Khalidah and *cadari* who take similar steps can be regarded as a strategy to discipline themselves while upholding true Islamic teachings, and at the same time trying to negotiate their outfit with their passion to be attractive in their own most secure space. For the passionate *cadari* of some Salafi groups, it is often regarded as taboo to wear an embroidered *cadar* in public.

Nowadays, since the number of *cadari* in Indonesia is growing, the Muslim fashion business has begun to cater for the demand of *cadari* so they can find a complete outfit. Indeed, with the growth of e-commerce, some *cadari* own *cadar* fashion businesses.[19] Jilbab Zahrah can be regarded as one of the earliest players in the *cadar* industry that is managed professionally. The *cadar* designed by

Jilbab Zahrah is colourful and the fabric is stretchy. Therefore, many *cadari* are interested in wearing this kind of *cadar* which is suitable for Indonesia's humidity. Those who do not approve of wearing colourful *cadar,* usually buy it for daily use at home. Many such women pursue employment through selling clothing online to fellow *cadari*. For many of them becoming designers of Muslim dress is one of the few career paths open that allows them to help other women find proper Muslim dress and that does not risk them coming into contact with unrelated men.

Marriage and divorce for the sake of religion: The marital life of *cadari*

In 2017, I returned to my field site in Yogyakarta and was excited to have the opportunity to visit my key research subjects. It was insisted that I visit the Jamilurrahman complex early in the morning to attend the wedding of my key research subject's close friend, which would be held later in the afternoon. The wedding would be in the mosque of Jamilurrahman. After spending a day with the middle-aged Jamilurrahman *cadari,* I attended the wedding.

After afternoon prayer, I arrived at the wedding with my research subjects. All of the women attending the wedding arrived wearing a *cadar.* However, once inside, the women removed their *cadar* because the mosque was segregated, and men could not see inside the women's area. As we were about to sit, my key research subject informed me the wedding was polygamous and that the woman in her mid-thirties who had greeted us at the mosque's entrance was the first wife. I was admittedly shocked, because the woman who had greeted us had shown warmth in the typical manner of a wedding host, with no sign of sadness on her beautiful oval face.

When the ceremony was about to begin, the first wife sat next to the new bride (the second wife). Throughout the wedding procession she was very calm with no sign of tears. I observed quietly, attempting to digest the whole atmosphere, which was quite dramatic. My key research subject saw my puzzled and teary expression and whispered to me, 'You know Mbak Eva? The first wife was the one who chose the co-wife.' Although I knew that it was common practice among conservative groups in Indonesia, for wives in polygamous marriages to choose a co-wife, it was not easy to witness two beautiful young women agree to share a husband. The practice of allowing a woman to choose her co-wives is indeed common throughout the history of Southeast Asia to ensure 'an amicable atmosphere' (Andaya 2006, 189). Men in Salafi movements usually allow their wives to choose their co-wives so that the wives can work together to build a healthy Salafi family. When the ceremony had finished, all women congratulated both wives. I observed that some women were unable to hold back tears when congratulating the first wife.

In order to understand this scene which is increasingly part of the everyday life of *cadari* outside their religious *taʿlīm* (lesson) and the logic behind their emphasis on *ketaatan,* the last section of this chapter discusses the ways in which they seek to maintain the purity of their marital life. The practice of religious homogamy is part of their *taat* habitus. Religious homogamy as defined by Tim

Heaton (1984) can cover several distinct dimensions: denominational homogamy (marrying someone from the same religious denomination), theological homogamy (shared interpretations of scriptures) and attendance homogamy (frequency of attending a place of worship) (see also Chinitz and Brown 2001, 729). In the marital life of *cadari,* theological homogamy and attendance homogamy are the most important considerations for finding a proper husband. Theological homogamy is significant because these women argue that to be in the same religion, Islam, is not enough; their prospective husbands should adhere to the same theological interpretation of Islam. The way they conceptualise religious endogamy is related to their preference for marrying someone coming from the same group who has the same understandings of the religious texts. In Islam, this concept of religious homogamy in marriage can be related to the concept of equality between spouses (Ar. *kafā'a*) or (Ind. *kufu'*).

One key implication of their self-conscious commitment to a *taat* habitus is the concept of *kafā'a,* which refers to the suitability and compatibility of marriage partners. Among my research subjects this is interpreted further to mean not only shared religion, but also having a common vision and commitment to the observation of the religious tenets. However, the concept of *kafā'a* is understood differently by different Muslim groups. Some emphasise the equality of the lineage, profession and property and some even ignore this concept of *kafā'a* altogether (Schacht et al. 2021). In pre-Islamic Arabia, *kafā'a* was emphasised in regard to one's social status, with reference to one's racial and tribal affiliation (de Bellefonds 2021). This practice is still prevalent in certain communities. Hence, the Saudi Arabian board of religious decree, the Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta (al-Lajna al-Dā'ima lī al-Buhūth al-ʿIlmiyya wa al-Iftā'), issued a *fatwa* that *kafā'a* in marriage should be in relation to one's religion not in relation to one's lineage (*ʿal-kafā'a fī al-dīn lā fī al-nasab'*) (al-Juraysī 2008, 1345–46). They argued that this is in line with the passage of Q.S. Al-Hujurāt [49]:13, 'Verily, the noblest of you in the sight of God is the one who is most deeply conscious of Him. Behold, God is all-knowing, all-aware' (al-Juraysī 2008, 1345–46). Therefore, a majority of Muslim scholars agree that what counts for *kafā'a* is the quality of one's religious observance. One of the most prominent Salafi scholars in Indonesia, Ustādh Abdul Hakim bin Amir Abdat, explains that having the same *kufu'* (*se-kufu'*) means that both husband and wife are equal in terms of their nobility and their obedience towards God, towards religious teachings and in good behaviour (Abdat 2008, 109). Ukht Jamilah (pseudonym), a 22-year-old university student who is one of the students of Ustādh Abdul Hakim, said: 'It is important to find a husband who is *se-kufu'* to make sure that we can work together as a team to create a *keluarga sakinah* [harmonious family] and to raise good Muslim children.' Umm Ibrahim, a 20-year-old university student of the Pharmacy Faculty, also said:

> I believe that Islam has outlined that good believers, men and women, are a perfect match for one another. Therefore, my duty is to strive to be a good believer and pray to Allah to give me *jodoh* [a marriage partner] who is a

> good believer who can guide my life and who can make me even stronger while defending my *cadar* from those who oppose it.

Therefore, following the concept of *kafā'a,* the communities *cadari* belong to believe that a healthy marriage can only be achieved when religious inclinations and religious backgrounds are shared by both spouses. *Cadari,* like Umm Ibrahim, also believe that as long as they try to strictly adhere to their religion, they can find a match who is similarly committed.

Ummu Mujahid: My *manhaj* is my life[20]

The importance of ideology can also be seen from the most common story that accompanies the divorce of *cadari* that I have heard during my fieldwork, which is that there are differences in *manhaj* between husband and wife.[21] A married woman whose husband does not approve of her sudden decision to embody a new *taat* habitus and become much more religious might ask his wife to give up this transformation. If a wife is unsuccessful in persuading her husband to follow in her religious footsteps, she will, in many cases, ask for a divorce. This is not new. There were some divorce cases within the Arab community in the archipelago due to the wife's rejection of her husband's requirement that she wear the face veil.

Divorce is permissible in Islam. However, it is morally and socially difficult. The often-mentioned reference for this is a *ḥadīth* reported by Ibn ʿUmar saying 'the most hated of permissible things to Allah is divorce.' *Cadari* who were divorced, however, argued that they did so for the sake of their love for God; they could not live with a husband who did not love God and did not have a strong commitment to Islam.

To further illustrate the nature of this issue, I would like to take a closer look at the life experience of the late Ummu Mujahid, formerly known as Soraya Abdullah—an Indonesian model, TV presenter and actress—who became a follower of one of the Salafi jihadi groups in Indonesia. Within her Salafi jihadi circle, Ummu Mujahid was among one of the first women to wear the *cadar.* Ummu Mujahid had been married several times.[22] The first marriage lasted for two and a half years. The main motive behind its dissolution was because she felt that there were many differences between her and her husband in dealing with life issues. Following this, she became more religious and began to wear *jilbab* and remarried in 2006. She was then active in joining different Islamic groups until she met Abu Jibril—one of the radical preachers and the former leader of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Bubalo, Phillips and Yasmeen 2011, 28–29)—and committed to follow his teaching. She adopted the *cadar* in 2007 and got divorced for a second time in 2008.

After her second divorce, Ummu Mujahid seemed reluctant to seek another husband and had no intention of looking. She admitted that the pressure and stigma around divorcees was strong in her new religious community. Divorcees are subject to gossip. However, being financially affluent and having her own business, she admitted that her two children needed a father figure. In her words:

> Being a divorcee can create a big *fitna.* Surprisingly, the *fitna* is mainly created from my other *cadari* sisters who are afraid that their husbands will take the initiative to 'save' me and make me their *mathnahan* [co-wife]. Therefore, when I divorced for the second time, I was reluctant to tell women in my community.

The pressure that Ummu Mujahid encountered is understandable, particularly because her background can be easily traced. Although she had adopted the *cadar,* many men in her new religious community know that she was a model; she appeared in a number of soap operas that can be seen and downloaded from the internet. Because of embodying new forms of *taat* habitus, she realised that finding a new proper husband was going to be difficult. Therefore, she was willing to be a second wife if she found a proper man. She said: '*Ana ikhlas untuk dimadu nantinya*' (In the future, I am willing to be taken as co-wife if it is needed). If this is the price that she had to pay to have an Islamic family and remain committed to her *taat* habitus, she told me, she was ready to do whatever it took.

Ummu Mujahid felt that after the failure of her first marriage, she had made a mistake by marrying a man who was not from the same *manhaj.* She emphasised: 'In the future, if *qadarullāh* [God has decided] that I have the chance to remarry, I hope that my husband is a *mujāhid* [a man who has performed jihad] or at least wants to become a *mujāhid.*'[23] Her wish to find a *mujāhid* is influenced by the image of a proper Muslim man set by the group that she belongs to, jihadi Salafism. She also wished that her only son might one day become a *mujāhid.* Thus, her *nama kunyah* (teknonym) is Ummu Mujahid (Mother of a *mujāhid*). In 2011, she contacted me to tell that she had remarried a *mujāhid* who was at that time still in jail and the marriage ceremony (*nikah*) took place in jail in May 2011.

The other example that illustrates the importance of *manhaj* in the life of Ummu Mujahid's *cadari* sisters can be seen in the different religious practices between the followers of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi factions. These differences can become a source of tension in marital life. For example, for Tablīghī followers, the required regular period (*niṣāb*) for men to leave home for propagation of the faith (*khurūj*) can be a source of tension between couples who do not have the same ideology. The *niṣāb* for *khurūj* in Indonesia for male Tablīghī is three days in a month, forty days in a year, two to four months in their lifetime. Religious scholars are expected to perform *khurūj* for one year in their lifetime. It is extremely difficult for ardent followers of the Tablīghī to maintain their religious practice without the support of women who understand and accept the Tablīghī doctrines. Female Tablīghī are also required to perform *daʿwa* actively with their *maḥram* (Amrullah 2011). This means that the devoted female Tablīghī must find a husband who can also accept the Tablīghī teachings. During my fieldwork, I found some Salafi households where women had initiated divorce because their husbands were Tablīghī. This is because the Salafi movement considers the style of Tablīghī *daʿwa* as innovative which is forbidden in their religion (*bidʿa*) and regards the teachings as deviant. Examples of this tension are not only found between members of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and the Salafi movements. Even among

the Salafi factions themselves the tension can be quite severe, as they regularly engage in doctrinal disputes and often compete with each other for authority, legitimacy, followership and strategic links.

This chapter demonstrates that the subjectivity of *cadari* is a social phenomenon in which their religious affiliations and elites within their communities play significant roles in shaping their worldviews and conduct. This in turn brings us to understand that *ketaatan* in the life of *cadari* is social and interactive and not just a self-focused pursuit. The agency of these women that can be seen from their practice of religion also highlights the importance of structural affiliations that contribute to the shaping of their conduct.

They express their agency through their efforts to equip themselves with global Islamic knowledge, particularly by utilising modern technologies that give them access to Middle Eastern scholars. Their agency should not be equated with resistance which in this regard is related to resistance to male authority. For *cadari,* following religious authorities within their milieu and committing to authoritative knowledge purify their Muslim faith, which can lead them to become true *Muslimah.* Acquiring such knowledge is an important source of subcultural capital that can prepare them to be active in *daʿwa* activities.

Following their *hijrah* or self-transformation from being lax Muslims to Muslims who adopt strict literalist understandings of Islam, *cadari* actively and deliberately engage in transforming their pre-existing religious habitus. The new *taat* habitus they embrace shapes all aspects of their lives, including the way they discipline their everyday lives. *Ketaatan* becomes the main reference for all matters related to the way these *cadari* restructure their everyday lives, including the way they adopt certain styles of dress and arrange their family life. These behaviours must be explained in the light of the ideological framework that guides them. For example, concealing their charms in front of people beyond their *maḥram* cannot be seen as a restriction or seclusion imposed through men's control of women's bodies: for them it is an embodiment of religious virtue.

Notes

1 This term is particularly used in discussions about the choice of *madhhab* (the school of Islamic law). In practice, however, some Salafi groups follow closely (not blindly) one of the law schools, Ḥanbalism, which is the popular *madhhab* in Saudi Arabia (DeLong-Bas 2004, 110). Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal as the founder of Ḥanbalism was himself one of the important figures in the formation of the doctrine of Salafism (Meijer 2009, 4).
2 The term 'politico' was coined by Wiktorowicz (2006) to refer to the faction that espouses the blend of Salafi doctrines and Muslim Brotherhood approach introduced by Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966)—who was also influenced by Ibn Taymiyya and Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb. This politically minded Salafi strove to implement the Salafi creed into the political arena (Wiktorowicz 2006, 208).
3 This faction regards jihad (Ar. *jihād*) as its way to reach its goal (Hegghammer and Lacroix 2007, 118; Wiktorowicz 2006, 225).
4 Another term is Sururi Salafi, a label used by opponents to refer to the sympathisers of Muḥammad b. Surūr al-Nayef Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn (1938–2016), a figure who opposed senior purist *ʿulamā',* especially in their decision to support the Saudi Government for

permitting American troops in Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War in 1990 (Hasan 2009; Wiktorowicz 2006).

5 *Cadari* from Tablīghī Jamāʿat prefer *pesantren*-based residential educational institutions.

6 Obligatory (*wājib*) is one of the five religious qualifications known in Islamic law; obligatory (*wājib*), recommended (*mustaḥab or mandūb*), permissible (*mubāḥ*), reprehensible (*makrūh*) and forbidden (*ḥarām*).

7 He was also one of the most prominent figures of the Salafi movement in Indonesia. He is even considered by many Salafi all over the world as the third main contemporary reference, after Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz b. Bāz and Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-Uthaymīn (Lacroix 2008, 6).

8 Q.S. al-Aḥzāb [33]:53, 'O You who have attained to faith! Do not enter the Prophet's dwellings unless you are given leave; [and when invited] to a meal, do not come [so early as] to wait for it to be readied: but whenever you are invited, enter [at the proper time]; and when you have partaken of the meal, disperse without lingering for the sake of mere talk … And [as for the Prophet's wives,] whenever you ask them for anything that you need, ask them from behind a screen: this will but deepen the purity of your hearts and theirs.'

9 Q.S. al-Aḥzāb [33]: 59, 'O Prophet! Tell thy wives and thy daughters, as well as all [other] believing women, that they should draw over themselves some of their outer garments [when in public]: this will be more conducive to their being recognized [as decent women] and not annoyed. But [withal], God is indeed much-forgiving, a dispenser of grace.'

10 Some scholars (both proponents and opponents of veiling) have discussed the heated controversies over the interpretation of verses mentioned above (see Shaheed 1994; Sherif 1987; Siddiqi 1983). However, these controversies mostly focus on whether it is obligatory for Muslim women to wear the veil (not the face veil). The discussion in this section focuses only on those who use the same Islamic sources for diverse interpretations in relation to the obligatory of wearing the face veil (not the veil in general).

11 The followers of jihadi Salafism, who believe that it is obligatory, quoted the opinion of one of the leading elites within the movement, ʿAbdullah ʿAzzam (1941–1989) who argues that wearing the *cadar* is obligatory (2008). In justifying his argument, he quoted the purist scholar, Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ al-Uthaymīn.

12 Deobandi *ʿulamā'* is named after a seminary established in Deoband India in 1867 (Metcalf 2002, 1).

13 The teaching related to this strict rule is known among Tablīghī as *garis taqwa* (the line of *taqwa*), which is a term only used by the Tablihi Jamāʿat. According to them, *garis taqwa* refers to Islamic teachings written in religious texts (al-Qurʾān and *ḥadīth*) which have to be obeyed strictly as they are, without any further interpretations.

14 Veiling and unveiling, or covering and uncovering, in some Middle Eastern countries are also a nationalist issue. The issue is at the heart of political and social debates in the making of modern states like Egypt (Elsadda 2001, 40). In Egypt in 1915–16, a magazine called *Sufūr* (Unveiling) advocated for liberal thought in the country.

15 This practice could be found not only among Muslims but also among Jews and Christians (Badran 1995, 5). Mernissi argued that the veil was introduced to Muslim women only in the fifth year of Islam, before that, other civilisations had already adopted it (1991, 95).

16 Muhammadiyah, as the second largest Muslim mass organisation in the country, also issued a *fatwa* on *cadar* in 2009 by analysing the two verses Q.S. al-Aḥzāb [33]:59 and an-Nūr [24]:31, stating clearly that there is no specific *dalīl* (indicant) to support the ruling whether the *cadar* is obligatory or recommended in Islam (Tim Majelis Tarjih dan Tajdid 2013, 238–39).

17 The five pillars of Islam consist of: the profession of faith, prayer, fasting in Ramadan, almsgiving and pilgrimage.

18 Scholars have debated the term *jāhiliyya* referring to either the age or condition of ignorance or barbarism (Goldziher 1967; Rosenthal 1970).
19 I will discuss this further in Chapter 3.
20 Part of this section was published as Eva F. Nisa, 2011, Marriage and divorce for the sake of religion: The marital life of *cadari* in Indonesia. *Asian Journal of Social Science* 39(6): 797–820, doi: 10.1163/156853111X619238.
21 *Manhaj,* in this context, refers to the Islamic path based on the ways of life of the early Muslims.
22 When I met her, she admitted she had been married three times. After that there were many rumours that she had been married several times. However, what was certain was that before she passed away she had been married to a new husband.
23 The term *mujāhid* is commonly used among *cadari* of the jihadi Salafi group. *Mujāhid,* for these women, is an ideal type of husband (Az-Zahra 2008).

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3 Media and *cadari*

From *Ayat Ayat Cinta* to the Niqab Squad

The image of *cadari* (face-veiled women) as part of Indonesian popular culture contrasts with their image within national and international news media. Indonesian movies and novels often construct *cadari* as ideal Muslim women. National and international media outlets tend to publish news on *cadari* in relation to accusations of their connections to terrorist networks. On 16 June 2011, during the announcement of the verdict in the trial of one of the well-known figures of the jihadi Salafi group on terrorism charges, Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, *cadari* among his supporters gathered outside the court and gained significant media coverage. The news focused on the policewomen who were screening the *cadari* before they were allowed to attend the trial (*VIVAnews* 2011). In fact, the staunch supporters of wearing the *cadar* are those who belong to non-violent Salafi groups.

The visibility of *cadari* in media stories related to terrorist networks strengthens the stereotype of them as sympathisers of terrorist organisations which are the major threat to Indonesia's security. Jihadi groups do strive to strategise by wearing certain outfits when conducting their acts of terror. Frances Hasso studied four militant Palestinian women who were not wearing face veils when they killed themselves in 2002 in coordinated suicide bombing attacks. Only the fifth Palestinian woman bomber, Heba Daraghmeh, wore a face veil on a daily basis, but when she pursued her violent act, she did not wear it. This was a strategy so that she could enter Jewish communities and be seen as non-threatening to Jewish people (2005, 24, 26). During my interview with Nasir Abas, a Malaysian national who was a senior Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) member and was head of JI's territorial subdivision Mantiqi III,[1] he pointed out the importance of being in tune with the accepted norms relating to the outward appearances of people in their targeted areas to guarantee that their presence did not create suspicion. He said that when he was in charge in the southern Philippines, he asked male JI members to wear jeans, because jeans were popular among the Filipino community at that time.

Unfortunately, jihadi women donning the *cadar* and becoming more involved in frontline terrorist positions by perpetrating attacks have become more prevalent. There have been many offline and online campaigns to emphasise that the *cadar* is not a terrorist symbol. A fact they have to face is that a few *cadari*—mainly attached to the local Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-linked Jamaah

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Ansharut Daulah terrorist network—have been active in local and global terrorist networks. This can be seen in some *cadari* who have been willing to conduct *amaliyah* (sacrifice or suicide attack). This includes 20-year-old Fitri Diana who was involved in an attack on the then Indonesian security minister, Wiranto, and who stabbed the local police chief in 2019. More recently, in March 2021, two *cadari* died: one (21-year-old Yogi Sahfitri Fortuna) by suicide bombing in Makassar and the other (25-year-old Zakiah Aini) was shot dead after attacking the national police headquarters in Jakarta. The increasing number of Indonesian jihadi women involved in frontline positions is part of a global trend. Amanda Spencer argues this became evident after the 'U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2006' (2016, 77). Jihadi *cadari* are not solely responsible for providing moral and logistic support as per al-Qaida and Hamas, but women are now active in the frontline conducting *amaliyah,* as has been seen in ISIS and local-based homegrown terror groups affiliated with ISIS (Nisa and Saenong 2018). The face veil has been known as the uniform of ISIS women. Al-Khansaa, an ISIS female brigade founded in 2014, was in charge of 'policing public morality of women' in Raqqa (Syria) in late 2015 (Spencer 2016, 83). Spencer notes, 'ISIS has imposed a dress code demanding all women from puberty upwards wear two gowns to conceal their body shape, black hand gloves and dark layers of two face veils year-round. No makeup is allowed' (2016, 84). The ISIS guideline for women, *Women of the Islamic State: A Manifesto on Women by the al Khansaa Brigade,* published in 2015 mentions that women should wear face coverings (Ali 2015, 13). Thus, it is not surprising to see ISIS women with face coverings and carrying weapons.

It is little wonder then, that information that circulates about *cadari* is linked with widely circulated news in the media on the involvement of a very few of them in terrorist activities. This also emphasises their oppression and subordination, and a presumed Islamic suppression of women's freedom. Pekka Rantanen, in his study of non-documentary pictures, such as drawings and pictures of the *burqa* (face veil) on the internet, argues that the representation of women under their *burqa* maintained 'stereotypical cultural conceptions' (2005, 331; see also Fahmy 2004).

While the presence of *cadari* within mainstream media has been linked to terrorism, this chapter focuses on *cadari* and popular culture—including literary works and movies—and how *cadari* use mainstream and alternative media, including the internet and various social media platforms, in their everyday life. The influence of the Niqab Squad and cosmopolitan *cadari* public figures, like Indadari, will be the principal theme of the last section of this chapter. Their presence aligns with the growing trend of *hijrah* (religious transformation to be better Muslims) spirit among young Muslims and signifies one of the most current images of Indonesian Muslim publics, to borrow Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman's term (2004), born from a resurgence of piety. In the early 1970s and 1980s, many countries, including non-Muslim countries, witnessed a rise of piety across religious traditions, including Indonesia. Robert Hefner contends, 'The resurgence defies a century of forecasts by secularization and modernization theorists of religion's imminent privatization and decline' (2010,

1031). This resurgence has taken diverse forms. The new wave of *hijrah* in Indonesia is one of the latest forms and can be regarded as a glocalised trend and a form of globally hybrid piety.

There have been some studies on the image of veiled and face-veiled women in literary works, such as Gillian Whitlock (2005) and Clare Bradford (2007); however, the focus is on women in countries where the practice of veiling has become the norm. For instance, Whitlock suggests that the images of Muslim women with veils or face veils on the covers of literary works, such as Latifa's *My Forbidden Face* (2002), Jean Sasson's *Mayada, Daughter of Iraq* (2003), and Azar Nafisi's *Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir in Books* (2003), have successfully attracted their most targeted market, that is, liberal Western consumers (Whitlock 2005, 54–55, see also El-Saadawi 2010). Whitlock points out that the representation of women under their *burqa* espouses stereotypes about them as oppressed agents who need to be liberated (unveiled). She criticises this kind of representation, especially the idea of the *burqa* as oppressive, and unveiling the wearers as an act of liberation. This is an oversimplification of the meaning of *burqa* for the wearers themselves. It does however strengthen the stereotypes that the wearers are weak and need to be saved by others. The production of *cadar* novels in Indonesia, where the practice of face veiling is foreign to most Muslims even though it has a long history in the archipelago, is a relatively recent development.

A different story emerges from the presence of *cadari* in Indonesian popular culture, where there have been positive representations of *cadari*—especially in novels and movies—such as a *cadari* representing the image of an ideal Muslim woman. This has provided *cadar*-wearers with a different way of seeing their existence. Representation in this regard refers to 'an essential part of the process by which meaning is produced and exchanged between members of a culture. It *does* involve the use of language, of signs and images which stand for or represent things [emphasis in original]' (Hall 1997, 15). Since the 2000s, some Indonesian novels have used the image of the *cadari* and offered alternative representations, which seem to have eased the stereotype that *cadari* are agents of terror. One example is a 2008 movie *Ayat Ayat Cinta* (Verses of love) or AAC. AAC is based on the novel of the same title. One of the main characters is a beautiful, pious and fashionable face-veiled woman—a positive representation of *cadari.* However, since novels might be understood by the readers or audiences differently, new representations of the image of *cadari* in these novels may generate different meanings for different readers.

Ayat Ayat Cinta and the emergence of '*cadar* novels'

One sunny day, after attending a *bayan mastura* (a religious speech known among the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and targeted at female Tablīghī), a group of five upper-middle-class Tablīghī women mentioned AAC. I was not aware that there was a face-veiled woman character in AAC. Three of the women tried to convince their other two friends to watch the movie in a cinema. One of them said: 'Many people

Figure 3.1 A *cadari* before watching *Ayat Ayat Cinta* at the cinema in 21 Pondok Indah, Jakarta. Source: Photo credit, author, 28 March 2008.

told me that there were many veiled women watching this movie in the cinema and it is okay because it is a *daʿwa* [Ind. *dakwah* or proselytisation] movie. Let's go!' Finally, all five agreed to watch the movie and they asked me to join. At that time, I was unable to accompany them. However, I did watch the movie with another Tablīghī woman at a different time and was surprised to see some *cadari* in the audience (Figure 3.1). What is AAC? What is its significance in the life of Indonesian *cadari?*

Ayat Ayat Cinta by Habiburrahman El Shirazy (affectionately known as 'Kang Abik') was first published in December 2004 and, by March 2008, it had been reprinted forty-one times (excluding its pirated versions). After the overwhelming success of AAC, the image of the *cadari* has become more familiar to Indonesians, especially following the 2008 release of the movie based on the novel.[2] This piece of fiction is a classic melodramatic romance novel about a male Muslim protagonist, Fahri, and four beautiful women.

The story begins by portraying the everyday life of Fahri bin Abdullah Shiddiq, a poor Indonesian student at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, who has won a scholarship to complete his graduate studies. The novel is the love story of Fahri and a *cadari* named Aisha. Fahri meets Aisha in the metro during a dramatic incident. Aisha offers her seat to an elderly American woman who is very tired; the other passengers, mostly Egyptians, are offended by her friendly gesture. They purposefully refuse to let the American woman have a seat, as they regard all Americans

to be the common enemy of Muslims because of the US actions in Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine. Some Egyptians began to verbally abuse Aisha, accusing her of being a bad Muslim. Finally, Fahri intervenes to defend her and calm the situation. This is the part of the plot most often referred to by the director of the movie in interviews, as it stresses the fact that not all Muslims have a blind fanaticism for their religion. Many Muslims practise tolerance, as exemplified by Aisha and Fahri.

It has been claimed that AAC portrays the moderate, pluralist face of Islam (Santikajaya 2008, 4). However, the image of a *cadari* and Fahri's polygamy[3] seem to contradict this assertion (Brenner 2011). In the story, Fahri asks Aisha to remove her *cadar* once they have arrived in Indonesia, as it is not in accord with local custom (El Shirazy 2008, 218). Still, the image of Aisha with her *cadar* is omnipresent throughout the novel and the film. In the aftermath of the success of AAC, there has been a significant increase in the number of *cadar* novels (Figure 3.2).

The publication of AAC can be regarded as the starting point of the growing popularity of *cadar* novels in Indonesia. Although some authors in this genre, such as Geidurrahman Elmishry, seem averse to being associated with Kang Abik because they rate his literary style as poor, they do admit that the success of AAC has benefited those who write religious novels, and helped their work win the same acclaim and popularity as AAC. When AAC became a bestseller, many of my non-*cadari* research subjects yearned to read more such inspiring novels. At

Figure 3.2 Image of *cadar* novel covers that accentuate women's eyes, in a Gramedia bookstore, Pondok Indah, Jakarta. Source: Photo credit, author, 6 September 2008.

that time, many people felt disheartened because of the critical condition of the country, particularly the economic and political crises that hit Indonesia in 1997. Apart from *fiksi Islami* (Islamic fiction) or *sastra Islami* (Islamic literature), which became increasingly popular after the breakdown of the New Order regime and is exemplified by AAC, since the late 1990s another genre has emerged within the literary community: *sastra wangi* (fragrant literature) (Watson 2005, 67–69). *Sastra wangi* is a secular prose that frequently uses sexual issues to highlight inequality between the sexes. *Sastra wangi* was pioneered by the publication of *Saman*—Ayu Utami's first book—in April 1998, one month before the breakdown of the New Order regime. This genre has successfully set a new trend in Indonesia's literary world (Allen 2007, 25; Bodden and Hellwig 2007, 1).

The fictional character of Aisha in AAC, wearing the *cadar* and submitting to strict religious doctrines such as *ta'aruf* (Ar. *taʿāruf* or getting to know each other before marriage without having pre-marital relations or a passionate courtship)[4] and polygamy, can be regarded as counter constructions to women portrayed in *sastra wangi,* which often emphasise women's sexuality, female desire, women's liberation and social injustice (Arnez 2005, 2009). Also, AAC was published at a time advantageous for certain Islamist communities that used it to broach the subject of morality and pornography, a controversial issue advanced by conservative Muslims. In July 2003, for instance, women members of the Indonesian Islamist party Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or PKS (Prosperous Justice Party) held a seminar on pornography titled '*Pornografi dan komitment menjaga moralitas bangsa*' (Pornography and the commitment to guard the morality of the nation) (Rinaldo 2008, 23–24; see also van Wichelen 2010).

Constructing an image of *Muslimah* (Muslim women)

To analyse how the image of an ideal *Muslimah* is being constructed in *cadar* novels, I will focus on two fictional works on face-veiled women, AAC and *Laila Cinta Sang Hafizah* (Laila: The love of a female memoriser of the Qurʾān) (Aisyah 2008). The latter was written by Ninik Peni Sulistiyowati, a Muslim woman also known as Ummu Aisyah. She graduated from the Faculty of Law at Jember State University. Her own life as a *ḥāfiẓa* (memoriser of the Qurʾān) strongly inspired her to create the fictional character of Laila who is also a *ḥāfiẓa.* Moreover, Ummu Aisyah's affiliation with the Tablīghī Jamāʿat community stimulated her to recount the way of life of a Tablīghī family.[5] Kang Abik, author of AAC, graduated from Al-Azhar University in Egypt and was initially well known not only as a member of Forum Lingkar Pena (FLP, the Pen Circle Forum) (Arnez 2009, 46) but also as the founder of the FLP branch in Egypt. FLP is an organisation for writers and potential writers which aims to propagate Islamic values. It has a special informal relationship with the Indonesian Islamist Jama'ah Tarbiyah. The FLP founders are activists of the Jama'ah Tarbiyah (Arnez 2009; Arnez and Nisa 2016).

In all *cadar* novels, the image of the heroine is pious and physically flawless; she is the promoter of the ideal *Muslimah.* Kang Abik includes face-veiled, angel-like characters in several of his novels. Aisha in AAC, Afirah in *Di atas*

Sajadah Cinta (On the prayer rug of love) (El Shirazy 2005) and Masyithah in *Ketika Cinta Bertasbih* (When love extols God) (El Shirazy 2007) are presented as the most beautiful women in the stories. Aisha in AAC is described as follows: '*Subḥānallāh* (Praise be to God). The woman in front of me is an angel or a human being. Praise be to God who has created that beautiful face' (El Shirazy 2008, 214). Laila in *Laila Cinta Sang Hafizah* is also described as an extremely beautiful woman. When Yusuf, the main male character in the novel, sees Laila for the first time, he is impressed by her beauty: 'Any normal man will be impressed when he sees such a beautiful woman. Such was also the case with Yusuf (when he saw Laila), for him it was like seeing an angel descended to earth' (Aisyah 2008, 24). The question is: what exactly makes these women beautiful? They are described literally as having beautiful eyes and a flawless face (El Shirazy 2008, 236). This physical beauty is accompanied by their flawless religious aura.

In general, the word *salihah* (Ar. *ṣāliḥa* or pious woman), which implies these women's *ketaatan* (obedience) towards God's commands, is often used to describe the piety of the face-veiled women. In El Shirazy's AAC, for example, Aisha is described as follows: 'Perform the prayer for guidance. This *salihah* woman is truly *salihah.* She is looking for a *saleh* [Ar. *ṣāliḥ* or pious] man, not a rich man' (2008, 202). In contrast to the stereotype of *cadari* representing Islamic extremism, it is remarkable that such beautiful women are represented as being superior to other Muslim women.

Between propagation and commodification

Kang Abik and Ummu Aisyah have stated that through their works they contribute to *daʿwa* (El Shirazy 2006). Post-AAC, many novelists strove to produce this kind of *daʿwa* novel because the image of Aisha in her *cadar* in AAC won the hearts of many Indonesian readers. The image of *cadari* has become a highly marketable icon promising large profits. Some publishers have exploited the *cadari* image for book covers, even though such a character may not necessarily appear in the story. Diva Press is a publishing company which often uses images of *cadari* for their Islamic novels. However, only one of their nine novels with 'face-veil covers' actually features such a woman, namely Al-Krienciehie's *Berselimut Surban Cinta* (Wrapped in love's turban) (2008)—and the *cadari* is not a main character.

What exactly is being offered by this image? The main reason for the use of the image of *cadari* on the covers of these novels is commercial. It aims to reach a large readership. The marketable seductive image of *cadari* can be regarded as an extension of an orientalist representation of 'the Oriental woman.' The way people in the publishing business use the image of *cadari* is identical to the colonial fantasy of women in the Arab world, albeit a better representation and for different purposes. The most famous collection of postcards of Algerian women produced by the French in Algeria discussed in Malek Alloula's *The Colonial Harem* (1986) depicted representations of semi-nude Algerian women. Alloula collected these pictures to indicate the 'Western vision of the Orient,' as mentioned by

Barbara Harlow in the introduction to *The Colonial Harem* (xi). From the colonialist point of view, a full face-veiled woman was seen to be destabilising colonial superiority by making herself inaccessible. Jasmin Zine depicts this colonial fantasy as follows: 'How could one be superior to, or establish authority over, creatures that could not be known since they could not be seen or grasped as a picture … the act of seeing was a symbolic act of possession' (2002, 9–10). Referring back to people in the *cadar* novel business, although they did not produce seminude representations, they have successfully reproduced new ways of representing the image of the mysterious and exotic face-veiled women. The startling aspect here is that the book covers are depicting 'oriental' to the 'orient'—not a western audience.[6] The other similarity between the production of these images of colonial fantasy and people in the *cadar* novel business is that they are mostly the product of the male gaze. The gaze of people in the face-veil novel industry is like the gaze of the coloniser (the French) upon colonised subjects (Algerian) in Alloula's study.

This commercial agenda also becomes apparent in a statement made by one of the most successful Diva Press authors, Taufiqurrahman Al-Azizy, who admitted that he did not really know about the process of 'packaging' his work, as he entrusted the publisher and illustrator with all such affairs. Initially, he was not aware that most of his works had the image of *cadari* on their covers. When I interviewed him, he remarks: 'I only received the novel to be launched on the market without really paying great detail to its cover. There was no sharing of ideas in the process of packaging, including the decision to choose the proper cover for my work. Since I already trust them, I am happy with whatever they do.'

Al-Azizy's works (2006; 2007a; 2007b; 2007c) and other products of Diva Press imply that the publisher's marketing strategy emphasises the illustrations, not the content. This is to a certain degree comparable to what Kamilla Elliot refers to as 'the Book Beautiful,' where the most important element of the book is its appearance. Elliot goes further to argue that 'here, pictures appeared for picture's sake, not for words' sake' (2003, 48). The appearance of face-veiled women as part of the promotion of books resembles the strategy of many other advertisements exploiting women as objects. This phenomenon shows that women's bodies are being objectified in multiple ways: not only can slim Barbie-like women with sexy dresses magnetically attract the attention of fiction readers (Macdonald 1995, 11–12), but fully body-covered women can be the source of attraction, mystery, allure and seductive eyes. Attention is immediately drawn to the eyes and brows of these women. Figure 3.2 suggests that cover illustrators exploit the mysterious and alluring gaze of face-veiled women.

Responses to *cadar* novels

During fieldwork, the phenomenon of *cadar* novels encouraged me to unpack various versions of *cadari* representation in this genre. Analysis of *cadar* novels as texts lead me to deal with the way the text is activated by diverse readers.

Anne Cranny-Francis and colleagues define a text as 'a sign-based communicative practice that involves readers or viewers activating signs to generate meanings.' Therefore, text in this regard is not confined to literature. It covers 'cultural production and communication in all media and genres—including everyday conversation, service encounters, terms of personal address, bureaucratic exchanges, legal documents, historical manuscripts, novels, plays, films, television programmes and so on' (Cranny-Francis et al. 2003, 89, 136). In responding to *cadar* novels, readers are not passive recipients. There are two types of reading in this context: 'mainstream or compliant' and 'resistant.' Mainstream readers, who are represented mostly by non-*cadari,* produce a reading that complies with 'the reading expected from a literate member of the reader's society' (Cranny-Francis et al. 2003, 115). Resistant readers who are the *cadari* themselves produce a reading which rejects the mainstream reading.

Mainstream readers of this genre admitted that the presence of Aisha in AAC has given them some insight into the life of face-veiled Muslim women. Many of my male non-Salafi and non-Tablīghī research subjects commented that the *cadar* worn by Aisha is very attractive. One reason why *cadar* novels have become so popular for mainstream readers is that they hope to find something that will help them return to the religion. The production of *cadar* novels and their 'consumption' can be seen as one of the varied expressions of 'public religion' (Meyer and Moors 2006). Dania (31 years old), a consultant in one of Indonesia's law firms, shared with me her experience of reading AAC:

> I learn a lot from reading religious novels, especially AAC. I was amazed with the way Fahri and Aisha conduct their lives. Reading this kind of novel is like a reminder for me. It reminds me about my religion, my sins, and about many things that I do not know about my religion. I did not know about *ta'aruf* before. Reading this novel is like joining a religious journey and like returning 'home.'

Dania is one of many typical readers who want to return to Islam through reading religious novels. Indeed, Kang Abik told me how he was surprised with the success of AAC and since then more people have invited him to deliver Islamic sermons. He said, 'Since AAC, so many people have invited me to deliver sermons, including Ramadan sermons. Unfortunately, many times I have had to decline the invitations, because there are too many.' AAC was seen by many of its readers not only as a novel but as a way of understanding their Muslim identity.

The act of reading produces diverse meanings, given the different knowledge readers have. Below I analyse responses from *cadari* and their communities in Indonesia, who can be regarded as producing resistant reading to the representation of *cadari* in novels and other popular culture products.

The popularity of AAC has prompted Salafi communities to drag the issue into the public eye, that is, into discourse about basic religious legal doctrine (*ḥukm*) regarding the reading of fiction by Muslims. *Nikah,* a Salafi-based community magazine, dedicated a special issue to AAC and Islamic views on

the legality of reading fiction. *Nikah* quoted a *fatwa* (Ar. *fatwā* or non-binding religious ruling or opinion from religious scholar/s on questions related to Islam and Muslims) by Shaykh Ṣāliḥ b. Fawzān al-Fawzān, one of the best-known Saudi Salafi *'ulamā'* (Muslim scholars) in Indonesia, on this topic. According to him, if the activity of reading or writing fiction is prone to make people forget or neglect some mandatory religious activities, it is forbidden (*haram* or *ḥarām* [Ar.]) (al-Fawzān 2008, 56–57).

AAC has also inspired Salafi groups to release books to counter the novel and movie (Heryanto 2011, 63–64). One well-known book published by a Salafi group in this context is *Tafsir Cinta Ayat Ayat Cinta; Sebuah Tafsir Penuntun Jiwa* (A commentary of love on the verses of love: An interpretation by a soul guide) by Zaenal Syamsudin (2008). Syamsudin (2008) stated that he did not want to buy the book. Instead, he borrowed it from a person who he claimed was a 'victim' of the novel so that he could criticise it. Muslims affiliated with this group are urged not to buy or even have a look at AAC. This is also the main reason some of my *cadari* research subjects, especially those of the passionate group, were reluctant to admit that they had read it.

The responses from the *cadari* reveal a dilemma. Some of my face-veiled research subjects stated that Indonesians have begun to get to know more about the practice of face veiling through AAC. They feel that a positive change has occurred in the manner in which they are perceived in public. This is also illustrated by a joke among face-veiled university students in Yogyakarta: 'Nowadays, after the appearance of Aisha in AAC, especially its movie version, our image has greatly improved, from being a ninja to being a beautiful woman like Aisha.' Many of them also asserted that in the wake of the 'AAC fever' people—for example, their neighbours—began to treat them more warmly. Ummu Raihani, a 20-year-old student at a Saudi-funded university in Indonesia, says: 'After AAC, kids in my neighbourhood call me "Aisha." Their mothers start to talk to me and to some of my friends. They have started asking various funny questions such as, "Don't you feel hot under your *cadar?*"'

In my interviews, I found that a number of *cadari* are resistant readers who are unwilling to accept a mainstream reading of the text. They feel disappointed with the emergence of Aisha and their reading explicitly challenges the text and the responses of the mainstream readers. While it is primarily women without a *cadar* who consider Aisha a flawless and pious Muslim woman, some face-veiled women perceive Aisha and her image in AAC as a 'virus,' a travesty of their belief system. Therefore, ironically the popularity of *cadari* in literature is rejected by some *cadari* themselves. As Ummu Hasna (23 years old), a student at a state university, put it:

> I and most of my friends are really sad about the popularity of Aisha's *cadar.* Suddenly our sacred dress is tainted by the emergence of Aisha. We treat our *cadar* as something pure and sacred, and something that can move us closer to God—unlike other Muslim women who suddenly play with the *cadar,* making it part of their 'new style.'

According to them, the visualisation of *cadari* with a stylish and sometimes transparent *cadar* and seductive eyes cannot be regarded as being in accord with religious observance.

Another reason why *cadari* communities reject the commercialisation of the image of *cadari* is that some media have responded to the novel with parodies of the face-veiled Aisha. One example is *Extravaganza,* a former biweekly TV comedy show. Modifying the storyline of AAC in one of its episodes, the program shows Aisha when she finally takes off her *cadar* after her marriage to Fahri, exposing enormous protruding upper front teeth. Moreover, the community of *cadari* feels offended by celebrities like Dewi Persik, an Indonesian *dangdut* (an Indonesian music genre) singer, who on one occasion wore a face veil on a TV show. Ummu Khonsa (24 years old), a face-veiled university student, commented:

> We felt so sad when some of our friends said that Dewi Persik wore the *cadar* in a TV program. What was her point? What did she want to tell us by wearing the *cadar?* While the day after wearing it, she appeared again in her sexy dress, almost in the nude. Following the growing popularity of AAC, Indonesians have become more comfortable playing around with our dress.

For *cadar*-wearers themselves, like Ummu Khonsa, the conception of *cadari* as ideal women offered by the novels unfortunately contradicts the way the entertainment business uses the image of *cadari.* Therefore, many of them regard the production of *cadar* novels as incompatible with the ideology that they uphold.

Cadari engaging with media

The previous section focused on how *cadari* were represented by the media and in popular culture. This section focuses on how *cadari* self-present themselves; how they use the media, especially the alternative media—the internet and social media platforms—in their everyday lives. The previous section has demonstrated that many have been disappointed with the representation of *cadari* initiated by people in the print industry. It is in this section that we can see the agentive capacity of these women in sharing their life experiences. This section investigates the online activities of *cadari.* The internet has enabled *cadari* to exercise their agency and embrace their subcultures and to embody diverse experiences compatible with their subcultures.[7]

Suggesting that *cadari* belong to a subculture is invited by the way they distance themselves from Indonesia's mainstream culture. As the varied stories of the *cadari* in this book demonstrate, they distinguish themselves from the practices of Islam performed by their parents and the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. Their subcultures are reflected in the way they embody their new *taat* (Ar. *ṭāʿa* or obedient) habitus. Their obsession with maintaining ideological boundaries can be seen in the way they use the internet and social media platforms that are regarded as being characteristic of modern subcultures. The presence of the media as an integral aspect of a subculture has been emphasised by Sarah Thornton (1997) and

scholars who support the concept of post-subcultures (Kahn and Kellner 2003). These scholars point out the importance of media in the formation, propagation and circulation of ideas and ideologies of subcultures (Kahn and Kellner 2003; Thornton 1995). This section on alternative media initially focuses on the internet and then on social media platforms in which the presence of the Niqab Squad has become a game changer in the discussion of *cadari* and media.

Cadari and their internet subculture[8]

The bulk of the literature about Indonesian Islam and the internet demonstrates how the use of technology by *cadari* has been neglected. Taking advantage of the freedom of speech emerging in post-New Order Indonesia, *cadari* have used media strategically for their own purposes, revealing a usage that contrasts, in important respects, with that of mainstream Muslims in Indonesia. This section demonstrates that free speech has benefited all Indonesians, including *cadari,* a group of citizens who to a certain extent remain invisible (see the Niqab Squad below) yet nevertheless 'threatening' (Figure 3.3). It focuses on how they create and maintain their own subcultures through the internet.

While there is a tendency by some scholars to emphasise the internet's functionality in the creation of 'civil society' (Anderson 1999; Castells 2000; 2005; Hill 2003; Hill and Sen 2005), the internet in the life of *cadari* reveals different trajectories which are compatible with their subcultures, but which register lightly or not at all under the civil society paradigm. The functions of the internet in the life of *cadari* do not resemble a liberalising path. Instead, they use the internet as part of their project of resistance against the way many Muslim women have

Figure 3.3 Romaini sitting at her computer at work. Source: Photo credit, author, 1 January 2009. Used with Romaini's permission.

started to engage with global flows of Islamic knowledge in diverse media—messages that *cadari* regard as promoting a 'liberal' interpretation of Islam (on agency and resistance see Mahmood 2005).

The way they engage with the internet is by creating their own secluded virtual public sphere. They regard this as part of the embodiment of their new *taat* habitus to be true *Muslimah.* At the same time, the online activities of these women go against the stereotypes attached to their *cadar* status, especially the symbolic interpretation of *cadari* as a marker of women's oppression and subordination, and the subsequent negative evaluations of these women's capacity for agency (Macdonald 2003; Rantanen 2005; Shirazi and Mishra 2010; Wikan 1982).

Since the aspiration of becoming a true *Muslimah* is the everyday concern of *cadari,* all their life experiences need to be adjusted to this aspiration. Their agency needs to be associated with religious ends evident from their everyday use of social media platforms which is tied to the Islamic rules they uphold. For them, engaging with the media is not just a matter of passing time; it is approached as a virtuous act. Kamaludeen Nasir, Alexius Pereira and Bryan Turner propose that the concept 'degree of pietization' be used in analysing pious acts. This 'degree of pietization' is especially important regarding the current revival of religion among Muslims in certain communities. The 'degree of pietization' refers to 'the reform of daily practices that give otherwise secular activities (eating, sleeping, dressing and so forth) a religious significance' (2010, 10). I also argue that engaging with the internet is part of the quest to be good *Muslimah.* The *cadari* make decisions about which media they should engage with, and which internet sites should be visited. Becoming and being good *Muslimah* for them means paying significant attention not only to their bodies but to the activities in their everyday life as a whole.

The internet as a cultural technology for communication has created possibilities for *cadari* to create and maintain their own subcultures within their own 'safe' public space. Most *cadari* with whom I worked commit to using the internet in harmony with their understandings of Islam. Ummu Sarah, a 36-year-old young mother, says:

> I think the presence of the internet is very helpful for all *akhwat* [sisters or *cadari* in this context], especially for sharing religious knowledge. Usually if I go online then I will visit my friends or *'ulamā'*'s blog to get some inspiration how to practise Islam. However, I still have to be very careful while using the internet to make sure that I do not violate the rule related to *ikhtilāṭ* [the mixing of sexes] and *khalwat* [illicit close proximity between genders].

Many *cadari* implement strategies to preserve their religious worldview, even in 'private' internet usage. They do not consider the virtual world to be a space where associations and socialisations which are not permitted in the real world become permissible. They strive, for example, to sterilise their virtual world from men. Some also maintain their virtual public appearance carefully when using friendship networks, such as Facebook and Instagram, particularly by not

attaching their real pictures. Instead of uploading pictures of themselves, they upload other pictures such as those of flowers and images of nature.

Cadari and their internet practice

Many Salafi groups in Indonesia, ranging from jihadi, such as Laskar Jihad (Bräuchler 2003), to non-jihadi groups, use the internet for disseminating their teachings. However, among them, debate about whether the internet is *halal* (Ar. *ḥalāl* or permissible) or *haram* is ongoing. Gary Bunt discusses how the presence of women on the internet invites critique from some clerics who are doubtful about the real benefits for women being publicly, albeit virtually, present there (2009, 25). Some clerics argue that women's online presence may contravene Salafi adherence to gender segregation; a view prompted by the assumption that many young Muslims are tempted to go online by virtue of the transgressive possibilities the internet offers (Slama 2010).

With social media platforms mushrooming via the increasing presence of Facebook (2004), Twitter (2006), WhatsApp (2009), Instagram (2010) and TikTok (2017), some *ʿulamā',* including those of the Tablīghī and Salafi groups in Indonesia, have progressively upheld negative views towards this communication technology. This includes a discussion about using Face App (As Sidawi 2019). Indonesia's highest Islamic clerical body, the Council of Indonesian ʿUlamāʾ (MUI), has issued some *fatwa* (Ar. pl. *fatāwā*) on the use of social media platforms. In 2017, MUI issued *fatwa* no. 24 to regulate the use of a platform known as 'Muamalah medsosiah' (Behaving on social media). By exploring the uses of social media in the country, especially when used to spread hoaxes, hate speech,[9] pornographic materials and other *maʿṣiya* (sinful behaviour), the MUI issued this *fatwa* to guide Muslims on how they could safely use social media (see also Campbell 2011 on conservatism and technology). Negative views of the internet and social media, however, do not prevent some *cadari* in Indonesia from using varied social media platforms for their agenda, which demonstrates the way they exercise agency.

A Q&A section on an Indonesian Salafi female website (*akhwat.web.id*) includes an answer to a question on how to engage with the internet by a Medina-born Salafi scholar, Shaykh ʿUbayd al-Jābirī (2009). The Q&A was uploaded from *Salafitalk.net* (n.d.) which, according to Thomas Maguire (2005, 122), is a pro-Saudi traditionalist site that remains loyal to the Saudi Government. Al-Jābirī emphasises that all Muslims, including Muslim women, should ideally limit their online presence to searching for religious knowledge. Driven by their eagerness to be true *Muslimah,* many Salafi women limit their online activities to the purpose of *daʿwa,* while at the same time striving to uphold their subcultural ideology. Here, I will focus on two early forms of *cadari*'s online activities, mailing list As-Salafiyyat and the online business of Bunda Alifa.

Mailing list: As-Salafiyyat

As-Salafiyyat is a mailing list for Salafi women. This group was founded by and for Muslim women. It is one of the best examples of how *cadari* are active in

creating their own virtual subcultures. They strive to build a niche that supports their interest in maintaining their new *taat* habitus, a 'healthy' *halal* lifestyle, and that maintains a distance from mainstream, Indonesian lifestyles, perceived as non-Islamic. The aim of As-Salafiyyat is to learn, communicate and share religious knowledge based on the Salafi ideology.

Women regard participation in this discussion forum as part of their *daʿwa.* Such participation creates subcultural capital, a term coined by Thornton (1995), inspired by Pierre Bourdieu's (1984) concept of cultural capital. The list excludes participants from outside the group. Although new members of the group do not have to be members of a pre-existing Salafi group, they are expected to share the group's concern for avoiding communication across gender lines, thereby committing resistance towards one of the most accepted norms of the mainstream virtual world (lack of gender segregation). Prior to being approved, members are screened by way of online interviews, in which they are asked questions such as:

1. Do you want to know Salafiyyah *daʿwa?* (In this context the Salafi teachings)
2. Is there a Salafi Ahlus Sunnah wal Jama'ah *ta'līm* (Salafi study circle) in your place? Do you attend it? Who is the teacher?

In all, thirteen screening questions must be answered by prospective members before the moderator approves their application to join the forum. In the interests of upholding gender segregation, only women are allowed to join. Men are forbidden to join As-Salafiyyat. There is a strict warning for men who use false gender identities in order to take part in the group. The rule states: 'As-Salafiyyat does not allow men to be part of the group. Be afraid of Allah The All-Seeing and All-knowing.' The online world for members of As-Salafiyyat is the expansion of their everyday offline life. Some members demonstrated that it was through the online world that they finally found not only the real Islam but also their real sisters.

Bunda Alifa

Doing online business or, to borrow Emma Tarlo's term, 'cyber-Islamic commerce' (2010), has enabled some *cadari* to be active in another form of *daʿwa.* For them, business can be part of *daʿwa,* as well as *ʿibāda* (an act of devotion), if it results in bolstering an Islamic lifestyle within their communities. The experience of Bunda Alifa, the owner of the *Rumah Bunda* website, provides an early example of how *cadari* have successfully shaped and maintained their subcultures through business. Bunda Alifa is renowned among other *cadari* followers of a Salafi group in Yogyakarta as something of a 'web geek.' She has been an active web user since the early establishment of *warnet* (*warung* internet or internet café) in Yogyakarta in 1996, and has been blogging since 2005, long before the presence of the cosmopolitan tech-savvy *cadari* public figures or the Niqab Squad. In the early days of the internet in Indonesia, she revealed to me, she was the only *cadari* who went back and forth to *warnet* every day. Nowadays,

however, people can go online from their mobile phone directly and Bunda Alifa can go online every day from her home.

In conducting her online business, Bunda Alifa strives to ensure that her activities are in line with Salafi ideology. For marketing purposes, for example, she uses mannequins without heads. In addition, she also sells alcohol-free, *halal* beauty and health products. The range includes Breast Care Spa, V Whitening Lotion, V-spa and Beauty Buster, and there is even a product for men, called Natural Oil Enlargement. The reason for choosing all these products originates from her eagerness to help women to be attractive to their husbands by using *halal* products which she says have been ignored by many Muslims in Indonesia. When I asked Bunda Alifa why she chose these kinds of beauty products, she laughed while saying: 'Hahaha … it must be like that sister, because I want my husband's eyes only on me.' She wanted other Muslim women to have the same experience. Thus, *cadari* are not immune to the demands of the beauty culture, but they try to adjust these demands to suit their Salafi ideology by using *halal* products. The intention of the usage should also be in line with Islamic teaching, namely to please husbands' eyes. Through her online businesses, Bunda Alifa can navigate her (online) public presence from her private realm.

Hijrah hype: From public figuring *cadar* to online and offline Niqab Squad fever

This last section specifically portrays the latest development in the interplay between *cadari,* the internet and social media and agency. It will begin by analysing the emergence of cosmopolitan Indonesian public figures who wear the *cadar* in the name of *hijrah,* especially since 2017. The way *cadari* respond to the rapid growth of advanced technology, especially to social media platforms, and adjust not only to their private but also public and communal piety will be foregrounded. The birth of the online–offline *cadari* community Niqab Squad in 2017, which attracted national and international media attention, will specifically be at the core of this discussion. The use of the internet and social media platforms by the Niqab Squad has added to the dynamic presence of *cadari* in Indonesia. Through the presence of the Niqab Squad, we can see clearer the influence of advanced technology in the lives of *cadari,* beyond the use of closed mailing lists like As-Salafiyyat.[10]

Evidenced here from *cadari*'s use of various social media platforms is not only their *taat* agency but also their everyday agentive joy. Scholars focusing their work on Muslims have often focused on piety and others have concentrated on everyday Muslim life beyond religiosity (Deeb and Harb 2013; Schielke and Debevec 2012; Soares and Osella 2009). These scholars mention ambivalence, incoherence and the coexistence of religious and nonreligious sensibilities of Muslims' everyday lives (Schielke 2010). Nadia Fadil and Mayanthi Fernando point out that some scholars were preoccupied with the binary of the opposition between piety and the everyday (2015, 63). Following this, scholars have been

debating how to understand everyday life or 'the everyday' in relation to Islam (Deeb 2015, 94; see also Fadil and Fernando 2015; Schielke 2019).

In line with scholars who turn to everyday Islam, the everyday Islam and agentive joy of *cadari* can be clearly seen in those who are attached to the Niqab Squad. Their everyday life, however, cannot be separated from their religiosity. The Niqab Squad's everyday activities and agentive capacities should not be read as totally opposed to their religiosity or *taat* agency. Lara Deeb, in her response to Fadil and Fernando who discussed the binary, also argues that both piety and the everyday should not be read as 'diametrically opposed to one another' (2015, 59). Deeb argues that

> viewing the everyday in opposition to piety also risks reinscribing the normative as static and homogenous. … One way to move in new directions might be to think about how moral norms and everyday practices are coconstituted in relation to one another, which means that the coproduction works *in both directions* [emphasis in original].
>
> (2015, 96)

This chapter aligns with Deeb's argument that everyday practices are inseparable from piety.

Public figuring *cadar* and *hijrah*

In recent times, Indonesia's public sphere has witnessed the growth of a new wave of Muslim eagerness to become better Muslims by performing *hijrah,* especially among cosmopolitan young people. *Hijrah* in this context refers to religious transformation to become a better Muslim and the journey that is involved in becoming a more pious Muslim (Nisa 2019a, 445). The Qurʾān uses the term *hijrah* to refer to migration or withdrawal, in particular the Prophet Muḥammad's migration which occurred in 622 CE from Mecca to Medina. The new *hijrah* wave that is celebrated by young Muslims demonstrates a rise of piety but also a global hybridity of piety, termed glocal piety. There is an encounter between global Islamic resurgence, the influence of transnational revivalist movements, modern consumption—including media consumption—and local expressions of becoming religious, or more religious than the 'newborn' Muslims of the early 1970s and 1980s. The presence of the *hijrah* wave and the Niqab Squad signify two of the many faces of Indonesian Muslim publics. Salvatore and Eickelman argue that Muslim publics are born from articulations on Islam in public spheres which encompass varied initiatives and 'are grounded in practices that emerge through the complex process of [the] ingraining of Muslim traditions into modern social life' (2004, 24; see also Tayob 2012, 142). Within Muslim publics, new media platforms play a crucial role.

The phenomenon of *hijrah* was especially popularised when public figures started to join the movement and adopted veils and face veils. In November 2018, a number of public figures initiated 'Hijrah Fest 2018.' The event was targeted

at Muslim youth. The organisers wanted to make it the 'Biggest Hijrah Event of the Year' and planned it as an annual festival. These public figures were mostly well-known Indonesian actors who had just experienced *hijrah.* For example, Arie Kuncoro Untung, a 46-year-old former MTV Indonesia VJ, actor and TV presenter, conducted *hijrah* in 2016. It is noteworthy that the phenomenon of *hijrah* does not specifically and directly attach to certain Islamist and conservative movements. The reference is often related to Muslims, especially young people, who want to be more religious. They usually do this by attaching themselves to various Islamist and other conservative groups, and their appearance becomes the symbol of this transformation. Women usually adopt a veil or a *cadar* and men usually grow a beard and wear non-*isbal* (Ar. *isbāl*) trousers which should fall above the ankles. During the Hijrah Fest, for example, the organisers usually invite clerics of the various Islamist and conservative movements, including various Salafi factions and the currently banned Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) to deliver Islamic sermons. Muslims who undertake *hijrah* are the same as those who become part of Islamist and conservative movements as mentioned in the previous chapters. They do not have strong understandings of Islam from their past. Therefore, young students at *pesantren* (Islamic boarding school) of moderate Muslim organisations like Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, who have worn veils since attending primary school or *pesantren*, are usually not considered to be undertaking *hijrah.* Even so, although the phenomenon of *hijrah* is gaining popularity, especially among young people, their number is very small compared to mainstream Muslims in Indonesia.

When analysing closely the notion of *hijrah* as propagated by its current supporters, many outsiders feel that *hijrah* is Arabising Indonesian Islam. Alima, a 45-year-old Muslim woman, shared her thoughts on the phenomenon of *hijrah:*

> I do not mind seeing some people, including my close friends suddenly mention that they have conducted *hijrah.* I do not mind seeing her with a veil, but I do not like it when suddenly everything should be Arabised. They criticise me when I said '*makasih*' [thank you], they said I should say '*jazākillah khayran kathīran*' or '*shukran.*' They are all Arabic. It does not mean I do not like Arabic. I am learning Arabic, I want to understand the Qurʾān, but I do not want to talk in Arabic in Indonesia. I am a proud Indonesian Muslim I want to talk in Bahasa [the Indonesian language].

Alima's position was echoed by Malika, a 39-year-old veiled Muslim woman, sitting next to her:

> Yes, I have the same feeling too. Why suddenly it is wrong to write 'insya Allah' or 'insyaallah.' They said, 'It's a wrong spelling. You should write it *in sha Allah* [Ar. *in shā'allāh*].' Please I know how to write and pronounce it perfectly in Arabic. I wrote it in Indonesian spelling. What's wrong with Indonesian Muslims. We are living in Indonesia!

Alima's and Malika's concerns should be understood as the voices of Indonesian Muslims who are disturbed by the Arabisation of their Indonesian culture. This

language Arabisation has been embraced by the Niqab Squad through their popularisation of the Arabic term *niqab,* instead of *cadar.* While many Indonesians still use the term *cadar,* the current face-veiled women, especially those belonging to the Niqab Squad caravan are more comfortable using the term *niqab.* Since 2017, after the birth of the Niqab Squad, the use of the term *niqab* has become more popular.

In late 2017 and early 2018, Indonesia witnessed the emergence of female public figures who started adopting the *cadar* to accompany their *hijrah.* Prior to 2018, there were a handful of female public figures or wives of Indonesian public figures who began to adopt the *cadar,* the most famous of whom was Soraya Abdullah (Ummu Mujahid), a female actor who decided to wear the *cadar* in 2007 after facing turbulence in her marriage and becoming a member of a Salafi jihadi movement. In late 2017 and early 2018, more public female figures started to adopt the *cadar,* such as Pipik Dian Irawati (a former model, female actor and a wife of the late famous preacher, Jeffry al-Bukhori, best known as Uje), Peggy Melati Sukma (a female actor, businesswoman and philanthropist), Nuri Maulida (a female soap opera actor), Tiara Dewi (a singer and female soap opera actor) and Inara Rusli (a former member of girl band, Bexxa). In addition to these public female figures who have shown a commitment with the *cadar,* others have shown interest in wearing the *cadar* occasionally, such as Kartika Putri and Bebi Silvana.

Their transformation is often labelled *hijrah* and indeed many of them began their journey with a *cadar* when the phenomenon of *hijrah* was emerging. There are many motives behind their decisions to wear the *cadar.* Living in the spotlight as public figures in the entertainment industry, with its lifestyle of a prevalence of promiscuity, drugs, piercings and tattoos, there is tough competition for short contracts. This brings extensive stress for some. As public figures, marriage failure, including widowhood, can greatly impact on the lives of women. Some may decide to find refuge in religion by conducting *hijrah,* including *hijrah* from wearing revealing clothing and by covering their bodies with *cadar* and joining Tablīghī or Salafi movements.

Peggy Melati Sukma, who changed her name to Khadijah, is one of the important public figures who decided to conduct *hijrah* and adopt *cadar.* The 45-year-old Peggy rose to fame in the mid-1990s and 2000s as female actor, television host, businesswoman, and now philanthropist, motivator and writer (Nisa 2019b). During her time of *jāhiliyya* (ignorance), the term she used to depict her past, Peggy was enrolled in a beer brewing school in Manchester and was named one of their best graduates. Peggy had faced some turbulence in her life, including divorce from businessman Wisnu Tjandra in 2011. Peggy told me, 'Between 2010 to 2012, I experienced a difficult period and began to find refuge. By mid-2012, I decided to begin my *hijrah* journey.' Peggy began wearing a veil and since then, she has embarked on a *daʿwa* journey through humanitarian activities to help Muslims in Indonesia and beyond (Nisa 2019b). Peggy's journey to become a better Muslim woman led her to commit to wearing the *cadar* in late 2017. Peggy however does not consider her *hijrah* journey to be because of the failure of her marriage, rather she believes that *hijrah* is God's call.

The presence of *cadari* public figures is considered a fresh breeze for other *cadari* or prospective *cadar*-wearers. These public figures have been vocal in trying to convince the Indonesian public that wearing the *cadar* does not mean they are terrorists. The image of *cadari* has never been so colourful, in particular, without the presence of the Niqab Squad.

The Niqab Squad

In 2017, Indonesia witnessed the birth of the first cosmopolitan *cadari* network, named the Niqab Squad. The plan of this establishment can be traced back to 2016. Its birth happened while Indonesia was witnessing the emergence of female public figures who began to adopt the *cadar.* The Niqab Squad was founded by Indadari Mindrayanti, known as Indadari, with the assistance of her face-veiled network, Diana Nurliana (a fashion designer), Dian P.S. (wife of pop preacher Kasif Heer) and Dian Rositaningrum (a fashion designer and former wife of musician Opick). The Niqab Squad is the first *cadari* movement initiated by cosmopolitan *cadari* themselves. The establishment of the Niqab Squad was aimed at providing a forum of *ukhuwah Islamiyah* or Islamic sisterhood to unite not only *cadari* but also those who have shown interest in the *cadar,* in addition to supporting those who wear the *cadar* to maintain their commitment. This is reflected in their tagline 'to embrace Muslim women so that they do not feel alone in their *hijrah* and in wearing the face veils.' In addition, the Niqab Squad has the objective of improving the religious knowledge and other life skills of face-veiled women and countering the rooted negative stigma pertaining to them, including stereotypes that assume they are associated with terrorist networks, oppressed, passive and backward.

Fighting prejudice against face-veiled women who are often seen as oppressed and backward Muslim women, terrorists and extremists, Indadari came up with the name the Niqab Squad. She admitted that the name was inspired by the 2016 American superhero film *Suicide Squad.* She chose the term *niqab* instead of the Indonesian term *cadar* as she considered the term *niqab* was catchier. The combination of *niqab* and *squad* offered a modern twist, she explains, 'It's kind of cool and doesn't feel extreme. From this kind of ear-catching name, it's easier to attract lay people's attention.' Indadari's prediction was indeed right. Amrita, a 53-year-old lawyer, shared her thoughts: 'First when I heard this term Niqab Squad, I didn't understand what *niqab* was. So, now, I understand *niqab* is *cadar.* I myself won't wear it, it's not the way I understand Islam. That kind of outfit is more appropriate in Arab countries, but I also admit the squad [Niqab Squad] is kinda cool.' This cool name has also encouraged many local and international journalists to learn more about them. Journalists from the *New York Times, Sydney Morning Herald, New Strait Times* and *Deutsche Welle* have provided coverage on the Niqab Squad. The presence of the Niqab Squad has also brought *cadari* into the spotlight with headlines in local newspapers and magazines.

Indadari argues that the Niqab Squad does not have structural and special affiliations with any Islamic or Islamist movements. A close analysis of the organisation,

however, demonstrates that it has been loosely affiliated with diverse Salafi preachers, especially those associated with Indadari Salafi's circle, such as Ustādh (Ind. Ustaz) Syafiq Riza Basalamah, Ustādh Khalid Basalamah, Ustādh Oemar Mita and Ustādh Aan Chandra Thalib. Indadari says: 'I intentionally gather my friends from various religious movements. I ask them, "let's join Niqab Squad," but if there are some things that they do which I believe are not in accordance with the Qurʾān and the Prophet's traditions, then I will correct them.' Although Indadari's intentions are to welcome face-veiled women from various Islamic movements to the Niqab Squad, her statement 'I will correct them' refers to her Salafi understandings of Islam. Therefore, it is not surprising if, according to the current head of the Niqab Squad, Tri Ningtyas Anggraeni, known as Tyas, the majority of Niqab Squad followers attach themselves to Salafi, especially those of Indadari Salafi's circle.

The Niqab Squad has used social media extensively in its everyday life. It is through the Niqab Squad that we can see clearly how media, both conventional and non-conventional (social media), have made *cadari* more present to the Indonesian public and beyond. The Niqab Squad was not specifically born from social media platforms but was launched and popularised through social media. The iconic hat design mentioning Niqab Squad was first uploaded to Instagram by Indadari and Asti Pratiwi. The post received a massive response from netizens (internet users), which inspired them to create Niqab Squad Indonesia in February 2017. Not long after, in April 2017, branches of the Niqab Squad in Indonesia and abroad were established, such as Niqab Squad Jogja and Niqab Squad Bandung.

To date, the Niqab Squad has more than 4000 members dispersed in various branches throughout Indonesia and abroad (Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan). In Malaysia, the Niqab Squad is led by Malaysian *cadari,* and in Singapore and Taiwan, it is managed by Indonesians who work there. Big cities like Jakarta and Makassar have more than 500 members. Members' ages range from sixteen to women in their forties and fifties. Most members, however, are university students or women in their twenties and thirties. Tyas, says: 'After they graduate from high school, usually they begin to question their identity. University students usually have more free time in Indonesia. They can also freely choose their own friends. Therefore, many of them just follow some of their friends who already joined the Niqab Squad.' Sul, a 29-year-old university student majoring in computer science from Borobudur University, said: 'At my university, wearing the face veil is not a problem. Mostly the stories of my friends who then decide to wear the face veil is because we attend the same activities.' Yuli, a high school student, shares her journey:

> I started wearing the face veil just lately, but I am still not a fully committed wearer, because I am still in high school. I usually wear a face mask [surgical masks] if I do not wear a face veil, because at school it is still not common. I know Niqab Squad from Mbak Putri, who is my neighbour. I am inspired by her.

Putri, sitting next to Yuli, who is also a high school student, says: 'Before joining Niqab Squad I already wore the face veil, but my environment did not support it,

so I decided to take it off. But now, I have started my *hijrah* slowly [with the help of Niqab Squad]. Yuli and I now have begun to wear the face veil which is great.'

Surgical masks, as Yuli mentioned, have been used by many *cadari* as a strategy to negotiate being present with their *cadar* in hostile environments that do not accept the *cadar.* This is because wearing surgical masks in large Indonesian cities like Jakarta is an increasingly common sight due to air pollution and COVID-19, especially by motorcyclists. Niqab Squad elites also support this kind of strategy, so that women can still cover their faces with surgical masks if wearing the *cadar* is impossible. Indeed, the trajectories of Sul, Yuli, Putri and other Niqab Squad *cadari* mirror similar approaches taken by most of my other *cadari* research subjects. Peer support is important for new wearers. The problems faced by Yuli and Putri in finding support for wearing the *cadar* is exactly the gap that the Niqab Squad aims to fill—to provide a support system for other *cadari.*

Daily interactions of the Niqab Squad are maintained through WhatsApp groups, while the wider public can consume their *da'wa* through other social media platforms, especially Instagram, Facebook and YouTube. Through WhatsApp groups, Niqab Squad members share daily religious messages and varied information with their community. This includes sharing the schedule of obligatory prayers. The most followed platform is Instagram. Niqab Squad had 60,000 followers on 14 August 2021, a significant increase from 36,000 followers on 9 June 2019 (Figure 3.4).

The activities of the Niqab Squad are not only about piety. Indeed, as many scholars like Deeb argue, we cannot create opposition between piety and the everyday. Their activities help us to understand how their everyday lives are shaped by certain understandings of piety (2015, 96). Besides religious activities, like routine monthly Islamic study circles and sending online religious messages, they

Figure 3.4 Niqab Squad members in their black *cadar* practising archery. Source: Courtesy of Indadari, 9 June 2021.

Figure 3.5 A boutique for *cadari* in the Mosaicht Store with Niqab Squad members inspecting the merchandise. Source: Photo credit, author, 4 November 2017.

also organise workshops to benefit the daily life of *cadari,* such as workshops on how to make healthy *bento* (Japanese-style decorated packed lunch), archery and horse riding. In addition, some members are also passionate fashion designers. As a fashion designer with strong links to Indonesian businesswomen, the leader, Indadari, has collaborated with one of the major Muslim fashion boutiques in Indonesia, Mosaicht, to open a special boutique in a Mosaicht store for selling *cadar*-related fashion (Figure 3.5).

When I visited the store in 2017, I was surprised to see a *cadar* corner—a feature that had not existed when I visited Mosaicht for my work in Muslim fashion in 2006. The presence of *cadar* fashion allowed me to realise how the Niqab Squad was influencing the general public about *cadari* as well as their presence in the Indonesian Muslim fashion scene. Indadari gathered a wide range of Niqab Squad *cadari* who had fashion lines or were excited about fashion design to join her in developing *cadar* boutiques in Mosaicht. One of Niqab Squad's elites, Diana Nurliana, who began wearing *cadar* in 2015, started showcasing her *cadar* designs in two significant fashion events in Indonesia: Jakarta Fashion Week (since 2016) and Indonesia Fashion Week. In analysing these activities, it became clear that piety and the everyday cannot be read as diametrically opposed.

Indadari: Bringing the *cadar* to the public

Discussion of the Niqab Squad and their media presence cannot be separated from Indadari, one of the founders of *cadari* and an icon of the Niqab Squad. She is known as a Muslim fashion designer, writer, motivator, philanthropist and businesswoman. She rose to fame not only due to her work, but also because of her connection to other Indonesian public figures and her first and second marriages to Indonesian public figures. Her first husband was an actor and was a member of the Indonesian House of Representatives and her second husband was a comedian. Indadari is known as a humble and bubbly public figure. Her polka dot trademark for her Muslim fashion line, including her *cadar* and *ʿabāya* (Ind. *abaya* or head-to-toe wrap completely covering a woman's body) designs inform her personality (Figure 3.6).

With an undergraduate degree in communication obtained in 2012, Indadari has written six books to date, especially on Muslim fashion and what motivates Muslim women. Whenever we met, she emphasised the importance of *hijrah.* True *hijrah* for her means the adoption of *cadar.* Indadari frames her *cadar* journey as one of salvation:

> The Prophet [Muḥammad] and his wives are the best exemplars for Muslims. They are guaranteed to go to heaven. I really want to enter God's paradise. So, I think I have to have an idol to follow. All the wives of the Prophet wore the face veil. If I imitate women other than them, it is not guaranteed they can go to heaven. I want to emulate those who are definitely guaranteed, including through their practice of wearing the face veil.

Figure 3.6 Indadari, wearing her *cadar* with her signature polka-dotted border, promoting her designs for Instagram stories, in Mosaicht. Source: Photo credit, author, 4 November 2017.

Although wearing the face veil is an important part of her effort to emulate the lifestyle of the Prophet's wives, Indadari believes that wearing the face veil is not obligatory—it is only *sunna* or recommended, referring to an activity that deserves a reward in the hereafter. Indadari contends: 'So, I think by wearing a face veil I can gain an additional reward. I cannot guarantee that every day I will be free from any sins, but at least by wearing the face veil I know that at least as long as I wear it the reward will continue.'

Indadari's journey with her *cadar* began when she attended a *kajian* (Islamic study gathering). She attended many *kajian* by various Muslim preachers from different Muslim groups in Indonesia, but she often attended that of Ustādh Syafiq Riza Basalamah. Syafiq Riza is part of the Salafi preacher network of Ustādh Yazid bin Abdul Qadir Jawas, Ustādh Abu Yahya Badrusalam, and their institutions such as Yayasan Cahaya Sunnah and Radio Rodja (Radio Dakwah Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah). Indadari says: 'When I attended Ustādh Syafiq Riza Basalamah's *kajian* on *hijrah,* I saw many women with the *cadar,* so I began to be interested … And when I attended the *kajian,* I received a *cadar* souvenir, so I tried it out directly.' Indadari said that she felt she was in limbo at the time, because of the personal problems she had to face. She believed that during the *kajian* she received signals of what she calls *jalan hidayah* (the path of God's guidance).

Adjusting to her *hijrah* and *jalan hidayah* journey, Indadari focused her activities on fighting prejudice against *cadari.* She began designing Muslim fashion to cater to the needs of *cadari,* by designing a *cadar, ʿabāya,* long *khimār* (veil) and gloves. This was to respond to those who believe that *cadari* are backward and do not understand fashion. Her boutique made it easy for *cadari* to find what they need to cover themselves. The *cadar* has been a big hit in Indadari's boutiques. She admitted that she wanted to be the pioneer in selling fashionable *cadar.* Many young urban *cadari* that I met after Indadari launched her *cadar* products stated that they bought their *cadar* from Indadari's boutiques.

As a public figure, Indadari is also active in voicing her concerns relating to stereotypes and prejudices against *cadari* on national media, especially television, and through social media platforms. Her appearances on national television have gained significant interest because prior to her frequent appearance with her *cadar* it was uncommon to see vocal *cadari.* Indadari blurred the public–private presence of *cadari,* which invited various perceptions not only from other *cadari* but also from the Indonesian public. In contrast to many other *cadari,* she always accepts invitations to be on television, even for gossip and celebrity news programs. Her presence in gossip and celebrity news programs has disconcerted some other *cadari* whose religious understandings restrict them from watching TV. Many Salafi *ʿulamā'* have expressed their rejection of television. Ustādh Muhammad Abduh Tuasikal, for example, says: 'The badness and damage inflicted by TV at the moment are more than its benefits. Therefore, it is better not to have TV present in a Muslim family' (2009). Indadari, however, believes that her presence on TV is important as part of her *daʿwa* to make *cadar* more accepted by the Indonesian public and to fight against the stereotype that *cadari* are terrorists and oppressed subjects. Indadari says:

> It is a rubbish TV program [a celebrity gossip and entertainment news program]. There is a risk here. But, if I do not appear on this kind of program, then people are not used to seeing the *cadar.* This is a chance for me to do *daʿwa.* Not bad, if I am on TV for 30 minutes, and everyone sees me, it means that they will see *cadar* non-stop for 30 minutes. This is part of my *daʿwa* and when they interview me, I quote religious texts too.

Indadari also admits that there are many who oppose her decision to appear on TV, especially on gossipy celebrity TV programs. She believes that this is her way of strategising *daʿwa* in a smooth way.

Instagramming and YouTubing: Be yourself *cadari*

Indadari has tried to instil the culture of 'be yourself' among *cadari* of the Niqab Squad. She often mentions that *cadari* should confidently express themselves, and to style as they wish. As the trendsetter of Niqab Squad followers, Indadari says: 'I try to emphasise that they need to embrace the notion of "be yourself" as long as it does not violate the rules [Islamic teaching on dress]. If you want to wear a hat if you are hot, then just wear it.' Indadari's statement reminds us of the difficulties of seeing 'piety' and 'the everyday' as diametrically opposed, as many scholars like Deeb (2015) have argued. Indadari argues that after *hijrah,* many Muslim women feel that they are confined. They feel they cannot be themselves. She believes that this is the main reason why many Muslims feel it is hard to be *istiqāma* (committed) to their *hijrah* path. She created the Niqab Squad to teach her followers that *hijrah* should not be restricted, should not only be about religious lessons but also about being expressive human beings.

One of the often-mentioned everyday activities of Niqab Squad followers is taking selfies and posting the photographs to social media platforms, in particular, Instagram. Therefore, the Niqab Squad has been identic with the selfie culture. Some *cadari* from various Salafi groups criticise the Niqab Squad and their selfies, especially *cadari* who have become celebgram (celebrities on Instagram). Natasya (2019) writes on one of the online news platforms belonging to a Salafi jihadi group, *Voice of al-Islam* (Voa-Islam): 'The purpose of face veiling is to protect us from evil spies. But the reality is in this epoch there are many face-veiled sisters who ignore the purpose of what they wear. Especially now there are many celebgrams wearing face veils with thousands of followers. Can you imagine how many spies enjoy the beauty of the face-veiled women?' Since most Niqab Squad followers are urban middle-class tech-savvy young women who want to return to their religion, it is not surprising if some of them are active on Instagram as influencers or celebrities of Instagram. Indeed, according to Tyas, most of those who are interested in the Niqab Squad and want to become members know it from their cyber activism.

The presence of these *cadari* on Instagram has unsettled other *cadari,* especially long-time wearers of the garment. Umm Hasanah, a 53-year-old housewife who has worn the *cadar* since 1995, says: 'We are not Niqab Squad! My friends

and I do not agree with the way they [Niqab Squad] appear in the public and on Instagram. But at least I know that none of them is part of ISIS or any terrorist movements.' Those who hold the belief that women's voices are *ʿawra* (part of the body that must be covered) that need to be covered, find that the diverse platforms of social media provide a venue for women to exercise their agency and be active on social media through their writings, without 'showing' their voices. Those who are active in conducting *daʿwa,* can conduct *daʿwa* through religious messages that they write and post on social media platforms or what I call *daʿwa* by keyboard (Nisa 2019c, 12).

Media privacy has become an important issue for women who uphold strictly conservative understandings of Islam (for Arab countries, see Abokhodair, Hodges and Vieweg 2017). Indadari and her circles, however, are different. They proudly upload their pictures on their social media platforms. Indadari posts photos and videos of her activities and her views on various issues including photographs of her giving charity to a man in the Indonesian public sphere. This might be seen by some conservative *cadari* as violating the public/private segregation and boundaries between genders.

The use of the internet and its varied platforms such as blogs, social media networking sites and content-sharing sites (Facebook, Twitter, Weibo, Instagram, YouTube, TikTok) has blurred the boundaries between public and private. Zizi Papacharissi argues, 'Cyberspace is public and private space. It is because of these qualities that it appeals to those who want to reinvent their private and public lives' (2002, 20). Indadari and other *cadari* celebgrams have enjoyed blurring the public/private spaces. With a growing number of *cadari,* like Indadari, active in social media, especially Instagram and YouTube, Indonesians not only hear the voices of *cadari* in the public space, but they also see diverse everyday expressions of *cadari* more easily.

As a philanthropist, Indadari has influenced her followers in the Niqab Squad to be active in philanthropy for the common good (*al-maṣlaḥa al-ʿāmma*). One of Niqab Squad's main projects, initiated by Indadari, is Project Akhirat (The hereafter project) which focuses on philanthropy. Project Akhirat offers a free ambulance service, free workshops on how to prepare Muslim funeral services, donations for students who memorise the Qurʾān, donations for Muslims in Syria and Palestine, and donations to respond to natural and humanitarian crises, including earthquakes and floods. The Niqab Squad has also collaborated with one of the largest Indonesian humanitarian institutions, Aksi Cepat Tanggap (ACT, Quick Response Action), which has reached more than sixty countries to channel their aid. Project Akhirat has its own social media platform and website to share its activities and recruit prospective donors. Tech-savvy Niqab Squad has successfully recruited a significant number of donors through their social media posts.

Indadari and Niqab Squad's presence in Indonesia's public sphere and social media through Project Akhirat have also had a significant impact on public reception. Saminah, a 60-year-old widow, who received a donation from Niqab Squad shares her impression: 'I was a little bit afraid when they approached me because I

thought you know, they are terrorists. They said they want to give charity because I am a poor widow. … Now, I know they are not terrorists. They are different.'

Through their social welfare activities, the Indonesian public has become accustomed to seeing *cadari.* Aldi, a 37-year-old professional, shares his impression: 'I begin to see women wearing face veils now in public. I know there is this Niqab Squad. I think they are active in giving charity which is good. Perhaps, people might not see them all as terrorists now. I think the Niqab Squad are different from *cadar teroris* [face-veiled women who are terrorists].' Aldi's impression is shared by others who witnessed Niqab Squad charity activities during the floods in Jakarta. Defina, a 45-year-old Christian businesswoman, says: 'I know Niqab Squad from television, of course. I saw on social media too that they are active helping the flood victims. I think it's good. This might change people's impression towards them, but you know I'm Christian, so I do not know much about them.'

Indadari and her Niqab Squad have fostered a non-frightening *cadari* subculture. Although many Indonesians do not approve of the practice of face veiling, they are becoming more familiar with the presence of *cadari,* online and offline. Indonesian internet users, for example, have become more comfortable openly discussing *cadari.* This aligns with Papacharissi's argument about the difference between the public space and the public sphere in her discussion of political activities and the internet. She argues, 'As public space the internet provides yet another forum for political deliberation. As public sphere, the internet could facilitate discussion that promotes democratic exchange of ideas and opinions. A virtual space enhances discussion; a virtual sphere enhances democracy' (2002, 11). The internet has provided a new stage for the voices and experiences of young *cadari* celebgrams, who have recently gained significant online and offline popularity.

The current most popular *cadari* celebgrams are: Wardah Maulina, Uni Alfi, Sonia Ristanti, Wafiq Malik, Intan Surullah and Sarah Gumelar. Wardah Maulina married a young celebgram and singer Natta Reza and, in 2018, featured as a videoclip model in her husband's song *Kekasih Impian* (Dream lover), which was inspired by their love story. To date, the viewers have reached more than 14 million and some of the comments demonstrate how they have been inspired by Wardah. Wardah can be regarded as one of the most famous *cadari* celebgrams who has 2.1 million followers.[11] On her Instagram, she is active in presenting and endorsing various products for different brands ranging from skincare to *cadar* outfits.

Intan Surullah is known as a YouTuber, singer and celebgram like Wardah. She has 382,000 Instagram followers and 781,000 YouTube subscribers. She uploaded a video to her YouTube channel, showing her singing with her *cadar.*[12] She also shared her daily activities, such as stories about when she met her husband, eating with her friends and grocery shopping. Uni Alfi is another *cadari* celebgram who has 1.1 million Instagram followers.[13] As a celebgram, Uni Alfi is often asked to endorse various *cadar* clothing products. Uni Alfi is also known as

a motivator for other *cadari.* She uploads videos and pictures encouraging them to be confident and committed to their *cadar.*

These women's cyber activities, through Instagram and YouTube, which craft their online identities, can be approached through Erving Goffman's 'presentation of self' theory in which he highlights how people are performers when they express their identity verbally or non-verbally. In social interaction, Goffman mentions the role of the 'stages'—'front stage' or 'backstage,' using the metaphor of theatrical performance, to signify how people actively choose to play various roles depending on the 'stages.' He elaborates, 'when one's activity occurs in the presence of other persons, some aspects of the activity are expressively accentuated and other aspects, which might discredit the fostered impression, are suppressed … there may be another region—a back region or backstage—where the suppressed facts make an appearance' (Goffman 1956, 69). This aligns with the way celebgram and YouTuber *cadari* use visual social media sites to communicate their various identities. Aligned with this, Sherry Turkle highlights how self-fashioning operates virtually. She contends,

> Now, in postmodern times, multiple identities are no longer so much at the margins of things. Many more people experience identity as a set of roles that can be mixed and matched, whose diverse demands need to be negotiated. … The Internet has become a significant social laboratory for experimenting with the constructions and reconstructions of self that characterize postmodern life. In its virtual reality, we self-fashion and self-create.
>
> (1995, 180)

The birth of these *cadari* celebgrams and YouTubers has also helped *cadari*'s outfit businesses to grow significantly to cater to the needs of young urban *cadari* to self-fashion and self-create themselves (Figure 3.7).

This chapter began by unpacking the ways that the image of the *cadari* was used by the media in two ways: as a negative stereotype and as an ideal image of Muslim women. Within the literary genre, the image of the *cadar* has been introduced as a symbol of flawlessness. Those who have been active in the production of novels within this genre can be regarded as trying to promote particular ways of seeing *cadari,* which suggests they are exotic and full of mystery. They can be regarded as an extension of orientalist representations depicting exotic *cadari,* mainly for a non-western audience. *Cadar* novels have influenced their readership in many different ways. For some readers, the wish to become more pious and to deepen their understanding of Islam is an incentive to buy the books. In this context, fictional texts have provided a successful religious framework that helps readers make sense of their world.

However, *cadar* novels are strongly debated by *cadari* themselves and their communities. Many Salafi, for instance, claim that the texts have tainted the sacredness of modesty in Islam and have damaged the dignity of the practice of face veiling. Such groups oppose the reading of fiction, especially when it distorts the image of *cadari,* whom they sincerely respect. Some novelists have

Figure 3.7 A *cadari* model with a tennis racquet, showing the activewear line of one of Indadari's circle. Source: Photo courtesy of © Nusseyba, 9 June 2021. Used with permission.

been accused of disrespecting their *cadari* sisters' dignity because they 'stole' their images.

Some face-veiled women dislike the image of the *cadari* on book jackets, though for different reasons. They actively respond to the misuse of representations of their dress, pointing out that Indonesians have misused the *cadar* by popularising it through the female characters in these novels, especially Aisha in AAC. They feel that the presence of the *cadari* in the Indonesian entertainment industry has disgraced their 'sacred uniform,' which they have adopted in an effort to embody the true Islam.

The second section of this chapter has illustrated how the *cadari* themselves use the media, in particular the internet and social media platforms, for their own religious aspirations. The internet and social media platforms play an important role in shaping and being shaped by the *cadari*. They are also crucial in sustaining the subcultures of the *cadari,* whose mobility is limited, and who are dedicated to embodying the true Islam. The *cadari*'s web engagement enables them to present themselves and engage publicly, while embodying their version of Islam. The case studies discussed above demonstrate *cadari*'s responses to mainstream

social stereotypes. For young Indonesians, one of the common ways they use the internet and social media is linked to its ability to mediate social relations across gender lines. For *cadari,* however, the internet and social media platforms have offered them different functions. Various social media platforms facilitate their struggles to exercise their specific *taat* agency.

The presence of the Niqab Squad provides a fresh breeze for *cadari* in Indonesia. Although the terrorist image is difficult to counter, especially due to the more visible appearance of *cadari* terrorists conducting *amaliyah,* the Niqab Squad and Indadari have striven to use mainstream media and social media platforms strategically so as to familiarise the Indonesian public with the presence of *cadari* non-terrorists. Their posts on various social media platforms signify the blurry boundaries between private and public spaces. Their everyday online activities cannot be glossed over as a manifestation of their *taat* agency because the posts range from religious activities to fashion statements, business activities, hobbies (including singing and playing sports) and more intimate lives with families. All these activities should be understood as everyday agentive joy rooted in their strict understanding of Islam. These religious and everyday activities are not binaries. They cannot be seen as opposing each other.

Notes

1 Jemaah Islamiyah was Southeast Asia's largest terrorist organisation (see Jones 2005).
2 The movie, which was released on 28 February 2008, was not only popular and well received in Indonesia but also in some neighbouring countries. Singapore Airlines played the film on its flights. In Indonesia, even the president watched it with his cabinet ministers (Haryadi 2008, 6; van Heeren 2008, 20).
3 The term 'polygamy' is used in Indonesia to refer to the practice of polygyny (one man marrying many wives).
4 *Ta'aruf* usually begins by exchanging biographical data. Following this, a meeting between the future bridal pair is arranged through mediation. The prospective bride and bridegroom are allowed to see each other's faces (*naẓar*) before the proposal of marriage (*khitba*) in the presence of their mediators.
5 Some Tablīghī teachings such as *khurūj* (venturing out to proselytise), *tablīgh* (propagation activities) or *taʿlīm* (religious study circle) are also broached in the novel (Aisyah 2008, 70, 106). Readers unfamiliar with the lifestyle of the Tablīghī community may thus have some difficulty understanding the plot. Tablīghī readers will identify with the world view presented in the text and feel part of the audience the novel addresses.
6 I am grateful to Carolyn Brewer for pointing this out.
7 The concept of subculture refers to an alternative social grouping for those who do not belong to the mainstream or dominant culture of the status quo (Kahn and Kellner 2003, 299; Williams 2011, 8). Some scholars have proposed a shift in the theoretical framing of subcultures since the groundbreaking works of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), University of Birmingham, England in the 1970s (Thornton 1995, 8). CCCS focused on the working-class youth subcultures that strove to distinguish themselves from their parents' working-class heritage and the dominant bourgeoisie culture (Williams 2011, 28). CCCS emphasised the importance of class-based issues in its discussion of subculture (Muggleton 2000, 20–22). Today, some scholars have proposed more diverse approaches to reading subcultures. Some, for example, propose a postmodern concept of 'post-subculturalist,' emphasising postmodern characteristics

such as weak boundary maintenance and a low degree of commitment (Muggleton 2000, 52; Weinzierl and Muggleton 2003; see also McRobbie 2000 on girl subcultures).

8 Part of this section was published as Eva F. Nisa. 2013. The internet subculture of Indonesian face-veiled women. *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 16(3): 241–55, doi: 10.1177/1367877912474534.

9 The process of the issuance of this *fatwa* was during the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election which created a rift on social media due to the blasphemy accusation faced by Chinese and Christian governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama known as Ahok.

10 Recently, scholars have begun focusing on the expressions of face-veiled women on diverse online platforms (on British face-veiled women, see Piela 2017; 2013; 2021).

11 As on 14 August 2021 at 9:36 p.m.

12 As on 14 August 2021 at 9:37 p.m.

13 As on 14 August 2021 at 9:38 p.m.

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4 *Cadari* in Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi educational institutions

This chapter focuses on the practice of wearing a *cadar* (face veil) in Islamic educational institutions called *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools), which have special relationships with the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi movements. *Pesantren* is an Indonesian educational institution that has existed since the sixteenth century, and it is particularly prevalent on the island of Java (Azra and Afrianty 2005; van Bruinessen 1994). Girls began to have access to *pesantren* between 1910 and 1930, before which it was available only to boys (Srimulyani 2008, 120). This chapter analyses the life experiences of girls and young women who wear the *cadar* because it is the norm within their educational institution. Therefore, I emphasise that their subjectivity is intertwined with social and ideological forces. In analysing the agency of *santriwati* (female students of *pesantren*), I use a Foucauldian lens to aid in understanding the operations of power within *pesantren.* By emphasising that the power embodied by those in authority is 'productive,' it can be shown that young *cadari* (face-veiled women) act in certain ways based on their desire.

Studies on *pesantren* often emphasise their role in the development of Islam and civil society in Indonesia, especially when *pesantren* teachers attempt to modernise their curricula (Lukens-Bull 2001; Pohl 2009; Sirry 2010). *Pesantren* are often affiliated with religious organisations or movements, and thus they also represent the diverse tendencies of Islam in Indonesia, from more traditionalist *pesantren* to Salafist and Islamist *pesantren* that, in some cases, have links to extremist movements. Studies have mostly focused on the 'traditionalist' *pesantren* that have links to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The majority of *pesantren* are associated with Islamic traditionalism (Kull 2009, 25; Rabasa 2006, 101). After the 9/11 attacks in the United States and bombings in Indonesia, international media tends to link Islamic institutions across the globe with terrorism. This includes *pesantren* in Indonesia (Nilan 2009; Noor 2007; Rabasa 2006; Tan 2011). Studies of *pesantren* attached to purist groups which are accused of providing sanctuary to radicals remain neglected. Notable exceptions to this are Noorhaidi Hasan (2010), Martin van Bruinessen (2008) and Din Wahid (2012a; 2014) who have written on Salafi *madrasah* (Islamic schools)[1] and Islamist *pesantren* in Indonesia, and some other studies on Pondok Pesantren (PP) Islam al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Surakarta (Central Java), which is famous for its association with the radical spiritual leader

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Ustādh (Ind. Ustaz) Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (Noor 2007; Tan 2011). There has been a plethora of literature on women within traditional *pesantren* (Kholifah 2005; Kull 2009; Srimulyani 2008; on traditionalist and modernist *pesantren,* see Hefner 2019); however, less has been written about women in revivalist *pesantren.*[2] Studies of girls and young women in *pesantren* that have set the *cadar* as a uniform will help us understand how their specific ethical subject formation works when the practice of face veiling is not the norm in the country.

Pesantren rules, norms and codes play important roles in the effort to produce *taat* (Ar. *ṭāʿa* or obedient) or pious children. These rules, norms and codes might be significantly different from those the children encountered before they attended the *pesantren.* For example, every *pesantren* has its own uniform and the most standard for *santriwati* is that they have to cover their hair by wearing veils (mostly *jilbab*). Male students (*santriwan*) follow a uniform code. Usually, they have to wear long pants, not jeans or short pants. It is important to note that wearing the *cadar* can be regarded as a special case that is found only in a small number of *pesantren* in Indonesia which are mostly affiliated with the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi movements.[3]

It is noteworthy that not all *pesantren* associated with Salafi groups make wearing the *cadar* obligatory. For example, PP Islam Al-Mukmin in Ngruki regards that the wearing of *cadar* is up to individual students. Since the number of *pesantren* associated with both the Tablīghī and Salafi movements consider wearing the *cadar* as obligatory, this chapter focuses mainly on this type of *pesantren.* However, I argue that although wearing the *cadar* is adopted as a norm of the *pesantren* subculture, many students find pleasure in wearing it. During my fieldwork, a handful of students who were not happy with their *cadar* asked their parents to move them to a different school. The norm within the *pesantren* shapes the experiences of the students.

Many scholars who focus their work on the body have emphasised how it meets with and is mediated by culture. Mary Douglas focuses on the body as a symbol. She introduces 'two bodies': 'The social body constrains the way the physical body is perceived. The physical experience of the body, always modified by the social categories through which it is known, sustains a particular view of society. There is a continual exchange of meanings between the two kinds of bodily experience so that each reinforces the categories of the other' (1970, 69). Douglas also mentions the importance of Marcel Mauss's 'culturally learnt control of the body' (Douglas 1970, 70). Linking body, nature and culture, sociologist Bryan Turner also argues, 'One thing that distinguishes humans from animals is human modesty; humans need to cover nature (genitals, hair or the face) with culture (the loin cloth, the head scarf or the veil)' (2008, 5). Mauss, as mentioned in previous chapters, is famous for his work on body techniques in which training is important for the human body to do basic activities, including walking and dancing which are performed so the actor is accepted into society. He defines body techniques as 'ways in which from society to society men [*sic*] know how to use their bodies' (1979, 97). Although Mauss does not specifically focus on dress, his concept is important in the context of how the human body is shaped by culture.

Wearing the *cadar* in the life of *santriwati* can be regarded as part of their desire to shape and train their bodies to follow the ideology upheld by the *pesantren* subculture. Mauss points out that biological and physiological skills, including bodily technique, are the result of a learning process (1979, 120). This includes the way people try to control their bodies to fit certain accepted norms. Mauss (1979, 100) provides some examples of how this works:

> There are polite and impolite *positions for the hands* at rest. Thus you can be certain that if a child at table keeps his elbows in when he is not eating, he is English. A young Frenchman has no idea how to sit up straight; his elbows stick out sideways; he puts them on the table, and so on [emphasis in original].

For *santriwati,* controlling their bodies by wearing the *cadar* is an aspect of the learnt bodily technique associated with being pious girls or women. This is taught and emphasised in the *pesantren* about which I am writing. Therefore, the *taat* agency of *santriwati* cannot be separated from their desire to practise their religion in ways that meet normative expectations within the *pesantren.* In order to 'do' religion within the *pesantren, santriwati* must understand that this mode of conduct is for religious reasons: namely the creation of pious girls or young women. *Santriwati* need to show their *ketaatan* (obedience) by obeying their *pesantren*'s rules and regulations. In this kind of institution, *ketaatan* refers not to directly obeying Islamic teachings but to obeying the 'rules of the game' which are based on the interpretations of Islam upheld by the leaders in the *pesantren.*

The subculture of *pesantren*

The subculture of *pesantren* demands that *santriwati* embody a specific ideal of femininity, which is different from that demonstrated by mainstream society. For example, in this study, wearing the *cadar* within a small number of *pesantren* associated with Salafism and Tablīghī Jamāʿat is regarded as an important aspect of ideal Islamic femininity, while for most Indonesians the *cadar* itself is regarded as a strange dress.

There are diverse modes of ideal femininity in Indonesia linked especially with changing historical contexts. During the Suharto regime, for example, the state engaged in determining modes of femininity which were adjusted to the 'nature' of women, as carers and educators of the young generation (Blackburn 2004; Rinaldo 2013; Robinson 2006; Suryakusuma 1996). The ideal of femininity at that time was reflected in the ability of women to manage their domestic sphere properly (Brenner 1998; Jones 2010) which would support New Order developmentalist projects. Nowadays, ideal femininity is more diverse. While some women seek professional success and leadership roles, others take pleasure in being stay-at-home mothers. Even so, there is continued social pressure to uphold certain feminine ideals. Linda Bennett, for example, details 'polite, moderate

and modest' as being key aspects of Indonesian femininity (2005, 37). These are linked to the ability of women to maintain what are considered to be traditional Indonesian values. For the majority of Indonesians, wearing the *cadar* is regarded as a sign of fanaticism, so it is noticeable that the modes of femininity operating within the *pesantren* under discussion are different from those in the larger Indonesian context.

Abdurrahman Wahid points out that *pesantren* can be regarded as a subculture in which there are specific life patterns, internal authority, ways of life and mores that should be followed by the people involved (1988, 94–95). The words *pesantren* and *pondok* can be used interchangeably. They mostly consist of student residences, a mosque, a *kitab* (Ar. *kitāb*) or classical Islamic texts, the *santri* (students) and the *kyai* (head of the *pesantren*) (Dhofier 1980, xxvii). Besides equipping students with Islamic knowledge, cultivating noble behaviour (*al-akhlāq al-karīma*)—which includes adopting the norms related to dress and personal interactions—is an important teaching concern.

For *pesantren* associated with Salafism and Tablīghī Jamāʿat, wearing *cadar* as an element of their subculture has been standardised by the people in authority to produce pious girls or young women. In addition, the norms within the *pesantren* subculture are aimed at inculcating collective identity to strengthen the bond among people in both movements. At the same time, this collective identity works as a boundary marker that distinguishes the commitment to religion of *pesantren* communities from that of outsiders. For both movements, the establishment of *pesantren* is a major agenda in their effort to maintain group cohesion. Followers are expected to send their children to *pesantren* associated with their *manhaj* or Islamic path to prepare them to be pious Muslims. The *pesantren* are also expected to serve the movements they follow by producing a future generation that will support the development of the movements.

The subculture of *pesantren* is also reflected in their curricula, especially religious subjects. Since the 1930s, many *pesantren* have begun to incorporate the *madrasah* system. *Madrasah* is a new educational institution that was launched in the twentieth century in order to respond to a Dutch schooling system (Azra and Afrianty 2005, 2). The curricula introduced by *madrasah* included a combination of religious subjects (30 per cent) and non-religious or general subjects (70 per cent). Religious subjects offered by the *madrasah* system are combined with religious subjects chosen by *pesantren.* Some religious subjects offered by the *madrasah* system are *al-Qur'an hadis* (the Qur'ān and *ḥādith*), *akidah akhlak* (faith and behaviour), *fikih* (Islamic jurisprudence) and *sejarah Islam* (Islamic history). *Pesantren* religious subjects might consist of specific books which are in line with their specific Islamic ideology. For example, the Islamic Centre Bin Baz, a *pesantren* that affiliates with one of the Salafi groups in Yogyakarta, has special religious subjects, such as *manhaj* (a methodology that refers to the way of life of the early Muslims) and *tawḥīd* (a doctrine that asserts the absolute oneness of God). Thus, the subculture of the *pesantren* can be seen clearly from the religious subjects taught.

Living in a total institution

As a typical segregated institution, a *pesantren* can be understood as an exemplar of what Erving Goffman calls a 'total institution' defined as follows: 'A total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut-off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life' (1984, 11). Goffman argues that within diverse types of total institutions—such as prisons, military barracks, mental hospitals, monasteries and convents and boarding schools—we can see how people are transformed into particular kinds of subjects.

Goffman's total institution does not focus solely on control but also on complete resocialisation that aims to remake the self in isolation from the broader public. This is the case with the *pesantren.* Through resocialisation, students learn new norms and values, especially those pertaining to the ideal image of a face-veiled *Muslimah* (Muslim woman). All aspects of the daily routines of the residents adjusted to *pesantren* discourses which are aimed at producing a *salihah* (Ar. *ṣāliḥa* or pious) generation (see below). The presence of students in a total institution can be regarded as a refashioning of self and, hence, of their communities—as expected by their parents who initially play an important role in choosing a 'proper' place for this process of refashioning. The *pesantren* is an important locus of resocialisation for the students' changing lifeworld, as they move from childhood in their hometowns to their becoming as Muslim women.

Within the total institution of the *pesantren,* those in authority engage in the process of the resocialisation of students. This involves introducing new norms, values and practices, such as asking them to wear the *cadar* and introducing the *pesantren*'s version of ideal femininity and a *salihah* generation. This is resonant with Goffman's goal of a total institution in which, as Ashley Crossman argues, there is 'resocialization to completely alter an individual and/or group of people's way of living and being' (Crossman 2020). As a total institution, *pesantren* can be seen as places that involve an initial curtailment of self. This process happens alongside a more Foucauldian productive process of individuation.

Michel Foucault's earlier work on discipline and punishment and the panopticon provides insights into analysing the characteristics of *pesantren* in the context of the discipline of the body. Although he does not specifically focus on dress, his work helps us understand the importance of specific regimes in managing the human body. In *Discipline and Punish* (1977), Foucault emphasises the importance of the total institution which is linked to embodied practices. The architectural design of the *pesantren* can be regarded as one of these disciplinary technologies. Some of the characteristics of the *pesantren* fit Foucault's description of the disciplinary panopticon and how it produces 'docile bodies.'

The concept of *taat* and face-veiled students' efforts to discipline their bodies aligns with Foucault's analysis of the panopticon (1977), or the prison architecture of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) (see Bentham 1995), which he develops as a model of modern reflections of governance. Foucault developed this theory of surveillance in analysing modern society and how docile bodies are produced. He

argues, 'One can speak of the formation of a disciplinary society … that stretches from the enclosed disciplines, a sort of social "quarantine," to an indefinitely generalizable mechanism of "panopticism"' (1977, 216). Foucault defines this form of power as panoptic, referring to 'a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power' (1977; 2010). It is through this model of the watchful gaze which might be developed in diverse institutions—hospitals, workshops, schools, prisons—that docile bodies are produced. Foucault argues that this mode of punishment was understood to be more enlightened than the older tradition of physical violence against criminals. The panopticon can rehabilitate and induce compliance through surveillance rather than physical punishment. The bodies of young women in those *pesantren* that compel their students to wear face veils are disciplined by the regulatory practices within the *pesantren* society. They are supervised by the head of the *pesantren,* teachers and senior students and their daily lives strictly adhere to the rules, in ways that align with Foucault's ideas of the panopticon where the prisoner is subjected to constant surveillance. It is easy to see mirrored aspects of panoptic surveillance in the *pesantren*'s infrastructure. The feeling of living under surveillance, however, is experienced beyond its walls.

The panopticon is the architectural innovation in prison design recommended by Bentham: 'an annular building' with a central tower that can make the prisoners feel that they are being watched all the time (Foucault 1977, 200). The fundamental nature of the panopticon is constant surveillance. Bentham contends that the capacity for watching from the guard's central control tower is the 'apparent omnipresence of the inspector' (1995, 45). The idea is that prisoners modify their behaviours because of the expectation that they are being watched, rather than because of physical punishment. Foucault argues that the design of the building was 'to arrange things [so] that the surveillance is permanent in its effects' (1977, 201). These aspects and characteristics can be found in *pesantren,* in which the students feel that they are being controlled via the gaze of those in authority. The main difference, however, is that while the prisoners in the panopticon can be seen by a centrally located guard, he himself is unseen to them. The atmosphere of *pesantren* is slightly different. The head of the *pesantren,* teachers and senior students who are in charge of supervising students are present around the *pesantren.* This surveillance operates in a way similar to that of the panopticon, in which inmates feel they are being watched constantly. Students of a *pesantren* feel they are continually being observed when they are in the *pesantren* and when they are outside. Azizah, a 15-year-old student from Lampung, recounts her experience when I asked her whether she wears the *cadar* at home during the *pesantren* break. Her home is a distance away from the *pesantren.* She said: 'I always wear the *cadar* at home during the *pesantren* break, because I am afraid I might accidently meet *ustādhāt* [female teachers, sing. *ustādha* (Ind. *ustazah*)] or *kakak pengurus* [seniors]. I do not feel good if they see me without the *cadar.*' Azizah's experience illustrates how the nature of constant surveillance has been embodied in the life of students. She always feels that she is under the eye of

people in authority. This implies that the authority of the *pesantren* goes beyond its physical perimeter.

Pesantren Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah[4]

This section focuses on the life of *cadari* in one of the *pesantren* that has a special relationship with Tablīghī Jamāʿat, Pesantren Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah. The aim is to shed some light on how life in the *pesantren* works, as wearing the *cadar* is crucial to maintaining its ideology and the norms related to the image of ideal Muslim women. Pesantren Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah is in South Tangerang (Banten) (on women at the Pesantren Sunanul Husna, see Amrullah 2011; Nisa 2014b). It was established on 15 November 1982 by Ustādh Abdul Najib Al Ayyuby, known as Ustādh Najib, the son-in-law of one of the owners of the land, H Sinen. Ustādh Najib was a graduate from Universitas Islam Negeri/UIN (State Islamic University) Syarif Hidayatullah. He then became leader of the *pesantren* until he passed away. Most outsiders may assume that this *pesantren* belongs to the Tablīghī Jamāʿat due to the affiliation of people in the *pesantren* with the movement. However, the linkage is informal (on the relationship between Madrasatul Niswan and the Tablīghī Jamāʿat see Winkelmann 2005, 55). Historically the *pesantren* did not have any connection with Tablīghī Jamāʿat.

As recounted by the late Ustādh Najib, the story behind the attachment of this *pesantren* to Tablīghī Jamāʿat is as follows: around late 1982–early 1983, Pondok Ranji, where the *pesantren* lies was visited by Tablīghī from countries such as Pakistan, Jordan and India. They were welcomed by Ustādh Najib, as the head of the *pesantren,* and invited to use the institution as a base in which to perform their *daʿwa* (Ind. *dakwah*) (proselytisation). After this visit, Ustādh Najib became interested in their method of *daʿwa,* which led him to join the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. After his involvement, he became very active in calling his students, and the population around the *pesantren,* to follow the path of Islam introduced by the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. Although initially there were some Muslims who lived nearby who opposed this movement, gradually Ustādh Najib successfully recruited some of the Muslims who lived around the *pesantren.*

When I first visited, I was struck by the poor and shabby condition of this *pesantren,* especially in comparison with others nearby. It is difficult for outsiders to see the female dormitories and classrooms because they are blocked by a big green gate (Figure 4.1). In the centre of the female wing lies a small prayer room, *muṣalla,* in poor condition, which is also used as a gathering place for female students' activities, excluding formal school activities. For these they have their own classrooms located next to the *muṣalla.* Although the classrooms have their own chairs and blackboard, the condition is also below that of the standard classrooms in other *pesantren* and in general schools that can be found within the area (Figure 4.2). For example, there is no glass in the windows and some of the walls are covered with thin plywood. During its early establishment, the family owning the land played a major role in supporting the *pesantren.*

Figure 4.1 A *cadar*-clad student in front of Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah's female wing. Source. Photo credit, author, 30 January 2010.

Besides the family's assistance, the *pesantren* also received some financial support from donors, some of which is ongoing. The donors are mostly from the congregation of Ustādh Najib's *majelis taklim* (religious gathering for learning Islam). Besides his role as the head of the *pesantren,* Ustādh Najib was also well known as a *dāʿi* (religious preacher), especially among Tablīghī followers. According to the female head of the *pesantren,* who is the daughter of Ustādh Najib, Ustādha Siti Rahmah Azizah and who is known as Bunda (mother), the *pesantren* cannot depend on tuition fees from the students, because many of them come from lower-class family backgrounds. This made Ustādh Najib strive to fulfil the needs of the *pesantren.*[5] According to Bunda, the students are offered only two meals a day, not three times a day as in other places. She recounts, 'We just decided to give them two meals per day, because everything becomes so difficult lately, especially post 9/11. We cannot afford to provide a meal three times a day.' The impact of 9/11 for this *pesantren* was a loss of trust by some donors due to the widespread stigma about the link between *pesantren* and terrorist activities (Winkelmann 2005, 39). Prior to this, they had received funding from a US humanitarian institution which supplied them with cooking oil and rice. This funding stopped post 9/11.

Figure 4.2 A group of *cadar*-clad Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah students with their *'abāya* or *gamis* in the classroom. Source. Photo credit, © Mala Hayati, 22 June 2008. Used with permission. (Note: *Gamis* is a long, full body covering. In Indonesia *'abāya* and *gamis* are often used interchangeably. Although some might emphasise that *'abāya* is looser than *gamis*.)

Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah has been influenced by the most well-known *pesantren* among Indonesian Tablīghī, PP Al-Fatah in Temboro (Magetan, East Java). Due to its important position among people of Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah, I also visited PP Al-Fatah. PP Al-Fatah was founded in 1912 by K.H. Shiddiq. Like Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah, PP Al-Fatah initially did not have any attachment to Tablīghī Jamāʿat. Instead, it originally had a strong connection to Tarekat Naqshbandiyya Khalidiyya, one of the major Sufi orders (*ṭarīqa*), and to NU. The attachment of the PP Al-Fatah to the Tablīghī Jamāʿat began during the period of K.H. Mahmud (1934–96), the son of the founder, K.H. Shiddiq. In 1983 K.H. Mahmud was visited by Abdussobur, a Tablīghī follower from Pakistan. The aim of Abdussobur's visit was to perform *daʿwa* and to establish a good relationship (*silaturahmi*) with the population of the village. Abdussobur was polite, modest, decent and always committed to practising *sunna* (the exemplary ways of life of the Prophet Muḥammad). Abdussobur's personality attracted K.H. Mahmud to learn more about Tablīghī Jamāʿat. In 1988, Kyai Mahmud and his son Kyai Uzairon, who by then had become head of the *pesantren,* decided to visit India to see the Tablīghī Jamāʿat movement at its headquarters. Upon returning from India, they started to call Muslims in Temboro to follow the Tablīghī Jamāʿat movement. Al-Fatah has always been

the main destination of many Indonesian Tablīghī who wish to become proficient in Islamic knowledge.

Most teachers in Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah are graduates of Al-Fatah, or at least they have had some experience studying in Al-Fatah. The children of Ustādh Najib are also graduates of Al-Fatah, including Bunda and her husband. When the head of the *pesantren* began to be active in the Tablīghī Jamāʿat movement, the relationship between Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah and the movement became stronger. The popularity of Al-Fatah among Indonesian Tablīghī can be seen from its status as one of the biggest *pesantren* in East Java. In 2020, the number of students in this *pesantren* was 22,467, not only from Indonesia but also from twelve other countries, including Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah has adopted the *madrasah* system, which means that general as well as Islamic subjects are taught in this *pesantren*.[6] Therefore, graduates can continue their studies in any Indonesian higher educational institution. One of the female graduates was successfully admitted to a well-known university in Indonesia through a highly competitive program called Penelusuran Minat dan Kemampuan (PMDK; talent scouting for admission to the state university system), a special program dedicated to assisting bright and talented students. The formal *madrasah* programs offered in Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah are: *tsanawiyah* (junior high school) and *aliyah* (senior high school). In addition to these formal programs, the *pesantren* has its own programs divided into four levels: *i'dadiyah,* in which the students have to learn the basics of reading the Qur'ān; *diniyah* 1, which is dedicated to students who have just started reading some classical books, often known as *kitab kuning;*[7] and *diniyah* 2 and 3, whereby students are expected to understand more advanced classical books, such as *Bulūgh al-Marām* (Attainment of the objective) and *Kifāyat al-Akhyār* (The sufficiency of the selected ones).

The books used in this *pesantren* are similar to those in many other *pesantren* in Indonesia, especially traditionalist *pesantren.* The main difference is the use of some core Tablīghī books, especially *Faḍā'il al-Aʿmāl* (Virtues of everyday actions) by Mawlānā Muḥammad Zakariyya Kandhalawi, the nephew of Mawlānā Muḥammad Ilyās. Reading *Faḍā'il al-Aʿmāl* every day is a characteristic of every *pesantren* which has an informal relationship with the movement, including Madrasatul Niswan in India (Winkelmann 2005, 53). This can be regarded as an important element of the subculture of Tablīghī *pesantren.* All knowledge and religious activities based on Tablīghī Jamāʿat teachings originated from the teachings in *Faḍā'il al-Aʿmāl,* which consists of teachings related to the virtues of prayer, *dhikr* (lit. means remembrance of God, consisting of a litany formula), the Qur'ān, *tablīgh* (preaching Islam), the month of Ramadhan and stories of the Prophet's companions.

Besides *Faḍā'il al-Aʿmāl,* the students also do *mudhākara* (memorisation) of the six *sifat* (the six principles of the basic tenets of the movement) and read other collections of Tablīghī books, namely *Faḍā'il aṣ-Ṣadaqāt* (Virtues of charity) by Mawlānā Muḥammad Zakariyya Kandhalawi and *Muntakhab Aḥādīth* (A collection of *ḥadīth*) by Mawlānā Muḥammad Yūsuf Kandhalawi. They read all these

books for thirty minutes after Ẓuhr prayer (noon prayer). In addition to these books, some Tablīghī *pesantren,* such as PP Al-Fatah, might read another book known as part of the Tablīghī curriculum, namely *Ḥayātu aṣ-Ṣaḥāba* (Lives of the companions of the Prophet Muḥammad) by Mawlānā Muḥammad Yūsuf Kandhalawi.

Since this *pesantren* has a special attachment to the movement, it is not surprising that many parents also have a special attachment to Tablīghī Jamāʿat. As in the case of Madrasatul Niswan in Delhi (Winkelmann 2005, 47), information relating to the enrolment of the students is promoted by word of mouth among followers of Tablīghī Jamāʿat. Many of the students are recruited through their parents' Tablīghī *daʿwa.* Annisa, an 18-year-old student from Central Jakarta, said: 'When I finished my primary school, my father was a bit confused about choosing a junior high school for me. Then, when he returned from *khurūj,* he told me and my mother that he already found a good school for me. His friend from *khurūj* informed him about this *pesantren.*'

For parents who attach themselves to this transnational missionary movement, choosing an educational institution is very important because it is an indispensable part of guiding their children to the true Islam and preserving their collective identity. This *pesantren*'s close connection to the Tablīghī Jamāʿat means that it appeals mainly to followers of Tablīghī, so it has grown slowly in comparison with other nearby *pesantren.* In 1982, there were only three students. In the 2008–2009 school year, the number was 350, and the number of female students was greater than their male counterparts. However, the place where this boarding school is located can be regarded as one of the most committed Tablīghī communities in Indonesia, especially in Banten and Jakarta. The number of Tablīghī followers residing there has increased greatly since the establishment of the *pesantren,* which means that it is common to see women with the *cadar* and even young children with *jilbab* nearby.

Ideals of Islamic womanhood

The link between the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and this *pesantren* can be seen from the concept of the ideal Islamic womanhood promoted within the *pesantren* milieu. This concept is instilled through the introduction of Islamic teachings related to women's bodies in which wearing the *cadar* is central. After Ustādh Najib's early encounter with the Tablīghī Jamāʿat, he introduced what he considered to be proper Muslim dress, based on the examples set by the Prophet and his family as well as his male and female companions. For male students, this consists of *jubah* (an ankle-length garment) and *baju koko* (a shirt that is one of the most common styles of Muslim dress for men in Indonesia). During the school hours, they have to wear a long white *jubah* not *baju koko.* For female students, the uniform consists of *gamis* or looser *ʿabāya* (Ind. *abaya*) and *jilbab.* In 2001, Bunda began to introduce the *cadar* to replace the *jilbab* as the proper Muslim dress for women. She says:

> I explained that the *cadar* is an important part of Islamic teaching. Therefore, the use of the *cadar* is imperative in this *pesantren.* Unfortunately, it did not

> work properly. I believed it was because at that time the students did not understand the importance of wearing the *cadar* in the formation of *anak salihah* [Ar. *ṣāliḥa* or pious children]. In addition, they had not prepared yet for such a change.

From 2002, however, the use of the *cadar* has intensified. While previously people in authority accepted the use of *jilbab,* they finally formalised the wearing of the *cadar.* In 2004, they even formalised the wearing of black *cadar* instead of white and colourful *cadar.* The formalisation of wearing the *cadar* has had to be taken gradually, because, according to Bunda, mainstream Muslims in Indonesia do not wear it. These gradual steps were also intended to lessen the pressure of change that the *cadar* could bring to the life of the students.

The norms that are prevalent in the *pesantren* are linked to the commitment of people in authority to introduce moral order to produce ideal Muslim women. Ustādh Najib pointed out the reason behind this formalisation:

> The students should train themselves to always have commitment to their religion. It is true that there are some different opinions among *ʿulamāʾ* [Ind. *ulama* or religious scholars] concerning the wearing of the face veil. However, we want to provide some understanding that it is an important norm in this *pesantren,* because we believe that wearing the face veil is better than not wearing it, as the Prophet's wives had set the example of wearing it.

There are other norms related to the techniques of the body. It is forbidden for the students to wear short veils, such as *bergo* (*bergo* is a type of veil which can be worn instantly without any pins). Students have to wear *gamis* (a long, full body covering) and veils to communal toilets in *pesantren* which are located outside their rooms. Every time they go out of their room, they have to wear *gamis* not skirts or pants. Following Mauss's (1979) concept that every human being must know and learn how to contextualise her or his body, the way these *students* discipline their bodies is also part of their effort to contextualise their knowledge.

Although most of the students try to self-regulate to conform to the *pesantren* norms, this does not mean that there has not been resistance. The *pesantren* is also aware of this possibility. They have created certain punishments for those who do not wear the *cadar,* especially when they go out of the *pesantren* and when they are being taught by male teachers. Those who violate the norms receive a punishment in the form of wearing a colourful *cadar* which they call *alma mater,* ranging from a green, yellow, orange to red *cadar.* This *alma mater* must be worn for a certain number of days depending on the violation. Some of the students argued that the hardest thing is not the wearing of the *alma mater* but the shaming attached to wearing it.

The standardisation of wearing the *cadar* has been supported by the characteristics of Tablīghī Jamāʿat *pesantren* that fit Foucault's panoptical model of surveillance as aspects of a disciplinary regime. All activities are centred in the *pesantren* and the classrooms (for formal *madrasah* activities). The shop that

caters for their needs, a public phone and prayer place are inside the *pesantren.* They do not have to wear the *cadar* if there are no men wandering around the female wing. The female wing is demarcated from the male wing and is protected from the view of outsiders. However, most of the time students wear the *cadar* inside the *pesantren,* even in the female wing.

Besides wearing the *cadar,* the subculture of the *pesantren* and its efforts to instil Islamic womanhood can be seen through the extracurricular activities that are perceived as suitable for women. These include sewing every Friday afternoon, making handicrafts like bags, arranging flowers and cooking whenever they have free time, *qasidah* (a type of Indonesian music which originates from an ancient Arabic word *qaṣīda* referring to religious poetry accompanied by chanting and percussion) every Sunday, *ṣalāwāt* (sending blessings to the Prophet) every Friday morning and *muhāḍara* (learning how to deliver a speech) every Thursday night.

There are also specific programs adopted from Tablīghī Jamāʿat's teachings, namely *khurūj* (to go out for *daʿwa*) or *mastura khurūj,* a term used to identify *khurūj* for women. Performing *mastura khurūj* within the *pesantren* neighbourhood is a practice unique to this group. In Madrasatul Niswan, for example, there is no such activity (Winkelmann 2005). The head and staff of the *pesantren* pointed out that not all students have a Tablīghī background, but according to Bunda, since the formalisation of wearing the *cadar* none of them has objected. Indeed no one has come to the head of the *pesantren* or any staff of the *pesantren* to oppose this norm and in fact any other norms in the *pesantren.*[8] Bunda recounts the key success of the formalisation of these norms:

> What I told them with regard to all these norms is that since these students are still very young and they stay in one supportive place in this *pesantren,* they can train themselves to be *taat* and more committed to their religion. In addition, being in the *pesantren* means that obstacles to staying close to religion are relatively minor even non-existent in contrast to staying outside the *pesantren* where they can encounter diverse interpretations of religion. I always tell them that we can take a benefit from our existence here, just focus ourselves on religion.

Her statement implies that the condition and power relations operating within the *pesantren* are suitable for producing students who have the desire to practise their religion totally.

Salafi educational institutions

During my fieldwork, I went to several Salafi *pesantren.*[9] To get a better understanding of their networks, I had to go outside my original fieldwork sites (Jakarta, Yogyakarta and Makassar). The diverse factions of Salafism in Indonesia are reflected in the existence of different types of *pesantren* claiming to be Salafi. For example, Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy located in Bantul, Yogyakarta

(founded in 1995), is attached to one of the most well-known Salafi groups in Indonesia. Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy is an educational institution under a Salafi foundation called Yayasan Majelis At-Turots Al-Islamy (Reviving of the Islamic Heritage Foundation) named after its main donor the Jamʿiyya Iḥyāʾ at-Turāth al-Islāmī (the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, RIHS), a Kuwaiti Salafi organisation founded in 1981 (Hasan 2006, 55; Pall 2014, 3). The establishment of the Yayasan Majelis At-Turots Al-Islamy in 1986 was initiated by Ustādh Chomsaha Sofwan (known as Abu Nida), a graduate of Imam Mohammad Ibn Saud Islamic University in Saudi Arabia, with the aim of spreading Salafi teachings, especially among students at two well-known universities in Yogyakarta, Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) (Gadjah Mada University) and Universitas Negeri Yogyakarta (UNY) (Yogyakarta State University). Abu Nida is regarded as an important figure in the development of Salafi *daʿwa,* especially for the group known as *haraki* Salafi, in Indonesia (Wahid 2012b, 252).

Besides Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy, the other important institution under the banner of Yayasan Majelis At-Turots Al-Islamy is the Islamic Centre Bin Baz (ICBB), located in Bantul, Yogyakarta. ICBB is especially dedicated to Nine Years of Compulsory Basic Education (Wajib Belajar 9 Tahun) which makes it slightly different from Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy which focuses mainly on producing cadres who can understand their religion properly and who can dedicate their life for the sake of *daʿwa.* The other *pesantren* which also has a relationship with Yayasan Majelis At-Turots Al-Islamy is Ma'had Ihya As-Sunnah in Tasikmalaya (West Java), established by Ustādh Abu Qatadah, one of the Indonesian students sent by Ja'far Umar Thalib to study with Shaykh Muqbil b. Hādī al-Wādiʿī in Yemen. The relationship can be seen, for example, in Ustādh Abu Qatadah's involvement in *daʿwa* activities upheld by this Yayasan (Foundation).

There are some Salafi *pesantren* that have a special attachment to jihadi groups, which are different from those attached to the Yayasan Majelis At-Turots Al-Islamy. Two of these *pesantren* are PP Islam Al-Mukmin in Ngruki and Ma'had al-Mar'atush Sholihah in Bekasi (West Java). It is noteworthy that the number of *pesantren* which uphold a militant ideology is very low in contrast to the majority of *pesantren* in Indonesia (Hasan 2010, 678; van Bruinessen 2008, 217). PP Islam Al-Mukmin was founded by Ustādh Abdullah Sungkar and Ustādh Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 1972. This *pesantren* has been widely known for its radical reputation, especially regarding those people in the *pesantren* who are accused of having strong links with the terrorist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah or JI (van Bruinessen 2008, 232–33; Hasan 2010, 685).

Ma'had al-Mar'atush Sholihah which was founded in 2002 by a medical doctor, Dr Yusuf Irianto, also has a special link with this Salafi faction, especially with Ustādh Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. Ba'asyir visited the *pesantren* several times to deliver religious lessons. According to the principal of SMAIT (Sekolah Menengah Atas Islam Terpadu/Integrated Islamic Senior High School), al-Mar'atush Sholihah, every visit Ba'asyir made to the *pesantren* was monitored closely by the police. Their link to Ba'asyir can also be seen from the fact that some female religious

teachers at this *pesantren* are graduates from PP Islam al-Mukmin. These include the principal of the SMAIT and the head of the residential facility. Besides Ba'asyir, Ma'had al-Mar'atush Sholihah also has a good relationship with other male religious scholars from the same ideology, such as Ustādh Abu Jibril.

Some of these Salafi *pesantren* have chosen to establish *sekolah Islam terpadu* (an integrated Islamic school) that incorporates the national curriculum, additional religious subjects and Islamic moral education (Hasan 2009). This brings them under the authority of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research and Technology instead of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The main difference between *madrasah* and *sekolah Islam terpadu* is that *madrasah* is managed under the auspices of the Ministry of Religious Affairs (Azra et al. 2007) while the latter is under the Ministry of Education Culture, Research and Technology. Tablīghī *pesantren* have mostly chosen this *madrasah* system. In contrast, some Salafi educational institutions have adopted integrated Islamic schools instead of *madrasah* (Hasan 2009, 7). This model of integrated Islamic schools was pioneered by the activists of Jama'ah Tarbiyah and people within its political vehicle PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party) with the inspiration taken from the concept of Islamic education developed by Ḥasan al-Bannāʾ (1906–1949) in Egypt (Hasan 2009, ii). Although some Salafi factions severely oppose the ideology of PKS, it does not prevent them from following the PKS model of education.

According to some principals of the Salafi *pesantren* that I visited, this *sekolah Islam terpadu* system is proving to be more effective than the *madrasah* system, not only in producing bright and skilled alumni but also in instilling proper moral guidance and character development. In addition, they argued that the curriculum offered by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research and Technology has given them more freedom in creating their own *pesantren* curriculum. One of the main figures of Ma'had al-Mar'atush Sholihah states:

> It is easier for us to follow the Ministry of National Education's[10] curriculum when we want to combine it with our own religious curriculum. The Ministry of Religious Affairs has its own religious curriculum which is different from ours. In order to stick to our own *manhaj* and *pesantren* curriculum we prefer to attach to the Ministry of National Education.

The link between Salafi *pesantren* and Salafi factions in Indonesia is very prominent. By establishing the *pesantren,* Salafi groups attempt not only to maintain the purity of their Islamic belief but also to strengthen the collective bonding among the followers and to expand their influence among Muslims in Indonesia. These *pesantren* are an important strategy for the dissemination of Salafi teachings to younger generations and to prepare future generations to understand Islam based on their *manhaj.* Therefore, the terms *salaf* and *salafus shalih* (Ar. *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* or pious predecessors) often accompany the words stating the aims of these *pesantren.* For example, Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy aims at: 'producing *dāʿi* [male preacher] and *dāʿiya* [female preacher] and *mudarris* [male religious teachers] and *mudarrisāt* [female religious teachers] who uphold Salafi

manhaj and are able to be involved in the *daʿwa* arena and teach religious knowledge and Arabic.' Ma'had Ihya As-Sunnah states that it attempts to '*mengembalikan manusia kepada pemahaman salafush-sholih*' (bring back human beings to [Islam] as understood by *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*). The principle of the *pesantren* also states that it is based on Islam as understood by *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ.* Therefore, all accepted norms within the *pesantren* are aligned with the norms acknowledged within their groups, including norms related to the ideal of femininity.

Building a *cadari* family around *pesantren*

One of the significant characteristics around the Salafi *pesantren* (and Tablīghī as mentioned above) is the growing presence of housing belonging not only to the families of the *pesantren* leaders but also followers of the Salafi (and Tablīghī) movements. Housing complexes of Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy or Jamilurrahman's community are an example. Jamilurrahman's community could initially have been regarded as a small and 'different' Muslim community in comparison to those of the nearby *pesantren* (Hasan 2006, 55). This is in reference to their lifestyle, which is significantly different from the rest of the inhabitants in the village. For example, the women wear *cadar* and the men have long beards and wear trousers which are not *isbal* (Ar. *isbāl* or below the ankles). In late 2008 and early 2009, many of my research subjects mentioned that outsiders tend to regard them as belonging to radical groups due to the resemblance of their outfits with clothing of women belonging to radical groups mentioned in diverse media outlets. In addition, the location of Jamilurrahman is in the middle of a rice field—separated from general housing areas around the village, which adds an impression of exclusivity. Ibu Asmarini, a 48-year-old villager, explained, 'I think we are a bit different from them Dik [Sister or lit. younger sister]. People of the Jamilurrahman complex usually do not mix with us. It is also difficult to get along with them because the women are face veiled.' Indeed, Ibu Asmarini's impression is echoed by others in the village.

When I returned to Jamilurrahman's community in 2017, the atmosphere was significantly different to the previous visit. I was surprised by the presence of permanent housing complexes and growing businesses around the Jamilurrahman *pesantren.* They have also increasingly influenced the broader community around the village through their various community engagement programs. In my earlier fieldwork, there were a few houses and small stall-type shops; however, the structures seemed poorly built. When I arrived the second time, there were a number of new houses under construction. Jamilurrahman had undergone so much change that I found myself at the front entrance asking my research subjects whether this was the same complex as the one which I had previously visited. *Cadari* are an important part of this modern 'Salafi village.'

Jamilurrahman's housing complex is now a vibrant place to stay. Two of my *cadari* research subjects said enthusiastically: 'See Umm (lit. Mother),[11] Jamilurrahman is now different. You can find everything here. Come, move here with us!' The women's enthusiasm in inviting me reveals the success of

Jamilurrahman in building this Salafi village. Hasan mentions that Abu Nida's intention to establish an Islamic village was 'to imitate the first model Islamic village established by Ashari Muhammad, the leader of the Darul Arqam, in Sungai Penchala' (2006, 55).

Jamilurrahman networks established an educational institution for children from early childhood and the *cadar* became the norm in both formal and informal education in this Salafi village and its networks. Besides being popular among young Muslim women aiming to prepare themselves to be future educators and proficient in Salafi *manhaj,* the institution is also well known among parents, especially middle-aged women, who want their children and grandchildren to know about the true Islam based on Salafi *manhaj.* Scholars have pointed out that the enthusiasm of Salafi followers will relapse as they become older. Anabel Inge (2016, 230) argues,

> The zealous young people who became Salafis in the early to mid-1990s are now middle-aged, and even many of those who embraced Salafism in the 2000s are now faced with parental responsibilities. This raises the related issue of successfully transmitting Salafism to the first generation of 'born-Salafis', which began to emerge in the early 2000s.

Within Jamilurrahman's complex, however, we can see the growing enthusiasm of middle-aged women, between the ages of 40 and 60 years, who have contributed to the development of the *pesantren* and the growth of their Salafi village. These middle-aged *cadari* have become important role models for many young *cadari* within Jamilurrahman's educational institutions, including their teenage *cadari* daughters. Many have continuously equipped themselves with new knowledge and are active in business, which has inspired young *cadari* from the same Salafi group to follow their lead. Indeed, passionate university *cadari* attaching to the Jamilurahman group often mention that having a house around Jamilurrahman *pesantren* complex is one of their main goals as they work towards their goal of building a conducive Salafi family.

Ummu Muhammad—a middle-aged woman from the first generation of Salafi living within the Jamilurrahman *pesantren* complex—has been a strong figure among Salafi women belonging to the network of Jamilurrahman. She is known as an influential figure who has a great passion for educating others. She established Sekolah Ibu (the School for Mother) in 2015, as an informal educational institution within the Jamilurrahman *pesantren* complex for those who wanted to learn how to be good mothers and wives. In 2017, Sekolah Ibu had ninety students. The majority are *cadari* mothers with children, with a smaller number of participants from the younger generation wanting to prepare themselves to become good Salafi wives and mothers. Sekolah Ibu is designed as a quasi-school, with mixed religious and non-religious subject curriculum. Therefore, it is not only about the discussion of creed (see Inge 2016, 3), especially *tawḥīd*—as many study circles of young Salafi often focus on—rather it is aimed at educating mothers and prospective mothers in effective parenting strategies to produce zealous-born Salafi.

The older generation of Salafi women, or middle-aged women, do not face the same problems as young Salafi. They do not have to deal with some rules and restrictions regarding their outfits, especially face veils, as often faced by university students. Nevertheless, their role in the development of Salafism is also important because they carry the responsibility of educating the first generation of born-Salafi. Coping with the teen dating of their high-school-age children has been one of the common issues that these older generations of Salafi women have faced. Initially, before understanding child development, the women were panicked and shocked by the knowledge that their boys and *cadari* teenagers were dating. When I asked these middle-aged women how this works because the boys cannot see the face of *cadari* teenagers, the women laughed. Ummu Unais explained: 'There are so many ways the boys can recognise the girls' faces. One of them is through their younger sisters or brothers. The little ones are the brokers who can show pictures of their older sisters without the *cadar.*' Ummu Muhammad adds: 'They can also secretly make an appointment to meet in a forest close from here. They meet there, and the girls will open their *cadar.* They can also borrow their parents' mobile phone, without their knowledge, and take a picture of themselves without the *cadar* and send it to their friends.' Through Sekolah Ibu, the middle-aged Salafi learn how to manage their fears when their children start dating. They become more open-minded and recognise that their teenage *cadari* studying in the *pesantren* are not immune from showing interest in their counterparts.

Ummu Muhammad's Sekolah Ibu also offers extracurricular activities for middle-aged *cadari,* namely archery and swimming, which they consider as *sunna* sport (sport practised by the Prophet Muḥammad including his companions). These two sports are learnt due to their belief that the Prophet Muḥammad emphasised the importance of archery and swimming during his lifetime. Almost all of these women learnt how to swim at Sekolah Ibu. Ummu Ubaid says, 'People probably think that, as women who wear the *cadar,* we cannot move.' Ummu Ubaid's statement is indeed shared by outsiders when they see *cadari.* Ummu Adam, a student of Sekolah Ibu, organises the teaching of Kegel exercises (pelvic floor exercises) for women. Kegel exercises aim to strengthen pelvic floor muscles which are believed to provide positive benefits for sexual relationships. Ummu Adam, who is responsible for teaching this body exercise, says 'This is a secret ingredient for a harmonious life with our husbands [while giggling].' Besides these sports, what is striking about the everyday life of Sekolah Ibu women is their business activity. Many have successful clothing businesses. Ummu Muhammad and Ummu Adam have a thriving clothing business and have received orders from many parts of Indonesia. Others have businesses in catering, baking, beauty salons and wedding dress hire. Ummu Atiyah said, 'Our village is now like a satellite village. You can find everything and *cadari* are very active in business.' These women see that their businesses not only generate income for their families, but they are a means of self-fulfilment. Ummu Muhammad says, 'My husband doesn't want any money from me at all. For me, it doesn't matter if he does not give me money because I already have money.' Ummu Adam adds, 'It's really nice Mbak [Sister]

to have our own money. The important thing is that my husband knows that I do not go out everywhere to sell the clothes. I am sitting at home and my employees walk to sell the clothes.' The growth of Salafi complexes around a *pesantren* that has been successfully coloured by the presence of middle-aged *cadari* women has become an important element of the *pesantren* subculture and growth of passionate *cadari.*

The concept of ideal femininity within the Salafi *pesantren*

The concept of ideal femininity operating within these *pesantren* is related to the effort of authoritative voices in the *pesantren* to encourage their students to practise Islam totally (*kaffah*). With regard to female students, maintaining the purity of their bodies forms a crucial element for this practice of Islam totally—in Tablīghī terms, according to *garis taqwa*—without leaving any room for exception.

The notion of purity that the students uphold is linked to the concept of chastity or purity (*ʿiffa*) in Islam. The norms are resonant with Douglas's notion of purity (1966). She points out that the concept of purity/the purity rules and the ideas of pollution are part of a symbolic classification. This symbolic classification is then adjusted to establish patterns of meaning related to individual and collective experience. People can assess which attitudes fit into the patterns and which do not. For example, Douglas defines dirt in any given society as 'matter out of place.' She points out:

> Dirt then, is never a unique, isolated event. Where there is dirt there is a system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements. This idea of dirt takes us straight into the field of symbolism and promises a link-up with more obviously symbolic systems of purity.
>
> (1966, 35)

In the context of *pesantren* if a person is unable to conform to the norms in a given *pesantren* context, this is interpreted as an inability to guard purity. The *pesantren* usually introduces the accepted norms related to the concept of ideal femininity as early as the first day of a prospective student's visit to the *pesantren* for enrolment at which time all female students should be accompanied by their *maḥram* (non-marriageable male kin), especially their fathers.

It is noteworthy that the rulings related to the wearing of the *cadar* in these Salafi *pesantren* vary. Although almost all *pesantren* attached to Salafi factions consider wearing the *cadar* as the most proper Muslim dress, some of them do not make it mandatory. In contrast to the popular assumption that wearing the *cadar* is a sign that the wearers are part of a militant group, during my fieldwork I found that staunch supporters of the *cadar* were indeed students in *pesantren* that have no special connection to the jihadi faction. Wearing the *cadar* in the most famous *pesantren* claimed as the hub of Jemaah Islamiyah, PP Islam al-Mukmin (Hasan 2010, 678), is not obligatory. In fact, the number of students who wore the

cadar in this *pesantren* was very low, at least during my fieldwork observations. However, those who wore the *cadar* were often regarded as students who were, quoting the director's opinion, 'strictly careful' (*ashaddu iḥtiyāṭan*) with their attitude. Therefore, *pesantren* leaders had significant respect for a wearer's decision to wear the *cadar,* particularly because it was not compulsory. The PP Islam al-Mukmin director explained:

> We feel more secure with the students who wear the *cadar.* We do not need to keep our eye on them because we believe that they already know how to behave properly and how to take care of themselves. Some students who wear the *jilbab* can be predicted that they wear it only because of the *pesantren* ruling, not because they are really willing to do so. While those who wear the *cadar* mostly base their decision on their understandings of Islam and a strong desire to be *anak salihah.*

The other noticeable difference is that students from *pesantren* of the non-jihadi factions wear diverse types of face covering. Students in Ma'had Ihya As-Sunnah, for example, not only wear the *cadar* but also the *purdah,* which covers their eyes. If they happen to wear the *cadar* and not the *purdah,* then the norm related to wearing the *cadar* in this *pesantren* is that the upper part of the eye hole should not exceed beyond the wearers' eyebrows and the lower part of the hole has to be located right below their eyes not in the middle of their noses (Figure 4.3). According to the wife of the head of the *pesantren,* wearing the *purdah* (Figure 4.4) in this *pesantren* should be based on the students' understanding of what it means to practise Islam totally and to be *taat.* She says:

Figure 4.3 Students of Ma'had Ihya As-Sunnah wearing their *cadar* inside their dormitory. Note the very small eye slits. Source. Photo credit, author, 28 June 2008.

Figure 4.4 Two students outside their *pesantren* wearing their optional school uniform *purdah.* Source. Photo credit, author, 28 June 2008.

> We do not want them to wear the *purdah* because of us, but because of their *ketaatan.* Therefore, we give them a thorough understanding about the *purdah* and women's *ʿawra* [part of the body that must be covered] hoping that the decision to wear the *purdah* comes from their desire to practise religion properly, not because of their *pesantren,* their teachers, their friends or their parents. If the reason to wear the *purdah* is because of us, only because of their *ketaatan* to the *pesantren* rules and norms but not to Islamic teachings, then they will wear it in front of us and will take it off behind us. If it is because of their responsibility towards their religion, I believe that wherever they go they will wear it and they will be very strong in tackling all difficulties while facing those who oppose their *purdah.*

In this *pesantren* there is strong belief that those who wear the *cadar* and the *purdah* are regarded as students who are more capable of maintaining their purity and can be regarded as those who have successfully embraced the concept of ideal femininity.

Producing a *salihah* and *taat* generation

The terms *salihah* (f)/*saleh* (m) and *taat* have salience for students in *pesantren.* These terms can often be found in the vision of the *pesantren* in my study. For

example, Ma'had Ihya As-Sunnah uses these terms in its vision statement, namely '*mendidik anak menjadi anak sholih/sholihah*' (to educate students to be *saleh* [Ar. *ṣāliḥ*] and *salihah* [Ar. *ṣāliḥa*]).[12] Ma'had al-Mar'atus Sholihah, also uses the term *salihah* in their mission statement, 'To educate students to become *salihah* who are *taat* towards God and His Prophet.' It is a term that refers to the aspiration of people in authority to produce pious and *taat* children.

Scholars have pointed out the dedication of *pesantren* to produce *ʿulamāʾ* (Dhofier 1980; van Bruinessen 1990), future generations and leaders who become proficient in scientific disciplines while at the same time being devout Muslims (Lukens-Bull 2001, 369; Zuhdi 2006, 424). However, for most parents who send their daughters to the *pesantren,* there is another important expectation, namely that this educational institution will be like a sanctuary that can safeguard their girls from the dangerous moral decay that is being spread around the country with the impact of modernisation and globalisation (Lukens-Bull 2001, 351). In addition, some parents also believe that graduates from *pesantren* are more desirable for marriage because of the common assumption in Indonesia that they are good young women. Sending their daughters to a *pesantren* is especially important in relation to preserving the honour (*sharaf*) of the family. When girls engage in bad behaviour, such as committing fornication or adultery, free sex and the inability to internalise the concept of *malu* (shame), then this will threaten the honour of the father who is supposed to protect his family's honour (Abu-Lughod 1986). The barometer of women's honour is how they can preserve their purity (*ʿiffa*). By purity in this context, I mean the concept that relates to how a woman preserves her morality and guards her body to avoid shame and embarrassment which can put her father and herself at risk, which in turn can also jeopardise the 'face' of the whole family. Therefore, for parents who are strongly concerned about such risks to family honour, sending young girls to *pesantren* which uphold strict religious values, especially the values that they believe can safeguard their children, is the main option for the whole future of their family.

For outsiders, especially *pesantren* staff and parents, wearing any kind of Muslim dress, not only the *cadar* but also the *jilbab,* in the context of the *pesantren,* is considered a symbol of a wearer's religious identity (Smith-Hefner 2007, 402). Ibu Aminah, a 41-year-old wife with three children who sends her daughter Fauziyah (14 years old) to the *pesantren,* says:

> I am very proud of my daughter, because when I sent her to this *pesantren,* she did not object to it. All students in this *pesantren in shā'allāh* [God willing] are *anak salihah.* We can see from their *cadar* Mbak, not many *pesantren* in Indonesia can ask their students to wear the *cadar.* It all depends on whether the *pesantren* upholds the correct *manhaj.*

Ibu Aminah in this regard emphasises that wearing the *cadar* is a mirror of her daughter's religious identity. It implies for many outsiders like Ibu Aminah that the clothes say something about the wearer. The other example of how wearing the *cadar* is regarded by some *pesantren* staff as a mirror of the identity of pious

children can be seen in the *pesantren* where wearing the *cadar* has not been formalised, such as in the case of PP Islam al-Mukmin mentioned above. Joanne Entwistle reminds us that 'we need to continue to question the close associations of fashion/dress with identities' (2015, 17). Indeed, some young students in this type of *pesantren* who wear the *cadar* are wearing it mainly to be *taat* to the *pesantren* norms. Entwistle discusses the interconnectedness between body, identity and Foucault's influence on the body, 'We are no longer content to see the body as finished, but actively intervene to change its shape, alter its weight and contours. The body has become part of a project to be worked at, a project increasingly linked to a person's identity of self' (2015, 40–41). This is in line with the position of parents when they decide to send their children to *pesantren.* For outsiders like parents and elites of *pesantren,* the trajectory of students from non-*cadar* wearers to *cadar* wearers is part of the process of building a *taat* or pious identity.

Although wearing the *cadar* is part of the discipline operating within *pesantren* associated with the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi movements, most *santriwati* have also internalised the connection between wearing the *cadar* and becoming *anak salihah.* Awliya, a 14-year-old student from Aceh, says, 'My aspiration to study in this *pesantren* is to make my parents happy and to become a pious child who is obedient to God.' Indeed, most of these students voice aspirations similar to those of their parents. Awliya's intention to make her journey in the *pesantren* as part of her effort to make her parents happy demonstrates that family, especially parents, have an important role in determining the choice of school for daughters who have internalised an understanding that making their parents happy is one of the greatest acts of devotion (*ʿibāda*). Based on my interviews with some heads of *pesantren, pesantren* teachers and parents themselves, the ideological inclination of parents and family is the main consideration for choice of school. Although not all students within the Tablīghī Jamāʿat or Salafi *pesantren* have parents associated with a Tablīghī Jamāʿat or Salafi background, the majority of them belong to these groups or at least have become sympathisers of the groups.

For the staunch cadres of each movement, choosing appropriate schools for their children is equal to choosing the true Islam. It is noteworthy that, according to many students in Pesantren Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah, the mother's role is greater in deciding the choice of school. Umm Wahid, a 36-year-old woman belonging to one of the Salafi groups in Yogyakarta, says:

> I do not want to send my daughter to a random school. I want to make sure that the school does not teach my daughter how to sing, draw and dance. I want my daughter to learn how to read the Qur'ān and memorise it. I want her to wear *cadar* and *ʿabāya* not a white and blue uniform [an Indonesian junior high school uniform].

Umm Wahid's expectation stems from her understanding of true Islam according to her version. For example, within Salafi schools, parents do not expect their

children to learn how to sing and dance because these activities are considered unIslamic.

It is noteworthy that I found the term *salihah* is often used by *cadari* within the *pesantren* but not by *cadari* at university level. The term *salihah* is related to their belief that the norms in the *pesantren* are the key to guiding them to achieve this goal. Therefore, *ketaatan* to *pesantren* norms is linked to their *ketaatan* to God. They believe that all the techniques of the body they learn from living in the *pesantren* are the techniques needed for them to become pious children. Therefore, when I asked students in Pesantren Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah whether they intended to continue wearing the *cadar* upon their graduation from the *pesantren,* many of them responded positively. Annisa, who will graduate soon, said: 'Of course, Kak [Sister] Eva, I will keep wearing my *cadar.* I know it will be very hard wearing the *cadar* outside the *pesantren. Anak salihah* wears the *cadar,* therefore, I will try to always wear it. I am also already used to it Kak. It feels strange when I do not wear it.' Annisa's experience signifies how she embodies her *taat* habitus.

Understanding the life and aspirations of *santriwati*

The implication for those living in a place of residence that fits Foucault's model of the panopticon is that they are often regarded as being under the control of the institution, and thus agents who have a lack of choice and autonomy (Scott 2010). Living in a total institution or a panopticon implies that there is an element of coercion, and it is an indication that the residents are powerless. Foucault himself admitted that his earlier work did not say much about agency. In his later work, Foucault incorporates agency linked to subject formation as his focus—a focus that refers to self-regulation (Foucault 1990). His arguments on subjectivity are useful for analysing the power relations that operate in the lives of students in *pesantren.* The subject, according to Foucault, is produced through such relations. He argues that power 'is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere' (1980a, 93).

Power in this sense also operates in the micro-politics of everyday life. This power operates through the production of knowledge and desire. Foucault emphasises:

> Power would be a fragile thing, if its only function were to repress, if it worked only through the mode of censorship, exclusion, blockage and repression, in the manner of a great Superego, exercising itself only in a negative way. If, on the contrary, power is strong this is because, as we are beginning to realise, it produces effects at the level of desire—and also at the level of knowledge. Far from preventing knowledge, power produces it.
>
> (1980b, 59)

Foucault's argument moves away from looking at the power that is embodied by those in authority, which makes it merely repressive, to that which can be seen

as productive. In this sense, power does not simply prevent people from acting in certain ways, but it also encourages them to act in certain ways.

Using a Foucauldian lens, then, we can understand how, despite the existence of rigid disciplinary rules and harsh living conditions, most of the *santriwati* do not experience operations of power within the *pesantren* as coercive (Nilan 2009, 226). Instead, they feel the pleasure of being on the right track of Islam in order to be pious children as expected by their parents. Suci, a 16-year-old student of Pesantren Sunanul Husna Al-Jaiyah from Jepara (Central Java), recounts her experience with the *cadar* as follows: 'Initially it was very difficult [wearing the *cadar*], stuffy because it was hard for me to breathe, but after a while I began to enjoy it. *In shā'allāh* I will continue wearing the *cadar* to be a pious child and to make my parents happy.' Suci's story is a typical statement of those uttered by her friends in this *pesantren.* Her words resonate with Foucault's argument about some aspects that make power acceptable:

> If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but to say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse.
>
> (1980a, 119)

One important thing that should be underlined is that for Foucault power is exercised through the production of discourses. Discourses are part of how people experience themselves. They also determine the way people think and speak, as well as act (Cranny-Francis et al. 2003, 93). For most *santriwati, pesantren* discourses about the ideal image of pious children, who are the source of parents' happiness, has brought them to find pleasure in embodying the norms. Moreover, because of the nature of the *pesantren*'s milieu which relatively isolates them from broader society, they are not exposed to a counter discourse.

The other important insight from Foucault which is relevant to analysing the life of *santriwati* is the paradox of subjectivation. He argues that the processes and conditions that subordinate the subject are also the means by which the subject becomes a self-conscious agent (1982). Adapting the insights of Foucault, Saba Mahmood elaborates on how agency can be explained within this condition: 'Such an understanding of power and subject formation encourages us to conceptualize agency not simply as a synonym for resistance to relations of domination, but as a capacity for action that specific relations of *subordination* create and enable [emphasis in original]' (2005, 17–18).

Mahmood explains this paradox of subjectivation, as follows:

> We might consider the example of a virtuoso pianist who submits herself to the often painful regime of disciplinary practice, as well as to the hierarchical structures of apprenticeship, in order to acquire the ability—the requisite agency—to play the instrument with mastery. Importantly, her agency

> is predicated upon her ability to be taught, a condition classically referred to as 'docility.'
>
> (29)

Mahmood focuses on how pious subjectivity can be both agentive and docile. *Cadari* in these *pesantren* are also agentive and docile. However, their obedience in striving for their aspiration to be pious children involves them seeing themselves through the eyes of authority figures in their *pesantren* and also their parents. Therefore, their *taat* agency which is embedded in their obedience is not entirely individuated and self-focused. It is noteworthy that since some of these students are still very young, between 11 and 18 years of age, I also encountered a few who do not really understand the essence of wearing the *cadar.* They just follow the 'rules of the game' to avoid punishment and other consequences within the *pesantren* without any intention of further understanding the implications of such a practice.

This chapter has demonstrated how wearing the *cadar* has become the accepted norm in some *pesantren* that have special attachments to the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi movements in Indonesia. Wearing the *cadar* is related to the discourse of ideal Islamic femininity. The process of making the *cadar* a norm within these *pesantren* signifies the importance of the body as a powerful symbolic form. For the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi movements, wearing the *cadar* is a powerful symbol of the wearer's commitment to meticulously follow Islam as practised by *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ.* For *pesantren* staff and parents, it is also part of the most important symbolic solidarity and boundary maintenance that can distinguish between their students/daughters who adhere strictly to the notion of ideal femininity and others who they perceive to be failing to conform to the norms of true Islam. This phenomenon is resonant with Nilüfer Göle's argument, in her study of veiling in Turkey, that the practice can be regarded as 'a source of collective empowerment and horizontal bondage among those who distinguish themselves as Muslims' (2003, 817). Disciplining the body in this context is not only a cultural statement but it is also an ideological statement. The belief is that Muslim women who have a strong zeal to follow true Islam should understand that wearing the *cadar,* which is perceived to be associated with ideal feminine virtues, is an important element to guard their purity. They believe that preserving female purity is one crucial and endless effort to practise Islam totally.

The significant presence of the *cadari* in Indonesia can be seen from the existence of *cadari* students within the *pesantren* under study and the growing presence of middle-aged *cadari* within *pesantren* complexes. Outsiders who are not familiar with the presence of these *pesantren* might assume that there are hardly any *cadari* in Indonesia. However, once they enter the *pesantren* complexes they will see that the Salafi village (or Tablīghī village) has successfully maintained its specific everyday lifestyle. The fact is that these *pesantren* are not only successful in producing *cadari* but some of them have also been successful in influencing the way people in their neighbourhood dress.

Pesantren for the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi movements can be regarded as the most important sites for producing 'real' ideal Islamic womanhood. People within the movements assume that sending their girls to *pesantren* is the best choice to provide a sanctuary for girls living in a country where moral decline is pervasive. For purist movements, women are always considered the repositories of religious values, therefore norms related to women's bodies prevalent in *pesantren* are perceived as important elements which can maintain the boundaries of their collective identity. Hence, in their view, these boundaries mark a high commitment to religion compared with other Muslim groups in Indonesia. These *pesantren* are creating subcultural communities of Muslims who share deeply conservative gender norms and literalist understandings of Islamic scripture. This kind of *pesantren,* unfortunately, has contributed significantly to the already well-rooted patriarchal understandings of Islam in many *pesantren* in the country, including those with attachments to the two biggest Muslim mass organisations, NU and Muhammadiyah.

In contrast to the current staunch supporters of wearing the *cadar* in Indonesia, that is, university students who must struggle to defend their *cadar* including against opponents within their educational institutions, adopting the *cadar* for students in the *pesantren* is supported by the living conditions in the *pesantren,* including the presence of Islamic villages, and the power relations operating within this type of institution. Power within the *pesantren* has successfully produced discourses related to an ideal femininity, namely becoming *salihah,* which in turn has led students to embody pleasure in conforming to *pesantren* norms. Conformity to the norms of students in the *pesantren* in wearing the *cadar* is not a sign of lack of agency, but rather an indication of their self-conscious capacity to act, especially in the context where it is not enjoined as a rule. Therefore, adapting the insight of Foucault (1980a; 1980b; 1990), power that operates within the *pesantren* operates as a productive force that introduces discourses and forms of knowledge and also pleasure.

Referring to the discussion of *ketaatan* which is at the heart of this book, this chapter has shown that the obedience of *pesantren* students is social and interactive. They are performing their obedience by striving to see themselves through the eyes of the authority figures of their current lives in *pesantren.* Based on their understanding that respecting parents is also part of an act of devotion, they practice their religion to conform with their parents' desire for their children to be pious. Therefore, conforming with the discipline of pious religious practice can be seen as the goal of the docile agency they exercise.

Notes

1 In Indonesia, the spelling used for *madrasa* is *madrasah.* I use the Indonesian spelling (*madrasah*), except when I refer to other scholars who use the first spelling.
2 It is important to mention one interesting study on girls' *madrasa* which has special connection to the Tablīghī Jamāʿat movement (Winkelmann 2005), although her area of study is India, not Indonesia.

3 There are also some *pesantren* with strong ties to NU which requests that their *santriwati* wear a *cadar,* such as Pesantren Darullughah Wadda'wah in Bangil, East Java, Pesantren Miftahul Huda al-Musri in Cianjur, West Java and Pesantren Mambaus Sholihin in Gresik, East Java. This is mainly done to maintain social ethics between male and female students within the *pesantren.* The elites of these *pesantren* believe that when the students are in the *pesantren,* they are their responsibility. Therefore, as these students' 'foster parents' they have to be extra careful. They believe that by asking them to wear the *cadar* they can save their students from immoral behaviour. Some of these *pesantren* do not oblige their students to wear the *cadar* when they are outside the *pesantren.*

4 Part of this section was published as Eva F. Nisa. 2014. Insights into the lives of Indonesian female Tablīghī Jamāʿat. *Modern Asian Studies* 48(2): 468–91, doi: 10.1017/S0026749X13000681.

5 There are different types of monthly tuition fees. Those who are able pay full tuition fees which, during my fieldwork, were Rp200,000 (AUD19.19); those who cannot afford the full tuition fee can pay as much as they are able and there is no limitation on this; for orphans, who also cannot afford it, the tuition fee is waived. In comparison, some well-managed *pondok pesantren* may cost more than AUD100.

6 This is different from the subjects taught in Madrasatul Niswan in Delhi which are only religious lessons (Winkelmann 2005, 47).

7 *Kitab kuning* (yellow books) refer to classical Arabic texts. For a very important study on *kitab kuning* see van Bruinessen (1990).

8 Some other norms of the *pesantren* are that it is forbidden to watch TV, listen to music, read newspapers, novels or magazines, and many more. For the students whose families are familiar with the Tablīghī Jamāʿat's teachings, all the norms in this *pesantren* are not big burdens, because they are used to this situation. Some of the students, for example, admitted that they do not watch TV in their homes, because their parents forbid it.

9 In Indonesia, there is also a term *pesantren* Salafiyah (Salafiya *pesantren*). These two terms have caused confusion. Salafiya *pesantren* has been well known as the *pesantren* that maintains the 'traditional' curriculum. It is also known as NU *pesantren.* In East Java, for example, some *pesantren* use the term *Salafiyah* as their name. In this study, however, Salafi *pesantren* belong to diverse Salafi factions, or those that strictly maintain the ideology of the Salafi movements.

10 During my fieldwork, the now Ministry of Education, Culture, Research and Technology was called the Ministry of National Education.

11 The term *umm* is like other terms, such as *ukht, kak* and *mbak.* They are often used by my research subjects to address me during the research. These are terms of respect, instead of using one's name directly.

12 Many Indonesians use varied non-standard spellings for this term. The official dictionary of the Indonesian language uses *salihah* for girls and women, *saleh* for boys and men. It also lists some non-standard spellings for *salihah,* including *sholeha, sholehah, soleha* and *solehah.*

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5 Finding a niche

Face-veiled university students in Indonesia

In the previous chapter, we saw how wearing the *cadar* (face veil) has been normalised as part of the culture of those *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) that have a special association with either the Tablīghī Jamāʿat or Salafi movements. Thus, outsiders may see the practice of wearing the *cadar* by *santriwati* (female students at *pesantren*) merely as part of the wearers' efforts to conform to the rules within the *pesantren,* not as a sign of the self-transformation of themselves. The characteristics of the *pesantren,* with its discipline and ordered living arrangements that typify Erving Goffman's total institution (1984), have made wearing the *cadar* within the *pesantren* less challenging than wearing it in other public spaces. In addition, despite the intention of the *santriwati* to commit to their *cadar,* some older passionate *cadari* (face-veiled women) questioned the young *cadari*'s commitment to continue wearing the *cadar* after they had graduated from the *pesantren.* This scepticism is because some *cadari* do give up their *cadar* after graduation. Almira (pseudonym), a 24-year-old university student of the Saudi Arabia-funded university, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic, LIPIA), recounts her life and her experience with the *cadar:*

> My father is an *ustādh* [religious teacher]. You can say our family is a very typical Salafi family. My mother also wears the *cadar.* When I was ten years old my parents sent me to a Salafi *pesantren* in Yogyakarta [Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy]. During my first days in this *pesantren,* I asked my mother to send me a *cadar,* because I saw all my seniors wore it and I wanted to copy them. At that time, the *cadar* was not mandatory for me, because I was still very young. Following this, my parents sent me to another Salafi *pesantren* in Solo [Imam Bukhari] for my high school education. In this *pesantren* I had to wear the *cadar.* It was mandatory for all female students.

Almira has given up her *cadar* since graduation. She said that she had learnt so much that now she realises that the *cadar* is not obligatory in Islam. Besides Almira, Romaini or Roma is my other research subject who wears the *cadar* casually. Roma, who began wearing the *cadar* in 2005, is a university student majoring in theatre studies at the Institut Kesenian Jakarta (IKJ) (Jakarta Institute for

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the Arts). Her parents were initially against her decision but then they accepted it. Roma recounted, 'Thankfully, they finally agreed with my decision to wear this [touching her *cadar*]. Since the booming of *Ayat Ayat Cinta* [the movie], people have often called me Aisha [the *cadari* character in the movie]. However, I am different from other face-veiled women, I am a very relaxed person. My *cadar* is very colourful and sometimes even transparent.' Roma also auditioned for the *Ayat Ayat Cinta* movie, but unfortunately, she did not get a role.

In contrast to Almira's and Roma's stories, wearing the *cadar* by passionate wearers who are university students demonstrates a different scenario, especially as they must wear it in unsupportive environments, and they are committed to wearing and defending it. This chapter focuses on the life experiences of these committed face-veiled university students (see Figure 5.1), I call them passionate *cadari,* who associate with some Salafi groups, but not Tablīghī Jamāʿat. This is because in Indonesia Salafi groups are more popular than Tablīghī Jamāʿat among university students. As Ummu ʿAbdullah, a 21-year-old university student, says: 'Tablīghī women are rarely seen at universities, especially among female students. Tablīghī Jamāʿat is not as popular as other groups. Its appeal is defeated in the "harsh competition" between Salafism, Jama'ah Tarbiyah, and HTI [Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia or Indonesian Liberation Party].'[1]

Figure 5.1 A Salafi *cadari* in her black *purdah* entering al-Hasanah Mosque (Yogyakarta) for her religious lesson. Source: Photo credit, author, 22 March 2008. Used with subject's permission.

This phenomenon is different from other countries, such as Bangladesh, where the presence of Tablīghī Jamāʿat is salient within university campuses (Rozario 2006, 371). During my fieldwork, I also noticed that Tablīghī Jamāʿat is more appealing to those who have already graduated from university, or among those who did not attend university. Its female constituents are mostly married women and their daughters who are enrolled in *pesantren* with a special connection to the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. As mentioned in previous chapters, the appeal of the Salafi movements for Indonesian university students from the mid-1980s has become stronger, especially since the 1990s. The visibility of the involvement of female university students in diverse factions of the Salafi movements, however, became more salient only after 2000.

In this chapter, I pursue the idea that the embodiment of a virtuous *taat* (obedient) habitus shapes the formation of good and true *Muslimah* (Muslim women). It clearly reveals that the objective of fulfilling religious obligations or *taat* towards God is the main priority of these women. Indeed, for many Indonesian women, the issue of veiling and face veiling has always been pivotal in relation to their intention of becoming more religious. For example, Suzanne Brenner (1996) pointed out, in the late 1970s–early 1980s, the importance of the *jilbab* (tight veil) as proper Muslim dress for those who support Islamic and Islamist movements. With the growing popularity of Salafi groups in some parts of Indonesia nowadays, the *cadar* can be regarded as another type of 'Muslim women's uniform.' The majority of women in these communities argued that the *jilbab* could no longer be considered proper Muslim dress. For many *cadari,* the development of fashionable styles of *jilbab* has made the *jilbab* lose much of its meaning as a modest form of dress (Jones 2010c). This chapter emphasises that the agency of *cadari* that can be seen from their everyday life experiences is not for extra-religious ends. These passionate *cadari*'s life experiences and the process of negotiating and renegotiating the *cadar* show their long struggle to reconstruct a virtuous habitus and their capacity to exercise a specific form of the *taat* agency.

These well-educated women are eager to strengthen their commitment to their religion by engaging in a typical movement that is widely considered by scholars and the public alike to be subordinate and oppressive towards women. This oppression is thought to be related to constraints on women's autonomy and the choices that women have, including the choice to adopt certain styles of dress (Abu-Lughod 2002, 785–86; Winter 2001). As mentioned in previous chapters, these arguments are based on the assumption that those who wear such clothing do not have the freedom to participate in normal social life. Another common public assumption about this type of movement is that women adherents wear the *cadar* because it is enforced by men. Scholars have also argued that men in these communities usually have privilege and dominant positions (Hasan 2006, 180; Knutilla 2004)—and with some justification, given that most authority figures are indeed men. Those who have been active in issuing *fatwa* (Ar. *fatwā*) or nonbinding legal opinions on women are also men. Indeed, the authoritative voices in such movements become the main references for the ways in which women adherents exercise their agency.

Adopting the insights of scholars who emphasise that agency can be present alongside docility (Avishai 2008; 2016; Deeb 2006; Mahmood 2005; Rinaldo 2014; Werbner 2018), this chapter also highlights the relevance of agency in deciphering the life choices of these women. Saba Mahmood's work focusing on the ways in which pious subjectivity can be both docile and agentive is especially influential. The *cadari* do indeed submit themselves to the path of religion in which the authoritative voices are mostly from male religious scholars. Lyn Parker in her study of the wearing of the veil in Indonesia also highlights that 'agency can derive from many sources, but usually is deployed using the cultural resources at hand—in this case, the authoritative Islamic discourses that advocate modesty of dress and the wearing of the *jilbab*' (2008, n.p.).

Many anthropological studies have taken various approaches in understanding subjectivity, including through individual and cultural approaches (on cultural approaches see Geertz 1973). João Biehl, Byron Good and Arthur Kleinman, for example, recorded that 'in the nineteenth century, *subjectivity* referred to an essential individuality, the consciousness of one's perceived states [emphasis in original] (2007, 5). Some anthropologists have emphasised 'the importance of subjectivity in social life, these anthropologists have rethought culture, seeing it as emerging from institutional and intersubjective interactions and as an evolving phenomenon, constantly remade through social encounters, ethical deliberations, political processes' (Biehl, Good and Kleinman 2007, 7). In her definition of subjectivity, Sherry Ortner also emphasises the intersections between 'cultural formations and the inner states of acting subjects' stressing that 'by subjectivity I will always mean a specifically cultural and historical consciousness' (2005, 31, 34). Ortner highlights the importance of cultural and social formation in shaping individual subjectivity including feelings, desires and intentions. In analysing the passionate *cadari,* the intersubjective interactions, social encounters, culture and the inner state of acting subjects—to borrow Ortner's terms—are all intertwined.

Mahmood points out the importance of understanding agency not only in the forms of resistance but also 'in the multiple ways in which one *inhabits* norms [emphasis in original]' (2005, 15). Therefore, it is important to understand the desire and pleasure of the person concerned. In the case of the passionate *cadari,* their capacity for agency can be seen from their desire to return to the true Islam by associating themselves with Salafi movements and by embodying virtuous practices including wearing the *cadar.* The pleasure that they feel is related to their achievement in cultivating virtuous selves. However, as mentioned in the previous chapters, the agency of *cadari* also involves a specific kind of resistance, especially given how rare *cadari* are. The *taat* agency of *cadari* demonstrates areas in which they must challenge everyday cultural and social formations that do not accept their presence. This is part of their commitment to uphold their Salafi doctrine of *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* (loyalty to Islam and Muslims and dissociation from all things non-Islamic and the renunciation of unbelievers). This doctrine requires them to be *taat* (*al-walā'*) and to resist what they believe as un-Islamic influences (*al-bara'*) and to avoid *tashabbuh* (imitating) those they consider to be unbelievers in all aspects of their lifestyle, including in how they dress.

Their resistance, however, does not involve resisting their movement's religious doctrine and practices. The Salafi women in Indonesia do not resist Salafi understandings of the position of women, but they do resist the religious understandings and practices upheld by others.

The story of Khaula and Maryam[2]

Here, I introduce one of my research subjects, Khaula (pseudonym). She comes from one of the most well-established Salafi groups in Yogyakarta, affiliated with Yayasan Majelis At-Turots Al-Islamy. Khaula is a 21-year-old mathematics and natural sciences student at one of the most prestigious universities in Indonesia, Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) (Gadjah Mada University). Borrowing Clifford Geertz's typology (1964), she was brought up in a typical *abangan* family.[3] She did not have a strong religious upbringing or education. Her parents always sent her to non-Islamic schools, although they did send her to non-formal Qur'ānic reading lessons. Here she learnt how to read Arabic letters and how to recite the Qur'ān, without grasping its content. Therefore, she knew very little about Islam when she was a teenager. Khaula compared her first encounter with the Salafi community to a drop of water from heaven falling in the middle of the desert. She recounts her story as follows:

> When I enrolled in this university, I did not have any friends. I felt that the university environment was very strange. In addition, as you know, I stayed in a rented house with other students who I honestly did not have anything in common with. After returning from classes, I felt that I had plenty of time but did not know exactly how to spend it. Suddenly, when I was in this big confusion, my eyes went to one of my friends who had worn the *cadar.* Every time I saw her, I knew that she was happy although she did not interact much with other students. One day, I decided to follow her steps secretly, again *subḥānallāh* [lit. God is pure from all faults/all glory be to God] … I was amazed, I thought her day was dense with meaningful religious activities.

For Khaula, who comes from a rural area in Yogyakarta, campus life brought about a feeling of alienation and disconnection from others. She tried to fight this disorientation by asserting her religiosity.

Khaula's curiosity about the life of *cadari* is almost identical to the other life stories I heard in Makassar. I began my Makassar fieldwork by visiting a campus mosque at Universitas Hasanuddin (UNHAS) (Hasanuddin University). Here, I hoped to meet *cadari* activists who, based on my initial fieldwork in Yogyakarta, often gather in the mosque during their free time on campus. In the mosque, I talked as much as possible to the students and finally met an inspirational face-veiled woman called Maryam (pseudonym).

Maryam is a 23-year-old university student studying dentistry. She is from the Gowa regency in South Sulawesi and was brought up in a religious family. Her father and mother are of a strong Muhammadiyah background. Maryam admits

that since primary school she had always been one of the brightest students in school. She has a significant passion to do everything properly. Therefore, when she started to understand that Salafi teachings were correct and the *cadar* was the proper dress for true *Muslimah,* she found pleasure in learning more about them. She became interested in joining the Salafi group when she was a new student at the university. Maryam is not attached to the same Salafi group as Khaula, but rather to the largest Salafi mass organisation in Makassar, Wahdah Islamiyah. Maryam recounts her interest:

> When I was a new student at this university, I was struck by the appearance of some of my seniors with their *cadar.* I thought this dress carried a different positive aura. One day, I was informed by one of my friends who was also interested in this group that they were organising a workshop on religious issues. After the workshop two of them approached us, Rahma, my friend, and I, and they started to talk about the importance of these kinds of religious activities. Eventually, they invited us to join their religious activities.

Maryam's story emphasises the appeal of the presentation of self of *cadari.* The discussion of aesthetics regarding the choice of veiling in Indonesia often relates to its connection with fashionable Muslim dress (Amrullah 2008; Jones 2007; 2010a; 2010b). Nevertheless, the aesthetic aura of inward peace and tranquillity of the wearer felt by outsiders who are drawn to the beauty of becoming closer to religion is often overlooked.

Like many other supporters of Islamic revivalist and conservative movements (Chandrakirana and Chuzaifah 2005, 56; Smith-Hefner 2007, 390), many of these *cadari* study secular science-based subjects[4] at well-known state universities but not Islamic state universities (Sakai and Fauzia 2014, 44). In Yogyakarta, many of Khaula's face-veiled friends come from UGM, while Maryam's friends in Makassar mostly attend UNHAS. In late 2008, in Yogyakarta, only two students at Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) (State Islamic University) Sunan Kalijaga wore the *cadar.*[5] At the same time, at UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta, there were only three students who wore the *cadar;* two of them were Malaysians. This number is different from the *cadari* at Universitas Indonesia (UI) (the University of Indonesia). In 2008, there were fifty UI students who wore the *cadar.* This trend strengthens the argument that practising strict Islam appeals more to students who do not have strong religious backgrounds than to those who are attached to Islamic universities. The faculties which can be regarded as the 'base camp' of these face-veiled students both in Yogyakarta and Makassar are the Faculties of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, Pharmacy, Medicine, Biology and Dentistry, and at UGM, the Faculties of Forestry, Agriculture and Agricultural Technology.

Some *cadari* from state non-Islamic universities criticise UIN students. In a focus group discussion, one of Khaula's friends explained: 'Students at UIN are usually not interested in joining our *taʿlīm* [religious study circle] Ukht [Sister], because they feel that they are smarter than us in terms of their mastery of religious knowledge.' Some *cadari* also have certain opinions concerning the UIN students'

appearance. Khaula says: 'Among ourselves we usually already understand why there are only a few UIN students who wear the *cadar.* This is primarily because their religious knowledge is restricted to the realm of mere knowledge. They do not transform it into concrete practice.' These *cadari*'s expectation is that female UIN students who most likely have deeper Islamic knowledge than themselves can also practise their religion better. They evaluate the appearance of female UIN students with their 'inappropriate' *jilbab* as a sign that they would not be good Muslim women. This is because, for them, being a true *Muslimah* means not only mastering Islamic knowledge but also publicly embodying the belief through correct behaviour.

The *cadar* and the quest for becoming true *Muslimah*

It is noteworthy that the way Khaula, Maryam and other *cadari* perceive what constitutes a good *Muslimah* is not only the adoption of the *cadar* but also the strict following of all Islamic disciplines. Thus, being a true and good *Muslimah,* according to passionate *cadari* like Khaula and Maryam, means fashioning one's everyday commitment. Here in this context, it becomes problematic to find non-pious dimensions of their everyday lives, even when we go beyond their religious circle activities.

As I pointed out in previous chapters, anthropologists and scholars from other disciplines have tried to unpack the notions of 'everyday Muslims,' 'everyday Islam,' 'everyday religiosity,' or Filippo Osella and Benjamin Soares's 'Islam mondain,' in order to balance or counter some studies that focus heavily on piety and neglect other important aspects of religious subjects such as 'political, economic, and other structures mediating Muslim life' (Fadil and Fernando 2015a, 60; see also Osella and Soares 2010). The debate among Lara Deeb (2015), Samuli Schielke (2015), Nadia Fadil and Mayanthi Fernando (2015a; 2015b) are examples on how everyday and pious activities have been discussed in the anthropology of Islam. In responding to Fadil and Fednando's assessment of scholars working on everyday Islam, Deeb, for example, suggests that 'a problem emerges if what is understood as nonnormative ways of being are taken up as *the only* form of the everyday [emphasis in original]' (2015, 94). Ammara Maqsood contends that 'the distinction between the "pious" and "everyday," implicitly made in the anthropology of Islam, is not always clear in lived experience' (2017, 151). Passionate *cadari* who decided to take the *hijrah* (religious transformation to be better Muslim women) path in my study indeed do not espouse the separation between the 'pious' and 'everyday.' Here, I adopt Deeb's definition of everyday Islam that refers 'attention to the ways in which people draw on ideas that they understand to be rooted to varying extents in Islam in order to figure out how to handle everything from handshaking to prayer, from dress to which cafes to hang out in and what social invitations to accept.' The everyday of the passionate *cadari* is also aligned with Deeb's position that normative should not be seen as 'static and homogenous' (2015, 94, 95). Talal Asad, in his explanation of religion and Islamic corporal discipline, argues one needs 'to abandon the idea of religion

as always and essentially the same, and as dependent of faith that is independent of practical traditions because and to the extent that it is transcendental' (2001, 220). Here in this context, Asad emphasises the 'mutual dependence and tension between "religion" and "secularism" as modern constructions' (2001, 217). Secularism, according to Asad, in this context should be understood 'not merely as a political ideology that structures the modern liberal state but as an untidy historical complex that includes behavior, knowledge, and sensibility in the flow of everyday life' (2001, 206). Thus, religious and secular experiences cannot be easily separated in everyday life. This can be seen clearly in my ethnographic study of the *cadari.*

The key concept of their everyday lifestyle is *taat* (Ar. *ṭāʿa*). *Ṭāʿa* is contrasted with *maʿṣiya* (disobedience to God) which is linked to sin (Gimaret 2011). When a woman is *taat* (*muṭīʿa*), it means that she understands her obligations as God's creation and God's agent on earth. Also, as part of her *taat* she has a desire to be committed to her religious duty. A good *cadari* is often known by others, especially her friends who know her lifestyle as *perempuan yang taat, perempuan salihah* or *muṭīʿa* (a woman who is *taat*). Regarding the use of the term *salihah* (Ar. *ṣāliḥa*) (pious), the passionate *cadari* with whom I worked seemed sometimes relatively reluctant to use the term. For them, being *salihah* is an ultimate achievement of those who can practise Islam flawlessly, while they feel that they have not reached this level. They feel they are still struggling to be *taat.* Here, their position resonates with Mahmood's account of the women in the mosque movement in Egypt, which focuses more on 'what they do' not 'what they mean' (2005). Outsiders may regard the *cadar* as an expression of the wearers' identity that indicates the desire to be *Muslimah.* In regard to dress worn by pious Shi'i Muslim women, Deeb argues that dress is part of the expression of the visibility of personal levels of piety (2006, 36). For the passionate wearers, however, wearing the *cadar* is not in itself an expression of piety but a way to realise piety or, using their concept, to achieve their aspiration to be true *Muslimah.*

The concept of *taqwa* (Ar. *taqwā*), which is linked to *ketaatan* (obedience), is also important in the everyday life of *cadari.* Mahmood (2005) applies the concept of *taqwa* in her study of women in the mosque movement in Egypt to analyse the notion of piety and its connection to the fear of God that can keep the believer abstaining from sin (see also Izutsu 2006, 92–93). *Cadari*'s faithful observance, fear of God and their abstinence from everything which can distance them from God can be summarised as their *taqwa.* Maryam explained the connection between *taqwa, taat* (*taqwa* and *taat* in Indonesia are sometimes used interchangeably) and *cadar* as follows: '*Taqwa* is *taat* towards God. Wearing the *cadar* is part of *taqwa* and the implementation of *taat*.' Most *cadari* I worked with believed that they should adjust their lifestyle to be in line with the spirit of *taat* attached to their *cadar.* They argued that there is an element of *taat* not only towards God but also towards the Prophet in their *cadar* because it is part of the Islamic creed mentioned in the Qur'ān, *ḥadīth* (the narration of words, deeds or approvals of the Prophet Muḥammad) and *sunna* (the exemplary ways of life of the Prophet Muḥammad). They believe that while wearing the *cadar* they should

reflect noble behaviour (*al-akhlāq al-karīma*). For example, most committed *cadari* will not wear make-up and perfume, or colourful dresses because they consider these will attract men's attention and lead to *fitna* or sexual temptation in this context.

A common assumption that appears in interpreting this phenomenon is that these women's *cadar* represent their resistance towards western culture and western materialism. However, although this is one aspect supporting the decision to wear the *cadar,* most of the women prefer to describe their adoption of the *cadar* as part of their desire to embody their *taat* habitus. This is resonant with Webb Keane's work on agency that emphasises the importance of the social world in which subjectivity emerges (2007). Therefore, in analysing agency there should be careful consideration of the historical context of practices. The agency of these passionate *cadari* manifested in their practice of religion is also part of their responsibility as God's vicegerents and Muslim women who are eager to purify their religion. Their notion of responsibility resonates with the opinion of some Salafi scholars who mention the importance of wearing the *cadar* in countries such as Indonesia where moral decadence has allegedly emerged. The *cadari* frame their everyday lifestyle in resistance to the secular and immoral society. In addition to this, Salafi scholars and the passionate *cadari* often identify a moral crisis in the country resulting from the loss of a *budaya malu* (shame culture), especially among women (Collins and Bahar 2000). *Malu* is indeed a core element of both Islamic teachings and local wisdom. For passionate *cadari, malu* (Ar. *al-ḥayā'*), which refers to shyness and modesty, is an Islamic virtue and noble behaviour which should be cultivated (Frembgen 2004, 55; Mahmood 2005, 156). Maryam elaborates on shyness and modesty (*al-ḥayā'*) as follows:

> The most important thing that should be 'owned' by all Muslim women is the virtue of *al-ḥayā'* [she uses the Arabic word]. We have to struggle hard to have *al-ḥayā'* because it is the key to God's blessings. It is the key to being a good Muslim woman. For example, if we do not have *al-ḥayā',* especially towards God, then we will feel good when we uncover our *ʿawra* [part of the body that must be covered]. But when we have *al-ḥayā',* we will not feel good when we do not cover our *ʿawra* properly.[6]

The cultivated *malu* (*al-ḥayā'*), as understood by passionate *cadari,* that can bring them to being true *Muslimah,* can be different from the view of their parents, especially if they are not part of the same religious movement. In contrast to their daughters' understandings of the cultivated *malu,* parents who do not approve of the religious transformation feel that their daughters have brought *malu* (shame) to the family because of their behaviour—wearing the strange dress *cadar*—which is against mainstream norms. Santi Rozario's (1991, 16) account of two different connotations of shame is a useful tool with which to analyse this issue. Rozario suggests that the two connotations of 'shame' are positive virtues and negative qualities. To have shame is a good quality referring to someone's sensitivity towards the social norm. That said, shame can be regarded as a negative

quality when it refers to someone who brings shame to herself and loss of status to her lineage. It is worth noting that for the passionate *cadari* to have shame does not refer to their sensitivity towards mainstream social norms but to their sensitivity towards God's rules. Returning to the true path of Islam by following God's rules and embodying virtuous dispositions including cultivated *malu* are significant in teaching the *cadari* to be true *Muslimah.*

Scholars who have studied the practice of wearing the *jilbab* in Indonesia have pointed out the significance of the notion of 'awareness' (*kesadaran*) or 'becoming aware' (*menyadari*) as the most important motive for the *jilbab*-wearer's religious transformation (Brenner 1996, 683; Lindquist 2004, 493; Parker 2008, 15; Smith-Hefner 2007, 398). This is different from the *cadari* in this study. Mostly they did not index their transformation to wear the *cadar* as an aspect of their awareness, but rather as *hidāya* (guidance from God) to embody *ketaatan.* For the *cadari,* the main difference between *hidāya* to be *taat* and awareness lies in the fact that people can be aware of their responsibilities as Muslims, but this awareness cannot guarantee that it will lead them to follow true paths to God. That said, they believe that *hidāya* comes from God which means those who have received and achieved *hidāya* will practice Islam totally (*kaffah,* Ar. *kaffa*). *Hidāya* signifies their *taat* agency because *hidāya* requires a believer to actively seek it. The *cadari* believe that those who are granted *hidāya* will feel that God will help them offer their *kaffah ketaatan.* The *cadari* strive to discipline themselves to enforce virtuous acts on a daily basis. They avoid *ikhtilāṭ* (the mixing of the sexes) in all spaces, *khalwat* (being alone with a male stranger), shaking men's hands and other practices that they believe can lead them to sin. They reject diverse forms of worldly activities, such as watching TV and going to entertainment venues (cafés, bars, nightclubs), which can distract their attention from *ketaatan* and prevent them from performing *al-akhlāq al-karīma.* For the *cadari,* obedience towards these rules is part of their pleasure. Here lies the difficulty I mentioned above—the difficulty in seeing pious and everyday activities as diametrically opposed in the everyday life of the *cadari.*

'Salafi Islam is more authentic'

Salafi doctrine all over the world increasingly draws young Muslim followers, including in France (Adraoui 2009), Tunisia (Kolman 2017), Britain (Hamid 2009; Inge 2016) and the Netherlands (de Koning 2009). The question that often comes up regarding face-veiled students' involvement in Salafi groups is: why do women join a group that supports a rigid and literalist understanding of Islam? Orit Avishai mentioned that the phenomenon of women participants in conservative religious movements from varied religious traditions has led scholars to study it since the 1980s and 1990s (2016, 266).

There are many things that make the passionate *cadari* 'fall in love' with Salafi Islam. As they told me, in the first instance, Salafi Islam is considered by them to be a more authentic version of Islam, especially in comparison with other versions of Islam in Indonesia that have been introduced by varied religious movements

and organisations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah, HTI and Jama'ah Tarbiyah. Salafi scholars in Indonesia have successfully convinced most of these students, whose religious knowledge is still limited, that they offer a superior understanding of Islam. All religious knowledge that is delivered is based on reliable Islamic sources—the Qur'ān and *ḥadīth*—which have been interpreted by reliable scholars, especially scholars from the Middle East, whose mastery of Islamic knowledge is, for them, unquestionable. For the passionate *cadari,* Salafi Islam is the most original and the purest version of Islam compared, commonly, with the Islam practised by their parents.

In addition, the Arab aspect of Salafi teachings is an important source of this appeal. Sadaf Ahmad, in her study of Pakistani Muslim women who actively turn towards Islam, also emphasises the importance of Arab elements as the main attraction for women in their alteration of ideology and behaviour (2008, 74; 2009). Passionate *cadari* in this study see their parents' religion and practice as 'too cultural' because it contains traditional elements such as cultural norms and values found in Java and Makassar versions of Islam. Their assessment of their new understanding of Islam and their effort to disassociate themselves from their past and local practice of Islam are parallel to that of the Javanese women in Brenner's (1996) study, although it happens in a different sociohistorical and political circumstance (1996, 673; in Turkey see Göle 1996).

Some scholars have pointed out that this phenomenon is part of women's effort to embrace modernity with Islamic values while rejecting western versions of modernity (Brenner 1996; Göle 1996; Rinaldo 2010; Smith-Hefner 2007). Nancy Smith-Hefner, for instance, argues that veiling is 'a symbol of engagement in a modern, albeit deeply Islamic, world' (2007, 395). The modern character of the life of the *cadari* can also be seen from their use of advanced communication technologies in the process of achieving their aspiration to be true *Muslimah.* In addition, those who are associated with Salafi piety can be regarded as modern subjects because Salafi piety itself is the product of Islamic modernity (Meijer 2009, 16–17; Bangstad 2011, 39). The eagerness of pious Salafi women to distance themselves from their 'past' Islam demonstrates their effort to embrace the 'new era' of their religious belonging. Therefore, their attachment to Salafism can be regarded as 'one among several competing visions of modernity' (Keane 2007, 201).

Second, for students familiar with a more rational, precise and logical way of thinking, Salafi Islam offers a more convincing and straightforward understanding of Islam. Khaula for example says:

> By attending Salafi *taʿlīm* I am not confused any more about my religion. This is because nowadays in Indonesia there are many *asātidh* [male religious scholars] who give opinions on religious matters that often confuse me. When I attended a *taʿlīm* at UIN [Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta], for example, there was one religious scholar who mentioned some opinions concerning the *jilbab.* Unfortunately, he did not really say which one is the most correct one. After listening to his speech, I became even more

> confused. I want more instant, direct, and precise answers to my religious queries.[7]

This view is quintessentially the critique of face-veiled students towards religious scholars outside their Salafi communities. Khaula's narrative reflects a typical perspective that the students are seeking certainty and more straightforward guidelines in practising their religion. Since they do not have a strong religious background before joining a Salafi group, they prefer certainty, and do not want to get involved in assessing and evaluating any debates on religious discourse.

Third, the other attraction of Salafi Islam for these face-veiled students is their observation of the 'performance' of people within the communities. Most of my research subjects argued that initially they were interested in joining a group because they were attracted to the distinct appearance and dress code of the women followers. The stories of Khaula and Maryam, mentioned earlier, support this point. For them, the Salafi look is more 'Islamic' than that of other Indonesian Muslims, which for some Indonesian Muslims means that it actually appears more Arabic.

Last, newly enrolled university students coming from relatively rural areas find it difficult to fit into the diverse and 'hip' campus lifestyle. Those who fail to adapt then focus on the wrongs they see in campus dynamics. Alienation and disconnection lead them to turn their attention to diverse religious groups inside the campus. Joining certain religious communities, such as Salafi groups, which emphasise strong solidarity among their followers, means finding a niche with their new sisters in Islam.

Based on the narratives of Maryam and Khaula and their face-veiled sisters, involvement in the Salafi movements can be regarded as part of their 'becoming true Muslim women.' As Khaula says: 'My religious journey to find this comfortable attire [*cadar*] and to find my Salafi group is like the end of my religious exploration. I will not change my belief to anything else, because nothing is bigger than the *cadar* and nothing better than Salafi *manhaj* [path].' There are two things which can be taken from Khaula's statement. First, she thinks that her religious journey to find the *cadar* and the Salafi movement is part of her religious exploration, which has played a significant role in the process of her religious transformation and the construction of her new *taat* habitus. Second, in order to reach this final destination, of becoming a good *Muslimah,* Khaula had encountered other Islamic groups. For most of these searching female youth, religious knowledge has only recently deepened and become important to them. When they were younger, they just followed what their parents told them concerning religious practice. The religious journey of these students to choose and find true religious knowledge is vivid evidence of their capacity for agency.

Negotiating and renegotiating the wearing of the *cadar*

Many passionate *cadari* admitted that they become stronger persons after facing resistance towards their lifestyle. It is in this context that we can see how the

agency of passionate *cadari* in this study also involves resistance (on agency and resistance see Mahmood 2005; Werbner 2018). The *taat* agency of the passionate *cadari* involves resistance against the norms prevalent in Indonesia, including cultural and religious norms. They engage in challenging some religious beliefs and practices upheld by many Muslims in Indonesia which they perceive as not being aligned with the true path of Islam.

Some *cadari* encounter crises, which appear especially after they create a distance from their impious past to adopt the *cadar.* The choice of Salafi Islam as their guidance does not significantly impact on their relationships with others. It is when they first wear the *cadar* that their situation becomes totally different. Maryam, Khaula and their friends admit that the most difficult thing to deal with is objection from their own families. From the perspective of many parents, a daughter's decision to wear the *cadar* is like a slap in the face. This is similar to the responses of parents whose daughters adopted the *jilbab* in the 1980s (Brenner 1996)[8] and includes their assumption that wearing the *cadar* may hinder their daughter's future career and marriage prospects.

One important difference from previous objections to wearing the *jilbab* is the issue of terrorism. This is linked to the stigma around the *cadari* (not the *jilbab*-wearers) in Indonesia who, commonly, are considered potential terrorists or associated with terrorist networks. Therefore, to prevent such rumours parents usually ask their daughters to abstain from wearing the *cadar* when they return home to the *kampung* (village). The most difficult moment for many parents is when their daughter asks their permission to quit university because the faculty does not accept the *cadar.* One of the parents said:

> I am just too tired and too old to argue with my daughter. Her father, brothers and sister have advised her not to wear the *cadar,* but without result. Suddenly, a few months ago, she came home and asked our permission to quit university because one of her lecturers did not allow her to wear the *cadar* inside the laboratory. I was shocked to hear this. I could not breathe. I cried and cried. I did not know what had happened to my daughter, why she changed so fast and drastically. I felt I did not know her. I could not argue any more with her and it was like the end of my life. My husband has spent much money on her. We sold one of our rice fields just to support her education. But what did we get in return … [she was crying and could not continue her story].

It should be noted that from the parents' perspective, their responses to their daughters' transformation or rebellion depend on how the *cadari* approaches them. According to many cadres in varied Salafi groups, the tension occurs when the *cadari* fail to approach their parents politely (*dengan santun*). The concept of politeness (*santun*) is the main instrument the female cadres within various Salafi groups teach their juniors for negotiating and achieving parental approval. Those who often fail in this are zealous novices who seek a quick 'transformation.' For instance, they wear the *cadar* without informing their parents.

Those who have been successful in convincing their families are mostly *cadari* or *akhwat* (Ar. *akhawāt*) (lit. sisters), as they call each other, who approached their parents gradually. Before adopting the *cadar,* they informed their parents about their involvement in Salafi activities including attendance at the weekly *taʿlīm.* Along the way, they strove to maintain a better relationship with their parents than they had before their involvement in the Salafi groups. Following this involvement, they become more polite and more respectful towards their parents. This is also part of their *daʿwa* (Ind. *dakwah* or proselytisation) towards their parents about the beauty of the teachings that they have received from their new communities. When they think that parents are ready to see more changes, only then do they inform them about their intention to wear the *cadar.* After this gradual approach, parents usually are not shocked at their daughters' transformation. Even with this slow introduction, some parents do not readily give their blessings for the whole transformation. The tension leads many *cadari* to find a new 'niche' that can support their struggle to be true *Muslimah,* especially by marrying someone within their group.

Since 2010 there have been changes evident in parents' views on the *cadar* and the Salafi movements. There has been a steady growth of parents becoming personally interested in attending Salafi *taʿlīm.* This is partly because of their daughters' successful *daʿwa* to them and the increasing popularity of some Salafi preachers using varied avenues, including social media platforms, in their *daʿwa.* The result of this development is that some parents currently do not have a phobia about the *cadar.* Their daughters' gradual approach and positive transformations have led this small number of parents to understand the essence of wearing the *cadar* and the understanding that this is not necessarily connected with deviant teachings. It is noteworthy that disagreement about religious belief, attitudes and outlook on life including lifestyle choices, such as dress, is often found between parents and children as part of the generational gap (Hopkins 2006; Lubell 1968). Therefore, generational differences can be seen in relation to the adoption of the Salafi lifestyle, even for those parents who are interested in following in the footsteps of their daughters. It is still difficult for them to adopt the *cadar.* This can be seen clearly from their *taʿlīm,* in which most older generations leave their faces uncovered. Currently, the emergence of the Niqab Squad *cadari* celebgram (celebrity on Instagram) and the growth of various Salafi movements—because of their use of varied social media platforms in their *daʿwa*—have led to a steady increase in followers of the older generations who accept the presence of *cadari* in public. However, when the *cadar* is worn by daughters, some mothers are still not ready. Ibu Saniya (53 years of age), who just joined a Salafi group in Jakarta, shares her view:

> I began attending Ustādh [Ind. Ustaz] Khalid Basalamah's religious lessons in 2018. I have gradually learnt how to become a good Muslim woman. My 19-year-old daughter also likes the Salafi *manhaj.* She even wants to wear a *cadar,* but I asked her not to start too early because she might not be ready to handle the pressure of wearing the *cadar* in Indonesia.

Navigating university regulations and expectations

The other battle faced by these face-veiled university students is in relation to university regulations. Some universities in Indonesia, especially those that have larger numbers of face-veiled students, have rules on the practice of face veiling to regulate the behaviour of students. For example, the Faculty of Pharmacy at UGM mentions the *cadar* in its rules concerning professional academic behaviour:

> During the lectures, examinations, and fieldwork, as well as any academic activities, students have to wear neat and modest attire (female: modest attire with face visible, no wearing of the *cadar* or any other type of face veiling; male: modest attire with tie or *batik* [traditional Indonesian cloth] shirt). The lecturer has the right to deny students who do not follow these instructions.

At UNHAS in Makassar, the faculties which have written rules on the *cadar* are those that have activities in laboratories and clinics. The regulation in the Faculty of Medicine states: 'Each student has to prove her (or his) identity during the internship (wearing a face veil is forbidden).' In addition to issues of dress code and identity, unwritten ethical issues are a major concern among university administrations. One important figure from the Faculty of Dentistry shares her thoughts:

> Although there are no written rules on the practice of face veiling in this faculty, there is an unwritten rule that wearing the *cadar* is forbidden, in particular, in the clinic during internship. This is an ethical matter, because when a patient comes to their dentist it means that they trust their dentist, whereas when the dentistry student wears the *cadar,* it means that she does not trust her patient. What is more, in the clinic these students certainly have to interact and communicate with their patients. Therefore, facial expressions are essential, especially when there is communication between the two. Again, patients will lose trust in their dentists if they cannot catch the words of the dentist properly if the dentist covers her face.

Communication problems are also the main reason why some universities overseas forbid the practice of face veiling in the learning process. Following this argument, the importance of facial and interactive communication, for the opponents of face veiling, means that the face covering may hinder the success of this learning process.

The face veil and the boundaries of liberal education are topics of ongoing debate in western nations, such as in the case of two undergraduate students of Moroccan origin at Leiden University (LU), a state university in the Netherlands (Herrera and Moors 2003). On 29 August 2003, a decision from the University Board banned face coverings and any sort of attributes that can cause problems in communication and identification when taking exams. The opponents of the practice based their arguments on the grounds that facial communication is 'a central value of liberal education,' thus the face veil is 'incompatible with principles and practices of liberal education' (Herrera and Moors 2003, 16–17). When

the French government banned the wearing of 'conspicuous signs' of religious affiliation in public schools on 15 March 2004, targeting primarily the *foulard* (veil)—which is often used as the parameter for dealing with the face veil—the proponents supported their position by arguing that they wanted to maintain the very nature of secular and neutral public schools (Bowen 2006; Fernando 2010; Scott 2007). Joan Scott contends that 'banning the headscarf or veil is a symbolic gesture; for some European nations it is a way of taking a stand against Islam, declaring entire Muslim populations to be a threat to national integrity and harmony.' She suggests the proponents see the headscarf as 'an emblem of radical Islamist politics' and 'the oppression of women' (2007, 3, 4). Fernando, in her analysis of headscarf banning, critically examines the nature of French secularism and the headscarf wearers' agency arguing that 'the simultaneous goals of personal autonomy and submission to God, considered contradictory by normative secular French standards, are reconciled by Muslim citizens for whom religious authority does not exist in opposition to one's "true" or inner self but, instead, is conceived of precisely as the means to the self's cultivation and realization' (2010, 20).

The debate around wearing the face veil in the educational sphere has also occurred in countries where Muslims are in the majority, such as Egypt (Herrera 2000; 2001; Herrera and Moors 2003). The American University in Cairo (AUC), a private university in Egypt, officially banned the face veil in 2001 after an undergraduate student appeared in lectures wearing the face veil.[9] The ban at AUC was made on the same dual grounds as at Leiden University—security reasons and their commitment to the principles of liberal education (Herrera 2001, 19; Herrera and Moors 2003). Although there are some differences in the national, political and legal contexts of the countries mentioned above, bans on wearing the face veil in Indonesian universities exist on more or less the same grounds, which mostly can be attributed to institutional uneasiness about certain expressions of Islam, specifically Islam which is different from *mainstream* Islam.

The responses of face-veiled students to such rules are diverse. Many strongly defend their right to wear the *cadar.* Their main reason can be seen in the following statement by one of Maryam's friends from the Faculty of Dentistry:

> I do not want to sacrifice something significant like my *cadar* which is part of my religion, for something small like attending university. I do not know what I will do with my degree later as there are many dentists who are not able to get work in hospitals or health clinics. As for my religion, I know what I will do for it. I know the future of my religion, the future of my *cadar.*

This phenomenon can be regarded by outsiders as part of *cadari*'s sacrifice in their search to be true *Muslimah.* The above quotation from Maryam's friend, however, demonstrates that they regard the demand to abandon religious obligations as a sacrifice. As many of them are not from wealthy backgrounds, failing to complete university is a very serious matter for their families. However, some passionate *cadari* do not feel this significance. They even argue that dealing with

their parents' objection to their *cadar* is more serious than dealing with queries about finishing their studies. It is noteworthy that the number of *cadari* who quit their study is very small, particularly because only a few faculties have strict rules on the *cadar.* Some of the *cadari* who are attached to strict faculties try to negotiate between the rules and their religious beliefs by taking off the *cadar* inside the laboratory and classroom. When the rules on the *cadar* are enforced on campus (and the *cadar* must be removed), some young women cover their faces with a small handkerchief, a book, a face mask or a piece of paper. As Maryam said: 'I always have a small handkerchief in my bag. For me the handkerchief is like a weapon to face the faculty's rule on the *cadar.* This is because when I cover my face with it, the lecturer thinks that I am sick. Some did not even really realise that I did it on purpose.' Khaula has a different approach to on-campus rules against the *cadar.* As she said, although there are no written rules on face veiling in her faculty, some lecturers strictly oppose the wearing of *cadar* inside the lecture theatres, labs and so forth. She recounts: 'Since there are no written rules it means that I formally do not violate anything. Therefore, I do not really care about some lecturers' opinions. Although the result is that I often do not get a good grade from these lecturers … for me that is totally fine, since I do not need a good grade to enter heaven.'

Since the birth of the Niqab Squad, the presence of *cadari* public figures and *cadari* celebgram the debate about the *cadar* has become more intensified on university campuses. In 2018, some Indonesian universities issued a ban on the use of the *cadar* on campus. The current debates about the *cadar,* however, slightly differ to those of previous years. Besides the ongoing prejudice attached to the *cadar,* as the 'outfit' of terrorists and oppressed Muslim women, today the issue has expanded into politics of discomfort, to borrow Annelies Moors's concept. Moors in her study of the face veil in the Netherlands argues that face veiling causes discomfort, anxiety and resentment. She contends:

> The fact that face veiling produces such feelings is again linked to Islam, as the repeated references to radical and violent Islam indicate. Still, the main reason for a sense of discomfort becomes clear … At the very moment that Muslims are increasingly pressed to prove their belonging to the nation, a very small number of Muslim women appear in public covering their faces. The very same women who are defined as oppressed by their own men, actively challenge Dutch normativities about gender and sociality. The fact that the face veil itself enables them to see without being seen makes this point in a different, visual and corporeal, register. Presenting such an embodied challenge, these women then do not simply evoke feelings of dislike and discomfort, but also feelings of resentment and anger.
>
> (2009, 407)

Although the Indonesian public has shown the same feelings of discomfort, anxiety and resentment as those in the Netherlands, the reasons for these feelings are slightly different. As a Muslim majority country, Indonesia is home to various

expressions of Muslimness. Despite witnessing a resurgence of conservativism, Indonesia has long been known as a moderate Muslim country. Therefore, opponents of the *cadar* have often used the notion of preserving 'moderate' Indonesian public Islam. A common scene in Indonesian public Islam has been the presence of Muslim women without a veil entirely or merely covering their hair, but not wearing a *cadar.* Before the presence of the Niqab Squad, *cadari* public figures and *cadari* celebgram a sense of anxiety around the *cadar* had been prevalent due to the stereotype attached to the *cadar* as a sign of radical Muslim exponents. This feeling is now combined with a feeling of discomfort seeing *cadari* in Indonesian Muslim publics, to borrow Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman's concept (2004), or among mainstream moderate Indonesian Muslims. Additionally, political discomfort and dislike also refers to public opposition of the image behind the *cadari* subculture which signposts Arab culture and the non-egalitarian lifestyle which they uphold. Throughout Indonesian history and the history of the region in general, egalitarianism, gender complementarity and female autonomy have been one of the common features of Indonesian culture and Southeast Asian culture in general (Andaya 2006; Robinson 2009). Although the emphasis on gender equality and complementarity in the insular Southeast Asia including Indonesia should not be presumed and needs to be carefully analysed (Errington 1990, 1–5), throughout the country's history women's organisations have actively fought against inequality. Thus, many believe that the *cadar* is not compatible with moderate Indonesian public Islam which supports egalitarianism.

An issue which emerged after the birth of the Niqab Squad and the increasing presence of *cadari* public figures and *cadari* celebgram was the opposition to the use of the *cadar* in some Indonesian state Islamic universities. For instance, in February 2018, the *cadar* was in the spotlight and became a national issue due to an effort to regulate the use of the *cadar* in UIN Sunan Kalijaga in Yogyakarta. The university's rector issued a letter stating counselling program directive aimed at *cadar*-wearers at the university, which had fourty-two *cadari* at the time. This letter was mistakenly understood by the public as a *cadar* ban. Although the letter does not mention banning, it stipulates that the university needs to record the number of *cadar*-wearers on campus and they need to be offered a counselling program. The then rector, Yudian Wahyudi, emphasised that the counselling program was aimed at encouraging a dress code in line with the spirit of moderate Indonesian Islam. During a press conference, the rector highlighted the notion of moderate Islam to support the university's position on the *cadar.* In addition to this, Yudian also mentioned that the *cadar* is part of Arab culture, which is not appropriate for Indonesian culture. He also raised his concern about the radicalisation of students by groups supporting this kind of outfit. An important point that he mentioned regarding the presence of *cadari* in the classroom also echoed what has often been underlined by other academic institutions, namely security and identification problems. The issue swiftly became a national issue. After receiving pressure from opponents of the letter, especially from conservative groups that use human rights rhetoric, the rector halted the plan on 10 March 2018. Yudian

issued another letter mentioning the reason behind revoking the decree was to maintain 'a conducive academic climate.'

Bannings in academic institutions signify that passionate *cadari* university students are confronted daily with a range of obstacles and problems because of their choices. As noted above, outside observers tend to assume that adopting the *cadar* is an index of their lack of agency. But the young women students whom I interviewed demonstrate diverse ways of exercising agency, even relating to their resistance.

Capacity for Muslim female agency

> Holding to the Prophet's tradition is like having a live coal in our hands, the tighter we hold, the hotter we will feel. Therefore, we should be *sabar* [Ar. *ṣabr* or patient] because when we try so hard to be consistent with the Prophet's tradition, we will feel even hotter and hotter and we will face more obstacles.

This statement, inspired by a *ḥadīth* on the struggle to uphold the Prophet's tradition, is typical of the explanations offered by Maryam and her friends to encapsulate the essence of their choice. Having to confront obstacles to their religious practice makes them more resolute in their defence of their religious position. They believe that to be true *Muslimah* they must cultivate a virtue of patience (Mahmood 2001). This is another form of resistance, or I call it 'quiet resistance,' that they exercise. Being patient does not mean that they must be passive. In contrast, it empowers them to enhance their religious zeal based on the belief that being *sabar* to face obstacles in practising religion is the characteristic of those who have a strong commitment to Islam. These young *cadari* are conscious of their choices. They know what they are doing and understand the implications of their actions. As mentioned throughout this book, face-veiled women are frequently defined as women who are oppressed and, generally, have little capacity for agency (Meer, Dwyer and Modood 2010, 102–4).[10] With regard to this, Charles Hirschkind and Saba Mahmood have also argued that western commonsense understandings of the Muslim woman emphasise that 'a Muslim woman can only be one of two things, either uncovered, and therefore liberated, or veiled and thus still to some degree, subordinate' (2002, 353). Adding to this, in Indonesia, women in such groups have often been regarded as victims of patriarchal norms and the Arabisation of Indonesian society (Woodward et al. 2011, 9; see also Wieringa 2009).

It is often difficult for observers, including family and friends, to understand the choice of well-educated young women to become involved in religious revivalist movements which sustain literal interpretations of Islamic sources—interpretations usually proposed by male Muslim scholars. Many studies have mentioned the presence of multiple forms of agency related to different kinds of social structures (Avishai 2008; Burke 2012; Keane 2007; Mahmood 2005; Parker 2005), and agency can also involve inhabiting norms rather than simply resisting or being

subordinated. The work of Rachel Rinaldo (2008) has demonstrated how Muslim women within Islamic and Islamist groups, such as Fatayat NU and PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party), enjoy forms of virtuous agency. Rinaldo rightly says that Fatayat NU exercised pious critical agency due to their efforts to critically engage in rereading religious texts (2014, 824). Agency in the life of *cadari* is one very specific type of virtuous agency. Within the Salafi groups, *cadari* are not at all critical of the religious understandings produced by men in the groups. This differs from women in Fatayat NU who are active in spreading new progressive interpretations of Islamic texts which emphasise gender equality. The Fatayat NU women do this as a response to conservative understandings or mis(interpretations) of Islamic texts.

Cadari's capacity for agency can be seen through the ways in which they deal with other choices pertaining to their *taat* habitus, besides the *cadar.* Take the issue of working: for *cadari,* the intention of working should be for the sake of *daʿwa* and their contribution to the economy of their family, which all can be regarded as part of their *ʿibādāt* (Ind. *ibadah;* acts of devotion or pious practices).[11] Most of them choose 'safe' jobs that can prevent them from *ikhtilāṭ*. Avoiding *ikhtilāṭ* is one of the entailments of being a good Muslim woman. The most common jobs among *cadari* include being: teachers for children or female students (in kindergartens, *pesantren* and Arabic language centres); activists in their communities' female organisations; designers of Muslim dress and clothing entrepreneurs; and food catering entrepreneurs. Most of these jobs provide service to others. Around the early 2000s, within varied Salafi and Tablīghī *cadari* communities, becoming a teacher in kindergarten or *pesantren* was one of the most popular occupations. This is partly related to *cadari*'s belief that the main responsibility of Muslim women is the religious education of the younger generation, in particular their own children. In short, the type of agency that they have is specifically related to their passion to be true *Muslimah.* For outsiders, it might seem that they have given up on the agency commonly associated with other types of mobility, jobs or educational paths. For some of them, the new religious mindset has awakened the idea that all the above-mentioned choices are no longer their priority. Instead, they feel restricted when they cannot fulfil religious demands.

The journey of passionate *cadari*

It is obvious that the characteristics of passionate *cadari* are usually young, confused and idealistic. They are looking for certainties in life that can give them clear directions and assurances. The following question in this discussion is how their commitment to Salafi rigid disciplines plays out over the longer term. How is the life of the *cadari* after their initial religious self-transformation—joining the Salafi movement and their adoption of the *cadar?* According to most of my research subjects, the most challenging moment was when they began to search and to be part of the true Islam. Khaula recounts her story: 'If we can pass the initial challenges of our early days, becoming part of this true Islamic community and maintaining our commitment to wear the *cadar,* then the life after all these

challenges will be a lot smoother. It will be easier, especially when we can have a husband who also supports us.' Ummu Khalid (pseudonym), a 35-year-old cadre of one of the Salafi groups in Yogyakarta, who sat next to Ukth Khaula during our conversation, adds: 'It has been always the case with every *akhwat* [sister] that her first days of *hijrah* [transformation] to be a true *Muslimah* were like 'hell.' However, after a while, everything will be better. She will become a stronger person and can be a cadre.'

Khaula and Ummu Khalid's statements resonate with the experience of other young *cadari* that their commitment becomes stronger when they pass difficult moments during their early transformation. Having religious homogamy by marrying a man within the same group is important to sustain their commitment. Therefore, the majority of married *cadari* with whom I worked have sought religious homogamy. Having religious homogamy is part of the embodiment of their *taat* habitus.

The story behind the transformation of these passionate *cadari* does not begin from their husband's volition, as assumed by others. Their religious journey to be true *Muslimah* began from within themselves. However, it is true that their commitment became stronger when they were able to marry someone with the same ideology. Together with their husbands, they can maintain their commitment even when they are unable to live within their community cluster. In one of the educational institutions associated with Yayasan Majelis At-Turots Al-Islamy, there is a rumour among the women that I interviewed that it is forbidden for men outside the community circle to marry sisters living in the Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy. One of the reasons for this is to produce strong male and female cadres within the community who have the same goal for the development of the community.

Many *cadari* who are still studying at universities are married. As Khaula said, they believe their lives will be easier when they have someone with whom to share their problems. They feel safe in the company of their husband. Ummu Khalid says: 'Many *akhwat* decide to marry when they are still studying at university because their husband can help them to ease the tension of holding strictly to the true Islamic teachings amid the criticism of people around them. They also can fulfil their parents' wish to finish study.'

In one of the classrooms at LIPIA in 2009 and 2010, there were ten students out of thirty-five who wore the *cadar* and five of these were married. Although some parents may not agree with their daughters' marriage choice, in the end parents usually accept it. Ummu Ayman, a 20-year-old LIPIA student, explained: 'Parents, especially mothers, usually do not agree with their daughters' choice. However, they cannot say much on this. They finally allow us to marry our choices. Their blessing will be apparent as long as we know how to respect them and maintain good relations with them.'

Many elite figures of the women's wing in Wahdah Islamiyah are married women and this is the case in most of the groups that I studied. Mostly those who are married and have passed the 'beginner' stage focus not only on self-transformation but the development of the movement. Their sense of belonging

to the community grows stronger when they have succeeded and passed this early phase of religious development.

The possibility of giving up everything—the *cadar* and withdrawal from the group—is very low, especially after the Salafi teachings have become popular. According to the senior cadre, Ummu Ahmad (pseudonym) (46 years old) of Wahdah Islamiyah women's wing: 'Nowadays, the challenges that have to be faced by the *cadari* are less strong than in my early days. In this city [Makassar], for example, many people have become used to the presence of the *cadari.* When the number is growing means it will be less pressure for our younger sisters to defend their beliefs.' The growing number of *cadari* in some universities in Indonesia and the growing number of *cadari* in their own communities are also indicators of their success in sustaining their belief. Khadijah, a 28-year-old UNHAS student, who I met several times says: 'You still remember right Ukht, when you were here in 2008 and 2009 the number of *cadari* was growing significantly. *Alḥamdulillāh* [Praise be to God] our number is now getting bigger and bigger.' The establishment of Salafi communities around their educational institutions has also successfully boosted the number of women who become committed to their group, such as women living within Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy.

This chapter has demonstrated that youth typically have a great motivation to bring about changes in their lives. They are not afraid of the consequences and cost that this transformation will entail. Their choices are often viewed by others as temporary transformations characteristic of youth—youthful 'slip-ups' and 'experimentation.' This can be seen from the way parents of face-veiled university students perceive and evaluate their daughter's new appearance with the *cadar.* To be sure, in some cases and to a certain degree, some changes adopted by *cadari* are simply part of their performance of 'youthfulness' (Inge 2016). However, many face-veiled university students who decide to adopt this attire and commit themselves to the Salafi movement, continue to wear it and hold Salafi Islam as their religious orientation, even after they graduate and marry.

The passionate *cadari* struggle to find their place in campus dynamics and this has taught them strategies with which to search for what they perceive to be their true self and for what they really want in life. The passionate *cadari* are mostly those who have found their way to the true Islam. They feel it is obligatory for them to leave all other former Islamic practices which they see are mixed with *bidʿa* (innovation which is forbidden in religion). According to *cadari,* the true Islam which can guide their life is different from that of their parents' generation. Therefore, they choose not to be 'in tune with' the values by which they were raised. In this context, we can see that their *taat* agency also involves resistance. They need to mount challenges on many fronts, including their parents, university regulations and Indonesian mainstream Islam which does not support their decisions. They often refer to their religious transformation as the ultimate achievement in their lifetime. The *cadari* argue that they have experienced religious transformation, while people around them—particularly their parents—think that they are still struggling to find a 'comfort zone' in their new social and cultural milieu.

Face-veiled students' attachment and activities in Salafism and their willingness to defend the use of the *cadar* cannot be valued merely as serving interests of the Salafi movements. Instead, they are expressing their own interest in developing themselves and achieving their passion to be true *Muslimah* who are ready to support their Salafi community. The way to understand the eagerness of these *Muslimah* to return to the strict practice of Islam is by analysing the Islamic concepts that have guided them, of which *taat* is crucial. The *cadar* is one of the ways they transcribe *taat* into bodily practices. For committed wearers, this phenomenon demonstrates the embodied nature of the *cadar* as part of becoming a true *Muslimah.* The *cadar* also has an important role in introducing other Islamic disciplines, such as maintaining *al-akhlāq al-karīma* which should be in line with the spirit of *taat* attached to their *cadar.*

The point that is often neglected by those who study veiling is the life that is lived after the choice has been made. This chapter had shown how wearing the *cadar* becomes fundamental to how these young women negotiate their positions as Muslims who are striving to live Islamic lives in a non-Islamic state. Do they feel oppressed? They do not, because they have worked to achieve this kind of life. In contrast, *cadari* argue that the truly oppressed are those who have been indoctrinated into believing that what the *cadari* are doing is a failure of women to exercise their agency.

Notes

1 The interview was conducted before the banning of HTI by the government in July 2017.
2 Part of this section was published as Eva F. Nisa. 2012. Embodied faith: Agency and obedience among face-veiled university students in Indonesia. *The Asia Pacific Journal of Anthropology* 13(4): 366–81, doi: 10.1080/14442213.2012.697187.
3 *Abangan* was used as one of typologies of Javanese Muslims by Geertz in the early 1960s. Geertz used the term *abangan* to distinguish between the devout (*santri*) and ordinary Muslims who were much more syncretistic (*abangan*). Some aspects of Geertz's typologies have also been criticised (Ricklefs 2006, 35).
4 This trend is indeed not unique to Indonesia but is present elsewhere such as in Malaysia (Anwar 1987; Frisk 2009; Nagata 1995; Ong 1990) and in Egypt (Macleod 1991; 1992; Mahmood 2005).
5 Currently, the trend in Makassar is quite different; the number of face-veiled students at Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN) Alauddin has grown. Among the main factors that have contributed to this trend are: first, the transformation of Institut Agama Islam Negeri (IAIN) (State Institute for Islamic Studies) to UIN on 10 October 2005, together with the establishment of its two new faculties, the Faculty of Science and Technology and the Faculty of Health Science; and second, the popularity of the Salafi movement in Makassar, in particular the transformation of Wahdah Islamiyah from a religious foundation to a Salafi religious mass organisation.
6 When she explained *ʿawra,* she pointed to her face which indicated that for her face is also part of woman's body that should be covered.
7 Most newcomers to the Salafi movement with its diverse factions give the same reason for joining this movement. However, after becoming staunch supporters and mastering religious knowledge and Arabic language, many of them are confident enough to say that they get their knowledge of Islam not only from their *asātidh* but also through their direct reading of Islamic sources.

8 However, nowadays the response of parents to the *jilbab* has changed (Smith-Hefner 2007).
9 The trend of the presence of university students who adopt stricter forms of what they perceive as Muslim dress is, indeed, in contrast to the existence of another trend, namely 'downveiling,' to borrow Linda Herrera's term (2000; 2001). Herrera argues that there is a current tendency of 'downveiling' among Egyptian urban women which refers to 'a subtle and seemingly growing tendency among certain circles of urban Egyptian women toward less concealing and less conservative forms of Islamic dress' (Herrera 2001, 16).
10 Nilüfer Göle in her work, which mainly focuses on Islam in Turkey and Iran, points out how even women with an Islamic headscarf (veil, not face veil) are regarded as 'manipulated agents' (2003, 816).
11 *ʿIbādāt* is also often used as a synonym of *ṭāʿa* (Bousquet 2011).

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6 *Cadari* as dedicated actors

This chapter examines the role of passionate *cadari* (face-veiled women) in some Salafi groups in Indonesia. The focus is mainly on Salafi rather than Tablīghī women. Salafi women from diverse factions are not only ardent supporters of *cadar* (face veil) wearing in Indonesia but also the most visible and energetic agents in the development of their movement. Salafi factions allow women to establish their own *daʿwa* (Ind. *dakwah* or proselytisation) spaces. This is evident from the presence of Salafi female wings. Tablīghī women are also active in the development of their movement, especially those from well-to-do urban backgrounds who have economic capital and access to mobility for their *daʿwa* (Amrullah 2011). For example, the well-to-do female follower can be active in attending weekly Tablīghī *taʿlīm* (religious study circle) because she has transport and can take her whole family to the event. However, those who come from less privileged families cannot afford the cost of long-distance visits. Public transport can be problematic for many Tablīghī *cadari* because of the mixing of male and female passengers. Furthermore, many women join Tablīghī after they get married, while passionate *cadari* begin attaching themselves to Salafism when they study at universities.

The struggle of Salafi women from diverse economic backgrounds to dedicate their lives to their groups is more salient than that of Tablīghī women. All Salafi factions emphasise that a woman who wants to be a female religious scholar or preacher (*dāʿiya*) needs to understand Islamic teachings. This signifies the presence of an intellectual hierarchy. In contrast, Tablīghī emphasise that there is no intellectual hierarchy (Metcalf 1998, 110; Nisa 2014a; 2014b). As a result, each female follower has the same chance to become a *dāʿiya* among women—with one important note, that she should not speak 'in an authoritative tone as if she is delivering a lecture' (Sikand 1999, 44). If a woman is familiar with the books used in their *taʿlīm*, especially the *Faḍāʾil al-Aʿmāl* (Virtues of everyday actions) and can read and understand the six principles of the basic tenets of the movement,[1] then she can lead the *taʿlīm.* Therefore, Salafi women often criticise Tablīghī women as 'being immature *dāʿiyāt*' (pl. form of *dāʿiya* or female preachers) (Amrullah 2011, 151).

By contrast, *cadari* from diverse Salafi factions have to make an extra effort to become cadres. Following their individual self-transformation, they pay increased attention to both becoming true *Muslimah* (Muslim women) as well as to the

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future of their Islamic communities and Islam in general. This challenges the stereotype of *cadari* as secluded and oppressed women who cannot exercise agency. Their capacity for agency can be seen in the way they support their movement and the way they enjoy performing religious acts. This chapter focuses on the activities of women in two Salafi groups, Lembaga Muslimah (LM, Women's Institution) of Wahdah Islamiyah (WI) and Yayasan Pendidikan Islam Al-Atsari (the Foundation of Al-Atsari Islamic Education), in sustaining the future of the movements and Niqab Squad activism. While my discussion of LM focuses on the general activities of its young female cadres, the discussion of *cadari* in Yayasan Pendidikan Islam Al-Atsari focuses more especially on an important cadre called Ummu Yazid and her Salafi group in Yogyakarta. The last section on the Niqab Squad analyses the activism and voices of *cadari* at the national level.

The younger generations in Indonesia are open to a wide variety of ideas about Islam brought by varied Islamic and Islamist movements (Hefner 2000; van Bruinessen 2002). This phenomenon is boosted by the assistance of media, especially Islamic publishing houses, and nowadays by the internet and social media (Nisa 2018a; 2018b; 2019). Martin van Bruinessen argues, 'Students and the gradually emerging Muslim middle class showed a great eagerness for Islamic reading, numerous discussion circles were formed where books were critically discussed' (2002, 126). Events in other Muslim countries, especially in the late 1970s and early 1980s, have inspired younger generations to be associated with Islamic movements, such as the Iranian Revolution. Female Muslim students are not immune from this development. Indeed, many female university students can be regarded as the backbone of some Islamic and Islamist groups including Islamist parties in Indonesia, especially Jama'ah Tarbiyah, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and diverse factions of Salafism.

The activities of the *cadari* within their groups are resonant of other scholars' accounts regarding the ability of women to take advantage of their association with Islamic movements for the sake of their own empowerment, such as education and career opportunities (Brenner 2005; MacLeod 1991; van Doorn-Harder 2006). Their agency is evident in their activities within the movements (Figures 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3). The most obvious agency that these Salafi women exercise is compliance, evident from their participation in *daʿwa* activities within their groups. They exercise compliant agency because they attempt to comply with religious teachings in their lives.[2] Orit Avishai (2008) argues that women who exercise this kind of agency, 'May participate in conservative religions in a quest for *religious* ends or that "compliance" is not strategic at all, but rather a mode of conduct and being [emphasis in original]' (2008, 412). This is because they gloss all their activities under the notion of acts of devotion (*ʿibādāt*), which are important in aiding them to reach their aspirations to be true *Muslimah*. Avishai's (2008) argument, which is inspired by Saba Mahmood (2005), details compliant agency: 'To see agency, one does not need to identify empowerment, subversion, or rational strategizing. It suffices to note how members of conservative religions "do"—observe, perform—religion, wherever that might lead' (Avishai 2008, 429).

Figure 6.1 Panellists at a seminar on Muslim women in the era of globalisation organised by a Salafi women's wing, in Bekasi. Note: Some Salafi women's wing organisations often invited female PKS politicians. They believe that although sometimes their understandings of Islam are different from that of PKS, at least some of them think that as an Islamist party, PKS is better than other parties. Source: Photo credit, author, 5 July 2008.

Figure 6.2 Nana chairing the seminar. Source: Photo credit, author, 5 July 2008.

Figure 6.3 A tech savvy *cadari* using expensive-looking equipment to film a video of the seminar. Note: Usually inside their event venues, *cadari* take off their *cadar* because they are women-only events. Source: Photo credit, author, 5 July 2008.

Michel Foucault's theory of the technologies of the self can explain the trajectory of these Salafi women in achieving happiness by being active in the movement and gaining influence through their *daʿwa* among other Muslim women. Foucault argues that technologies of the self 'permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality' (1997, 225). Becoming a true *Muslimah* demands certain modes of self-discipline and modification including bodily practices, like face veiling. Certain skills can also be acquired through these technologies. This chapter demonstrates how modes of training embodied by *cadari* have led many of them to gain power and influence in *daʿwa* spheres.

Studies on Muslim women in Indonesia have often focused on how moderate and liberal Muslim women as well as Muslim and Islamic feminists have criticised patriarchal interpretations of Islamic texts upheld by conservative groups (Schröter 2013, 48). These women exercise 'resistance agency' or, to borrow Rachel Rinaldo's concept, 'pious critical agency' (2013; 2014). It is also noteworthy that despite multiple studies of Salafism and radical Muslim organisations which draw attention to the harsh treatment of women, there has been little to say about women inside these movements, that is, with the exception of women within Salafi jihadism and the increased threat that they have posed to the country (Blackburn 2008; Nasir 2019; Nuraniyah 2018; Rahmah 2020). This chapter fills this void in affording importance to the voices of women of varied Salafi

movements of non-jihadism, especially those of the *cadari,* whose mobility is not easily seen by most Indonesians and who are often dismissed as terrorists and followers of a radical or deviant Islam.

Passionate *cadari* in contemporary Salafi groups are not kept in the background. They are active in the development of the movement, especially in the recruitment of newcomers, exemplifying what Asef Bayat terms 'active piety' (2007). They are not only actively practising their faith, but also experiencing pleasure in inviting other sisters to follow their path. Their pleasure can be seen as a sign of their achievement in embodying their virtuous habitus (Aristotle 2000).

This pleasure is expressed through their self-transformation and other virtuous practices within their new Islamic communities. For the Salafi women, being active in the recruitment process gave them a strong sense of worth and self-satisfaction. Here, we can see the degree of their empowerment agency. In addition, they are also active in engaging with diverse issues related to broader Islamic discourses, such as women and globalisation, terrorism, politics, women and reproductive health, and gender issues. They are not only busy with their movements' domestic issues, such as arranging religious study groups, but their involvement in global discussion is evident from the themes they deal with in their seminars and in articles on their websites.

Salafi women's active involvement in the movements underscores the important but often neglected part that women play in supporting revivalist and conservative groups. A core element of this chapter involves exploring the commitment of *cadari* to their movements, which is embedded in their performance of 'public piety,' a concept developed by Lara Deeb (2006) to refer to the expression of religious commitment which relies on visibility. The roles that have been played by these women in their movements demonstrate how 'invisible' women have been made visible, albeit in a gendered space.

Lembaga Muslimah: Women of Wahdah Islamiyah[3]

During my research in Makassar, South Sulawesi, I was amazed by the strong and positive spirit of Muslim women who were followers of religious revivalist movements, in particular the Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi movements. Support for the latter by the younger generation is particularly interesting. Thousands of young Muslim women from a variety of backgrounds have been attracted to the ideology of Wahdah Islamiyah (WI) (The Unity of Islam), a Makassar-based Salafi movement. WI is more than a Salafi institution with various educational levels; it is also a big 'company' which gradually and intensely has coloured Islam in Indonesia—particularly in South Sulawesi—with its Salafi ideology.[4]

On 21 June 2008, in Makassar, I attended a WI event—a combined Islamic study circle (*tarbiyah gabungan,* often abbreviated to *targab*). *Targab* is a religious study among followers from different levels of apprenticeship (*marhalah,* Ar. *marḥala*). The program, attended by 1,256 WI women, consisted of a series of speeches. One of these, on women and crime, was delivered by Ustādh (Ind. Ustaz) Muhammad

Zaitun Rasmin, who is also known as Ustādh Zaitun, the leader of WI. Ustādh Zaitun asked his female followers to strengthen their solidarity to combat all types of crime. He referred to an incident (4 May 2008) in which a man wore the *cadar* to disguise his identity and then tried to break into female student accommodation around Universitas Hasanuddin (UNHAS) (Hasanuddin University) whose occupants mostly wear the *cadar.* Not long after the *targab*, on 29 June 2008, WI held another event, religious lectures (*muhadarah,* Ar. *muḥāḍara*) which attracted more than 2000 Muslim women. When I attended WI women's activities, which included *targab, taʿlīm* and *dawrah* (Ar. *dawra* or training), as well as larger events such as *nadwah* (Ar. *nadwa* or seminars), I realised that WI pays significant attention to its female followers and that the female followers in turn have been very active in maintaining support for WI. This support is especially evident in the activities of the women's wing, known as Lembaga Muslimah (LM).

LM was officially established based on a decree (Surat Keputusan) from the WI central board in 2005. Its headquarters are in Makassar, but branches have been established elsewhere in Indonesia. The purpose of the central LM was to assist its branches and affiliates by providing supervision, consultation and coordination. It has the authority to activate LM branch committees. By 2009, WI had thirty-five branches and forty-three affiliates in eleven provinces in Indonesia. Central LM plays an important role as a motivator, a creator of the *daʿwa* concept and a manager of all activities including sending experts to run activities in its branches (Wahdah Islamiyah 2006). In 2006, one year after its official establishment, LM had 6729 cadres from twenty-one branches across Indonesia (Wahdah Islamiyah n.d.). Mostly they are young university students from well-known state universities, and this is especially noticeable in Makassar.

WI in Indonesia

WI was established on 18 June 1988 under the name Yayasan Fathul Muin (YFM) (Fathul Muin Foundation). The name was taken from K.H. Fathul Mu'in Daeng Mangading, a charismatic religious scholar in Ujung Pandang (now Makassar) who was also the leader of Ta'mirul Mu'minin, the Makassar centre of activities of the Islamic organisation Muhammadiyah (Juhannis 2006, 153). On 19 February 1998, the name of the movement was changed to Yayasan Wahdah Islamiyah (YWI) (Wahdah Islamiyah Foundation), and to provide an umbrella for their higher education institution, Sekolah Tinggi Ilmu Islam dan Bahasa Arab (STIBA) (College of Islamic Studies and Arabic Language), YWI became Yayasan Pesantren Wahdah Islamiyah (YPWI) (Wahdah Islamiyah Islamic Boarding School Foundation) on 25 May 2000. Another transformation occurred on 14 April 2002 when WI became an *ormas/organisasi massa* (mass organisation). The main goal for this transformation is to fulfil the need to spread and develop their *daʿwa* not only in South Sulawesi but throughout the Indonesian Archipelago. It was also part of their strategy to establish WI branches all over Indonesia by 2015.

WI can be regarded as a splinter group of Muhammadiyah (Chaplin 2018a, 213). The founding fathers of WI, Ustādh Zaitun, Ustādh Muhammad Qasim Saguni and Ustādh Haris Abdurrahman, were all members of one of the Muhammadiyah youth organisations called Ikatan Pelajar Muhammadiyah (IPM) (Muhammadiyah Student Association) whose membership encompasses youth between the ages of 15 and 23 years. At that time, K.H. Fathul Mu'in, as the charismatic leader of Muhammadiyah in Ujung Pandang, was the mentor for WI's founding fathers and other members of Muhammadiyah youth organisations, such as Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah (IMM) (League of Muhammadiyah University Students, whose members were aged between 18 and 30) and Pemuda Muhammadiyah (PM) (Muhammadiyah Youth Activists, aged from 30 to 40). Through the figure of K.H. Fathul Mu'in, WI had a close ideological relationship with the Darul Islam (DI) (Abode of Islam) movement (Aldjufri 2010, 142; Juhannis 2006, 15). The main reason that WI's founding fathers withdrew from Muhammadiyah was because of their opposition to a New Order directive that all organisations use the *asas tunggal* (sole foundation) of state ideology, Pancasila as their guiding ideology.[5]

In 1995, after four years of study at the Islamic University in Medina (al-Jāmiʿa al-Islāmiyya bī-l-Madīna al-Munawwara), Ustādh Zaitun strengthened WI's commitment to purify Islamic teachings by following the steps of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* (pious predecessors). This included opposition to Sufism (Aldjufri 2010, 167). Some Middle Eastern charity organisations, such as al-Muʾassasa al-Ḥaramayn al-Khayriyya, Jamʿiyya Ihyāʾ al-Turāth and Jamʿiyya Dār al-Bir, assisted him in establishing WI. Besides this financial assistance, Syarifuddin Jurdi, a scholar whose research focus includes WI, has pointed out the ability of the WI founding fathers to use the political situation in post-authoritarian Indonesia to introduce WI and to strengthen its influence (2007, 131).

International Crisis group (ICG) reports have connected the history of WI with the terrorist organisation Jemaah Islamiyah or the JI network. One of the reports argues that there are 'personal, historical, ideological and religious bonds linking Wahdah to JI but it is a separate organisation' (2003, 13). According to ICG, one of the most important moments in the history of WI was the conflict in Ambon in January 1999. WI elites split into two groups, one led by Ustādh Zaitun and the other by Agus Dwikarna. The latter group felt obliged to help their Muslim brothers in Ambon and then established Laskar Jundullah, a regional militia in South Sulawesi which was formerly the paramilitary wing of Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syari'at Islam (KPPSI, Preparatory Committee for the Implementation of Islamic Law)[6] (ICG 2003, 13; Hasan 2006, 21). Agus Dwikarna was arrested in the Philippines in March 2002 for illegal possession of explosives. During my interview with his wife, she explained that she was very active in WI. She said: 'I was active in WI since the 1980s. I was even the leader of the women's wing until 1998. The name of this women's wing was Majelis Musyawarah Akhwat (M2M) not LM. Since 1999, I stopped being active in WI.' Throughout its development, WI has struggled to emphasise that it is not a terrorist group and has no affiliation with any terrorist networks (Aldjufri 2010).

The *cadari* and their *cadar* in LM

The participation of women in LM differs from that in other Muslim organisations in Indonesia, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Muhammadiyah and PKS/Jama'ah Tarbiyah. The primary and most obvious difference can be seen in the presence of the *cadar.* As discussed in previous chapters, *cadari* are often stigmatised as fanatical women who are oppressed and invisible, *hidden* within their community. However, *cadari* of LM are visible. Not only are they visible, but they are active agents in the organisation. WI elites believe that wearing the *cadar* is part of Muslim women's effort to revive *sunna* (the exemplary ways of life of the Prophet Muḥammad).

For WI women, like other *cadari* from other Salafi groups and Tablīghī Jamāʿat, wearing the *cadar* is their effort to be *taat* (Ar. *ṭāʿa* or obedient), which in turn can lead them to be true *Muslimah*. Wearing the *cadar* is part of their 'ethical path,' to borrow Kenneth George's (2010) term. In his discussion about a painting by Abdul Djalil Pirous, George explains the 'ethical path' as: 'a means through which someone becomes a who and a what, finding relationships with oneself and others … It is a way of deciphering and achieving a way of being, though not without risk or vulnerability' (2010, 38). The way a *cadari* sees the *cadar* is part of her ethical path that has brought her to become a 'who' and a 'what.' Wearing the *cadar* is part of her progression towards achieving her aspirational way of being. Wearing the *cadar* also relates to *cadari*'s efforts to embody *taqwa* (Ar. *taqwā* or God-fearing), which in this context refers to righteousness or obedience to Allah, which leads towards them owning the field of reward (*ladang pahala*). By wearing the *cadar* they feel responsible for keeping their public surroundings more Islamic by presenting themselves as respectable women.

The *cadar* can be regarded as the WI female cadres' 'uniform.' Therefore, every LM event is flooded by *cadari.* But WI men are also subject to strictures on outward appearance, as indicated in a running text on Lembaga Muslimah/ Wahdah Islamiyah's website. It said:

> *Ketahuilah! Jenggot, cadar, celana ngatung adalah ajaran Islam, ajaran Rosulullah dan para sahabatnya, bukan ciri-ciri teroris!!! Tidak layak seorang muslim mengolok-oloknya.* (Bear in mind! Beard, *cadar,* men's trousers above the ankles, are Islamic teachings, the teaching of the Prophet Muḥammad and his companions, not the characteristics of terrorists!!! It is inappropriate for Muslims to disgrace these outward appearances).

All LM cadres are considered *dāʿiyāt* (Hadiati 2009, 118). Therefore, they must make a commitment to train themselves to be good *dāʿiyāt.* Although LM women are very active in *daʿwa,* they never get the opportunity to gain a position in the highest level of the WI structure, Dewan Syuro. One of the characteristics of LM which also can be seen in other Salafi groups, and which distinguishes it from other conservative and Islamist movements in Indonesia—like PKS/Jama'ah Tarbiyah—is that they always strive to strictly avoid any mixing of the sexes (*ikhtilāṭ*). Therefore, LM cadres isolate

all their activities from the presence of men. According to Umm Rahmah (pseudonym), 47 years old: 'This kind of very strict attitude was actually upheld by many conservative organisations in their early existence. For example, this situation could be felt within the PKS milieu. However, nowadays PKS women seem slightly more relaxed about preventing any *ikhtilāṭ* in their activities.'

LM cadres are active in public works, especially for their communities' common good. However, their public activities do not fit into western liberal concepts of the distinction between public and private spheres.[7] The *cadari* do take part in public work, but their activities are mostly conducted in private spaces or public segregated spaces. Deeb (2006) and Stacey Yadav (2010), who worked with Muslim women, have discussed this issue. Deeb's concept of 'public piety' resonates with the activities of the passionate *cadari* in this study. Deeb defines public piety as the expressions of religious commitment in the public sphere 'contributing to the common good' (2009a, 249). The activities of LM cadres are also consistent with Deeb's argument about public piety, in the sense that they demonstrate endless efforts to be true *Muslimah*. This involves visible virtuous practices to internalise 'a total obedience' (*ketaatan yang kaffah*) towards God. For LM cadres, to be true *Muslimah* means to be able to practise Islam totally (*kaffah*), and this includes their ability to make their commitment to Islam visible in public.

There is difference between the public visibility of the Lebanese Shiʿi women in Deeb's account and that of *cadari* in this study. Deeb emphasises that her Lebanese research subjects feel that 'public piety' provides an opening that allows women to participate more in public life. The WI *cadari*'s public piety refers to their efforts to create a more public version of Salafi practices or Islamic practices based on their Salafi *manhaj* (lit. a methodology that refers to the way of life of the early Muslims). A public version of Salafi *manhaj* means that the presence of women should be in a strictly gendered public space and there should be no violation of the teachings relating to women's dignity in Islam.

Cadari activities in public spaces challenge assumptions about the visibility of 'invisible' women. What I mean by 'invisible' is that their bodies are covered with the *cadar*. Noorhaidi Hasan, in his study of Salafism, points out how 'the public sphere belongs only to men' (2006, 180). The association of 'public' with 'visibility' is widespread (Deeb 2006, 34–45). Pekka Rantanen (2005) has also pointed out how the visibility and invisibility of women's bodies 'are central aspects in making the burqa a symbol of oppression vis-à-vis liberation' (336). Although the visibility of *cadari* from LM does not refer to the visibility of their bodies or their faces, their public presence challenges the Indonesian public.

LM *daʿwa* and the embodiment of public piety

Following Deeb's (2006) argument, this section analyses how the public version of Salafism is embodied by LM cadres in their participation in WI *daʿwa* activities at both personal and communal levels. In employing Deeb's concept of public piety, I do not mean to say that the visible virtuous activities of these *cadari* are their expression of piety—understood by most Indonesians as *kesalehan,*

which refers to the highest standard of one's spiritual state. For them, the effort to create a more public version of Salafi practices or Salafi piety is part of their effort to embody *ketaatan* (obedience) and commitment to God and the Prophet Muḥammad. In their understanding, *kesalehan* is difficult to attain, and it should start from *ketaatan.* Their creation of a public version of Salafi piety relates to the way they embody their duty to perform *daʿwa. Daʿwa* literally means a call or invitation, although it has a wide range of meanings. In the context of LM activities, *daʿwa* refers to the commitment of women followers to invite others to understand and adhere to the true Islam as practised by *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ.*

At the personal level, the public piety of LM cadres is especially manifested in their commitment to be role models for other Muslim women, particularly those to whom their *daʿwa* is directed. Wearing the *cadar* is one of the most important aspects of their bodily practice and is part of the technologies of the self in *daʿwa,* because one of the criteria for being *dāʿiya* is to follow the exemplary ways of life of the Prophet Muḥammad (*sunna*) and his wives, which includes wearing the *cadar.* At the personal level, their *daʿwa* is also resonant with Charles Hirschkind's insight into how *daʿwa* can be described as 'a particular way of linking public activism with moral reform' (2006a, 32; 2006b). For LM women, wearing the *cadar* makes their virtuous practice visible and is part of the embodiment of their *taat* habitus. It is also part of their true commitment to religion and their community. For example, the WI branch in Bulukumba sets additional requirements for women to pass from one level to the next of religious training (*tarbiyah,* Ar. *tarbiya*) by wearing proper Muslim dress (Hadiati 2009, 127). This means that they cannot advance unless they adopt the WI 'dress code.' The training levels discussed below do not always incorporate formal requirements for dress style. However, there is a consensus among followers that most higher-level followers are stricter about wearing Muslim dress. They wear a longer *cadar* than novices. Milah, a 19-year-old university student who has participated in WI religious activities for eight months, says: 'Those *akhwāt* [sisters] [while pointing at them] are the *murabbiyah* [mentors], Ukht [Sister]. We can tell from the very long *cadar* they wear. They are already *istiqāma* [consistent in wearing it].' Continuing, Milah explains to me that someone like her, who is still new to WI, is considered to be building *istiqāma.*

At the communal level, public piety is brought about by *cadari* embracing their responsibility to educate Muslim women who seek Islamic knowledge and who have the eagerness to return to the true Islam. This visibility can be seen through their *tarbiyah* activities (as mentor or *murabbiyah* and disciple or *mutarabbiyah*) and *taʿlīm,* which is open to all Muslims. Today, in almost all universities in Makassar we can find LM activities in nearby mosques or rented houses.

'Advancing your Islamic knowledge!'

What is unique about WI in comparison to other Salafi groups is that they have a special method of attaining Islamic knowledge, namely through the creation of levels of apprenticeship (*marhalah*). Other Salafi groups in Makassar often

consider WI's method of learning as an innovation which is forbidden in religion (*bidʿa*). WI's response to this accusation is explained by one of the LM cadres, Umm Yunus (pseudonym), 49 years old:

> Why do we need *marhalah?* This is because in every type of learning we need a specific tool and a method. This is done to assist the students and the teachers in organising the most suitable learning environment. This is just a method of *daʿwa.* Like a baby. A baby cannot eat rice directly. It takes time and practice, until she/he can eat by her/himself.

Through this method of learning, all WI followers are classified into three levels (*marhalah*): *ta'rifiyah* (beginner), *takwiniyah* (intermediate) and *tanfidziyah* (advanced). Each level has a female mentor who is responsible for not only teaching Islamic knowledge but also making sure that the disciples can live according to the proper Islamic way of life. To pass from one level to another is quite demanding. Ukht Faizah (pseudonym), a 22-year-old university student, says: 'I am still in *ta'rifiyah marhalah.* Actually, I have been in this *marhalah* for quite a while. My *murabbiyah* has asked me to repeat this *marhalah,* because I was often absent. She said that I have missed out so many lessons.' Discipline is important in this training. Regular attendance, memorisation of passages in the Qur'ān and *hadīth,* and their notes are strictly controlled not only by their mentor but also by the staff of Departemen Dakwah dan Kaderisasi (Department of *Daʿwa* and Caderisation) once every three months (Figure 6.4).

Figure 6.4 In Makassar, WI *cadari* ride motorcycles to their religious lessons in the mosque and park them outside. Source: Photo credit, author, 18 November 2012.

Besides being successful in the final written and oral tests, and receiving a recommendation from their mentor, their excellent performance in *tarbiyah* is also used as an indicator to let them pass from a lower to a higher level of expertise. These assessments are aimed at monitoring and evaluating the progress of disciples and their understanding of Islam. During my research among these women, they confessed that joining the *tarbiyah* is demanding, but they enjoy it because it is part of their struggle to be good *Muslimah* and to be truly committed to Islam. Umm Radiya (pseudonym), a 35-year-old woman, says: 'If what it takes to be a good *Muslimah* means to obey all these rules and to master Islamic knowledge, I am happy to do them. It is hard, but there is no success without hardship.' Umm Radiya's statement is shared by many *cadari* who attach themselves to WI. This signifies a degree of empowerment agency. Kelsy Burke mentions that scholars who focus their work on empowerment agency highlight 'how women use religion to empower themselves in their daily lives, focusing mostly on affect, or how religion makes women feel' (2012, 126; MacLeod 1991). Umm Radiya's experience with WI's strict rules also demonstrates her feelings, the pleasure she achieves by becoming proficient in Islamic knowledge and her ability to live according to WI norms.

LM is also active in organising special neighbourhood events that help followers strengthen their influence among Muslim women. Their activities directed to outsiders for the purpose of recruitment can be regarded as the most visible aspect of their agency as well as their public piety. They are involved in organising *dawrah* and workshops on varied topics, including journalism, Arabic, babysitting and learning rules about reading the Qur'ān (*tajwīd*). Besides these training activities, LM has started to focus their recruitment on older women who are active in *majelis taklim* (a religious gathering for learning Islam).

When the number of the female cadres in WI had increased greatly, *cadari* tried to reach out to older women, not attached to universities, to attend their *majelis taklim.* LM also founded a Korps Muballighot (Corps of Female Preachers) who are responsible for supervising and educating these older women in *majelis taklim* in their own neighbourhoods. In 2007, they successfully supervised forty *majelis taklim* in Makassar, and some of the women who have been educated by LM have established new *majelis taklim* (Rasmin 2007). One of the strategies related to bringing new recruits closer to LM and WI is to invite them to major events. In 2008, at an event called Tabligh Akbar Muslimah (Mass Prayer Event for Muslim Women), they successfully attracted women from nineteen *majelis taklim* who subsequently asked LM to teach them Islam more intensively.

LM impressed these women through its unique approach. One such approach was to legitimise LM's teachings as belonging to the true Islam originating from its main source. This position was reinforced through their efforts to invite female Muslim scholars from Saudi Arabia. In 2008, they invited Dr Muna Fahed Alnasser, a lecturer in Arabic Language at the College of Arts for Girls in King Faisal University in Dammam, Saudi Arabia. In July 2010, they invited Ustādha (Ind. Ustazah) Hannan Saad Ad Dautsariy, a Saudi Arabian preacher. For many lay Muslim women in Indonesia, the presence of female scholars from Saudi

Arabia, who justify what they bring as true Islam, is a sign that WI is propagating truth. Ibu Ardani, a 51-year-old woman, says: 'The Islamic knowledge that I gain from WI is the true one. This is because they received it directly from *ʿulamāʾ* [religious scholars] from Arab countries. I am very glad to have the opportunity to listen to the [translated] speech from Arab female scholars. It is a rare chance in Indonesia.' Positive responses from the broader community in Makassar have made LM confident in organising their major Muslim events in main community-gathering places, even in luxury venues. In July 2010, an event called Semarak al-Qur'ān (The Majesty of the Qur'ān) was held in the Celebes Convention Centre (CCC) (Sulawesi) and was attended by 6,500 Muslim women. The event was organised and managed purely by women, especially *cadari.* Although activities in LM are gender segregated, the women involved enjoy great freedom to exercise their agency, to do what they think is best for their lives and communities.

For prospective new recruits, another important appeal of WI women's *daʿwa* is their generous charity to the poor. This is one of WI's special recruitment methods. The WI strong commitment to community service and public welfare is similar to that of Lebanese Shiʿi who were studied by Deeb (2005). WI has special sections and programs for its social activities, such as Tim Penanggulangan Musibah (Disaster Recovery Team), Program Dana Bantuan Kesehatan (Health Funding Assistance Program), and Program Sumbangan Beras dan Sembako (Food Staples and Rice Donation Program).

These programs are created to support *daʿwa* needs, such as scholarships for the poor, donations for male and female preachers and the memorisers of the Qur'ān, natural disaster victims, free medical treatment, expectant mothers from deprived family backgrounds and women's programs. The programs have been successful in sustaining WI development, because charity is always an important aspect of Muslim life. Indeed, Indonesia has been named several times as the most generous country in the world according to the World Giving Index (Filantropi Indonesia 2021). Whenever there is a call to spend money in the path of God, Muslims, especially those who have internalised deep affection for any gestures in the name of God, will compete to give whatever they have without considering whether they come from the same religious ideology. One of the interesting methods of WI's donation gathering is to announce the names of *sedekah* (Ar. *ṣadaqa* or voluntary charity) givers during their big events. In such special events, the attendees are not just WI cadres and followers but also non-WI Muslims from the neighbourhood. One of my research subjects, a young mother with two children, who knew of WI because she visited a WI-affiliated pharmacy the day before she joined a WI special event, says: 'I do not feel good if I do not chip in. When they started to announce the donors' names, female attendees also became busy taking out money from their purses. Although I am not really sure about this group, if the donation is for the sake of Islam, then I think I should participate in it.'

Based on the amount of donations received during many WI events, women are very active in donating their money. For example, in December 2007 when WI elites wanted to pay for the land they bought for the Centre of Educational *Daʿwa* (Pusat Dakwah Pendidikan), they were able to collect 27.5 million rupiah

(AUD2639.07) from the male congregation and 37.5 million rupiah (AUD3598.73) from the female congregation. In addition to this, most of the female members of the congregation were more willing to donate valuable goods. For example, in this event, WI received sixty-two gold rings, fifty-four gold earrings, two gold bracelets and thirty-two wristwatches (Wahdah Islamiyah 2007). Despite their strict outward appearance with the *cadar* and *ʿabāya* (Ind. *Abaya* or head-to-toe wrap completely covering a woman's body) and their secretiveness, LM tries to show most Muslims in Makassar that they are not a terrorist group (Wahdah Islamiyah 2010). They are part of a *daʿwa* group that is active in social work and charities aiming for the *al-maṣlaḥa al-ʿāmma* (common good) to help their communities. In conducting their public service, the passionate *cadari* of LM create their own public version of Salafi piety by carefully maintaining their public presence in a way that does not violate their strict understanding of Islam—the *cadar* should be worn at all times and men should be absent from their public activities.

It is in this context that we can see WI *cadari* exercising compliant agency or 'doing religion,' to borrow Avishai's approach. Avishai argues that this doing religion approach 'avoids the false dichotomy that pits compliance and agency' (Avishai 2008, 413, 429). In contrast to Mahmood, who focuses more on personal ethics, the lives of the *cadari* of WI suggest that it is problematic to focus solely on individualised piety. They are striving for Muslim women's public participation to support WI programs and to challenge and reform Islamic practices in the country, which are deemed by them to be impure. Pnina Werbner contends, 'the expansion of *religious* literacy is beginning to challenge the exclusive authority of a caste of male priests and religious experts, and has led to the global spread of women preachers in reformist and fundamentalist movements [emphasis in original]' (2018, 88). This resonates with what I saw in WI. The religious literacy of staunch WI female cadres combined with their successful ethical self-making has enabled them to hold their position as new actors of religious authority and gain a reputation as exemplary Muslim women, at least in front of their female disciples.

The *daʿwa* life of Ummu Yazid

This section focuses on the life of Ummu Yazid (pseudonym) and her Salafi group in Yogyakarta. Ummu Yazid is a university student in her twenties from the Faculty of Agricultural Technology, Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM) (Gadjah Mada University), Yogyakarta. She was born in Makassar, South Sulawesi, and became active in one of the Salafi groups in Yogyakarta when she was a new student at UGM. Her parents' religious affiliation is Muhammadiyah. She went to high school in Makassar and had worn the *jilbab* (tight veil) before she finally adopted the *cadar.* She was one of the main contributors to the most well-known female Salafi website, *muslimah.or.id.* In 2009, she was active in maintaining the then new Salafi web-search engine called Yufid (on Yufid see Chaplin 2018b, 12).

I first met Ummu Yazid in her boarding house (*wisma*), where she was one of the main figures. The history before her self-transformation is almost the same as

Ukht Maryam and Ukht Khaula whom I discussed in Chapter 5. Ummu Yazid's association with one of the Salafi groups introduced her to a new *taat* habitus. Before she became committed to one of the Salafi groups, she had had some experiences wandering around diverse Salafi factions in Yogyakarta in search of what she believed to be the truth. She finally associated herself with Yayasan Pendidikan Islam Al-Atsari (YPIA), a Salafi institution formally registered in 2007 in Yogyakarta for university students, especially those at non-Islamic universities who did not have a thorough understanding of their religion. The root of the establishment of this institution dated back to 2000 from the initiative of UGM students and alumni who wanted to learn about Islam (*ngaji*), and male religious teachers who were eager to produce staunch cadres. The initiative was born at a time when the country faced the growth of political Islam, demonstrated by the popularity of Islamic organisations including the university-based KAMMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia, the United Action of Indonesian Muslim Students) founded in 1998 (Nisa 2018c, 33), communal and sectarian-based conflicts in the country, including in Maluku, Poso and Kalimantan and the conditions brought about in 2001 by 9/11 (Chaplin 2018b, 9).

YPIA has a special affiliation with one of the Salafi groups in Yogyakarta, Yayasan Majelis At-Turots Al-Islamy. The headquarters of YPIA, which was initially known as Lembaga Bimbingan Islam Al-Atsary (LBIA) (the Institution of Al-Atsary Islamic Guidance), is in Sleman, Yogyakarta. The founding fathers of this foundation had studied in different places, not only in the Middle Eastern countries but also at UGM.[8] Ummu Yazid was active in Ma'had al-'Ilmi which became the site for creating cadres for *da'wa* within YPIA. Ma'had al-'Ilmi is managed under the education section of YPIA. YPIA has four major areas of focus: education, *da'wa,* public relations and Kemuslimahan (Muslim women's affairs). In Ma'had al-'Ilmi, the university students were trained to become proficient in Islamic teachings even though they were not enrolled in an Islamic university and did not have a strong Islamic educational background.

Ummu Yazid argues that the program offered by Ma'had al-'Ilmi is suitable for university students, especially those who want to learn about Islam from the basics and want to learn it meticulously and systematically. She said:

> I'm a kind of person who loves to know everything. I told my seniors that I wanted to *ngaji* [learn Islam] with the same system as that of university. I want to attend *ngaji* which has a discipline and has tests like university. Eventually, I found this foundation [YPIA]. When I started to join their *pengajian* [religious study group], I realised that the discipline in this *pengajian* is tighter, and it is more difficult, but this is what I am looking for.

For many educated passionate *cadari* like Ummu Yazid, facing greater challenges to achieve greater impact is a pleasure. Indeed, even the process of enrolment in Ma'had al-'Ilmi is systematic. There are written and oral tests. The course runs five times a week, with each year divided into two semesters. Ma'had al-'Ilmi teaches participants to be committed to embodying public piety through their

Figure 6.5 Curtain within a *cadari* house to facilitate male teachers delivering their daily or weekly religious lessons to women. Source: Photo credit, author, 22 March 2008.

religious performances and also to pay attention to active piety by guiding others to follow the Salafi pathway (*manhaj*) (Figure 6.5).

Cadres in Ma'had al-'Ilmi teach participants that they are expected to behave as the embodiment of their *taat* habitus and that the teachings are an important part of the formation of comprehensive Muslim women who have a dedication to the development of their religion. Thus, to be true *Muslimah* means that they have to pay significant attention to the collective aspiration of their groups. The self-transformation experienced by *cadari,* such as Ummu Yazid and her friends, is part of their role in *daʿwa.* Thus, the way they exercise their agency should not be seen as completely personal (for example, by wearing the *cadar*). Rather, it forms part of their public participation, evident from their efforts to equip themselves to perform *daʿwa* among women. The activities of Ma'had al-'Ilmi are concentrated in their female *wisma* (accommodation)[9] (Raudhatul 'Ilmi 1 and 2, Hilyah and Zahiroh), and especially in the headquarters, *wisma* Raudhatul 'Ilmi. The role of *wisma* is important not only in strengthening the commitment of residents to follow the true Islam but also to breed the spirit of *daʿwa* among them.

When I first visited Ummu Yazid and her friends during one of their Islamic study circles in her *wisma,* I was surprised to find that all elements in the *wisma* are labelled with Arabic terms. This signifies their great passion about equipping themselves to be authoritative voices in *daʿwa,* in which the Arabic language is

a key element in understanding religious texts. Thus, these *wisma* are set up as 'nests' for producing *dāʿiyāt.* Here, the *cadari* are trained to embody their virtuous practices which differ from their past activities. For example, they are not allowed to watch TV or listen to music. All activities should be acts of devotion (*ʿibādāt*) and in the spirit of *taat* towards God and the Prophet Muḥammad. Those who want to live in these *wisma* must go through a screening process. Some of the requirements include:

- *Memiliki keinginan untuk ikut mengikuti pengajian* (have the eagerness to attend the [Salafi based] religious study group)
- *Tidak membawa TV* (do not bring a TV)
- *Tidak menyukai musik* (do not like [or play] music)

The active piety of Ummu Yazid and her friends can be seen from their own agenda of *daʿwa* towards outsiders. Ummu Yazid really enjoyed active involvement within her group. She said: 'I am a typical person who loves to participate in an organisation. My association with YPIA, especially Ma'had al-'Ilmi, has enabled me to fulfil my passion to be active in the organisation. In Ma'had al-'Ilmi, we set up our curriculum, we struggle to fund our organisation, we create our own publication, and so forth.' Although not all students of Ma'had al-'Ilmi and the residents of the YPIA *wisma* initially had the same passion as Ummu Yazid, once they committed to the movement their sense of belonging grew.

The Forum of Al-Atsari Muslim Women's Activities

In addition to Ma'had al-'Ilmi and *wisma,* YPIA also has an organisation which especially handles the *daʿwa* activities of its female cadres, Forum Kegiatan Kemuslimahan Al-Atsari (FKKA) (The Forum of Al-Atsari Muslim Women's Activities). This is organised under the Kemuslimahan (Muslim Women's Affairs) section in YPIA. As with Ma'had al-'Ilmi and *wisma,* FKKA cadres are mostly university students in Yogyakarta. It has three divisions: *daʿwa,* bulletin and library. The schedules of Ummu Yazid and her friends are very tight, especially because the activities are in addition to their university commitments. However, they felt much pleasure in being involved in programs related to division activities and public piety.

The division of *daʿwa* that focuses on organising workshops for Muslim women usually meets once a month. The speakers of the workshops are religious teachers from Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy, Islamic Centre Bin Baz and alumni of Ma'had al-'Ilmi. The division also organises teacher training within TPA (Taman Pendidikan Al-Qur'an/Qur'ānic kindergartens) to prepare the next Salafi generation to be able to spread the true Islam. This training has proven helpful for the cadres in preparing themselves to perform *daʿwa* after their graduation from universities. Many of them are interested in being teachers, especially in kindergartens.

As part of their *daʿwa* activities and recruitment process, FKKA cadres publish their own bulletin for Muslim women called *Zuhairoh.* It is published by the bulletin section every fortnight and distributed around the UGM campus. On special occasions, such as at the beginning of the new school year, *Zuhairoh* publishes special issues to introduce their agenda to the new students and to recruit them. *Zuhairoh* is also aimed at training the cadres to be good writers and to recruit new writers. The most important objective is to introduce Salafi *manhaj*, including its doctrine principles. In one edition, the bulletin reminds Muslim women about the connection between the Salafi doctrine of *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* (loyalty or fidelity to Islam and Muslims, dissociation from all things non-Islamic and the renunciation of unbelievers) and *kebahagiaan hakiki* (true happiness) by loving God. The article says, 'O my sister, know that a Muslim woman who loves God is required to prove her love for God by loving what Allah [God] loves.' It then emphasises that what God loves is *ketaatan* towards God's command (*al-walā'*). Here we can see how the notion of *ketaatan* is vital to the attainment of true happiness. The article also recommends that women perform *hijrah* (a transformation into better Muslim women) to demonstrate their *ketaatan.* It emphasises that as part of the *al-barā'* (disavowal of anything deemed unIslamic) doctrine, this *hijrah* needs to involve moving from *maʿṣiya* (disobedience to God) to the environment of *taat* people. Through this kind of article, potential recruits are called to follow their Salafi pathway.

In general, all programs set up by YPIA for women through its FKKA are aimed at preparing cadres to embody active and public piety even after their graduation from university. When they graduate from university, some will look for jobs in educational institutions which often have the same affiliation as their Salafi group, namely those that associate with Yayasan Majelis At-Turots Al-Islamy. Following their graduation from the university, some prefer to deepen their Islamic knowledge by joining *pesantren* which have a special affiliation to their group, especially Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy. Alternatively, they enrol in Islamic higher education, such as MEDIU online (Al-Madinah International University), and Ma'had Aly (Chaplin 2014, 225). The MEDIU online delivery system, for many of these *cadari,* is considered a good way to study Islam with Salafi *manhaj,* because they do not have to think about their *maḥram* (non-marriageable male kin) who would have to accompany them if they studied in Medina in person.

Despite efforts made by *cadari* of LM (WI) and FKKA to make their *daʿwa* more accessible to wider audiences, the majority of outsiders continued to perceive them as agents who maintain their own strict territory and their exclusivity (Hasan 2006, 179). Rasya, a 25-year-old university student, told me: 'I think these face-veiled women are too exclusive. Although I often see some of them on my campus, I never talked to them. How can I talk to them when they already "declare" themselves that they are "untouchable" by wearing this Arab dress?' Amar, a 26-year-old male university student, said:

> In my classroom there are four face-veiled women. For me, I already get used to them, so I do not care. What I noticed is that I knew one of them before she

> wore the face veil, she was easy going, I used to talk to her as well, but since she began wearing it, she maintains her distance from social interaction with men. After all, I understand that it is her decision. I just respect it. It is a life choice.

Rasya and Amar's statements on their face-veiled friends are typical responses of university students. Some of them might produce a statement like that of Rasya which can be regarded as part of the process of 'Othering.'

This process of 'Othering' resonates with what Edward Said explains in his landmark book *Orientalism.* Said exemplifies how the western world constructs an image of the Orient based on the privilege of western beliefs and practices. Through this process of Othering, Said points out how the Occident is enabled to orientalise the Orient (1995, 3). The process of 'Othering' is also evident from the way orientalists—including scholars, novelists and travellers—present oriental women. The story of Gustave Flaubert, a French novelist, and Kuchuk Hanem, an Egyptian dancer, is one of them. Here, Kuchuk Hanem is depicted as a sensual and sexual object by Flaubert (Said 1995, 6, 187–88). Said argues:

> Flaubert's encounter with an Egyptian courtesan produced a widely influential model of the Oriental woman; she never spoke of herself, she never represented her emotions, presence, or history. *He* spoke for and represented her. He was foreign, comparatively wealthy, male and these were historical facts of domination that allowed him not only to possess Kuchuk Hanem physically but to speak for her and tell his readers in what way she was 'typically Oriental' [emphasis in original].
>
> (1995, 6)

He suggests that this kind of viewpoint represents a western mode of colonial discourse. The process of 'Othering,' which usually involves two different categories of people, fits Rasya's assessment of how she represents the *cadari* as 'the Other' based on their different appearance. This process of 'Othering' has led her to assume that 'they are untouchable.' The position of most of the male and female university students whom I interviewed, however, tend to be more like that of Amar. They are more relaxed in accepting different expressions of religiosity. Therefore, many *cadari* feel that despite some critique from university staff they are more comfortable wearing the *cadar* within the university environment because university students tend to be more open-minded.

Some harsh critiques on the presence of the *cadari* usually come from people outside the campus milieu. Ibu Dayu, a 41-year-old woman, for example, shares her feelings on the *cadari:* 'Every time I met this *perempuan cadaran* [face-veiled women], it feels weird. They are too exclusive. They do not want to know their neighbour. They just befriend people in their group. They do not socialise with others.' According to most *cadari,* Ibu Dayu's comment is very typical. Many of them assumed that this perception might be true but could not be generalised. Ummu Fadilah, a 32-year-old cadre, says:

> We are aware of these kinds of comments. Therefore, we always ask our sisters to mingle well with the people around them, including their neighbours. Many of them felt frustrated with their efforts to mingle, because mostly the people they encountered already had their own preliminary prejudice against them. As you know Eva, the stereotype about us is very heavy. I can understand their feeling. I always ask them to smile first or to greet them first before they throw an 'unhappy' face to us, but many sisters said 'we always smiled at them, but the problem is that they cannot see our smile. We also greeted them first, but the problem is that they also could not hear our voice properly.' Sometimes, I think it is so funny [she laughed when telling me this story]. Life is a struggle, Eva. Therefore, I told them that if you want to be successful in this life and the life after then be strong.

During my fieldwork, I often heard the same concern shared by other *cadari.*

The usual strategies undertaken by *cadari* to overcome this problem of socialisation are: first, they prefer to live within their community's cluster, such as living around the *pesantren* attached to their group like Ma'had Syaikh Jamilurrahman As-Salafy mentioned above. The second strategy is that they prefer to live around university campuses in which they assume that people living in this context are more open-minded and more ready to accept differences. Ummu Fadilah adds:

> Only a very few of us who can be very proactive tend to be very flexible. However, it depends on their personal characteristics. What I notice is that usually many *akhwāt* [sisters] are very shy. I think it is just a matter of time. When they can see many people like them then they will be more confident. Nowadays, we can see our number is growing everywhere, so I think for the long run many sisters will be more relaxed mingling with other students who do not wear the *cadar* or who do not belong to their group.

Ummu Fadilah's statement is related to the last strategy, namely being more proactive in approaching and mingling with non-*cadari* without making boundaries. However, according to many *cadari,* the ability to be more flexible usually depends on the personality of the person.

Niqab Squad: Responding to the 'Othering' process

The voices and activities of two main cases above on LM and Ummu Yazid's YPIA are especially important in their localities. This last section focuses on how *cadari* of the Niqab Squad fight against the process of 'Othering' at the national level. In 2019 when the newly elected Minister of Religious Affairs General Fachrul Razi issued a statement banning civil servants from wearing the *cadar* and *celana cingkrang* or non-*isbal* trousers (trousers below men's ankles), the Niqab Squad, which is not officially affiliated with either LM (WI) or YPIA, were active in voicing their opposition to such an initiative. Fachrul Razi based his statement on security reasons, in particular after the stabbing incident of the Indonesian Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Wiranto

by a couple from the ISIS-linked homegrown extremist group, Jamaah Ansharut Daulah. Based on information from the National Intelligence Agency (BIN), the couple, especially the husband, Syahrial Alamsyah alias Abu Rara, was already on the intelligence radar for links to Islamic State. The face-veiled wife, Fitri Andriana, who also held a knife, stabbed a local police chief during the incident. Those who opposed Fachrul Razi's ban—not only conservatives and *cadari* but also human rights activists and some moderate Muslims—argued that the government should refrain from regulating what people wear. They emphasised that the ban signifies a violation of human rights. Fachrul Razi went on to emphasise that wearing a *cadar* does not reflect the quality of the wearer's faith. According to him, the banning initiative aligned with general security procedures for everyone entering government premises,[10] such as the removal of motorcycle helmets and the opening of car windows to show the drivers' and passengers' faces.

This case brought the Niqab Squad into the national spotlight when they were invited as part of the panel for a special discussion organised by the TV program Indonesia Lawyers Club (ILC) on TvOne, 5 November 2019, titled *Apa dan Siapa yang Radikal* (What and who is radical). Among the panellists was WI's current leader Ustādh Zaitun. In its tweet, the ILC uploaded a flyer with a *cadari* and a man with *celana cingkrang.* The caption said: 'RADICAL STAMPS are getting wilder, targeting those with *celana cingkrang* and wearing a *cadar.*' Two days before the show, Indadari—the founder of Niqab Squad—was contacted by the ILC team. They asked the Niqab Squad to be the representative of *cadari.* Indadari said:

> This is great because here in Niqab Squad we also have civil servants [the main target of the recommendation] and they wanted us to choose our members from different backgrounds … we did not bring any [ideological] flags at that time, because the five of us [present during the show] came from various ideological backgrounds … For example, Diana from Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Dr Sally from Salafi.

While LM and FKKA are part of well-established Salafi movements, the Niqab Squad does not have a direct structural link to any Islamist or Salafi movements. However, as mentioned in Chapter 3, they do have strong affiliations with some (young) Salafi preacher networks. Indadari, as the founder and leader of Niqab Squad, is also aware that friction among Salafi groups is severe. She says: 'Ustādh Oemar Mita is blacklisted from the Rodja Group of Ustādh Abdul Qadir Jawas.' The presence of friction between Salafi groups has led Indadari to choose preacher affiliation rather than organisational affiliation.

Indadari strategically chose four Niqab Squad members from various backgrounds and professions to accompany her to enlighten viewers about the diversity of *cadari:* Diana Nurliana, a fashion designer who had showcased her designs in Chicago; Astri, a travelling photographer and videographer; Dr Sally or Ummi Amizah, a medical doctor who also has a cosmetic brand Dr Ummi Amizah Skincare; Taekwondo athlete Arlyna; and Rachmadian, a school principal.

Before the existence of the Niqab Squad and celebgram (celebrity on Instagram), Indonesia witnessed the presence of more lower-middle-class and middle-class *cadari.* Nowadays, however, their increasing presence in Indonesian public Islam reveals that some higher-class Muslim women have decided to wear the *cadar.* Indadari says, 'Now, in urban areas like Jakarta, I would say that the number of higher-class *cadari* is more significant than those of the lower class. Some of them are medical doctors, lawyers, etc. Thus, *cadari* now are different from before who mostly were backward, smelly, tacky, and shabby.'

During a special discussion on the banning of the *cadar* and radicalism on TvOne, Indadari and the Niqab Squad shared their views and received significant support from other panellists and the audience. A politician from the nationalist party, Nasdem (National Democrats), Irma Suryani Chaniago who opposed the full banning of the *cadar* in Indonesia, expressed her view about a specific rule relating to civil servants: 'When for example the government stipulates that a civil servant must not wear the *cadar,* then that is an option. Just resign from being a civil servant [if you choose the *cadar*]. Choose other jobs that can indeed allow you to wear the *cadar.*' Furthermore, the majority of panellists emphasised that their non-oppositional position is bound by one requirement, namely that *cadari* are committed to preserving the four pillars of nationhood: Pancasila as the state ideology; Bhinneka Tunggal Ika as Indonesia's unity in diversity principle; Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia (NKRI) as the unitary state of Indonesia; and the Indonesian constitution UUD 1945. Responding to this anxiety during the show, one of the *cadari,* school principal Rachmadian, shared her story:

> They often assume that the *cadari* do not want to participate in the Indonesian flag raising ceremony and singing the Indonesian national anthem. My friends were shocked when I joined the ceremony and stood at the front and sang the national anthem … this is our field of *daʿwa* that with our *cadar,* we also still love NKRI. Pancasila is in our hearts.

Ustādh Zaitun also echoed and strengthened Rachmadian's position. He stated:

> Many of our members [in WI] wear the *cadar.* Even though we do not make it compulsory … at Wahdah the *cadar* is *sunna* [recommended]. But none of them is extreme. We sing Indonesia Raya [the Indonesian National Anthem], we are very sociable … In Indonesia, with the development of the *cadar,* it will not change that the majority will wear the *cadar.* This is the same as the *jilbab* [veil, not face veil]. Until now, it still can be said that those who wear and do not wear the *jilbab* is 50–50.

After Niqab Squad's over three-hour appearance on national television, many *cadari* felt grateful and 'saved,' including those of some WI and YPIA *cadari* and some who had previously opposed Indadari and Niqab Squad's presence on Indonesian media. Indadari believed that this appearance was part of Niqab Squad's *daʿwa* and said: 'Many of them, including those of Salafi groups, thanked

us for being their representative voices.' Amira [pseudonym], a 33-year-old of the WI, shared her view:

> To be honest, I initially did not like Niqab Squad because they *tampil* [appear in public including media] a lot. However, after I heard about the debate on the ILC [the television program] and listening to their views, I realised that we need a group like them that is vocal so they can explain to the public that we are not terrorists. We just want to be better Muslim women.

Nana, whose husband is affiliated with Salafi jihadism and was jailed due to his involvement in terror acts, said: 'Here is the way I see it: First, yes, it [their appearance] was great so that people understand the essence of *cadar.* We are not terrorists. Although my husband was in jail because of his jihad involvement, I am not a terrorist. I am different to him.'

Niqab Squad's appearance on ILC, however, has not been immune from criticism from other *cadari.* Some *cadari* of various Salafi backgrounds including WI and YPIA criticised Indadari and the Niqab Squad by pointing to the *ikhtilāt* (the social mixing between men and women) during the ILC because the panellists were women and men. Indadari shared her view on this: '[giggling] … It is funny to hear that they mentioned *ikhtilāt.* What happens when they are on an airplane? They have to be mixed with male and female passengers too, right?' The voices of *cadari* who respond to the process of 'Othering' and fight for their rights to wear the *cadar* clearly indicate a way that they exercise agency. From the Niqab Squad, we can see resistance against those who oppose them.

Muslim women's visibility in public life in Indonesia is not something new; women in Indonesian Muslim mass organisations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, have been active in public life (Robinson 2009). Indeed, scholars have emphasised that female autonomy and women's activities in the public sphere, including in trade and politics, are features common throughout the history of Southeast Asia, including Indonesia (Andaya 2006; Errington 1990; Reid 1988). In the early development of the factions within the Salafi movement (especially in the 1970s and 1980s), this phenomenon was barely evident, especially among women who wore the *cadar.* Salafi *cadari* are becoming more visible, particularly since the number of the wearers has been increasing from the 2000s onwards, and the establishment of women's institutions within their Salafi groups has been growing since 2005. The game changer was Niqab Squad *cadari* and the increasing presence of face-veiled public figures who are vocal on mainstream and alternative media, including social media. These *cadari*'s visibility can be seen through their embodiment of active and public piety which is manifested in *daʿwa* activities at both personal, communal and national levels (*daʿwa* for themselves and *daʿwa* for others). Despite the stigma attached to their appearance and chosen lifestyle, the constant effort of the *cadari* to make themselves visible in public through displays of public religious activity has contributed to growing positive perceptions of them.

The virtuous activities of LM and YPIA *cadari* in *daʿwa,* especially for the development of their own institutions, give women pleasure. This phenomenon

demonstrates the agency of *cadari.* Being active in *daʿwa* for others is also related to self-satisfaction because it embodies their *taat* habitus and maintains commitment to their religion. To understand the agency of these women, their beliefs and practices should be taken into consideration. It is only by understanding their belief, practices and aspirations can outsiders appreciate their agency.

LM and YPIA women are the most prominent exemplars of the proposition that membership in Salafi movements that emphasise sex segregation and strict religious dress does not hinder women from performing religious activities outside their domestic domain. Although LM and YPIA have brought these women into public spaces, their activities still occur in separate gendered spheres. Nevertheless, the public visibility of these women is in conformity with the ideal of Salafi teachings and so does not conform to western liberal notions of 'public.' The main rule they are expected to uphold is that their public activities must be associated with their commitment to live as true *Muslimah* and to their dedication to preserve the dignity of their groups. The *cadari* themselves are active in creating their own public versions of Salafi piety which do not violate the Salafi teachings that they uphold. The Niqab Squad have moved a step further by making themselves available to the media in the hope that they can make the voices of *cadari* heard. However, although some other *cadari* might think that they have violated some Islamic teachings like *ikhtilāt,* the Niqab Squad still see their presence in the media within the corridor of Islam because they do not remove their *cadar.* LM, YPIA and Niqab Squad *cadari*'s presence in public means that they can create their various versions of public 'secure' spaces.

Notes

1 The movement focuses on asking its followers to perform its basic tenets which consist of six principles: *kalima* or the article of faith that Muslims should really understand in regard to content and meaning: The declaration says 'that there is no God but Allah and Muḥammad is His Messenger'; prayer (*ṣalāt al-khushūʿ wa al-khuḍūʿ*) that every Muslim should realise the importance of *ṣalāt;* knowledge (*ʿilm*) and *dhikr* (remembrance of God, consisting of a litany formula), which means that every Muslim should possess knowledge about the basic Islamic teachings and should also occupy their daily life by praising God (*dhikr*); respecting other fellow Muslims (*ikrām al-muslimīn*), in understanding the importance of Islamic brotherhood and sisterhood; declaration of intention and sincerity that everything is done because of Allah (*taṣḥīḥu an-niyya*), which refers to the importance of directing any activities with the main intention of pleasing God; *daʿwa wa at-tablīgh* or *tafrīq al-waqt* (sparing time), which pertains to the formation of groups of Muslims to perform *daʿwa* tours (Haq 1972). This sixth principle is the defining feature of the Tablīghī Jamāʿat movement.
2 On the shortcoming of this kind of agency, see Burke (2012, 128–30).
3 Part of this section was previously published as Eva F. Nisa. 2012. *Cadari* of Wahdah Islamiyah: Women as dedicated actors of ultra-conservatism. *Intersections: Gender and Sexuality in Asia and the Pacific* 30, available 18 August 2021 at: http://intersections.anu.edu.au/issue30/nisa.htm.
4 Some of WI's businesses include maternal care and health clinics, pharmacies, bookshops, chocolate and clove plantations and a gold mine.

5 *Asas tungal* was the Suharto policy on the ideological basis of political parties and civil society organisations. Islamic organisations that wanted to be active in politics had to formally adopt Pancasila, the state ideology, and they could not use religion as their ideological foundation. This was part of Suharto's policy to depoliticise Islam, which heightened in the mid-1980s (van Bruinessen 2002, 132). Muhammadiyah accepted *asas tunggal* and declared so at Muhammadiyah's Forty-first National Congress in Surakarta, 7–11 December 1985.
6 KPPSI is an umbrella organisation which proposes the holistic implementation of Sharīʿa.
7 This is especially related to criticisms of Jürgen Habermas's (1990) concept of the public sphere which is problematic and too limited to be used in understanding Muslim majority societies because it mainly relies on secular rationality (Deeb 2005; Eickelman and Anderson 1999; Meyer and Moors 2006: Salvatore and LeVine 2005).
8 Ustādh Abu Saʿad Muhammad Nurhuda (an alumnus of Darul Ulum, Pakistan, who is also head of the education section in Yayasan Majelis At-Turots Al-Islamy), Ustādh Afifi Abdul Wadud (enrolled in the Faculty of Dentistry at UGM, but did not finish it, and an alumnus of Al-Madinah International University), Ustādh Kholid Syamhudi (an alumnus of the Islamic University in Medina, al-Jāmiʿa al-Islāmiyya bī-l-Madīna al-Munawwara), Ustādh Noor Akhmad Setiawan (a UGM lecturer from the Information Technology and Electrical Engineering Department), Ustādh Fauzan bin Abdillah (an alumnus of Chemical Engineering UGM who continued his study in Medina) and so forth.
9 The establishment of female *wisma* is part of YPIA's program on education.
10 Some in this largest Muslim majority county were also uncomfortable with the visibility of veiled (not face-veiled) policewomen, evident from the decree issued in 2005 requiring the use of standard uniforms (without veils), except in the province of Aceh. This decree was revised in 2015 (Davies 2018, 77).

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7 *Taat* agency and the embodiment of *true* Islam

The growing presence of *cadari* (face-veil wearers) in Indonesia is often linked to the resurgence of jihadi extremism. People see the practice of face veiling as the growing Arabisation of Indonesian Muslims; one of the signs of growing conservatism and the epitome of the wearers' repression and absence of agency. The presence of *cadari* is seen as something negative that has happened to the 'smiling face' of Islam in Indonesia. I have highlighted in this book that the adoption of the *cadar* (face veil) in Indonesia must be seen as an interactive process and a product of the wearers' deliberate adoption and reproduction of beliefs and practices deemed by them to be more Islamic than other practices associated with women's covering.

Cadari are important figures in the contestations around ideas as to how Islam should be practised in Indonesia. Through this book, I have demonstrated how Indonesia has constantly witnessed transformation and continuity in the meanings and practices of Islam. The growing presence of *cadari* in *pesantren* (Islamic boarding schools) and passionate *cadari* signifies that Indonesian Muslim 'publics' are in the constant process of being shaped and reshaped and are always open to varied expressions of Muslimness. Armando Salvatore and Dale Eickelman argue that Muslim publics are born from articulations on Islam in public spheres, which encompass varied initiatives (2004, xi). My study of the *cadar* and *cadari* in Indonesia has revealed a complex arena of contemporary politics, history, culture, economy, the contestation of religious voices, media and representation, education and an understanding of power relations. The way the wearers internalise particular Islamic discourses, beliefs and practices offers insight into the plurality of ideologies and the ideological contestation in Indonesian Islam. What one wears carries public messages and for many the face veil is an external signifier of the wearers' internal ideological worldview. This phenomenon expands our understanding of how women are key actors in the process of the embodiment of Islam, a practice that shifts over time.

The *cadar* might be seen as a *reflection* on the changes, expansion and processes of contestation in Indonesian Muslim 'publics.' Hence, women's agency is often reduced to whether they follow these changes. Through my study of *cadari,* I have shown that women's dress is not only *a reflection,* but indeed it is *a very active intervention* in the remaking of Indonesian Islam. This is illustrated by the

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way they exercise *taat* (Ar. *ṭāʿa* or obedient) agency focusing more on *al-maṣlaḥa al-ʿāmma* (the common good), not on their own self-focused pursuit per se.

The wearing of a *cadar* is an issue that has come to the fore whenever terrorist attacks occur in Indonesia. It has been particularly prevalent from the 2000s onwards, after events such as the bombings of the Jakarta Stock Exchange building (BEJ) in 2000, and Bali Bombings 1 and 2 in 2002 and 2005. It cannot be denied that many wives of accused terrorists wear the *cadar* and lately some *cadari* of jihadi Salafism have been frontline in terror attacks. Therefore, there is a persistent stereotype in both public opinion and scholarship that *cadari* and the wearing of the full-face veil signals membership of a terrorist network. Through this book, I have challenged this stereotype. Indeed, this study shows that the majority of *cadari* in the large cities of Indonesia do not belong to violent groups or jihadi Salafism. They mostly belong to either Tablīghī Jamāʿat or various Salafi groups which oppose jihadi Salafi factions.

My latest journey into the existence of the *cadar* and *cadari* in Indonesia has allowed me to witness the growing presence of urban cosmopolitan *cadari*—Niqab Squad *cadari,* public figures and *cadari* celebgram—who have more vividly coloured Indonesian Muslim publics. Salvatore and Eickelman emphasise the importance of the emergence of new media in the materialising of public Islam initiated by varied actors who 'want a say in political and religious issues' (2004, xi). The increasing voices of cosmopolitan *cadari* in Indonesian public Islam—women who are fighting against the stereotypes attached to *cadari* as terrorists and against the victimisation of *cadari,* especially from 2017 onwards—are evident in mainstream and alternative media, including various social media platforms. They are part of the broader *hijrah* (religious transformation to be better Muslims) movement in Indonesia, initiated by young Muslims attaching closely and loosely to varied Islamic and Islamist, including Salafi, movements in the country (Nisa 2019; 2020) (Figure 7.1).

Female Indonesian actors who have adopted the *cadar,* the increasing number of middle- to upper-middle-class face-veiled women, the birth of the Niqab Squad, the growth of conservative movements and the use of social media platforms that often feature face-veiled women have led the Indonesian public to become used to the increasing presence of *cadari*. Unfortunately, this visibility does not mean that society has become more approving of the *cadar.* For example, seeing face-veiled women spending time in cafés, like Starbucks and The Coffee Bean & Tea Leaf, is no longer taboo in Jakarta. A decade prior to the establishment of the Niqab Squad, I would not have dared to invite *cadari* to meet with me in an American coffee chain café. Since 2017, many urban cosmopolitan *cadari* have suggested that we meet to chat in these cafés and Jakartans have not seemed bothered when seeing *cadari* in public spaces. However, whether they support and approve of the wearing of the *cadar* is another story.

Varied perspectives and approaches—including those of Aristotle, Marcel Mauss and Pierre Bourdieu—have been used in examining the *taat* habitus of *cadari* from various backgrounds. Wearing a face veil in Indonesia has its own internal history and contemporary dynamic, which cannot be reduced to the

Figure 7.1 Rows of book covers showing *hijrah* hype in a Gramedia bookstore, Pondok Indah, Jakarta. Source: Photo credit, author, 7 December 2019.

product of extremist culture. It is part of the habitus involving collective knowledge and body techniques. Mauss's (1979) habitus that emphasises the training of the body can be seen especially in the everyday lives of *cadari* students. The struggle of passionate *cadari* to defend their *cadari* subculture aligns with an Aristotelian habitus, emphasising the capacity for virtuous activity and a capacity to overcome challenges in cultivating virtuous dispositions. Aristotle argues, 'virtue … is concerned with pleasures and pains' (2000, 17). Bourdieu's (1990) emphasis on social history in habitus can be seen when the face veil becomes the norm in one's locality which is evident from the wearing of the face veil in the archipelago.

This book is the first on the *cadari* in Indonesia and the first in-depth study to focus on the Indonesian face-veiled women's involvement with two Muslim transnational revivalist movements, Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafism. The voices and stories of these women are generally absent from discussions of Islam and the role of women within Indonesian Islam. Studies on women and various Islamist and Islamic conservative movements in Indonesia mostly focus on women who belong to Islamist movements, like Jama'ah Tarbiyah and its political vehicle, PKS (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera or Prosperous Justice Party) and HTI (Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia). These women mostly wear long thick veils (*jilbab*) but do not cover their faces. Therefore, this study is designed to enhance our understanding of Muslim women (*Muslimah*) (Ar. *Muslima*) in Indonesia living within strict

religious communities, with rigorous rules regarding religious attire and specific understandings of femininity.

Working closely with women in Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafism (two movements which often oppose each other) creates challenges that have required me to be meticulous in defining the differences between the two. Based on my close 'reading' of the everyday life of women in Salafi factions and the Tablīghī Jamāʿat movement, the *cadari* from the Salafi factions are more militant in embodying their new religious habitus than their Tablīghī counterparts. This can be understood in terms of the nature of the movements. The practice of Salafi factions claiming a monopoly over the one true Islam is a source of appeal to young and passionate followers. Tablīghī Jamāʿat, however, tends to be more tolerant and accepting of a plurality of voices in the context of Indonesian Islam. Another important aspect is the generational difference between the movements: the most passionate *cadari* within Salafi factions are university students, recent graduates and urban cosmopolitan middle- and upper-middle-class women (Niqab Squad). These women find pleasure in their strong desire to create 'new' selves and they are more ready to take risks in defining and defending their new virtuous or *taat* habitus, the embodiment of their true Islam. Their youthful spirit can be seen from the modern characteristics of their association with various Salafi factions, especially in the use of modern communication technologies, such as the internet and varied social media platforms, to strengthen their commitment to religion. The attachment of passionate *cadari* to various factions within global Salafism, including its glocal version or Makassar-based Salafism (Wahdah Islamiyah), and their adoption of the *cadar* help them navigate the rapidly changing modern world in which they live, and resist western versions of modernity by introducing and adopting what they perceive to be their alternative Salafi expressions of modernity. This is in particular done as part of their upholding of the Salafi doctrine of *al-walā' wa-l-barā'* (loyalty or fidelity to Islam and Muslims, dissociation from all things non-Islamic and renunciation of unbelievers).

The embodiment of true Islam

Following a wide range of studies on religion and gender, female piety and religious agency, in this book I have unpacked the complexity of the everyday life experienced by *cadari* as they negotiate the interplay between piety, agency and the rise of revivalist movements. The point of departure for this study has been Saba Mahmood's (2005) concept of agency which has been particularly influential in the study of religion (Islam), gender and anthropology. Christine Jacobsen calls the awkward interplay between these three elements a 'troublesome threesome' (2011, 66). Mahmood's approach—inspired by Aristotle and the later work of Michel Foucault on techniques of self-cultivation—in understanding the agency of docile agents or pious Muslim women and their support for Islamic movements has helped many scholars to understand pious women's capacity to act. Following Mahmood's steps, anthropologists working in various localities, like Maimuna Huq (2008) and Mayanthi Fernando (2010), have demonstrated

how women discipline themselves to be better Muslims by submitting to certain religious authorities or authoritative voices which they consider to be the means to their self-cultivation (Fernando 2010, 20; Huq 2008, 487).

Developing the insights of Mahmood (2005) in her study of female mosque participants in Egypt, I found that passionate *cadari* regard their *cadar* as important to their bodily comportment and the main 'ingredient' and discipline for the embodiment of true Islam. Despite the presence of different opinions related to the wearing of the *cadar,* most *cadari* with whom I worked perceived it as an act of devotion (*ʿibāda*) which is an important element in the process of the embodiment of their true Muslimness. Wearing the *cadar,* for these women, can be regarded as an important part of their habitus linked to the embodiment of moral virtues. Therefore, while wearing the *cadar* is not the ultimate achievement of their piety, it is an important element of their everyday life that contributes to the making of a true *Muslimah*. It is noteworthy that this concept of the true *Muslimah* can be understood differently within different religious or even *cadari* groups.

There are key differences between the mosque participant case that Mahmood (2005) discusses and that of my contemporary *cadari* interlocutors, especially in the way that they understand their religious transformation and how they frame their aspirations to be true *Muslimah.* In Mahmood's (2005, 126) study, the terms 'pious' and 'piety' are regarded as the ultimate goals of those who struggle to cultivate religious virtues. Most Indonesian passionate *cadari,* who adjusted their lifestyles to fit with their commitment to the true Islam, are quite reluctant to use the terms pious and piety, popularly translated as *saleh* and *kesalehan* in Indonesia. Instead, they prefer to designate their religious conduct as an aspect of *ketaatan* (obedience). The ultimate goal of all their efforts to embody the religious disciplinary practices is associated with being true *Muslimah.*

Those who use the term 'pious *Muslimah*' are outsiders to the subcultures under discussion. The preference for using the term 'true *Muslimah*' instead of 'pious *Muslimah*' for passionate *cadari* is due to their efforts to practise Islam comprehensively and not as a 'ticket' or a pass to making them pious Muslim women. The religious transformation or *hijrah* that they experience, including the embodiment of strict religious disciplinary practices, is part of their duty as Muslims, to be true Muslim women and to be God's vicegerents. Among passionate wearers, there was a tendency to regard the terms pious and piety as significant concepts that are difficult and even impossible to achieve. Therefore, the most rational standard for these women, who feel that their commitment to religion is always inadequate, is to lower their sights and expectations of piety in order to become true *Muslimah* who can guard their dignity. Among these passionate wearers, there is also an impression that those who tend to use the terms pious and piety, such as female students at *pesantren,* are still in the early stage of learning Islam.

Many of the Egyptian mosque participants in Mahmood's study emphasised the notions of shyness (*al-ḥayā'*) and patience (*ṣabr*) as important Islamic virtues if they want to achieve their aspiration to be pious Muslim women (2005, 155). These two religious virtues are also important in the life of *cadari* in Indonesia.

However, the most important virtue for them, which can be regarded as the key to their becoming true Muslim women, is *ketaatan. Ketaatan* as a moral virtue can be acquired by actively seeking God's *hidāya* (guidance) and embodying Islam correctly. By wearing the *cadar,* their virtuous habitus guides them to feel uncomfortable when they fail to observe in detail the teachings of Islam. They believe that this *ketaatan* can lead them to become Muslim women who can preserve their own *ʿiffa* (purity). This is another important moral virtue which should be cultivated by female believers who want to be true *Muslimah. Cadari* who are pursuing obedient lives to maintain their *ʿiffa* pay incredible attention to norms and rules and are anxious about doing things right in their lifeworld—doing things right according to the perspectives of authority figures ranging from senior students, religious teachers, friends and God.

Living obedient lives is not merely a self-focused pursuit but it is also more social and interactive than the pious lives led by women in Mahmood's study. This 'focus' influences the mode of agency that the women exercise. For the *cadari* in my study, it is both collective and individual agency. They feel that it is not enough to become self-conscious agents for their own sake. A good Muslim woman, for many of them, means being an agent of their community as well. Their obedience should not stop at *daʿwa* (Ind. *dakwah* or proselytisation) to themselves, but it should also involve public and active piety or *daʿwa* towards others. This is the manifestation of their responsibility to God and their duty as God's vicegerents.

Sketching the agency of obedient women

This book has responded to the broad questions of the formation of virtuous subjectivities and the effort of research subjects to embody a religious disposition as a specific kind of agency. Agency in this regard refers to the 'capacity for action' (Mahmood 2001). Outsiders may see belonging to these movements and doing virtuous deeds as reflections of a false consciousness of *cadari* and an indication of their lack of agency in determining their life course (Grewal and Kaplan 1994). However, for the *cadari* themselves, belonging to Tablīghī Jamāʿat and Salafi movements and the embodiment of a virtuous *taat* habitus that is supported and promoted by a movement is reflective of their capacity to exercise agency in order to achieve their aspiration to become true *Muslimah.*

Agency is important especially because of the stigma attached to the life of *cadari.* Talal Asad, in his discussion about agency and its connection to humanity, said, 'The doctrine of action has become essential to our recognition of other people's humanity' (1996, 272). I have shared the voices and stories of *cadari* and analysed the terms in which their agency can be understood to recognise their humanity. This book has introduced the notion of *taat* agency to capture the many ways in which *cadari* from various backgrounds live their everyday lives in accordance with what they believe as the most proper understandings of Islam. As the term suggests, the '*taat*' agency is the manifestation of their ultimate obedience towards God. *Taat* agency is not only about self-cultivation. It goes beyond

self-focused obedient lives. The social aspect of *taat* agency is evident from the way they conduct public and active piety in their *daʿwa* for *al-maṣlaḥa al-ʿāmma.* The interactive aspect of their *taat* agency can be seen from the way *cadari* have responded to the layers of obedience introduced by male authority figures in their lives. These authority figures have different ideas and values from one conservative movement to the other.

Passionate *cadari* actively resist those who see them as belonging to terrorist or militant groups and those who see them as oppressed women. Mahmood in her discussion of agency emphasised that agency should not be simply 'a synonym for resistance to social norms but as modality of action' (2005, 157). I agree with Mahmood that agency cannot be analysed mainly in terms of resistance. It is noteworthy that deep-rooted stereotypes about the *cadari* in Indonesia have led them to be active in challenging the prejudices against them. This is evident from their engagement in everyday resistance and in their *daʿwa* that takes place in varied avenues, including social media platforms like YouTube and Instagram. Their resistance should not be classified as resistance agency (Avishai 2008; Burke 2012; 'pious critical agency' in Rinaldo 2013) which implies that these women offer new interpretations of Islamic teachings that differ from those of their religious communities. *Cadari* barely resist male religious authority, especially within their movements.

What might be seen as an antithesis of their agency is their docility in the context of submission to religious disciplinary practices. But as Mahmood argues, docility is different from passivity (2001). It is true that *cadari* become compliant, even docile, agents when they prepare themselves to embody their strict and literal understandings of Islam. However, most of them, particularly passionate *cadari,* perform all of these acts because of their own aspirations to be true *Muslimah.* This aligns with Aristotle's argument that happiness can be acquired habitually through actions. He states that 'virtue is concerned with passions and actions … happiness is activity in accordance with virtue' (2000, 19, 129). The *cadari* also strive to submit to their religious disciplinary regime with pleasure.

Some scholars have warned that those focusing their work on agency or proving the agency of religious women may neglect those things that the women cannot do (Burke 2012, 129; Winter 2001, 16–17). This book has unpacked what *cadari* can and cannot do in relation to their religious understandings. In the context of the *pesantren* subculture in Chapter 4, for instance, their *taat* agency is linked to their *pesantren*'s patriarchal understandings of gender and literalist understandings of Islamic texts. This kind of position has been criticised widely by Islamic feminists, women activists and progressive Muslims who focus their work on introducing a gender-just perspective to Indonesian *pesantren.*

The ways that young teenagers in *pesantren* adopt the *cadar* could be regarded as docile because they are complying with rules. In analysing the characteristics of *pesantren cadari,* Foucault's earlier work (1977) on panopticon and disciplinary technologies and Erving Goffman's (1984) resocialisation as the goal of a total institution are especially important. Following Mahmood, I have used Aristotle—who influenced Foucault's later work on ethics and technologies of

the self (1997)—in reading the moral codes and ethical conduct within the everyday life of the *cadari,* in particular the passionate *cadari. Pesantren cadari* strive to change their behaviour, their ways of living and being, through the way the *pesantren* introduces them to new norms, values and practices as well as to surveillance. However, this docility is not linked to the abandonment of agency, because most students are fully aware that the norms in the *pesantren* are designed to produce better *Muslimah.* Foucault's later work (1997) on how one interprets moral codes and adopts them to shape moral conduct and become ethical subjects is especially pertinent in analysing the everyday life of *cadari.*

In my discussion of the agency of *cadari,* the structural and cultural constraints that surround them are important, even though most do not try to challenge these restrictions. Indeed, their lifeworld and subjectivity are manifestations of their dialogue with their socio-historical context. *Cadari* involve themselves in societal interventions through processes of self-making. Subjectivity in this context is then seen as the heart of broader social change. *Cadari* admit that the process of becoming a better *Muslimah* does not occur in a 'discursive vacuum.' The agency of *cadari* in the *pesantren* exists within the structural limitations that surround them and can be seen from their subjectivity which has been influenced by their efforts to follow the norms prevailing in the *pesantren* circle. Their *cadar* is like a painting in the life of Pirous as studied by Kenneth George. It is their ethical path or means through which they become a 'who' and a 'what' (2010, 58) and through which their subjectivity is formed. The *cadar* is not the only thing that matters in their lives, but it is the most important means by which they achieve a particular way of being.

Outsiders who fail to understand the life experiences of *cadari* will portray them as oppressed agents whose lives are totally determined by men and who need to be saved. Literature and media reports on the veil (and face veil) and women belonging to diverse currents of Islamic conservative movements often construct veils and the women who wear them as victims of patriarchal power and oppression (Munir 2003; see also Abu-Lughod 2002; Shirazi and Mishra 2010; Zine 2002). This reminds us of Lila Abu-Lughod's work, as I touched upon in the Introduction, that criticises western representations of Muslim women and calls on feminists and human rights activists to stop imposing their agenda on Muslim women (2002; 2013). Abu-Lughod is against the idea of generalising cultures to appreciate 'people's experiences' (2013, 6). Following Abu-Lughod (2002; 2013), in the context of *cadari* in my study the question of whether they really need to be saved is indeed irrelevant for them. People, who have negative judgements, fail to comprehend that religious goals and commitments may be equally as worthy, or even more worthy, than other life goals or commitments. Finding an excuse to prove that one lifeworld is better than another with a different ideological inclination cannot be achieved by defining the 'Others' as victims. Therefore, to understand the lifeworld of *cadari* in this book, we cannot escape from discussing the importance of religion in the reshaping of their experiences in the world. What should be acknowledged here is that there is a critical disconnect between ways of living that privilege the sacred above all else and ways of living that favour external goals such as education, economic, social

and material gain. It is also important to note that for *cadari* all these external goals are good when the intention to gain them is for devotional acts (*ʿibādāt*). Therefore, if material gain through e-commerce is performed using Islamic principles and the result enables the believer to perform their duty as a good Muslim, such as helping the poor, then this mundane worldly activity is categorised as a religious observance (*ʿibāda*). For *cadari,* nothing can be classified as bad when the process of gaining it and the intention of having it are for the sake of religious observance.

The everyday turn

Anthropological studies on Muslims, including Muslim women, have especially witnessed the 'piety turn' and 'everyday Islam turn.' The 'piety turn' focuses more on piety, including pious subjectivities (Soares and Osella 2009, 11). The 'everyday Islam turn' aims to move beyond piety and pious self-cultivation. Mahmood's work is especially important in the domain of the 'piety turn.' Those emphasising varied aspects of everyday Islam highlight that the potential ambivalence and internal struggles of believers' lives might not fit into certain Islamic norms (Moll 2018; Schielke 2010; Soares and Osella 2009). Nadia Fadil and Fernando critically analyse 'everyday Islam' and highlight the risk posed by those who are invested in 'everyday Islam.' They contend that 'the concept of everyday Islam emphasizes one side of these paradigmatic debates, highlighting the universality of humans and emphasizing opposition to norms' (2015a, 59; 2015b). Responding to Fadil and Fernando, Lara Deeb suggests that both piety and the everyday should not be seen as diametrically opposite each other (2015). The life experiences of *cadari* align with Deeb's argument that the everyday practices and piety of Salafi and Tablīghī women are not diametrically opposed to each other. Indadari and her circle, as I discussed in Chapter 3, believe that appearing on television for gossip and celebrity news programs is part of their *daʿwa.*

In Chapter 2 of this book, I discussed theological issues or moral codes that were mentioned during my fieldwork as being the reference points relating to *cadari*'s everyday lives. In this anthropological study of *cadari,* my engagement with their discussion of theology (when they make reference to it) is not aimed at analysing or judging what is wrong and right in Islam as mentioned in Islamic texts. Rather, I am covering the theological issue mainly due to the nature of the *hijrah* or the transformation of *cadari* into better *Muslimah* that often entails justification from theological references. Anthropologists have dealt with this issue (Lukens-Bull 1999; Schielke 2019). Yasmin Moll argues that anthropologists of religion need to talk about God seriously, but they are not supposed to be involved in theological debates (2018, 258). In this book, I have also unpacked how *cadari* engage with the founding texts in interaction with layered aspects of their everyday lives.

The *cadari* and their movements

I have demonstrated the zeal of women to be part of transnational Tablīghī and Salafi movements. This is another important difference between Mahmood's

study on the mosque movement and this book. Mahmood unites various Islamist and Islamic movements, including Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood, under the umbrella of one piety movement (2005, 180–85). I carefully discuss *cadari* and their movements to unpack different and often contesting norms and collective rules in both movements and to capture the nuances of transformations involved in their journey towards becoming Salafi or Tablīghī *cadari.* The participation of *cadari* in these movements indicates the appeal of currents of religious resurgence among Muslim women. Scholars have noticed the heightened participation of highly educated women in the upsurge of religious movements elsewhere in the Muslim world (see Charrad on the Middle East 2011; Deeb on Lebanon 2006; Jamal on Pakistan 2009; Mahmood on Egypt 2005). In the public sphere, the visibility of passionate *cadari* within these movements occurs in the context of their commitment towards directing their *daʿwa* activities to others, for the development of Islam. Performing *daʿwa* empowers them, as they feel their lives are meaningful when they do something for the sake of the preservation of *al-maṣlaḥa al-ʿāmma. Cadari*'s dedication to their relatively small communities has led them to be as active or even more active than other followers of more well-established Islamic movements in Indonesia, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah. In contrast to NU and Muhammadiyah women, who are not usually highly motivated to 'convert' others to follow their chosen religious paths, many passionate *cadari* zealously engage in public piety by inviting other Muslim women to follow their *taat* pathways. However, the increased presence of face-veiled women in public does not fit with the western liberal concept of the distinction between public and private. Except for the Niqab Squad, *cadari* usually inhabit separate public spheres from their male counterparts. Even so, the contribution of *cadari* within their movements is not trivial. It is the backbone of the growth of these communities which is evident from their public and active piety.

Their active and public piety can also be seen in the way they express their *ketaatan* through the use of mainstream and alternative media, such as the internet, social media platforms and other modern forms of communication. They use diverse forms of media to further their religious agenda and build 'cultural capital.' Many young *cadari* with adequate digital literacy are active in performing not only on the front stage of their identities, to borrow Goffman's (1956) concept, but their backstage identities are also evident, from the growing presence of *cadari* YouTubers, as discussed in Chapter 3. The birth of *cadari* YouTubers and celebgrams engaging in their everyday version of *ketaatan* performance demonstrates their daily agentic capacity and at the same time deconstructs the orientalist image of face-veiled women. The presence of *cadari* YouTubers and celebgrams also signifies the various identities that are being communicated, ranging from their *ketaatan* identity to the everyday pleasure of showcasing their fashionable style of being modern independent *cadari.*

In Arab countries, the study of full-face veiling or the life of face-veiled women is part of the established body of studies on women, Islam and the women's liberation and Salafi movements (Kolman 2017; Tønnessen 2016). In the

western context, studies of face veiling are an aspect of the current appeal of global Islamic and Islamist movements to women who are longing to find the true Islam and how they negotiate between their chosen identity and a western lifestyle (Brems 2014; de Koning 2009; Inge 2016). In Indonesia, which has the biggest Muslim population in the world (with the characteristics of moderate Islam), this study has engaged with the current phenomenon of some Muslims striving to distance themselves from perceived 'impure' practices of Islam. It is noteworthy that *cadari* are not only seeking to be part of a true global Islam, but they also feel the need to transform other Muslims in the country to be part of their true Islam. Discussion of face veiling and face-veiled women, thus, needs to be understood within social, political, economic and cultural contexts.

This book has dealt with the life experiences of *cadari* residing within the areas of my fieldwork, so it is not possible to generalise about all *cadari* in Indonesia. However, the number of sites does allow for comparisons and hence some broad understanding of this growing phenomenon which goes beyond specific case studies. The question that remains is the future position of women within and outside these groups. The establishment of higher education institutions dedicated to female cadres as well as the growth of other businesses (fashion, housing complexes, hospitals, pharmacies, shops) are cases in point. Salafi groups have started to build housing around their educational institutions for followers and other Muslims who are longing to have a true Islamic environment for their families. Building Salafi or Tablīghī housing will assist the development of the movements and support the commitment of their cadres to embody a virtuous *taat* habitus in more conducive surroundings.

It is understandable that, at the time of writing, the zeal of female cadres is high because they are aware of their responsibility to expand their small communities. An important question is whether female cadres will be involved in the future in the same ways as today. This book is an important benchmark study on this emerging phenomenon which is significant for understanding Indonesian Islam, in particular the emerging subcultures and the lives of women within them. It is in the nature of this study that it will need to be built on in future research to develop an understanding of face veiling in other places in Indonesia, the future development of the role of women within these organisations and the wider social implications. There are questions for the future that I have not been able to address in this book. With the increasing numbers of young women interested in joining Salafi movements and being educated in Salafi-based higher education institutions, including Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab (LIPIA, Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic [the Saudi Arabian-funded university]) and MEDIU online (Al-Madinah International University), it remains to be seen whether Indonesia will witness an increasing presence of *cadari* speaking from a position of religious authority. The country has witnessed an expanding divergence of women's movements, and various social media platforms play an important role in polarising these women. Therefore, analysing the position of *cadari* with digital creativity who speak from a position of religious authority would be another interesting area for future investigation. Another direction for future

research would focus on covering richer ethnographies of women belonging to various Islamic and Islamist movements in Indonesia. This would contribute to broader discussions in the anthropology of Islam. Amid growing anthropological inquiries into Muslim women joining conservative movements in the Middle East and Europe, there is a dearth of anthropological studies on Muslim women belonging to conservative or even ultra-conservative movements in contemporary Indonesia.

The *cadar* and *cadari* amid discussions of women and Islamic morality

The *cadar*, for its wearers, is a statement about how they understand Islamic ethics and morality. This kind of understanding can be different from women belonging to other conservative and Islamist movements in Indonesia, including Jama'ah Tarbiyah and HTI. Although there is a small number of the *cadari* belonging to Islamist movements, like Jama'ah Tarbiyah and HTI, and even moderate Muslim groups, many passionate Salafi *cadari* often oppose other Islamist and Islamic movements. This can be seen from their opposition to the morality of PKS cadres that, according to the passionate *cadari,* have 'violated' the true understanding of Islam. Some passionate *cadari* have argued that initially women in Partai Keadilan (PK, Justice Party, PKS's name before its transformation into PKS in 2002) were strict: they wore thick and sombre *jilbab.* However, nowadays, many *cadari* see PKS women who are wearing shorter and thinner *jilbab* as being 'careless' in practising Islam. This view adds to long-standing debates between various Islamic and Islamist movements on gender, sexuality and Islamic morality in Indonesia. Each group or movement has claimed that they have more authority to speak for Indonesian Muslims. In addition, they have used the atmosphere conducive to democratisation in the post-authoritarian era to promote their agenda and claim that they are the only ones who can speak about the true Islam.

Indonesian feminists and women activists often discuss women's morality and women's membership of conservative Muslim groups in the context of their opposition to the agenda of conservative Muslims—who uphold a misogynist interpretation of Sharīʿa focusing especially on regulating women's bodies. Many are worried that this might undermine their struggle to prove that Islam is not a religion of oppression and discrimination towards women. It is then understandable if many of them see *cadari* as lacking agency. Indeed, some are reluctant to acknowledge that *cadari* have agency and choose to live and to enjoy embodying *taat* habitus. Some Indonesian Islamic and Muslim feminists struggle to appreciate the different phenomena which are prevalent in the Indonesian context and which, at a glance, may be counterproductive to their agenda of liberating women from strict literalist understandings of Islam. Some grapple with why *cadari* adopt strict patriarchal interpretations of Islam—teachings that Indonesian Islamic and Muslim feminists believe are oppressive.

The current trend and ongoing debates about *cadari* demonstrate the persistent widespread stereotypes that accompany their presence. Although their number

is growing, the Indonesian sociocultural conditions are not yet ready to warmly and fully welcome them. However, amid this ongoing rejection *cadari* feel that they have become stronger. In the 1980s, Indonesia witnessed strong mainstream resistance to the *jilbab,* which has increasingly disappeared through time. This indicates that there can be a gradual acceptance of change, even in relation to previously taboo matters. Although more positive acceptance of *cadari* and their *cadar* might take longer than acceptance of the *jilbab,* in the long run there is a possibility for change. In understanding the everyday life of *cadari,* we need to consider that they each have layers of motives. Therefore, the *taat* agency of the *cadari* has to be situated within historical, political and sociocultural contexts. Reading the agency of *cadari* should not only focus on their piety and resistance, but more importantly on their *active social intervention* through the processes of self-making that they experience. Through this book, I have analysed how the individual decisions around dress (*cadar*) can shape broader public discourse around Islam in Indonesia. The growth of tech-savvy *cadari* celebrates their *intervention* in the shaping, reshaping and expansion of Indonesian Muslim publics through digital technologies. Therefore, the attachment of *cadari* to varied conservative movements, their desires, pleasures and everyday life experiences should be understood in contextualised terms to avoid essentialising them as being powerless, oppressed and lacking agency.

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THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY

Face-veiled Women in Contemporary Indonesia

Face veiling is relatively new in Indonesia. It is often stereotyped as a sign of extremism and the growing Arabisation of Indonesian Muslims. It is also perceived as a symbol that demonstrates a lack of female agency. However, increasing numbers of women are choosing to wear the *cadar* (the full face veil). This book provides an ethnographic study of these women: why they choose to wear the *cadar*, embody strict religious disciplinary practices and the consequences of that choice. The women in this book belong to two Islamic revivalist movements: various Salafi groups and the Tablīghī Jamāʿat. Indonesia has constantly witnessed transformations in the meanings and practices of Islam, and this book demonstrates that women are key actors in this process. Nisa demonstrates that contrary to stereotypes, the women in this study have an agency which is expressed through their chosen docility and obedience.

Eva F. Nisa is a Senior Lecturer in Anthropology in the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. She currently holds an Australian Research Council Discovery Early Career Researcher Award.

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